Malt Beverages Distributors Assn. v. Liquor Control Board - Cmwlth. Court- Feb. 23, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/896CD06_2-23-07.pdf
While courts traditionally accord the interpretation of the agency charged with administation of a statute some deference, the meaning of a statute is essentially a question of law for the court. Generally an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute for which it has enforcement responsibility is entitled to substantial deference. However, where an administative interpretation is inconsistent with the statute itself, or where the statutes's meaning is unambiguous, such an interpretation carries little or no weight.
Monday, March 26, 2007
admin. law - agency interpretation of its own regulations
Tire Jockey Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Protection - Pa. S.Ct. - February 20, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-30-2005mo.pdf
There is a two-step analysis when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its governing regulations: (1) whether the interpretation is erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations, and 2) whether the regulation is consistent with the statute under which it was promulgated.
When an agency adopts a regulation pursuant to it own legislative rule-making power, as opposed to its interpretive rule-making power, it is valid and binding on courts as a statute, so long as it is a) adopted within the agency's granted power, b) issued pursuant to proper procedure, and c) reasonable.
When a court reviews a regulation issued pursuant to an agency's legislative rule-making power, the court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency to demonstrate that the agency has exceeded its administrative authority. It is not enough that the prescribed system may appear to be unwise or burdensome of inferior to another. Lack of wisdom in exercising agency power is not equivalent to abuse. What has been ordered must appear to be so entirely at odds with fundamental principles as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment.
Regarding the reasonableness prong, appellate courts accord deference to agencies and reverse agency determinations only if they were made in bad faith or they constituted a manifest or flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or functions.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-30-2005mo.pdf
There is a two-step analysis when reviewing an agency's interpretation of its governing regulations: (1) whether the interpretation is erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations, and 2) whether the regulation is consistent with the statute under which it was promulgated.
When an agency adopts a regulation pursuant to it own legislative rule-making power, as opposed to its interpretive rule-making power, it is valid and binding on courts as a statute, so long as it is a) adopted within the agency's granted power, b) issued pursuant to proper procedure, and c) reasonable.
When a court reviews a regulation issued pursuant to an agency's legislative rule-making power, the court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency to demonstrate that the agency has exceeded its administrative authority. It is not enough that the prescribed system may appear to be unwise or burdensome of inferior to another. Lack of wisdom in exercising agency power is not equivalent to abuse. What has been ordered must appear to be so entirely at odds with fundamental principles as to be the expression of a whim rather than an exercise of judgment.
Regarding the reasonableness prong, appellate courts accord deference to agencies and reverse agency determinations only if they were made in bad faith or they constituted a manifest or flagrant abuse of discretion or a purely arbitrary execution of the agency's duties or functions.
Thursday, March 01, 2007
UC - willful misconduct - corrections officer
Department of Corrections v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - February 28, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1205CD06_2-28-07.pdf
A corrections officer who heard rumors of a planned attack on an inmate was guilty of willful misconduct for not reporting the rumors and not intervening when he heard the inmate being beaten. The officer's fear of reprisals and fear for his own safety did not constitute good cause for his actions.
The Court said that its conscience was shocked by the Board's conclusion "that a corrections officer who refuses to report a threat of violence against an inmate and refuses to render aid to an inmate being beaten could use fear for his own personal safety as good cause justification for his refusal to render aid....We can do nothing but express our outrage" that the DOC's Office of Professional Responsibility was aware of and condoned claimant's conduct and that of others in his situation.
Citing its decision in Williams v. UCBR, 648 A.2d 1321 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), the court noted its prior holdings that a "corrections officer, like law enforcement officials, occupy positions of great responsibility and trust, and thus, must adhere to demanding standards, which are higher than those applied to many other professions."
As noted in a concurring opinion, this statement is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Navickas v. UCBR, 778 A.2d 284, 290-1 (Pa. 2001), where the court rejected a higher standard of care for a health care worker, stating that that is a "question...of policy...not posed by the Unemployment Compensation Law we are called upon to construe. The Act sets for a single governing standard of willful misconduct, one that does not draw distinctions based upon the type or nature of the employee involved."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1205CD06_2-28-07.pdf
A corrections officer who heard rumors of a planned attack on an inmate was guilty of willful misconduct for not reporting the rumors and not intervening when he heard the inmate being beaten. The officer's fear of reprisals and fear for his own safety did not constitute good cause for his actions.
The Court said that its conscience was shocked by the Board's conclusion "that a corrections officer who refuses to report a threat of violence against an inmate and refuses to render aid to an inmate being beaten could use fear for his own personal safety as good cause justification for his refusal to render aid....We can do nothing but express our outrage" that the DOC's Office of Professional Responsibility was aware of and condoned claimant's conduct and that of others in his situation.
Citing its decision in Williams v. UCBR, 648 A.2d 1321 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), the court noted its prior holdings that a "corrections officer, like law enforcement officials, occupy positions of great responsibility and trust, and thus, must adhere to demanding standards, which are higher than those applied to many other professions."
As noted in a concurring opinion, this statement is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Navickas v. UCBR, 778 A.2d 284, 290-1 (Pa. 2001), where the court rejected a higher standard of care for a health care worker, stating that that is a "question...of policy...not posed by the Unemployment Compensation Law we are called upon to construe. The Act sets for a single governing standard of willful misconduct, one that does not draw distinctions based upon the type or nature of the employee involved."
Friday, February 23, 2007
Pennsylvania Bulletin of February 24, 2007
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-8/index.html
court rules - exemption of certain funds (social security, et al.) from execution
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-8/304.html
court rules - PFA forms - Rule 1905 - effective May 7, 2007
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-8/303.html
court rules - exemption of certain funds (social security, et al.) from execution
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-8/304.html
court rules - PFA forms - Rule 1905 - effective May 7, 2007
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-8/303.html
Monday, February 12, 2007
child abuse - expungement - hearsay - finding that child is "unavailable"
C.E. v. Dept. of Public Welfare - Commonwealth Court - February 12, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/232CD06_2-12-07.pdf
Hearsay statements of child victim were not admissible, absent findings by the ALJ that the hearsay satisfied the requirements of the statute, 42 Pa. C.S. 5986. See, A.Y. v. DPW, 641 A.2d 1148, 1153 (Pa. 1994) and In the Interest of Tina K., 568 A.2d 210 (Pa. Super. 1989).
In particular, the ALJ never made a finding that the child was "unavailable" to testify, that is, "whether testifying would cause her emotional distress to the extent that her ability to communicate would be substantially impaired." The lack of such a finding is not a "mere failure by the ALJ to use the 'magic words' in 42 Pa. C.S. 5986. It is a clear requirement of the statute. Moreover, the evidence in this case included statements by the child that she was not afraid of the Petitioner, that she felt good and was not afraid to be at the hearing.
Although the Commonwealth Court did not mention it, the Superior Court reached a similar result in construing a related statute, 42 Pa. C.S. 5986.1, in Cmwlth. v. Kriner, January 2, 2007 - http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/e03003_06.pdf , where it held that the hearsay statement of a child victim/witness under 12 years of age is admissible under 42 Pa. C.S. 5985.1 to prove certain criminal offenses if, inter alia, the child is "'unavailable" as a witness. The statute defines "unavailable" as "serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child's ability to communicate." This definition is exclusive. There is "no other manner, method, procedure or definition of what constitutes unavailability." Thus, the death of a child witness does not come within this statutory definition of unavailability.
There was also an issue of witness competency. Although it was not considered in deciding the case, the court set out (in n. 8) the criteria for deciding whether a child in a competent witness, citing Commonwealth v. McMaster, 666 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. Super. 1995).
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/232CD06_2-12-07.pdf
Hearsay statements of child victim were not admissible, absent findings by the ALJ that the hearsay satisfied the requirements of the statute, 42 Pa. C.S. 5986. See, A.Y. v. DPW, 641 A.2d 1148, 1153 (Pa. 1994) and In the Interest of Tina K., 568 A.2d 210 (Pa. Super. 1989).
In particular, the ALJ never made a finding that the child was "unavailable" to testify, that is, "whether testifying would cause her emotional distress to the extent that her ability to communicate would be substantially impaired." The lack of such a finding is not a "mere failure by the ALJ to use the 'magic words' in 42 Pa. C.S. 5986. It is a clear requirement of the statute. Moreover, the evidence in this case included statements by the child that she was not afraid of the Petitioner, that she felt good and was not afraid to be at the hearing.
Although the Commonwealth Court did not mention it, the Superior Court reached a similar result in construing a related statute, 42 Pa. C.S. 5986.1, in Cmwlth. v. Kriner, January 2, 2007 - http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/e03003_06.pdf , where it held that the hearsay statement of a child victim/witness under 12 years of age is admissible under 42 Pa. C.S. 5985.1 to prove certain criminal offenses if, inter alia, the child is "'unavailable" as a witness. The statute defines "unavailable" as "serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child's ability to communicate." This definition is exclusive. There is "no other manner, method, procedure or definition of what constitutes unavailability." Thus, the death of a child witness does not come within this statutory definition of unavailability.
There was also an issue of witness competency. Although it was not considered in deciding the case, the court set out (in n. 8) the criteria for deciding whether a child in a competent witness, citing Commonwealth v. McMaster, 666 A.2d 724, 727 (Pa. Super. 1995).
Monday, February 05, 2007
parol evidence rule
Ragnar Benson, Inc. v. Hempfield Township Munic. Authority - Superior Court - Jan. 30, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s65001_06.pdf
If a written contract is unambiguous and purports to be the entire agreement of the parties, and there is no claim of fraud or mistake, then oral testimony and prior written agreements or other writings are not admissible to explain or vary the terms of the contract. This is what is referred to as the parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425 (Pa. 2004) for a "comprehensive review" of the rule.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s65001_06.pdf
If a written contract is unambiguous and purports to be the entire agreement of the parties, and there is no claim of fraud or mistake, then oral testimony and prior written agreements or other writings are not admissible to explain or vary the terms of the contract. This is what is referred to as the parol evidence rule. See, e.g., Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425 (Pa. 2004) for a "comprehensive review" of the rule.
Friday, February 02, 2007
false imprisonment
In the Interest of M.G. - Superior Court - January 30, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a36004_06.pdf
The court upheld the delinquency adjudiction of a juvenile accused of false imprisonment, where he followed his cousin into her bedroom, shut and locked the door, and stood between her and the door during an incident which lasted "at most, two minutes."
"In determining the magnitude of the restraint necessary for false imprisonment, this Court has recognized that false imprisonment covers restraints which are less serious than those necessary for the offenses of kidnapping [18 Pa. C.S. 2901(a)] and unlawful restraint [18 Pa. C.S. 2902(a)].
"In determining whether the restraint at issue interfered with [the victim's] liberty 'substantially,' we give the word 'substantially' its plain meaning....Thus, we determine the Legislature intended false imprisonment to cover restraints where an individual's liberty is interfered with in an ample or considerable manner."
It did not matter that the restraint took place in the victim's own bedroom. "Whether in her own home or elsewhere, Appellant restrained [the victim] and kept her in an area where she did not wish to remain. Removing [a victim] from her home or luring her to an unfamiliar place are simply not elements required for false imprisonment."
"Making threats, intimidating and/or using physical force are not stated elements of false imprisonment, although they may be the tool used by an offender in 'restraining another unlawfully.'"
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a36004_06.pdf
The court upheld the delinquency adjudiction of a juvenile accused of false imprisonment, where he followed his cousin into her bedroom, shut and locked the door, and stood between her and the door during an incident which lasted "at most, two minutes."
"In determining the magnitude of the restraint necessary for false imprisonment, this Court has recognized that false imprisonment covers restraints which are less serious than those necessary for the offenses of kidnapping [18 Pa. C.S. 2901(a)] and unlawful restraint [18 Pa. C.S. 2902(a)].
"In determining whether the restraint at issue interfered with [the victim's] liberty 'substantially,' we give the word 'substantially' its plain meaning....Thus, we determine the Legislature intended false imprisonment to cover restraints where an individual's liberty is interfered with in an ample or considerable manner."
It did not matter that the restraint took place in the victim's own bedroom. "Whether in her own home or elsewhere, Appellant restrained [the victim] and kept her in an area where she did not wish to remain. Removing [a victim] from her home or luring her to an unfamiliar place are simply not elements required for false imprisonment."
"Making threats, intimidating and/or using physical force are not stated elements of false imprisonment, although they may be the tool used by an offender in 'restraining another unlawfully.'"
custody - paternity - standing - presumption
E.W. v. T.S. and C.S - Superior Court - January 31, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a37030_06.pdf
A man who claimed to be the father of a child did not have standing to seek a declaration of his paternity or ask for custody of a 3 year old child, as against mother (T.S.) and her husband (C.S.), where
- mother and husband were married before conception, at time of conception and birth, etc.
- mother and husband never separated, filed for divorce, etc., and want to maintain their marriage
- husband was named as father on birth certificate
- husband has always assumed paternity and treated child as his own
"The presumption that a child born during the marriage is a child of the husband is always the starting point in a contest involving the parentage of a child born during coverture. Moreover, the strength of the presumption...is a child of the marriage is grounded in the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the family unit. Although the presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of husband's non-access, impotency, or sterility, the presumption is irrebuttable where mother, child, and husband live together as an intact family and husband assumed parental responsibility for the child."
Justice Newman's opinion that there is a conflict between these principles and the Uniform Act on Blood Tests has never commanded a majority of the Court. See, Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1056 n. 2 (Pa. 1999)
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a37030_06.pdf
A man who claimed to be the father of a child did not have standing to seek a declaration of his paternity or ask for custody of a 3 year old child, as against mother (T.S.) and her husband (C.S.), where
- mother and husband were married before conception, at time of conception and birth, etc.
- mother and husband never separated, filed for divorce, etc., and want to maintain their marriage
- husband was named as father on birth certificate
- husband has always assumed paternity and treated child as his own
"The presumption that a child born during the marriage is a child of the husband is always the starting point in a contest involving the parentage of a child born during coverture. Moreover, the strength of the presumption...is a child of the marriage is grounded in the Commonwealth's interest in protecting the family unit. Although the presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of husband's non-access, impotency, or sterility, the presumption is irrebuttable where mother, child, and husband live together as an intact family and husband assumed parental responsibility for the child."
Justice Newman's opinion that there is a conflict between these principles and the Uniform Act on Blood Tests has never commanded a majority of the Court. See, Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1056 n. 2 (Pa. 1999)
Pennsylvania Bulletin of February 3, 2007
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/index.html
courts - juvenile records - proposed amendments - public availability -
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/157.html
court rules - support - amendments
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/155.html
governor - regulatory agenda -
"The agendas are compiled to provide members of the regulated community advanced notice of regulatory activity. It is the intention of the Administration that these agendas will serve to increase public participation in the regulatory process."
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/186.html
courts - juvenile records - proposed amendments - public availability -
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/157.html
court rules - support - amendments
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/155.html
governor - regulatory agenda -
"The agendas are compiled to provide members of the regulated community advanced notice of regulatory activity. It is the intention of the Administration that these agendas will serve to increase public participation in the regulatory process."
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-5/186.html
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
UC- employee v. independent contractor
Beacon Flag Car Co. v. UCBR - 910 A.2d 103 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/928CD06_10-31-06.pdf
Claimant held to be a self-employed independent contractor rather than an employee and thus not eligible for UC benefits.
The Claimant -- who did not appear at or participate in the referee hearing -- provided flag car services to clients of Beacon Flag Co. (BFC) under an "independent contractor agreement." A flag car (aka pilot or escort car) accompanies oversized loads on trips. Drivers such as claimant are free to accept or decline any offered trip from BFC and are encouraged to promote their own business. Some drivers have their own vehicles; some rent them from the a business owned by the ER's husband. The drivers get no training. They are given 1099 income tax forms rather than W-2 forms.
The UCBR determined that claimant and others were under BFC's direction or control. The court reversed, based on the decision in Viktor, Ltd. v. Dept. of Labor and Industry, 892 A.2d 781 (Pa. 2006), which decision "was ignored by both the referee and UCBR."
The courts refer to sec. 4(el)(2)(B) of the UC Law, 43 P.S. sec. 753 (el)(2)(B) in these cases. That provision "presumes that an individual is an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, but this presumption may be overcome if the putative employer sustains its burden of showing that the claimant was free from the control and direction in the performance of his service and that, as to such service, was customarily engaged in an independent trade or business....Unless both of these showings are made, the presumption stands that one who performs services for wages is an employee."
"The first element -- the issue of control -- is based upon a showing of control, not only with regard to the work to be done, but also with regard to the manner of performing it."
"As to the second element -- whether Claimant conducts his driving services as an 'independently established' business -- the courts have identified two factors as important in making this evaluation: (1) whether the individual was capable of performing the activities in question for anyone who wished to avail themselves of the services; and (2) whether the nature of the business compelled the individual to look to only a single employer for the continuation of such services."
The existence of a non-complete clause in the Indpt. Contractor Agreement is not dispositive. The "mere existence" of such a clause does not render the party agreeing to it an employee of the other party. Electrolux Corp. v. Bureau of Tax Operations, 705 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Cmwlth), appeal discontinued, 724 A.2d 936 (Pa. 1998). All factors must be considered. The "unique facts of each cases must be examined in order to resolve the question of employee versus independent contractor status."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/928CD06_10-31-06.pdf
Claimant held to be a self-employed independent contractor rather than an employee and thus not eligible for UC benefits.
The Claimant -- who did not appear at or participate in the referee hearing -- provided flag car services to clients of Beacon Flag Co. (BFC) under an "independent contractor agreement." A flag car (aka pilot or escort car) accompanies oversized loads on trips. Drivers such as claimant are free to accept or decline any offered trip from BFC and are encouraged to promote their own business. Some drivers have their own vehicles; some rent them from the a business owned by the ER's husband. The drivers get no training. They are given 1099 income tax forms rather than W-2 forms.
The UCBR determined that claimant and others were under BFC's direction or control. The court reversed, based on the decision in Viktor, Ltd. v. Dept. of Labor and Industry, 892 A.2d 781 (Pa. 2006), which decision "was ignored by both the referee and UCBR."
The courts refer to sec. 4(el)(2)(B) of the UC Law, 43 P.S. sec. 753 (el)(2)(B) in these cases. That provision "presumes that an individual is an employee, as opposed to an independent contractor, but this presumption may be overcome if the putative employer sustains its burden of showing that the claimant was free from the control and direction in the performance of his service and that, as to such service, was customarily engaged in an independent trade or business....Unless both of these showings are made, the presumption stands that one who performs services for wages is an employee."
"The first element -- the issue of control -- is based upon a showing of control, not only with regard to the work to be done, but also with regard to the manner of performing it."
"As to the second element -- whether Claimant conducts his driving services as an 'independently established' business -- the courts have identified two factors as important in making this evaluation: (1) whether the individual was capable of performing the activities in question for anyone who wished to avail themselves of the services; and (2) whether the nature of the business compelled the individual to look to only a single employer for the continuation of such services."
The existence of a non-complete clause in the Indpt. Contractor Agreement is not dispositive. The "mere existence" of such a clause does not render the party agreeing to it an employee of the other party. Electrolux Corp. v. Bureau of Tax Operations, 705 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Cmwlth), appeal discontinued, 724 A.2d 936 (Pa. 1998). All factors must be considered. The "unique facts of each cases must be examined in order to resolve the question of employee versus independent contractor status."
Wednesday, January 24, 2007
disability - grid - non-exertional impairment
Poulos v. Commissioner of Social Security - 3rd Circuit - January 24, 2007
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054637p.pdf
The ALJ determined that the claimant had both exertional and non-exertional limitations and "subsequently concluded, without reference to any vocational evidence, that a) Appellant's exertional and nonexertional limitations did not 'significantly compromise' the sedentary occupational base" and, thus, that b) the medical-vocational guidelines--the Grid--could be applied to deny appellant's claim.
The court held that the ALJ erred in doing this and that his "reliance on the Guidelines in the presence of Appellant's nonexertional limitations constitutes reversible error under Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000), where the court rejected the same argument that SSA made here -- that the guidelines can be relied on even in the presence of a nonexertional limitation, "so long as the limitation does not significantly diminish the range of work that could otherwise be exertionally possible."
The court "squarely rejected this argument in Sykes" and did so here as well. Absent a rulemaking establishing the fact of an undiminished occupational base, SSA cannot determine that a nonexertional impairment does not significantly erode a claimant's occupational basis unless SSA either a) takes additional evidence establishing as much, or b) provides notice to the claimant of its intent to take official notice of this fact and provides the claimant an opportunity to counter the conclusion.
The court remanded the case because the record had not been fully developed and reminded the ALJ of his duty to do so.
The court also reminded the ALJ "that under the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999), he is not entitled to consider potential accommodations by employers in determining the availability of jobs in the national economy that Appellant can perform."
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054637p.pdf
The ALJ determined that the claimant had both exertional and non-exertional limitations and "subsequently concluded, without reference to any vocational evidence, that a) Appellant's exertional and nonexertional limitations did not 'significantly compromise' the sedentary occupational base" and, thus, that b) the medical-vocational guidelines--the Grid--could be applied to deny appellant's claim.
The court held that the ALJ erred in doing this and that his "reliance on the Guidelines in the presence of Appellant's nonexertional limitations constitutes reversible error under Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2000), where the court rejected the same argument that SSA made here -- that the guidelines can be relied on even in the presence of a nonexertional limitation, "so long as the limitation does not significantly diminish the range of work that could otherwise be exertionally possible."
The court "squarely rejected this argument in Sykes" and did so here as well. Absent a rulemaking establishing the fact of an undiminished occupational base, SSA cannot determine that a nonexertional impairment does not significantly erode a claimant's occupational basis unless SSA either a) takes additional evidence establishing as much, or b) provides notice to the claimant of its intent to take official notice of this fact and provides the claimant an opportunity to counter the conclusion.
The court remanded the case because the record had not been fully developed and reminded the ALJ of his duty to do so.
The court also reminded the ALJ "that under the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803 (1999), he is not entitled to consider potential accommodations by employers in determining the availability of jobs in the national economy that Appellant can perform."
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
employment - nurses - licenses - suspension - violation of VRP agreement
Wittorf v. Board of Nursing - Cmwlth. Court - October 12, 2006 (publication ordered 01-10-07)
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/338CD06_1-10-07.pdf
The Court upheld the decision of the State Board of Nursing to suspend the license of a nurse who had violated a consent agreement which he entered under the Voluntary Rehabilitation Program (VRP), 63 P.S. sec. 224.1(c).
The nurse entered the VRP agreement after he had been charged with DUI, a 2nd degree misdemeanor. The criminal case was resolved without a finding of guilt, when Wittorf successfully completed an ARD program, after which his criminal record was expunged.
The Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs then took action concerning his nursing license. It offered him a chance to enter the VRP in lieu of disciplinary charges being brought against him. In the VRP agreement, Wittorf stipulated that a) he was unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety, due to his abuse of and dependency on alcohol. and b) that he had suffered from alcohol abuse or dependency for two years. Under the VRP agreement, Wittorf's license was suspended, but the suspension was stayed in favor of probation, conditioned on, inter alia, his complete abstention from the use of alcohol and his documented regular attendance and active participation in a support program.
The Bureau petitioned to suspend Wittorf's license when he later violated the VRP agreement by testing positive for alcohol several times and failing to submit support group attendance records after being requested to do so. At a hearing, Wittorf did not dispute violating the VRP agreement. Instead he argued that the Board had no authority to force him to enter into a VRP agreement, because he had only been charged with a misdemeanor, and the statute, 63 P.S. sec. 224(a)(5), only authorized suspension if the offense was a felony.
The Court held that Wittorf's argument ignored the Board's independent authority under 63 P.S. sec. 224(a)(2), 224(b)(4) and 224.1(c) to a) suspend or revoke a nurses license or, in the alternative, or to b) require a VRP program, when a nurse us "unable to practice....with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of....dependence upon alcohol...."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/338CD06_1-10-07.pdf
The Court upheld the decision of the State Board of Nursing to suspend the license of a nurse who had violated a consent agreement which he entered under the Voluntary Rehabilitation Program (VRP), 63 P.S. sec. 224.1(c).
The nurse entered the VRP agreement after he had been charged with DUI, a 2nd degree misdemeanor. The criminal case was resolved without a finding of guilt, when Wittorf successfully completed an ARD program, after which his criminal record was expunged.
The Bureau of Professional & Occupational Affairs then took action concerning his nursing license. It offered him a chance to enter the VRP in lieu of disciplinary charges being brought against him. In the VRP agreement, Wittorf stipulated that a) he was unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety, due to his abuse of and dependency on alcohol. and b) that he had suffered from alcohol abuse or dependency for two years. Under the VRP agreement, Wittorf's license was suspended, but the suspension was stayed in favor of probation, conditioned on, inter alia, his complete abstention from the use of alcohol and his documented regular attendance and active participation in a support program.
The Bureau petitioned to suspend Wittorf's license when he later violated the VRP agreement by testing positive for alcohol several times and failing to submit support group attendance records after being requested to do so. At a hearing, Wittorf did not dispute violating the VRP agreement. Instead he argued that the Board had no authority to force him to enter into a VRP agreement, because he had only been charged with a misdemeanor, and the statute, 63 P.S. sec. 224(a)(5), only authorized suspension if the offense was a felony.
The Court held that Wittorf's argument ignored the Board's independent authority under 63 P.S. sec. 224(a)(2), 224(b)(4) and 224.1(c) to a) suspend or revoke a nurses license or, in the alternative, or to b) require a VRP program, when a nurse us "unable to practice....with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of....dependence upon alcohol...."
welfare - NMP-MA - ongoing v. monthly program
Brobst v. DPW - Commonwealth Court 09-26-06, publication ordered 01-10-07
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/121CD06_1-10-07.pdf
The court upheld DPW's decision that the appellant was eligible for the monthly NMP-MA spend-down program but not the ongoing NMP-MA spend-down program, because a) her monthly expenses exceeded the specified income limits and b) her medical expenses were covered under the NMP-MA program, and so could not be deducted from her income.
The ongoing program allows a recipient to "received uninterrupted medical coverage for the full month. 55 Pa.Code sec. 181.13." The monthly program applies where income, after appropriate deductions, is still above the specified income limits, requiring the individual to "spend a certain amount on expenses every month before medical assistance can be available to cover the remaining expenses for the month, 55 Pa. Code sec. 181.13....[M]edical expenses covered by NMP-MA may not be deducted from monthly income....only expenses not covered by NMP-MA....."
The court held that the DPW program under 55 Pa. Code 181.13 was a valid application of the "flexible income test" required under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 USC sec. 1396 et seq.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/121CD06_1-10-07.pdf
The court upheld DPW's decision that the appellant was eligible for the monthly NMP-MA spend-down program but not the ongoing NMP-MA spend-down program, because a) her monthly expenses exceeded the specified income limits and b) her medical expenses were covered under the NMP-MA program, and so could not be deducted from her income.
The ongoing program allows a recipient to "received uninterrupted medical coverage for the full month. 55 Pa.Code sec. 181.13." The monthly program applies where income, after appropriate deductions, is still above the specified income limits, requiring the individual to "spend a certain amount on expenses every month before medical assistance can be available to cover the remaining expenses for the month, 55 Pa. Code sec. 181.13....[M]edical expenses covered by NMP-MA may not be deducted from monthly income....only expenses not covered by NMP-MA....."
The court held that the DPW program under 55 Pa. Code 181.13 was a valid application of the "flexible income test" required under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 USC sec. 1396 et seq.
appeals - interlocutory appeal - collateral order - discovery
Feldman v. Ide - Superior Court - January 9, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a33037_06.pdf
For an order to be deemed collateral and subject to interlocutory review
- The order must be separate and distinct from the main cause of action
- The right involved must be too important for review to be denied, i.e., the right is deeply rooted in public policy such that it goes beyond the controversy at hand, such as privacy.
- The question presented must be such that if review is postponed until judgment, the claim will be irreparably lost.
In a discovery controversy, there must be no effective means of review if the order were to be carried out. An order directing a doctor hired by the insurer of a tort plaintiff to produce documents about his income in worker's comp. and personal injury cases was held to be collateral and thus subject to interlocutory. However, the discovery order was upheld pursuant to the decision in Cooper v. Shoffstall, 905 A.2d, 482 (Pa. 2006).
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a33037_06.pdf
For an order to be deemed collateral and subject to interlocutory review
- The order must be separate and distinct from the main cause of action
- The right involved must be too important for review to be denied, i.e., the right is deeply rooted in public policy such that it goes beyond the controversy at hand, such as privacy.
- The question presented must be such that if review is postponed until judgment, the claim will be irreparably lost.
In a discovery controversy, there must be no effective means of review if the order were to be carried out. An order directing a doctor hired by the insurer of a tort plaintiff to produce documents about his income in worker's comp. and personal injury cases was held to be collateral and thus subject to interlocutory. However, the discovery order was upheld pursuant to the decision in Cooper v. Shoffstall, 905 A.2d, 482 (Pa. 2006).
Friday, January 12, 2007
Pennsylvania Bulletin of January 13, 2007
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/index.html
banking - right-to-know request policy
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/44.html
UC- table -rate and amount of benefits
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/53.html
agriculture - wine marketing and research program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/42.html
banking - right-to-know request policy
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/44.html
UC- table -rate and amount of benefits
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/53.html
agriculture - wine marketing and research program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol37/37-2/42.html
Tuesday, January 09, 2007
admin. law - appeal - timeliness - designation of mailing date
Julia Ribaudo Senior Services v. DPW - Commonwealth Court - January 4, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/351CD06_1-4-07.pdf
Where an appeal must be filed within a specified time from the mailing date of a decision, the decision must contain a clearly specified mailing date. There is "no substitute for denominating the date of mailing so as to constitute the starting date for the appeal period. . . . A disembodied date on the notice. . .without any indication that it is the mailing date, is not sufficiently informative."
A date on a letter or a "date final administrative action," without more, are not sufficient. Likewise, testimony on department practice about mailing its decisions is "no substitute for a clearly designated mailing date," without which a notice does "not serve to begin the appeal period."
The following cases were cited in support of the decision: Sheets v. DPW, 479 A.2d 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); Schmidt v. Commonwealth, 433 A.2d 4546, 458 (Pa. 1981); Mihordin v. UCBR, 471 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1984); Nyhart v. Dept. of Corrections, 721 A.2d 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/351CD06_1-4-07.pdf
Where an appeal must be filed within a specified time from the mailing date of a decision, the decision must contain a clearly specified mailing date. There is "no substitute for denominating the date of mailing so as to constitute the starting date for the appeal period. . . . A disembodied date on the notice. . .without any indication that it is the mailing date, is not sufficiently informative."
A date on a letter or a "date final administrative action," without more, are not sufficient. Likewise, testimony on department practice about mailing its decisions is "no substitute for a clearly designated mailing date," without which a notice does "not serve to begin the appeal period."
The following cases were cited in support of the decision: Sheets v. DPW, 479 A.2d 80 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984); Schmidt v. Commonwealth, 433 A.2d 4546, 458 (Pa. 1981); Mihordin v. UCBR, 471 A.2d 1334, 1336 (1984); Nyhart v. Dept. of Corrections, 721 A.2d 391 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).
PFA - right to plenary 10-day hearing
Lanza v. Simconis - Superior Court - December 19, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a29001_06.pdf
Plaintiff/appellant filed a pro se PFA and trial court conducted a hearing under 23 Pa. C.S. 6107(b), at which defendant unexpectedly appeared and denied the allegations of abuse. The trial court denied the temporary order, stating that it was unable to determine credibility. The trial court did not set or conduct a final 10-day hearing on the merits under 23 Pa. C.S 6107(a).
The appellate court held that it was error not to hold a plenary final hearing within 10 days. Such a hearing is required by the statute, 23 Pa. C.S. 6107(a) ("a hearing shall be held") and by a PFA plaintiff's due process right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, including the right to have counsel, to cross-examine defendant, and to present other witnesses and evidence.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a29001_06.pdf
Plaintiff/appellant filed a pro se PFA and trial court conducted a hearing under 23 Pa. C.S. 6107(b), at which defendant unexpectedly appeared and denied the allegations of abuse. The trial court denied the temporary order, stating that it was unable to determine credibility. The trial court did not set or conduct a final 10-day hearing on the merits under 23 Pa. C.S 6107(a).
The appellate court held that it was error not to hold a plenary final hearing within 10 days. Such a hearing is required by the statute, 23 Pa. C.S. 6107(a) ("a hearing shall be held") and by a PFA plaintiff's due process right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, including the right to have counsel, to cross-examine defendant, and to present other witnesses and evidence.
driver's license - suspension - delay
Orloff v. PennDOT - Commonwealth Court - December 18, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/136CD06_12-18-06.pdf
In a 4-3 decision, the court held that a) there was an "unreasonable delay chargeable to PennDOT [which] led the licensee to believe that his operating privilege would not be impaired; and b) "prejudice would result by having his operating privilege suspended after such delay."
The case had been decided in the licensee's favor by the trial court, which had held that DOT had not properly proven its case by use of copies of electronic transmissions from another state, which had reported a DUI conviction to Pennsylvania. DOT appealed and the Commonwealth Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of several legal issues. The trial judge died and the case languished there for about 5 years until DOT sent the court a letter asking that the case be be listed for hearing, at which time the licensee raised the issue of delay.
DOT's contention that this was judicial delay for which it was not responsible was rejected. The court said that the "General Assembly placed in PennDOT the responsibility to prosecute licenses suspension cases....[and the] responsibility for moving a case forward under circumstances where it is reasonable for it to be expected to do so," in which event "the delay is attributable to PennDOT....PennDOT was responsible for taking the appropriate action to have the case heard and, absent such action to carry out its responsibility to prosecute the appeal, PennDOT is chargeable with the delay."
The court also held that the licensee had established prejudice from the unreasonable delay in that he was "able to demonstrate that he changed his circumstances to his detriment in reliance on his belief that his operating privileges would not be impaired....[T]he loss of a job or required closing of a business requiring a driver's license constitutes prejudice.....Also prejudice is established when a licensee has changed jobs to a position that requires driving as part of the new job's duties....[or] by showing the an owner changed his job duties so that a license is necessary for the financial well-being of his company."
The dissent argued that the delay was caused by the lower court and should not be attributable to PennDOT, and that the court had created an "unworkable standard for future cases where a licenses suspension is remanded to this Court or to a court of common pleas solely for reconsideration of a legal issue."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/136CD06_12-18-06.pdf
In a 4-3 decision, the court held that a) there was an "unreasonable delay chargeable to PennDOT [which] led the licensee to believe that his operating privilege would not be impaired; and b) "prejudice would result by having his operating privilege suspended after such delay."
The case had been decided in the licensee's favor by the trial court, which had held that DOT had not properly proven its case by use of copies of electronic transmissions from another state, which had reported a DUI conviction to Pennsylvania. DOT appealed and the Commonwealth Court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court for consideration of several legal issues. The trial judge died and the case languished there for about 5 years until DOT sent the court a letter asking that the case be be listed for hearing, at which time the licensee raised the issue of delay.
DOT's contention that this was judicial delay for which it was not responsible was rejected. The court said that the "General Assembly placed in PennDOT the responsibility to prosecute licenses suspension cases....[and the] responsibility for moving a case forward under circumstances where it is reasonable for it to be expected to do so," in which event "the delay is attributable to PennDOT....PennDOT was responsible for taking the appropriate action to have the case heard and, absent such action to carry out its responsibility to prosecute the appeal, PennDOT is chargeable with the delay."
The court also held that the licensee had established prejudice from the unreasonable delay in that he was "able to demonstrate that he changed his circumstances to his detriment in reliance on his belief that his operating privileges would not be impaired....[T]he loss of a job or required closing of a business requiring a driver's license constitutes prejudice.....Also prejudice is established when a licensee has changed jobs to a position that requires driving as part of the new job's duties....[or] by showing the an owner changed his job duties so that a license is necessary for the financial well-being of his company."
The dissent argued that the delay was caused by the lower court and should not be attributable to PennDOT, and that the court had created an "unworkable standard for future cases where a licenses suspension is remanded to this Court or to a court of common pleas solely for reconsideration of a legal issue."
UC - vol. quit - racial/ethnic harassment, profanity
The Western & Southern Life Insurance Company - Commomwealth Court - Decembr 18, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1347CD06_12-18-06.pdf
Held, that the UCBR's findings that a) the claimant was subject to racial and ethnic slurs, profanity, and physical threats, and that b) claimant acted with common sense and did all he reasonably could to preserve his job before quitting were supported by substantial evidence, and that the Board did not commit any error in applying the relevant law.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1347CD06_12-18-06.pdf
Held, that the UCBR's findings that a) the claimant was subject to racial and ethnic slurs, profanity, and physical threats, and that b) claimant acted with common sense and did all he reasonably could to preserve his job before quitting were supported by substantial evidence, and that the Board did not commit any error in applying the relevant law.
Pennsylvania Bulletin of December 23, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/index.html
court rules - proposed - electronic filing and service of legal papers - comments due 2-16-07 http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2503.html
state police - uniform crime reporting act
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2542.html
professional & occupation affairs - schedule of civil penalties http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2510.html
crime victims compensation
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2509.html
court rules - proposed - electronic filing and service of legal papers - comments due 2-16-07 http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2503.html
state police - uniform crime reporting act
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2542.html
professional & occupation affairs - schedule of civil penalties http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2510.html
crime victims compensation
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-51/2509.html
evidence - child witness - hearsay - child "unavailable"
Commonwealth v. Kriner - Superior Court - January 2, 2007
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/e03003_06.pdf
The hearsay statement of a child victim/witness under 12 years of age is admissible under 42 Pa. C.S. 5985.1 to prove certain criminal offenses if, inter alia, the child is "'unavailable" as a witness.
The statute defines "unavailable" as "serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child's ability to communicate." This definition is exclusive. There is "no other manner, method, procedure or definition of what constitutes unavailability." Thus, the death of a child witness does not come within this statutory definition of unavailability.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/e03003_06.pdf
The hearsay statement of a child victim/witness under 12 years of age is admissible under 42 Pa. C.S. 5985.1 to prove certain criminal offenses if, inter alia, the child is "'unavailable" as a witness.
The statute defines "unavailable" as "serious emotional distress that would substantially impair the child's ability to communicate." This definition is exclusive. There is "no other manner, method, procedure or definition of what constitutes unavailability." Thus, the death of a child witness does not come within this statutory definition of unavailability.
forum selection clause - validity
Patriot Commercial Leasing Company v. Kremer Restaurant Enterprises
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A24012_06.pdf
In this case involving two commercial entities, the court held that forum selection clauses are presumed to be valid when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall be conducted in a particular forum and where the agreement is not unreasonable at the time of litigation. Such a clause will be considered unreasonable "only where its enforcement would, under all circumstances existing at the time of litigation, seriously impair a party's ability to pursue his cause of action....Mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of unreasonableness." The "modern trend is to uphold the enforceability of forum selection clauses where those clauses are clear and unambiguous."
A "forum selection clause in a commercial contract between business entities is presumptively valid and will be deemed unenforceable only when: 1) the clause itself was inducted by fraud or overreaching; 2) the forum selected in the clause is so unfair or inconvenient that a party, for all practical purposes, will be deprived of an opportunity to be heard; or 3) the clause is found to violate public policy."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A24012_06.pdf
In this case involving two commercial entities, the court held that forum selection clauses are presumed to be valid when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall be conducted in a particular forum and where the agreement is not unreasonable at the time of litigation. Such a clause will be considered unreasonable "only where its enforcement would, under all circumstances existing at the time of litigation, seriously impair a party's ability to pursue his cause of action....Mere inconvenience or additional expense is not the test of unreasonableness." The "modern trend is to uphold the enforceability of forum selection clauses where those clauses are clear and unambiguous."
A "forum selection clause in a commercial contract between business entities is presumptively valid and will be deemed unenforceable only when: 1) the clause itself was inducted by fraud or overreaching; 2) the forum selected in the clause is so unfair or inconvenient that a party, for all practical purposes, will be deprived of an opportunity to be heard; or 3) the clause is found to violate public policy."
landlord-tenant - covenant of quiet enjoyment
Kohl v. PNC Bank Natl. Assn. et al. - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - December 27, 2006 majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-129-2005mo.pdf
concur/dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-129-2005cd.pdf
In a 5-1 decision, the court held that a "suit by a landlord which substantially impairs a tenant's possessory interest in a leasehold, brought in bad faith, maliciously, or otherwise without probable cause and primarily for a purpose unrelated to seeking legal redress, constitutes a breach of the landlord's [implied] covenant of quiet enjoyment," citing the lower court decision in the case, 863 A.2d 23, 31 (Pa. Super. 2004) and Raker v. G.C. Murphy Co., 58 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1948).
The court mentioned the "need to protect a litigant's free access to the courts under Article I, sec. 11, of the Pennsylvania Constitution ("All courts shall be open...") and noted that "that law does not punish parties who avail themselves of the courts except in very limited circumstances manifesting bad faith, in order to avoid the potential chilling effect individuals' willingness to seek legal redress."
In discussing the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the court noted that it is "implied in all leases" and stated that it is "settled in this state that any wrongful act of the landlord which results in an interference of the tenant's possession, in whole or in part, is an eviction for which the landlord is liable in damages to the tenant." The covenant is breached by such acts as threatening eviction if the tenant's boyfriend visited the tenant at the property. On the other hand, there has to be "more than mere infringement of the tenant's rights." The act of the landlord must "substantially impair...a tenant's possessory interest in a leasehold."
concur/dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-129-2005cd.pdf
In a 5-1 decision, the court held that a "suit by a landlord which substantially impairs a tenant's possessory interest in a leasehold, brought in bad faith, maliciously, or otherwise without probable cause and primarily for a purpose unrelated to seeking legal redress, constitutes a breach of the landlord's [implied] covenant of quiet enjoyment," citing the lower court decision in the case, 863 A.2d 23, 31 (Pa. Super. 2004) and Raker v. G.C. Murphy Co., 58 A.2d 18 (Pa. 1948).
The court mentioned the "need to protect a litigant's free access to the courts under Article I, sec. 11, of the Pennsylvania Constitution ("All courts shall be open...") and noted that "that law does not punish parties who avail themselves of the courts except in very limited circumstances manifesting bad faith, in order to avoid the potential chilling effect individuals' willingness to seek legal redress."
In discussing the covenant of quiet enjoyment, the court noted that it is "implied in all leases" and stated that it is "settled in this state that any wrongful act of the landlord which results in an interference of the tenant's possession, in whole or in part, is an eviction for which the landlord is liable in damages to the tenant." The covenant is breached by such acts as threatening eviction if the tenant's boyfriend visited the tenant at the property. On the other hand, there has to be "more than mere infringement of the tenant's rights." The act of the landlord must "substantially impair...a tenant's possessory interest in a leasehold."
employment - civil service - "just cause" for termination - arrest
Woods v. State Civil Service Commission - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - December 27, 2006
majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-104-2006mo.pdf concur/dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-104-2006mo.pdf
In a 5-2 decision, the court held that the arrest of a youth counselor on felony (perjury) and misdemeanor (false swearing) charges did not, by itself, constitute "just cause" for dismissal under the state civil service law, 71 P.S. sec. 741.807.
"Just cause" is not defined by the statute, but it has been held to mean cause that is "merit-related,and the criteria must touch upon competency and ability in some rational and logical manner." Just cause involves considerable discretion on the part of the department head, but "[t]o be sufficient...the cause should be personal to the employee and such as to render him unfit for the position he occupies, thus making his dismissal justifiable and for the good of the service."
The court held that while the arrest "may have warranted suspension, we disagree that his arrest along on perjury and false swearing charges establish just cause for removal." The "arrest alone did not rationally and logically touch upon his competency and ability to perform his job as to warrant dismissal....and therefore did not provide just cause for removal." The "arrest alone, albeit on crimen falsi charges, failed to demonstrate that his trustworthiness or integrity had been compromised." The court "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule that 'the appearance of impropriety' by an employee in 'highly sensitive positions' provides just cause to warrant dismissal."
The court also held that absent some indication that the employee's competence and ability to perform his job had been compromised, the mere fact of student awareness of the arrest and charges was alone insufficient to provide the just cause for removal.
majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-104-2006mo.pdf concur/dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-104-2006mo.pdf
In a 5-2 decision, the court held that the arrest of a youth counselor on felony (perjury) and misdemeanor (false swearing) charges did not, by itself, constitute "just cause" for dismissal under the state civil service law, 71 P.S. sec. 741.807.
"Just cause" is not defined by the statute, but it has been held to mean cause that is "merit-related,and the criteria must touch upon competency and ability in some rational and logical manner." Just cause involves considerable discretion on the part of the department head, but "[t]o be sufficient...the cause should be personal to the employee and such as to render him unfit for the position he occupies, thus making his dismissal justifiable and for the good of the service."
The court held that while the arrest "may have warranted suspension, we disagree that his arrest along on perjury and false swearing charges establish just cause for removal." The "arrest alone did not rationally and logically touch upon his competency and ability to perform his job as to warrant dismissal....and therefore did not provide just cause for removal." The "arrest alone, albeit on crimen falsi charges, failed to demonstrate that his trustworthiness or integrity had been compromised." The court "decline[d] to adopt a per se rule that 'the appearance of impropriety' by an employee in 'highly sensitive positions' provides just cause to warrant dismissal."
The court also held that absent some indication that the employee's competence and ability to perform his job had been compromised, the mere fact of student awareness of the arrest and charges was alone insufficient to provide the just cause for removal.
Pennsylvania Bulletin of December 30, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/index.html
local rules - Allegheny County - service of process http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/2548.html
welfare - subsidized child care regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/2554.html
transportation - children - car seats - exemptions - size, weight, medical conditions http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/2555.html
local rules - Allegheny County - service of process http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/2548.html
welfare - subsidized child care regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/2554.html
transportation - children - car seats - exemptions - size, weight, medical conditions http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-52/2555.html
UC - willful misconduct - giving false information to ER
Downey v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - December 19, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1050CD06_12-19-06.pdf
Claimant engaged in willful misconduct when he falsely claimed total disability and accepted disability benefits while engaging in activities inconsistent with such claims -- i.e., doing substantial, heavy home repair work. The court said that there were no cases exactly on point, but likened this to theft cases, holding that "dishonesty or misrepresentation can exhibit a disregard of the employer's interests and disregard of standards of behavior that the employer can rightfully expect from its employees."
The fact that the employer allowed claimant to return to light duty work on May 4th before discharging him on July 29th was held not to bring the case within the remoteness doctrine, which holds that an unexplained substantial delay between the alleged misconduct and job termination precludes the employer from relying on such misconduct. Here, the employer was gathering evidence and pursuing an investigation through proper bureaucratic channels.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1050CD06_12-19-06.pdf
Claimant engaged in willful misconduct when he falsely claimed total disability and accepted disability benefits while engaging in activities inconsistent with such claims -- i.e., doing substantial, heavy home repair work. The court said that there were no cases exactly on point, but likened this to theft cases, holding that "dishonesty or misrepresentation can exhibit a disregard of the employer's interests and disregard of standards of behavior that the employer can rightfully expect from its employees."
The fact that the employer allowed claimant to return to light duty work on May 4th before discharging him on July 29th was held not to bring the case within the remoteness doctrine, which holds that an unexplained substantial delay between the alleged misconduct and job termination precludes the employer from relying on such misconduct. Here, the employer was gathering evidence and pursuing an investigation through proper bureaucratic channels.
appeal - matters complained of - Rule 1925(b) statement
Wells v. Cendant Mobility Financial Corp. - Superior Court - December 14, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a32035_06.pdf
Appellants' arguments were held to have been waived, because they filed an "indecipherably vague" statement under Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concerning "matters complained of on appeal."
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/210/chapter19/s1925.html
The Rule 1925(b) statement is "a crucial component in the appellate process" and is "intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal." A statement that is "overly broad and vague" or "unfocused and indefinite" or "vague and abstract" forces the trial court to "guess what issues an appellant is appealing." Such an "endless assignment severely taxes the trial court and impedes meaningful appellate review.
Where the Rule 1925(b) statement is inadequate, the trial and appellate courts "may find waiver and disregard any argument" on a point, "even if the trial court guesses correctly and addresses the issue" in a thorough opinion. "[I]ssues not included in a Rule 1925(b) statement are deemed waived on appeal....A Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all."
In the instant case, appellants alleged unspecified "errors of law" which were "extremely vague, encompassing the entire proceedings without providing a hint as to when, where, or how the trial court committed its alleged legal errors."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a32035_06.pdf
Appellants' arguments were held to have been waived, because they filed an "indecipherably vague" statement under Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) concerning "matters complained of on appeal."
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/210/chapter19/s1925.html
The Rule 1925(b) statement is "a crucial component in the appellate process" and is "intended to aid trial judges in identifying and focusing upon those issues which the parties plan to raise on appeal." A statement that is "overly broad and vague" or "unfocused and indefinite" or "vague and abstract" forces the trial court to "guess what issues an appellant is appealing." Such an "endless assignment severely taxes the trial court and impedes meaningful appellate review.
Where the Rule 1925(b) statement is inadequate, the trial and appellate courts "may find waiver and disregard any argument" on a point, "even if the trial court guesses correctly and addresses the issue" in a thorough opinion. "[I]ssues not included in a Rule 1925(b) statement are deemed waived on appeal....A Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise Statement at all."
In the instant case, appellants alleged unspecified "errors of law" which were "extremely vague, encompassing the entire proceedings without providing a hint as to when, where, or how the trial court committed its alleged legal errors."
Pennsylvania Bulletin of December 16, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/index.html
recent statutes - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2443.html
Numerous new statutes, including social security number privacy act; credit reporting agency law; sexual assault and evidence collection act; court interpreter law; plain language consumer contract act; court-apptd. custody health care or behavioral health practitioners; children's trust fund act - These can all be accessed by bill number, key word, etc. at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/session.cfm
mortgages - bankers/brokers/consumer equity prot. act statement of policy - first mortgages - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2456.html
health - medical records - charges
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2465.html
welfare - prior authoriz. reqmts. - HCPCS updates - MA fee schedule revisions http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2479.html
IRRC - actions taken by Indpt. Reg. Review Commn. http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2485.html
recent statutes - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2443.html
Numerous new statutes, including social security number privacy act; credit reporting agency law; sexual assault and evidence collection act; court interpreter law; plain language consumer contract act; court-apptd. custody health care or behavioral health practitioners; children's trust fund act - These can all be accessed by bill number, key word, etc. at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/session.cfm
mortgages - bankers/brokers/consumer equity prot. act statement of policy - first mortgages - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2456.html
health - medical records - charges
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2465.html
welfare - prior authoriz. reqmts. - HCPCS updates - MA fee schedule revisions http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2479.html
IRRC - actions taken by Indpt. Reg. Review Commn. http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-50/2485.html
custody - relocation - intrastate
Masser v. Miller - Superior Court - December 11, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a25012_06.pdf
The trial court properly denied the mother's petition to relocate the parties' 14 y/o daughter from Schuylkill to Dauphin County where
- both extended families lived in Schuylkill County
- child had daily contact with both families - child was very close to her half-brother in Schuylkill County
- child did not want to move
- the child had significant extracurricular activities in her current location
- there was no particular benefit to the move
- the move would cause a significant disruption in continuity and stability
The court's rejection of the opinion of the court-appointed expert was justified by the facts, which showed that the expert did not have a "sufficient understanding" of the effect that the proposed move would have on the child's contact with the extended families.
The court noted that the use of the Gruber analysis is "not necessarily required in analyzing all intra-state relocation disputes" but rather is "within the discretion of the trial court" which was properly exercised in this case.
The court also approved the modification of the existing order to expand father's partial custody, to reflect the "custody actually being exercised by the parties," as well as the best interests of the child.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a25012_06.pdf
The trial court properly denied the mother's petition to relocate the parties' 14 y/o daughter from Schuylkill to Dauphin County where
- both extended families lived in Schuylkill County
- child had daily contact with both families - child was very close to her half-brother in Schuylkill County
- child did not want to move
- the child had significant extracurricular activities in her current location
- there was no particular benefit to the move
- the move would cause a significant disruption in continuity and stability
The court's rejection of the opinion of the court-appointed expert was justified by the facts, which showed that the expert did not have a "sufficient understanding" of the effect that the proposed move would have on the child's contact with the extended families.
The court noted that the use of the Gruber analysis is "not necessarily required in analyzing all intra-state relocation disputes" but rather is "within the discretion of the trial court" which was properly exercised in this case.
The court also approved the modification of the existing order to expand father's partial custody, to reflect the "custody actually being exercised by the parties," as well as the best interests of the child.
custody - criminal convictions - evaluation/counseling - "qualified professional"
Ramer v. Ramer - Superior Court - December 11, 2006 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a27040_06.pdf
The trial court erred when it failed to appoint a "qualified professional" under 23 Pa. C.S. 5303(b) and (c) to evaluate and counsel father, who had two convictions of crimes listed under sec. 5303(b)(9) and (10) -- indecent assault and indecent exposure.
"qualified professional" -- A licensed psychologist was not a "qualified professional" where the psychologist admitted that he had no special training or expertise concerning sex offenders. "Qualified" requires that the "professional have expertise tied to the particular offense under assessment....[T]he statute attempts to ensure that the court will receive the kind of information necessary to assess whether the offending parents, with his or her unique criminal conviction history, poses a threat of harm to the child...The statute requires a sensitive inquiry aided by a professional whose qualifications allow him or her to assess the offending parents in light of the particular criminal conduct that has triggered the inquiry....[S]exual offenders in particular often present with unique mental health issues."
counseling - Sec. 5303(c) requires the qualified professional to provide "counseling to an offending parent" which "shall include a program of treatment or individual therapy designed to rehabilitate a parent..." A "one-time evaluation....did not...meet the description of 'counseling in section 5303(c)." Moreover counseling from 2000 does not satisfy the statute, which "requires counseling...in the present, i.e., at the time custody is under assessment."
required finding that the parent does not pose a threat - The trial court's reliance on the "absence of evidence that a parent poses a threat to the child...is an improper reading of the rule, which imposes an affirmative duty to determine that the parents 'does not pose a threat of hard to the child. 23 Pa. C.S. sec. 5303(b). This is to be accomplished through the appointment of a qualified professional, the provision of counseling to the offending parent in the present, and the taking of testimony from the qualified professional regarding the same. Such did not occur here, and, thus, we vacate the custody order and remand with instructions to comply with the plain language of 23 Pa. C.S. sections 5303(b)( and (c)."
The trial court erred when it failed to appoint a "qualified professional" under 23 Pa. C.S. 5303(b) and (c) to evaluate and counsel father, who had two convictions of crimes listed under sec. 5303(b)(9) and (10) -- indecent assault and indecent exposure.
"qualified professional" -- A licensed psychologist was not a "qualified professional" where the psychologist admitted that he had no special training or expertise concerning sex offenders. "Qualified" requires that the "professional have expertise tied to the particular offense under assessment....[T]he statute attempts to ensure that the court will receive the kind of information necessary to assess whether the offending parents, with his or her unique criminal conviction history, poses a threat of harm to the child...The statute requires a sensitive inquiry aided by a professional whose qualifications allow him or her to assess the offending parents in light of the particular criminal conduct that has triggered the inquiry....[S]exual offenders in particular often present with unique mental health issues."
counseling - Sec. 5303(c) requires the qualified professional to provide "counseling to an offending parent" which "shall include a program of treatment or individual therapy designed to rehabilitate a parent..." A "one-time evaluation....did not...meet the description of 'counseling in section 5303(c)." Moreover counseling from 2000 does not satisfy the statute, which "requires counseling...in the present, i.e., at the time custody is under assessment."
required finding that the parent does not pose a threat - The trial court's reliance on the "absence of evidence that a parent poses a threat to the child...is an improper reading of the rule, which imposes an affirmative duty to determine that the parents 'does not pose a threat of hard to the child. 23 Pa. C.S. sec. 5303(b). This is to be accomplished through the appointment of a qualified professional, the provision of counseling to the offending parent in the present, and the taking of testimony from the qualified professional regarding the same. Such did not occur here, and, thus, we vacate the custody order and remand with instructions to comply with the plain language of 23 Pa. C.S. sections 5303(b)( and (c)."
Pennsylvania Bulletin of December 2, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/index.html
courts - electronic case records - public access policy http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2328.html
court rules - proposed - support - contempt http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2329.html
court rules - proposed - discovery in domestic relations matters http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2330.html
general services - distribution of federally-donated food to needs households http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2337.html
health - medical records - charges
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2359.html
school districts - personal income tax
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2344.html
courts - electronic case records - public access policy http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2328.html
court rules - proposed - support - contempt http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2329.html
court rules - proposed - discovery in domestic relations matters http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2330.html
general services - distribution of federally-donated food to needs households http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2337.html
health - medical records - charges
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2359.html
school districts - personal income tax
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-48/2344.html
Friday, December 08, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of December 9, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/index.html
Cmwlth. Court - emergency applications - internal operating procedures
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/2403.html
health - home care agencies/registries - draft licensing regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/2413.html
DOT - alcohol highway safety schools/DUI program coordinators
These regulations implement 75 Pa.C.S. § 1549(b), which requires each county, multicounty judicial district or group of counties combined under a single DUI program to establish and maintain a course of instruction regarding the problems associated with alcohol or controlled substance use, or both, and driving.
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/2412.html
Cmwlth. Court - emergency applications - internal operating procedures
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/2403.html
health - home care agencies/registries - draft licensing regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/2413.html
DOT - alcohol highway safety schools/DUI program coordinators
These regulations implement 75 Pa.C.S. § 1549(b), which requires each county, multicounty judicial district or group of counties combined under a single DUI program to establish and maintain a course of instruction regarding the problems associated with alcohol or controlled substance use, or both, and driving.
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-49/2412.html
Thursday, December 07, 2006
employment - lie detectors - firefighters
City of Pittsburgh v. Bachner et al. - Commonwealth Court - November 30, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2539CD05_11-30-06.pdf
Applicants for firefighter positions with city challenged "just cause" determinations under 53 P.S. 23493.1(a) to reject their applications, and the use of lie detector tests involved in the city's passing over their applications for employment as firefighters
Held, just cause provision gives a right to placement on hiring list, unless there is just cause for disqualification, but just cause provision does not give candidates the right to challenge information gathering procedures to determine if just cause exists.
Here, the applicants' right to placement was affected ony by information they provided, and they retained the right to challenge their disqualifications and argue that they are not supported by just cause. The court discussed the Lie Detector Test Law, 18 Pa. C.S. 7321, which generally prohibits the use of lie detectors in employment situations, except in matters involving public law enforcement personnel or people whose job gives them access to narcotics or dangerour drugs, 18 Pa. C.S. 7321(b). The latter was conceded in this case.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2539CD05_11-30-06.pdf
Applicants for firefighter positions with city challenged "just cause" determinations under 53 P.S. 23493.1(a) to reject their applications, and the use of lie detector tests involved in the city's passing over their applications for employment as firefighters
Held, just cause provision gives a right to placement on hiring list, unless there is just cause for disqualification, but just cause provision does not give candidates the right to challenge information gathering procedures to determine if just cause exists.
Here, the applicants' right to placement was affected ony by information they provided, and they retained the right to challenge their disqualifications and argue that they are not supported by just cause. The court discussed the Lie Detector Test Law, 18 Pa. C.S. 7321, which generally prohibits the use of lie detectors in employment situations, except in matters involving public law enforcement personnel or people whose job gives them access to narcotics or dangerour drugs, 18 Pa. C.S. 7321(b). The latter was conceded in this case.
employment - application - false information - police job
Salters v. State Police - Commonwealth Coourt - November 29, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/761CD06_11-29-06.pdf
A false statement on an application for police certification was alone enough to disqualify an applicant, in spite of the police chief's alleged advice to applicant to lie. Applicant was required to get a psych. evaluation. The first one showed that he was a "psychological risk." A second one had no such finding. Applicant mentioned only the second evaluation on his certification application, on which he made a verified statement that there had been no other psych. evaluations.
Amendments to the charges made more than 30 days in advance of the hearing wre held to not violate due process/notice requirements, citing general admin. rules of procedures, 1 Pa. Code 35.1 et seq., and the relative simplicity of the issues. The court also rejected applicant's argument that only agency heads who are attorneys can adjudicate administrative decisions.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/761CD06_11-29-06.pdf
A false statement on an application for police certification was alone enough to disqualify an applicant, in spite of the police chief's alleged advice to applicant to lie. Applicant was required to get a psych. evaluation. The first one showed that he was a "psychological risk." A second one had no such finding. Applicant mentioned only the second evaluation on his certification application, on which he made a verified statement that there had been no other psych. evaluations.
Amendments to the charges made more than 30 days in advance of the hearing wre held to not violate due process/notice requirements, citing general admin. rules of procedures, 1 Pa. Code 35.1 et seq., and the relative simplicity of the issues. The court also rejected applicant's argument that only agency heads who are attorneys can adjudicate administrative decisions.
Monday, November 20, 2006
UC - sec. 401(d)- availablity for work - alien worker - expired work authorization
Ruiz v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - November 20, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1343CD06_11-20-06.pdf
An alien who does not have a current valid work authorization is not legally available for work and is not eligible for UC benefits under sec. 401(d)(1) of the UC Law, 43 P.S. sec. 801(d)(1).
"A claimant who registers for work is presumed [to be] able [to] and available for work....Nevertheless, to be available for work, a claimant must be ready and able to accept employment, and be actually and currently attached to the labor force."
"Immigration is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Accordinly, where the USCIS denies or revokes an alien's work authorization, the determination is binding on the states and can be assailed only before a federal agency or in a federal court....Significantly, when an alien does not possess a current or valid USCIS work authorization, he cannot accept employment. 8CFR sec. 274.12(c). Moreover, it is unlawful for an employer to hire, recruit, or continue to employ an alient who is (or has become) an "unauthorized alien." 8 USC sec. 1324a(a)(1)-(2).
This decision confirms the dictum in Jimoh v. UCBR, 902 A.2d 608, 612 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), concerning sec. 401(d).
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1343CD06_11-20-06.pdf
An alien who does not have a current valid work authorization is not legally available for work and is not eligible for UC benefits under sec. 401(d)(1) of the UC Law, 43 P.S. sec. 801(d)(1).
"A claimant who registers for work is presumed [to be] able [to] and available for work....Nevertheless, to be available for work, a claimant must be ready and able to accept employment, and be actually and currently attached to the labor force."
"Immigration is a matter of exclusive federal jurisdiction. Accordinly, where the USCIS denies or revokes an alien's work authorization, the determination is binding on the states and can be assailed only before a federal agency or in a federal court....Significantly, when an alien does not possess a current or valid USCIS work authorization, he cannot accept employment. 8CFR sec. 274.12(c). Moreover, it is unlawful for an employer to hire, recruit, or continue to employ an alient who is (or has become) an "unauthorized alien." 8 USC sec. 1324a(a)(1)-(2).
This decision confirms the dictum in Jimoh v. UCBR, 902 A.2d 608, 612 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006), concerning sec. 401(d).
Friday, November 17, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of November 18, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/index.html
PUC - practice & procedure - interpretation of rules on party status, rights, obligations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2266.html
Governor - notice of veto of HB 236 - promulgation of regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2259.html
courts - local rules - Philadelphia - motion for summary judgment - Rule *1035.2(a)http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2260.html
IRRC - notice of filing of final rule - commercial manure hauler/broker certification
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2284.html
PUC - practice & procedure - interpretation of rules on party status, rights, obligations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2266.html
Governor - notice of veto of HB 236 - promulgation of regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2259.html
courts - local rules - Philadelphia - motion for summary judgment - Rule *1035.2(a)http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2260.html
IRRC - notice of filing of final rule - commercial manure hauler/broker certification
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-46/2284.html
Wednesday, November 15, 2006
child witness - taint - clear and convincing evidence
Commonwealth v. Cesar - Superior Court - November 14, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s06009_06.pdf
The court discussed how to deal with the issue of the possible tainting of the testimony of a child. The Defendant claimed that the child's evidence had been tainted by improper coaching by a parent, an asst. DA, and someone from the victim-witness office.
The court discussed the problem of taint, stating that the "core belief underlying the theory...is that a child's memory is peculiarly susceptible to suggestibility so that when called to testify a child may have difficult distinguishing fact from fantasy. Taint is the implantation of false memories or the distortion of real memories caused by interview techniques...that are so unduly suggestive and coercive as to infect the memory of the child, rending that child incompetent to testify."
The court said that a taint investigation is triggered by "some evidence of taint. Once some evidence of taint is presented, the... hearing [about the child's competency to testify] must be expanded to explore this specific question. During the hearing the party alleging taint bears the burden of production of evidence of taint and the burden of persuasion to show taint by clear and convincing evidence. Pennsylvania has always maintained that since competency is the presumption, the moving party must carry the burden of overcoming that presumption...[A]s with all questions of competency, the resolution of a taint challenge...is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s06009_06.pdf
The court discussed how to deal with the issue of the possible tainting of the testimony of a child. The Defendant claimed that the child's evidence had been tainted by improper coaching by a parent, an asst. DA, and someone from the victim-witness office.
The court discussed the problem of taint, stating that the "core belief underlying the theory...is that a child's memory is peculiarly susceptible to suggestibility so that when called to testify a child may have difficult distinguishing fact from fantasy. Taint is the implantation of false memories or the distortion of real memories caused by interview techniques...that are so unduly suggestive and coercive as to infect the memory of the child, rending that child incompetent to testify."
The court said that a taint investigation is triggered by "some evidence of taint. Once some evidence of taint is presented, the... hearing [about the child's competency to testify] must be expanded to explore this specific question. During the hearing the party alleging taint bears the burden of production of evidence of taint and the burden of persuasion to show taint by clear and convincing evidence. Pennsylvania has always maintained that since competency is the presumption, the moving party must carry the burden of overcoming that presumption...[A]s with all questions of competency, the resolution of a taint challenge...is a matter addressed to the discretion of the trial court."
Friday, November 10, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of November 11, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/index.html
recent statutes and vetoes
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2193.html
court rules - execution sale - real property - Pa. R.C.P 3129.3 http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2195.html
court rules - proposed - divorce - answer/denial - Pa. RCP 1920.14 http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2194.html
LIHEAP - availability of 2007 plan
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2224.html
recent statutes and vetoes
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2193.html
court rules - execution sale - real property - Pa. R.C.P 3129.3 http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2195.html
court rules - proposed - divorce - answer/denial - Pa. RCP 1920.14 http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2194.html
LIHEAP - availability of 2007 plan
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-45/2224.html
Friday, November 03, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of November 4, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/index.html
court rules - Allegheny County-
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2149.html
Commonwealth Court - televising on PCN
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2147.html
Orphans' Court Rules - omnibus amendments
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2190.html
court rules - support - allocation of additional expenses - Rule 1910.16-6
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2148.html
IRRC- actions taken
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2174.html
agriculture - wine marketing/research - referendum
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2153.html
court rules - Allegheny County-
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2149.html
Commonwealth Court - televising on PCN
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2147.html
Orphans' Court Rules - omnibus amendments
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2190.html
court rules - support - allocation of additional expenses - Rule 1910.16-6
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2148.html
IRRC- actions taken
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2174.html
agriculture - wine marketing/research - referendum
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-44/2153.html
Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 28, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-43/index.html
court rules - appellate rules - "final order" - Rule 341
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-43/2102.html
labor - minimum wage increase - training wage - statements of policy
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-43/2115.html
court rules - appellate rules - "final order" - Rule 341
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-43/2102.html
labor - minimum wage increase - training wage - statements of policy
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-43/2115.html
Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 7, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/index.html
court rules - proposed - custody - modification - proposal to require allegation of substantial change of circumstances and overrule Karris decision, 544 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988)
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1960.html
court rules - appellate rules - briefs on reargument/remand/reconsideration
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1958.html
Commonwealth Court - proceedings - guidelines for broadcasting, photographing, recording
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1959.html
welfare - WIC - maximum prices, competitive prices
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1977.html
welfare - WIC - store peer group system
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1978.html
welfare - WIC - minimum inventory requirements
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1979.html
horses - breeding fund program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1967.html
court rules - proposed - custody - modification - proposal to require allegation of substantial change of circumstances and overrule Karris decision, 544 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988)
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1960.html
court rules - appellate rules - briefs on reargument/remand/reconsideration
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1958.html
Commonwealth Court - proceedings - guidelines for broadcasting, photographing, recording
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1959.html
welfare - WIC - maximum prices, competitive prices
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1977.html
welfare - WIC - store peer group system
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1978.html
welfare - WIC - minimum inventory requirements
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1979.html
horses - breeding fund program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1967.html
Monday, October 23, 2006
wages - "employer" - "employee"
Hirsch v. EPL Technologies, et al. - Superior Court - October 16, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a12012_06.pdf
Corporate officer found personally liable, along with the corporation itself, for unpaid wages to another corporate officer, because the individual defendant was "actively involved in corporate policy-making" while the plaintiff --although he had the title of a corporate officer -- was not.
The court held that a person's "title alone does not bar him from suing" under the Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 P.S. sec. 260.1 et seq. Noting the the WPCL does not define "employee," the court looked to the UC Law and Worker's Comp. Law rather than agency law to determine the right of a corporate officer to seek wages from his corporate employer and other individuals in the corporation who exercised policy-making functions, even if they do not have knowledge of the improper non-payment. "[S]cienter...is not required for civil liability [but] evidence of an active role in decision making is....."
Persons who are considered to be an "employer" in some context are still permitted to use the WPCL to hold their similarly situated fellow employers liable for unpaid wages," so long at the plaintiff does not exercise policy-making functions. "While evidence of status as a corporate officer...may be relevant, it is not necessarily dispositive of a party's status as an 'employer' under the WPCL."
The court reached this decision, noting that the purpose of the WPCL is to "removed some of the obstacles employees face in litigation by providing them with a statutory remedy when an employer breaches its contractual obligation to pay wages. The WPCL does not create an employee's substantive right to compensation; rather, it only establishes an employee's right to enforce payment of wages and compensation to which an employee is otherwise entitled by the terms of an agreement."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a12012_06.pdf
Corporate officer found personally liable, along with the corporation itself, for unpaid wages to another corporate officer, because the individual defendant was "actively involved in corporate policy-making" while the plaintiff --although he had the title of a corporate officer -- was not.
The court held that a person's "title alone does not bar him from suing" under the Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 P.S. sec. 260.1 et seq. Noting the the WPCL does not define "employee," the court looked to the UC Law and Worker's Comp. Law rather than agency law to determine the right of a corporate officer to seek wages from his corporate employer and other individuals in the corporation who exercised policy-making functions, even if they do not have knowledge of the improper non-payment. "[S]cienter...is not required for civil liability [but] evidence of an active role in decision making is....."
Persons who are considered to be an "employer" in some context are still permitted to use the WPCL to hold their similarly situated fellow employers liable for unpaid wages," so long at the plaintiff does not exercise policy-making functions. "While evidence of status as a corporate officer...may be relevant, it is not necessarily dispositive of a party's status as an 'employer' under the WPCL."
The court reached this decision, noting that the purpose of the WPCL is to "removed some of the obstacles employees face in litigation by providing them with a statutory remedy when an employer breaches its contractual obligation to pay wages. The WPCL does not create an employee's substantive right to compensation; rather, it only establishes an employee's right to enforce payment of wages and compensation to which an employee is otherwise entitled by the terms of an agreement."
admin. law - equitable class action - exhaustion of admin. remedies
Beattie v. Allegheny County - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - October 11, 2006
majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-87B-2005mo.pdf
concurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-87B-2005mo.pdf
Taxpayers permitted to bypass administrative procedures -- i.e., not required to exhaust administrative remedies - and bring an "equitable class action" challenged the county real estate assessment system which they alleged had "systemic flaws" and violated the uniformity clause of the state constitution, Article VIII, sec. 1.
This was held to be one of those "rare cases, as exception to the exhaustion rule" because "the balance between an administrative agency's exercise of its expertise and its ability to offer complete redress for an alleged wrong of egregious constitutional dimension falls in favor of proceeding in equity in the trial court."
In order to invoke equity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test: "the taxpayers must (1) raise a substantial constitutional issue, and (2) lack an adequate remedy through the [statutory] administrative appeal process."
The court discussed the legislature's "power to channel all issues, including constitutional ones, into a specified route of appeal, such as an administrative appeal" but recognized "an exception for certain types of constitutional questions that the administrative process was ill-suited to resolve...[B]ypassing the agency process within the framework of a direct attack on the enabling statute is inherently less likely to do violence to the agency's role as fact-finder and applier of specialized expertise that in the context of an 'as applied' challenge." The court discussed the "admonition that, 'where relying solely on the statutory appeal mechanism would result in a 'multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits and, in contrast, an action in equity would provide a tidy global resolution,' the legal remedy should be deemed inadequate." In such a case, a "complaint can be facially tested against constitutional norms unaided by agency expertise...."
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Cappy said that the majority's test was "incomplete" and missed an "important factor" in the court's exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine - whether administrative input would be helpful. The justice felt that the majority failed to give the agency's role sufficient deference, because of agency expertise or because an agency interpretation would be desirable.
majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-87B-2005mo.pdf
concurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-87B-2005mo.pdf
Taxpayers permitted to bypass administrative procedures -- i.e., not required to exhaust administrative remedies - and bring an "equitable class action" challenged the county real estate assessment system which they alleged had "systemic flaws" and violated the uniformity clause of the state constitution, Article VIII, sec. 1.
This was held to be one of those "rare cases, as exception to the exhaustion rule" because "the balance between an administrative agency's exercise of its expertise and its ability to offer complete redress for an alleged wrong of egregious constitutional dimension falls in favor of proceeding in equity in the trial court."
In order to invoke equity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test: "the taxpayers must (1) raise a substantial constitutional issue, and (2) lack an adequate remedy through the [statutory] administrative appeal process."
The court discussed the legislature's "power to channel all issues, including constitutional ones, into a specified route of appeal, such as an administrative appeal" but recognized "an exception for certain types of constitutional questions that the administrative process was ill-suited to resolve...[B]ypassing the agency process within the framework of a direct attack on the enabling statute is inherently less likely to do violence to the agency's role as fact-finder and applier of specialized expertise that in the context of an 'as applied' challenge." The court discussed the "admonition that, 'where relying solely on the statutory appeal mechanism would result in a 'multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits and, in contrast, an action in equity would provide a tidy global resolution,' the legal remedy should be deemed inadequate." In such a case, a "complaint can be facially tested against constitutional norms unaided by agency expertise...."
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Cappy said that the majority's test was "incomplete" and missed an "important factor" in the court's exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine - whether administrative input would be helpful. The justice felt that the majority failed to give the agency's role sufficient deference, because of agency expertise or because an agency interpretation would be desirable.
pleadings - amendment
Chaney v. Meadville Medical Center - Superior Court - October 19, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22017_06.pdf
The administratrix of a decedent's estate sought to amend the complaint in a wrongful death action. During the course of its appellate review, the Superior Court said that:
- Amendments to pleadings are permitted at any time, including before, during and after trial.
- Leave to amend pleadings is to be liberally granted
- Leave to amend should be granted when it will not "unduly prejudice or surprise the adverse party"
- "Undue prejudice" is something more than a detriment to the other party, since any amendment would likely have the effect of harming the adverse party's interest.
- The policy underlying the rule of liberal leave is to insure that parties get to have their cases decided on the substantive case present, and not on legal formalities
- However, an amendment introducing a new cause of action will not be permitted after the statute of limitations has run. Only if the proposed amendment merely amplifies, as opposed to altering, the cause of action already averred, will it be allowed if the statute of limitations has run
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22017_06.pdf
The administratrix of a decedent's estate sought to amend the complaint in a wrongful death action. During the course of its appellate review, the Superior Court said that:
- Amendments to pleadings are permitted at any time, including before, during and after trial.
- Leave to amend pleadings is to be liberally granted
- Leave to amend should be granted when it will not "unduly prejudice or surprise the adverse party"
- "Undue prejudice" is something more than a detriment to the other party, since any amendment would likely have the effect of harming the adverse party's interest.
- The policy underlying the rule of liberal leave is to insure that parties get to have their cases decided on the substantive case present, and not on legal formalities
- However, an amendment introducing a new cause of action will not be permitted after the statute of limitations has run. Only if the proposed amendment merely amplifies, as opposed to altering, the cause of action already averred, will it be allowed if the statute of limitations has run
Monday, October 09, 2006
debt collection - false/misleading threats to take action
Brown, et al. v. Card Service Center - 3d Circuit - September 29, 2006
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054160p.pdf
Plaintiff stated a claim for relief when she alleged that the Defendant collection agency violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692 et seq., by sending her a letter stating that her failure to make payments arrangements within 5 days "could result in our forwarding this account to our attorney with directions to continue collection efforts," where Plaintiff alleged that such attorney referrals were rarely if ever made.
The court applied the "least sophisticated debtor" (LSD) standard in determining whether the debt collector's statement was a "threat to take any action that...is not intended to be taken" under 15 USC 1692e(5) (false or misleading representations). The LSD standard protects "all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd, the trusting as well as the suspicious," and "prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collections notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basis level of understanding and willingness to read with care.""
The 3d Circuit reversed the district court, which had held that a debtor should have understood the conditional word "could" as simply advising the debtor of options available to the debt collector. The appellate court disagreed, stating that it was deceptive for the collector to "assert that it could take an action that it had no intention of taking and has never or very rarely taken before." (emphasis in original) The "least sophisticated debtor might get the impression that litigation or referral to a...lawyer would be imminent if he or she did not respond within five days. We do not believe that such a reading would be 'bizarre or idiosyncratic'....."
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054160p.pdf
Plaintiff stated a claim for relief when she alleged that the Defendant collection agency violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692 et seq., by sending her a letter stating that her failure to make payments arrangements within 5 days "could result in our forwarding this account to our attorney with directions to continue collection efforts," where Plaintiff alleged that such attorney referrals were rarely if ever made.
The court applied the "least sophisticated debtor" (LSD) standard in determining whether the debt collector's statement was a "threat to take any action that...is not intended to be taken" under 15 USC 1692e(5) (false or misleading representations). The LSD standard protects "all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd, the trusting as well as the suspicious," and "prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collections notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basis level of understanding and willingness to read with care.""
The 3d Circuit reversed the district court, which had held that a debtor should have understood the conditional word "could" as simply advising the debtor of options available to the debt collector. The appellate court disagreed, stating that it was deceptive for the collector to "assert that it could take an action that it had no intention of taking and has never or very rarely taken before." (emphasis in original) The "least sophisticated debtor might get the impression that litigation or referral to a...lawyer would be imminent if he or she did not respond within five days. We do not believe that such a reading would be 'bizarre or idiosyncratic'....."
Friday, October 06, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 7, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/index.html
court rules - proposed - custody - modification - comments due January 12, 2007
proposal to require allegation of substantial change of circumstances and overrule Karris - 544 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988) - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1960.html
court rules - appellate rules - briefs on reargument/remand/reconsideration
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1958.html
Commonwealth Court - proceedings - guidelines for broadcasting, photographing, recording
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1959.html
welfare - WIC - maximum prices, competitive prices
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1977.html
welfare - WIC - store peer group system
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1978.html
welfare - WIC - minimum inventory requirements
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1979.html
horses - breeding fund program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1967.html
court rules - proposed - custody - modification - comments due January 12, 2007
proposal to require allegation of substantial change of circumstances and overrule Karris - 544 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988) - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1960.html
court rules - appellate rules - briefs on reargument/remand/reconsideration
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1958.html
Commonwealth Court - proceedings - guidelines for broadcasting, photographing, recording
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1959.html
welfare - WIC - maximum prices, competitive prices
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1977.html
welfare - WIC - store peer group system
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1978.html
welfare - WIC - minimum inventory requirements
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1979.html
horses - breeding fund program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1967.html
Thursday, October 05, 2006
Workers' Comp. - failure to maintain insurance
Commonwealth v. Corban Corporation - Superior Court - October 4, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a12030_06.pdf
Failure to maintain worker's compensation insurance is a crime under 77 P.S. 501, for which the statute of limitations is five (5) years,under 77 P.S. 1039.12.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a12030_06.pdf
Failure to maintain worker's compensation insurance is a crime under 77 P.S. 501, for which the statute of limitations is five (5) years,under 77 P.S. 1039.12.
Monday, October 02, 2006
driver's license - suspension - multiple convictions - merger
Drabic v. Penn DOT - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - September 27, 2006
majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006mo.pdf
dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006do1.pdf
dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006do2.pdf
In a 4-3 decision, the court held that civil driver's license suspensions merge in accordance with the merger of the underlying criminal convictions on which the suspensions are based. The court held that its decision was based on long-standing precedent and on the plain language of the statute 75 Pa. C.S.1532, which "directs that only a single suspension can be imposed upon a single-criminal episode." The result in this case was the merger of the suspension based on the driver's DUI conviction into the suspension based on his conviction of homicide by vehicle-DUI and a consequent reduction in his suspension by 2 1/2 years.
majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006mo.pdf
dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006do1.pdf
dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006do2.pdf
In a 4-3 decision, the court held that civil driver's license suspensions merge in accordance with the merger of the underlying criminal convictions on which the suspensions are based. The court held that its decision was based on long-standing precedent and on the plain language of the statute 75 Pa. C.S.1532, which "directs that only a single suspension can be imposed upon a single-criminal episode." The result in this case was the merger of the suspension based on the driver's DUI conviction into the suspension based on his conviction of homicide by vehicle-DUI and a consequent reduction in his suspension by 2 1/2 years.
custody - religion - free exercise - advocating polygamy
Shepp v. Shepp - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - September 27, 2006 majority
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004mo.pdfconcurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004co.pdfdissenting http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004do.pdf
Analyzing the case under the U.S. rather than Pennsylvania Constitution (whose religion clauses, Article I, sections 3 and 4, are set out at the end of this summary), the state supreme court held that a father's teaching the parties' 13 year-old daughter about plural marriage and polygamy under Mormon Fundamentalism was protected by the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution, since there was no interest of "the highest order" that overrode father's First Amendment rights. The court said that it was "clear that the Commonwealth's interest in promoting compliance with the [state] statute criminalizing bigamy is not an interest of the 'highest order' that would supersede the interest of a parent in speaking to a child about a deeply held aspect of his faith" so long as that speech is not "causing or will cause harm to a child's welfare."
The trial court had prohibited the father from teaching the minor child about polygamy and plural marriages, even while finding "no evidence of a grave threat to the child" from such speech by the father. The Superior Court, 821 A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. 2003), found that conclusion "both erroneous and unreasonable" in light of the evidence, including the testimony of one of mother's children from another marriage that father had told her she'd go to hell if she failed to practice polygamy and that father and child (age 14) should marry because they were living under the same roof -- testimony which the trial court found credible.
The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court had engaged in "speculation that Father's statements to his stepdaughter might lead to insistence that his own child engage in polygamy" and in doing so had "improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court."
The Supreme Court "emphasize[d] that the illegality of the proposed conduct on its own is not sufficient to warrant the restriction " about teaching the virtues of plural marriage where there was "no finding that discussing such matters constitutes a grave threat of harm to the child...." In these circumstances, the court held that "there is insufficient basis for the court to infringe on a parent's constitutionally protected right to speak to a child about religion as he or she sees fit.....Because such harm was not established in this case, there was no constitutional basis for the state's intrusion in the form of the trials court's order placing a prohibition on Father's speech."
The concurring opinion (Eakin, J.) expressed "misgivings about the application of the strict scrutiny test," claiming the case didn't involve government infringement of any fundamental right. Justice Eakin also was concerned about the majority in effect making the the father's religious rights superior to the mother's "fundamental right to raise [her child] without learning about plural marriage," which the majority opinion rendered "substantially less valuable" than the father's. The justice felt that the parent's opposing rights had a "cross-out" effect on one another.
The dissent (Baer, J.) felt that there was adequate support in the record to uphold the restrictions on father's teaching the child about plural marriage, in that he had "crossed the line between expression and conduct," since he "had every intention" of following through on his beliefs "and, unchecked, would do whatever he could, in his position of considerable authority as Child's parent, to lead Child into a life of polygamy while still of tender years" -- a "factual finding....entirely supported by the evidence of record...." The dissent said that "parental decisions are entitled to no peculiar respect if they 'will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.' "
Article I, sec. 3 - Religious Freedom - All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
Article I, sec. 4 - Religion - No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004mo.pdfconcurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004co.pdfdissenting http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004do.pdf
Analyzing the case under the U.S. rather than Pennsylvania Constitution (whose religion clauses, Article I, sections 3 and 4, are set out at the end of this summary), the state supreme court held that a father's teaching the parties' 13 year-old daughter about plural marriage and polygamy under Mormon Fundamentalism was protected by the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution, since there was no interest of "the highest order" that overrode father's First Amendment rights. The court said that it was "clear that the Commonwealth's interest in promoting compliance with the [state] statute criminalizing bigamy is not an interest of the 'highest order' that would supersede the interest of a parent in speaking to a child about a deeply held aspect of his faith" so long as that speech is not "causing or will cause harm to a child's welfare."
The trial court had prohibited the father from teaching the minor child about polygamy and plural marriages, even while finding "no evidence of a grave threat to the child" from such speech by the father. The Superior Court, 821 A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. 2003), found that conclusion "both erroneous and unreasonable" in light of the evidence, including the testimony of one of mother's children from another marriage that father had told her she'd go to hell if she failed to practice polygamy and that father and child (age 14) should marry because they were living under the same roof -- testimony which the trial court found credible.
The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court had engaged in "speculation that Father's statements to his stepdaughter might lead to insistence that his own child engage in polygamy" and in doing so had "improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court."
The Supreme Court "emphasize[d] that the illegality of the proposed conduct on its own is not sufficient to warrant the restriction " about teaching the virtues of plural marriage where there was "no finding that discussing such matters constitutes a grave threat of harm to the child...." In these circumstances, the court held that "there is insufficient basis for the court to infringe on a parent's constitutionally protected right to speak to a child about religion as he or she sees fit.....Because such harm was not established in this case, there was no constitutional basis for the state's intrusion in the form of the trials court's order placing a prohibition on Father's speech."
The concurring opinion (Eakin, J.) expressed "misgivings about the application of the strict scrutiny test," claiming the case didn't involve government infringement of any fundamental right. Justice Eakin also was concerned about the majority in effect making the the father's religious rights superior to the mother's "fundamental right to raise [her child] without learning about plural marriage," which the majority opinion rendered "substantially less valuable" than the father's. The justice felt that the parent's opposing rights had a "cross-out" effect on one another.
The dissent (Baer, J.) felt that there was adequate support in the record to uphold the restrictions on father's teaching the child about plural marriage, in that he had "crossed the line between expression and conduct," since he "had every intention" of following through on his beliefs "and, unchecked, would do whatever he could, in his position of considerable authority as Child's parent, to lead Child into a life of polygamy while still of tender years" -- a "factual finding....entirely supported by the evidence of record...." The dissent said that "parental decisions are entitled to no peculiar respect if they 'will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.' "
Pennsylvania Constitution
Article I, sec. 3 - Religious Freedom - All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.
Article I, sec. 4 - Religion - No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.
Friday, September 29, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of September 30, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/index.html
address confidentiality program - domestic/sexual violenence victims
statement of policy - Office of Victim Advocate
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1908.html
courts - appellate rules - papers - margins, type size
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1899.html
courtd - appellate rules - proposed -trial court opinion in support of order
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1900.html
courts - MDJ courts - fee schedule
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1897.html
courts - rules - proposed - joinder of additional defendants - comments due 11-09-06
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1901.html
sign language interpreters - registration - IRRC notice of comments issued
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1943.html
child abuse reporting requirements - notice of filing of final rules - public meeting 10-19-06
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1944.html
chiropractors - patient records - proposed regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1904.html
address confidentiality program - domestic/sexual violenence victims
statement of policy - Office of Victim Advocate
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1908.html
courts - appellate rules - papers - margins, type size
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1899.html
courtd - appellate rules - proposed -trial court opinion in support of order
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1900.html
courts - MDJ courts - fee schedule
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1897.html
courts - rules - proposed - joinder of additional defendants - comments due 11-09-06
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1901.html
sign language interpreters - registration - IRRC notice of comments issued
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1943.html
child abuse reporting requirements - notice of filing of final rules - public meeting 10-19-06
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1944.html
chiropractors - patient records - proposed regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-39/1904.html
Wednesday, September 27, 2006
admin. law - late appeal - filing by email
McClean v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - September 27, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/716CD06_9-27-06.pdf
An appeal from a referee decision to the UCBR was not timely filed where it was sent by email within the 15-day appeal period but not received by UCBR within that period under 43 P.S. sec. 822 and 34 Pa. Code sec. 101.82(b)(4)
The email was sent well within the appeal period but apparently not received by the UCBR until after the 15-day appeal period had run. The claimant's attorney sent another appeal by regular mail, but that was filed one day late. The Board rejected the appeal on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction.
The statute, 43 P.S. sec. 822, http://members.aol.com/StatutesP4/43.Cp.14.5.html, says that a referee decision is final unless an appeal is filed "within first days after the date of such decision."
The regulation, 34 Pa. Code 101.82(b)(4), http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/034/chapter101/s101.82.html, allows the filing of an appeal by electronic transmission but stipulates that the "date of filing is the receipt date recorded by the Department appeal office....A party filing an appeal by electronic transmission is responsible for using the proper format and for delay, disruption, interruption of electronic signals and readability of the documents and accepts that risk that the appeal may not be properly or timely filed." (emphasis in original)
The court said that the "fifteen-day time limit is mandatory" and that the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely appeal, citing Shea v. UCBR, 898 A.2d 31, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). "The Department...has established strict, unambiguous requirements for filing an appeal." Vereb v. UCBR, 676 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
The court said that there were no grounds for an nunc pro tunc appeal, J.A. v. DPW, 873 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)
The court also held that the provision of Pa. C.R.P. 205.4(e)(2) regarding electronic filing do not apply to administrative actions.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/716CD06_9-27-06.pdf
An appeal from a referee decision to the UCBR was not timely filed where it was sent by email within the 15-day appeal period but not received by UCBR within that period under 43 P.S. sec. 822 and 34 Pa. Code sec. 101.82(b)(4)
The email was sent well within the appeal period but apparently not received by the UCBR until after the 15-day appeal period had run. The claimant's attorney sent another appeal by regular mail, but that was filed one day late. The Board rejected the appeal on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction.
The statute, 43 P.S. sec. 822, http://members.aol.com/StatutesP4/43.Cp.14.5.html, says that a referee decision is final unless an appeal is filed "within first days after the date of such decision."
The regulation, 34 Pa. Code 101.82(b)(4), http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/034/chapter101/s101.82.html, allows the filing of an appeal by electronic transmission but stipulates that the "date of filing is the receipt date recorded by the Department appeal office....A party filing an appeal by electronic transmission is responsible for using the proper format and for delay, disruption, interruption of electronic signals and readability of the documents and accepts that risk that the appeal may not be properly or timely filed." (emphasis in original)
The court said that the "fifteen-day time limit is mandatory" and that the Board lacks jurisdiction to consider an untimely appeal, citing Shea v. UCBR, 898 A.2d 31, 33 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). "The Department...has established strict, unambiguous requirements for filing an appeal." Vereb v. UCBR, 676 A.2d 1290, 1294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
The court said that there were no grounds for an nunc pro tunc appeal, J.A. v. DPW, 873 A.2d 782, 785 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)
The court also held that the provision of Pa. C.R.P. 205.4(e)(2) regarding electronic filing do not apply to administrative actions.
Friday, September 22, 2006
Deficiency Judgment Act - 42 Pa. C.S 8103
Muñoz v. Sovereign Bank - ED Pa. - September 18, 2006
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1173P.pdf
Judgment creditor's motion to dismiss denied on plaintiff-debtor's action under the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa. C.S. 8103. The creditor foreclosed on debtor's business property, which it purchased at execution sale. The debtor then received substantial money from the consensual judicial sale of debtor's home. Debtor then sued under the DJA, and creditor moved to dismiss.
The DJA requires that before a creditor who has bought its debtor's real property in execution proceeding seeks to collect the balance alleged to be due, the creditor must petition the court to fix the fair market value of the real property sold, 42 Pa. C.S. sec. 8103(a). The creditor did not file such a petition in this case.
"The Act prevent creditors from purchasing a debtor's real property, often at below market value, and continuing to execute on the debtor's other property to satisfy the judgment, without considering the fair market value of the previously executed-upon property, when determining the balance due on the judgment."
A judgment creditor must file its petition to fix fair market value within 6 months of the execution sale at which it buys the property, 42 Pa. C.S. sec. 5522(b)(2). If the creditor fails to do that, the debtor may petition the court, which "shall direct the clerk to mark the judgment satisfied, released and discharged" if the debtor alleges and proves "the fact of the sale, and that no petition has been filed within the time limited by section 5522 to fix the fair market value of the property sold...."
The judgment creditor did not file a timely petition to fix fair market value in this case. Its "obligations under the Act were triggered by the receipt of the deed" for the debtor's commercial property. It could not act against the residential property without first petitioning the court even if the debtor purported to agree, since any agreement to waive the benefits of the Deficiency Judgment Act "shall be void." 42 Pa. C.S. 8103(e).
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1173P.pdf
Judgment creditor's motion to dismiss denied on plaintiff-debtor's action under the Pennsylvania Deficiency Judgment Act, 42 Pa. C.S. 8103. The creditor foreclosed on debtor's business property, which it purchased at execution sale. The debtor then received substantial money from the consensual judicial sale of debtor's home. Debtor then sued under the DJA, and creditor moved to dismiss.
The DJA requires that before a creditor who has bought its debtor's real property in execution proceeding seeks to collect the balance alleged to be due, the creditor must petition the court to fix the fair market value of the real property sold, 42 Pa. C.S. sec. 8103(a). The creditor did not file such a petition in this case.
"The Act prevent creditors from purchasing a debtor's real property, often at below market value, and continuing to execute on the debtor's other property to satisfy the judgment, without considering the fair market value of the previously executed-upon property, when determining the balance due on the judgment."
A judgment creditor must file its petition to fix fair market value within 6 months of the execution sale at which it buys the property, 42 Pa. C.S. sec. 5522(b)(2). If the creditor fails to do that, the debtor may petition the court, which "shall direct the clerk to mark the judgment satisfied, released and discharged" if the debtor alleges and proves "the fact of the sale, and that no petition has been filed within the time limited by section 5522 to fix the fair market value of the property sold...."
The judgment creditor did not file a timely petition to fix fair market value in this case. Its "obligations under the Act were triggered by the receipt of the deed" for the debtor's commercial property. It could not act against the residential property without first petitioning the court even if the debtor purported to agree, since any agreement to waive the benefits of the Deficiency Judgment Act "shall be void." 42 Pa. C.S. 8103(e).
Thursday, September 21, 2006
federal courts- qualified immunity
Thomas v. Independence Township, et al. - Third Circuit - September 14, 2006
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052275p.pdf
The court upheld the district court's refusal to grant defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that that they had qualified immunity (q/i).
The court said that the q/I determination "must be made in light of the specific factual context of the case, and when a complaint fashioned under the simplified notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules does not provide the necessary factual predicate for such a determination, the district court should grant a defense motion...[or sua sponte order] a more definite statement regarding the facts underlying the plaintiff's claim for relief" pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 12(e).
A "plaintiff has no pleading burden to anticipate or overcome a qualified immunity defense, and a mere absence of detailed factual allegations supporting a plaintiff's claim for relief under sec. 1983 does not warrant dismissal of the complaint or establish defendants' immunity." The court rejected defendants' "novel argument" that the complaint did not include allegations that would negate a q/i defense. This argument "conflates qualified immunity with the merits of a plaintiff's cause of action under sec. 1983," something which was rejected in Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 635-6 (1980) and re-affirmed in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998).
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052275p.pdf
The court upheld the district court's refusal to grant defendants' 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the ground that that they had qualified immunity (q/i).
The court said that the q/I determination "must be made in light of the specific factual context of the case, and when a complaint fashioned under the simplified notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules does not provide the necessary factual predicate for such a determination, the district court should grant a defense motion...[or sua sponte order] a more definite statement regarding the facts underlying the plaintiff's claim for relief" pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 12(e).
A "plaintiff has no pleading burden to anticipate or overcome a qualified immunity defense, and a mere absence of detailed factual allegations supporting a plaintiff's claim for relief under sec. 1983 does not warrant dismissal of the complaint or establish defendants' immunity." The court rejected defendants' "novel argument" that the complaint did not include allegations that would negate a q/i defense. This argument "conflates qualified immunity with the merits of a plaintiff's cause of action under sec. 1983," something which was rejected in Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 635-6 (1980) and re-affirmed in Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998).
PFA - in-law "family/household member" - "abuse"
McCance v. McCance - Superior Court - September 20, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22033_06.pdf
in-law as "family or household member"
The court held that defendant's sister-in-law (married to his brother) had standing to bring a PFA action against him, because she was a "family or household member," that is, a person who was "related by...affinity" to the defendant. The court noted "today's world of split families burgeoning beyond the confines of local, county, and state lines...." and that "a remedial mechanism in the form of a PFA order is the appropriate vehicle to keep [ people ] "civil one toward the other." Interpreting affinity to include an in-law relationship "does not do violence to the purpose of the Act, which is to forestall escalation of disputes among family members where injury may be on the horizon."
abuse - " fear of imminent serious bodily injury "
The abuse in this case took place after a custody hearing when Plaintiff, the child's aunt, was transporting the child to Defendant's home. When she got there, Defendant initiated a confrontation during which he yelled obscenities and verbal threats at Plaintiff and struck her car so hard that $1000 in repairs were needed. The court also noted that the Defendant "had anger issues, a drinking problem and was physical with other individuals in the past." In this context, both the trial and appellate courts found that Plaintiff's fear was "real, reasonable and imminent which warrants protection under the PFA Act....[V]erbal chiding, intimidating demeanor (blocking [plaintiff's] vehicular access), threat of retaliation, and striking of [plaintiff's] vehicle to the point of damaging it coalesce to constitute abusive behavior prohibited by 23 Pa. C.S. 6102(a)(2) (...placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury....As a result, the issuance of the PFA order was proper."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22033_06.pdf
in-law as "family or household member"
The court held that defendant's sister-in-law (married to his brother) had standing to bring a PFA action against him, because she was a "family or household member," that is, a person who was "related by...affinity" to the defendant. The court noted "today's world of split families burgeoning beyond the confines of local, county, and state lines...." and that "a remedial mechanism in the form of a PFA order is the appropriate vehicle to keep [ people ] "civil one toward the other." Interpreting affinity to include an in-law relationship "does not do violence to the purpose of the Act, which is to forestall escalation of disputes among family members where injury may be on the horizon."
abuse - " fear of imminent serious bodily injury "
The abuse in this case took place after a custody hearing when Plaintiff, the child's aunt, was transporting the child to Defendant's home. When she got there, Defendant initiated a confrontation during which he yelled obscenities and verbal threats at Plaintiff and struck her car so hard that $1000 in repairs were needed. The court also noted that the Defendant "had anger issues, a drinking problem and was physical with other individuals in the past." In this context, both the trial and appellate courts found that Plaintiff's fear was "real, reasonable and imminent which warrants protection under the PFA Act....[V]erbal chiding, intimidating demeanor (blocking [plaintiff's] vehicular access), threat of retaliation, and striking of [plaintiff's] vehicle to the point of damaging it coalesce to constitute abusive behavior prohibited by 23 Pa. C.S. 6102(a)(2) (...placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury....As a result, the issuance of the PFA order was proper."
Monday, September 18, 2006
"professional witness" - bias
Cooper v. Schoffstall - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - September 7, 2006
majority - http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-51-2005mo.pdf
concurring - http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-51-2005co.pdf
The court held that, under state law, discovery was available to determine if a doctor was a "professional witness" whose pattern of compensation in past cases could raise the "inference of the possibility that the witness has slanted his testimony...so he could be hired to testify in future cases."
The court said that the "appropriate, threshold showing to establish cause for supplemental discovery related to potential favoritism of a non-party witness retained for trial preparation is of reasonable grounds to believe that the witness may have entered the professional witness category. In other words, the proponent of the discovery should demonstrate a significant pattern of compensation that would support a reasonable inference that the witness might color, shade, or slant his testimony in light of the substantial financial incentives."
If such a showing could be made, the party would be allow to depose the witness by written interrogatories concerning: a) the compensation in the pending case; b) the character of the witnesses' litigation-related activities, and in particular, the approximate percentage devoted to specific types of litigation and/or work on behalf of a particular litigant; c) the number of cases in the past 1-3 years; d) the approximate portion of the witness's overall professional work devoted to litigation-related services; e) the approximate income from such services.
Query: Is this an issue which could be raised in SSD/SSI cases?
majority - http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-51-2005mo.pdf
concurring - http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-51-2005co.pdf
The court held that, under state law, discovery was available to determine if a doctor was a "professional witness" whose pattern of compensation in past cases could raise the "inference of the possibility that the witness has slanted his testimony...so he could be hired to testify in future cases."
The court said that the "appropriate, threshold showing to establish cause for supplemental discovery related to potential favoritism of a non-party witness retained for trial preparation is of reasonable grounds to believe that the witness may have entered the professional witness category. In other words, the proponent of the discovery should demonstrate a significant pattern of compensation that would support a reasonable inference that the witness might color, shade, or slant his testimony in light of the substantial financial incentives."
If such a showing could be made, the party would be allow to depose the witness by written interrogatories concerning: a) the compensation in the pending case; b) the character of the witnesses' litigation-related activities, and in particular, the approximate percentage devoted to specific types of litigation and/or work on behalf of a particular litigant; c) the number of cases in the past 1-3 years; d) the approximate portion of the witness's overall professional work devoted to litigation-related services; e) the approximate income from such services.
Query: Is this an issue which could be raised in SSD/SSI cases?
admin. law - full hearing - issues
Cambria Co. Home v. DPW - Commonwealth Court - June 5, 2006 (ordered reported 9-14-06)
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1463CD05_9-14-06.pdf
This case concerns a DPW audit of a county nursing home. During the course of its opinion, the court noted (in n. 12) that under DPW regs and 2 Pa. C.S. secs. 501-508 , a party to an administrative process has the right to a full evidentiary hearing, but only as to those issues which are properly before it and have been adequately raised.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1463CD05_9-14-06.pdf
This case concerns a DPW audit of a county nursing home. During the course of its opinion, the court noted (in n. 12) that under DPW regs and 2 Pa. C.S. secs. 501-508 , a party to an administrative process has the right to a full evidentiary hearing, but only as to those issues which are properly before it and have been adequately raised.
public housing - conditional eviction
Allegheny Co. Housing Authority v. Johnson - Superior Court - September 14, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22002_06.pdf
County Housing Authority filed eviction action against tenant (T) with multiple lease violations (fighting, noise, extra tenants, fire, etc.). The trial court found that although the CHA had established that T had violated the terms of the lease and had engaged in "serious and repeated violations of the material terms of the lease, the CHA could not execute on its judgment for possession so long at the T submitted weekly verification that he was attending an MH/MR program and was attending at least three AA meetings per week.
The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that T's "behavior unequivocally amounted to 'serious and repeated violations of the material terms of the lease" and holding that the CHA was entitled to evict him, unconditionally and immediately.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22002_06.pdf
County Housing Authority filed eviction action against tenant (T) with multiple lease violations (fighting, noise, extra tenants, fire, etc.). The trial court found that although the CHA had established that T had violated the terms of the lease and had engaged in "serious and repeated violations of the material terms of the lease, the CHA could not execute on its judgment for possession so long at the T submitted weekly verification that he was attending an MH/MR program and was attending at least three AA meetings per week.
The Commonwealth Court reversed, finding that T's "behavior unequivocally amounted to 'serious and repeated violations of the material terms of the lease" and holding that the CHA was entitled to evict him, unconditionally and immediately.
Friday, September 15, 2006
Pennsylvania Bulletin of September 16, 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/index.html
Inpt. Reg. Review Commn. (IRRC) - notice of comments issued (several DPW regs)
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1824.html
Governor - proclamation of disaster emergency
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1796.html
Courts - orphans court - registration of foreign adoptions
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1797.html
Courts- local rules - Beaver County - electronic filing
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1798.html
Courts - local - Northamption - Diversionary program for bad check offenders
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1799.html
DPW - MA - payment for services of teaching physicians
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1805.html
Inpt. Reg. Review Commn. (IRRC) - notice of comments issued (several DPW regs)
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1824.html
Governor - proclamation of disaster emergency
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1796.html
Courts - orphans court - registration of foreign adoptions
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1797.html
Courts- local rules - Beaver County - electronic filing
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1798.html
Courts - local - Northamption - Diversionary program for bad check offenders
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1799.html
DPW - MA - payment for services of teaching physicians
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-37/1805.html
Thursday, September 14, 2006
admin. law - local agency - standard of review
Nevling v. Borough of Pleasant Hills - Commonwealth Court - June 26, 2006 (designated to be reported 9-12-06)
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/45CD06_9-12-06.pdf
The common pleas court "exceeded its limited standard of review" when it overruled borough council's decision -- including credibility and factual findings -- to deny former police officer disability pension benefits under the borough's pension plan, where a full and complete record was made before the local agency, and the agency's findings were supported by substantial evidence.
At the hearing before the borough council under the local agency law, 2 Pa. C.S. sec. 551 et seq., the only items of evidence were written reports of examining physicians for each party. Those reports were admitted without objection. The borough council credited the report of the borough physician over that of the officer's physician.
The officer appealed to the court of common pleas under the local agency law., 2 Pa. C.S. sec. 751 et seq. The parties stipulated that a "full and complete record was made before Borough Council" and the "trial court did not accept additional evidence." The trial court "made its own determinations concerning credibility and evidentiary weight" and found that "the evidence in this matter clearly and unequivocally establishes that [the officer] qualifies for a disability pension benefit under the plan."
The borough appealed to Commonwealth Court, which said that when a full and complete record is made before the local agency, the reviewing court's standard of review is limited to determining whether there has been an error of law or constitutional violation, or where findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. "A reviewing court…must accept the credibility determinations made by the local agency which hears the testimony, evaluates the credibility of the witnesses, and serves as a fact-finder….The reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the local agency….Assuming the record demonstrates the existence of substantial evidence, the court is bound by the local agency's findings…..[B]ecause all of Borough Council's findings are supported by Borough's Physician's credited report…the trial court exceeded its limited standard of review."
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/45CD06_9-12-06.pdf
The common pleas court "exceeded its limited standard of review" when it overruled borough council's decision -- including credibility and factual findings -- to deny former police officer disability pension benefits under the borough's pension plan, where a full and complete record was made before the local agency, and the agency's findings were supported by substantial evidence.
At the hearing before the borough council under the local agency law, 2 Pa. C.S. sec. 551 et seq., the only items of evidence were written reports of examining physicians for each party. Those reports were admitted without objection. The borough council credited the report of the borough physician over that of the officer's physician.
The officer appealed to the court of common pleas under the local agency law., 2 Pa. C.S. sec. 751 et seq. The parties stipulated that a "full and complete record was made before Borough Council" and the "trial court did not accept additional evidence." The trial court "made its own determinations concerning credibility and evidentiary weight" and found that "the evidence in this matter clearly and unequivocally establishes that [the officer] qualifies for a disability pension benefit under the plan."
The borough appealed to Commonwealth Court, which said that when a full and complete record is made before the local agency, the reviewing court's standard of review is limited to determining whether there has been an error of law or constitutional violation, or where findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. "A reviewing court…must accept the credibility determinations made by the local agency which hears the testimony, evaluates the credibility of the witnesses, and serves as a fact-finder….The reviewing court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the local agency….Assuming the record demonstrates the existence of substantial evidence, the court is bound by the local agency's findings…..[B]ecause all of Borough Council's findings are supported by Borough's Physician's credited report…the trial court exceeded its limited standard of review."
Monday, September 11, 2006
PFA and custody
Lawrence v. Bordner - Superior Court - September 6, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/S37011_06.pdf
A court can review and override an existing custody order in a separate PFA case, under 23 Pa. C.S. 6108(a)(4).
In this case, the trial court dismissed a PFA case, without prejudice, even though there was considerable evidence that the defendant-father had abused his teenage daughter (choking, throwing against wall, encouraging her to drink vodka, etc.). The trial court considered it "improper" to try to modify an existing custody order in a separate PFA case and refused an oral petition to modify the custody order. It "abruptly determined that [plaintiff] was not entitled to a final protection from abuse order for [her child] and limited appellant to a custody action as her exclusive remedy for the alleged abuse [that father] inflicted" on the daughter.
The Superior Court recognized that it has "not uniformly construed" the custody section of the PFA law, comparing its decisions in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 504 A.2d 350, 351 n.1 (1986), and Dye v. McCoy, 621 A.2d 144, 145 (1993). The court came down finally in the Dye v. McCoy camp, in which case it had held that a PFA court can modify an existing custody order. "To hold otherwise would have the effect of emasculating the central and extraordinary feature of the PFA which is to prospectively control and prevent domestic violence."
However, the court warned (in n. 4) that "it is not our intention to set a precedent under which it will be deemed proper in future matters to utilize the PFA rather than a Petition for Special Relief in Custody, as the proper avenue for a party to pursue in a circumstance similar to that herein. While a counseled party should be instructed to file a Petition for Special Relief in Custody, we are providing a party who initially files a PFA with a means of obtaining protection and lower courts with the ability to amend an existing Custody Order to effect the same."
Editorial note: I found this opinion very confusing and poorly written.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/S37011_06.pdf
A court can review and override an existing custody order in a separate PFA case, under 23 Pa. C.S. 6108(a)(4).
In this case, the trial court dismissed a PFA case, without prejudice, even though there was considerable evidence that the defendant-father had abused his teenage daughter (choking, throwing against wall, encouraging her to drink vodka, etc.). The trial court considered it "improper" to try to modify an existing custody order in a separate PFA case and refused an oral petition to modify the custody order. It "abruptly determined that [plaintiff] was not entitled to a final protection from abuse order for [her child] and limited appellant to a custody action as her exclusive remedy for the alleged abuse [that father] inflicted" on the daughter.
The Superior Court recognized that it has "not uniformly construed" the custody section of the PFA law, comparing its decisions in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 504 A.2d 350, 351 n.1 (1986), and Dye v. McCoy, 621 A.2d 144, 145 (1993). The court came down finally in the Dye v. McCoy camp, in which case it had held that a PFA court can modify an existing custody order. "To hold otherwise would have the effect of emasculating the central and extraordinary feature of the PFA which is to prospectively control and prevent domestic violence."
However, the court warned (in n. 4) that "it is not our intention to set a precedent under which it will be deemed proper in future matters to utilize the PFA rather than a Petition for Special Relief in Custody, as the proper avenue for a party to pursue in a circumstance similar to that herein. While a counseled party should be instructed to file a Petition for Special Relief in Custody, we are providing a party who initially files a PFA with a means of obtaining protection and lower courts with the ability to amend an existing Custody Order to effect the same."
Editorial note: I found this opinion very confusing and poorly written.
Wednesday, September 06, 2006
parol evidence - real estate contracts
Lutzky v. Petcove - ED Pa - August 21, 2006
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1054P.pdf
Plaintiffs permitted to use parol evidence in fraud claim on real estate contract. The parol evidence rule bars oral evidence about the terms of a written contact "when prior statements and representations (1) contradict, conflict, add, modify or vary the terms of a contract and (2) fall within the scope of the integrated agreement…..In Pennsylvania, an exception to the parol evidence rule exists for 'real estate inspection cases.'"
These cases require a court to "balance the extent of the party's knowledge of objectionable conditions derived from a reasonable inspection against the extent of the coverage of the contract's integration clause in order to determine whether than party could justifiably rely upon oral representations without insisting on further contractual protection or the deletion of the overly broad integration clause."
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1054P.pdf
Plaintiffs permitted to use parol evidence in fraud claim on real estate contract. The parol evidence rule bars oral evidence about the terms of a written contact "when prior statements and representations (1) contradict, conflict, add, modify or vary the terms of a contract and (2) fall within the scope of the integrated agreement…..In Pennsylvania, an exception to the parol evidence rule exists for 'real estate inspection cases.'"
These cases require a court to "balance the extent of the party's knowledge of objectionable conditions derived from a reasonable inspection against the extent of the coverage of the contract's integration clause in order to determine whether than party could justifiably rely upon oral representations without insisting on further contractual protection or the deletion of the overly broad integration clause."
Tuesday, September 05, 2006
employment - FMLA - waiver of rights
Dougherty v. TEVA Pharmaceuticals USA - ED Pa. - August 29, 2006
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1100P.pdf
The court held that a purported waiver of Plaintiff's FMLA rights was invalid under a DOL regulation, 29 CFR 825.220(d) and the 4th Cir. decision in Taylor v. Progress Energy, 415 F.3d 364 (2005) and similar cases.
The court rejected a contrary decision in Faris v. Williams WPC, 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003), that the anti-waiver provision applied only to current employees and only prohibited prospective waivers of rights.
In this case, plaintiff's employment had been terminated at the time she signed the disputed release/waiver.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1100P.pdf
The court held that a purported waiver of Plaintiff's FMLA rights was invalid under a DOL regulation, 29 CFR 825.220(d) and the 4th Cir. decision in Taylor v. Progress Energy, 415 F.3d 364 (2005) and similar cases.
The court rejected a contrary decision in Faris v. Williams WPC, 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003), that the anti-waiver provision applied only to current employees and only prohibited prospective waivers of rights.
In this case, plaintiff's employment had been terminated at the time she signed the disputed release/waiver.
Monday, September 04, 2006
admin. law - standard of proof - circumstantial evidence
A.B. v. Slippery Rock School District - Commonwealth Court - August 31, 2006
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/695CD06_8-31-06.pdf
In this school expulsion case, the court (at n. 5) affirmed that the "level of proof required to establish a case" before an administrative agency or other quasi-judicial body is a preponderance of the evidence, citing Lansberry v. PUC, 578 A.2d 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
The court also said (at n. 8 and related text) that circumstantial evidence can be used to satisfy that burden.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/695CD06_8-31-06.pdf
In this school expulsion case, the court (at n. 5) affirmed that the "level of proof required to establish a case" before an administrative agency or other quasi-judicial body is a preponderance of the evidence, citing Lansberry v. PUC, 578 A.2d 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
The court also said (at n. 8 and related text) that circumstantial evidence can be used to satisfy that burden.
federal courts - standing - abstention
Taliaferro v. Darby Township Zoning Board - 3rd Cir. - August 10, 2006
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052253p.pdf
This is an exclusionary zoning case that contains short summaries of a) federal standing law, including when a litigant can bring a case on behalf of a third party, and b) two kinds of absention, Younger and Rooker-Feldman.
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/052253p.pdf
This is an exclusionary zoning case that contains short summaries of a) federal standing law, including when a litigant can bring a case on behalf of a third party, and b) two kinds of absention, Younger and Rooker-Feldman.
employment - Title VII - retaliation
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway v. White - U.S. Supreme Court - June 22, 2006
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-259.pdf
In what one of the plaintiff's lawyers called an "exceptionally important decision," the court held 9-0 that a person pursuing an anti-retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C . sec.. 2000e-2(a),against an employer need only prove a "materially adverse" employment action that "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker" from complaining about discrimination. The anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who has made a charge, testified, assisted orparticipated in a Title VII proceeding or investigation, sec. 2000e-3(a).
The court rejected the employer's claim that retaliation should only include actions that affect an employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The court found that the anti-retaliation provision was broader that the anti-discrimination provision and is "not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment," holding that Congress wanted to "deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take" in the workplace and beyond.
The court said the context and common sense matter and that it was not imposing a "general civility code" on the workplace. Rather, the court's decision and standard would "screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from complaining."
This new standard was applied in Walsh v. Irvin Stern's Costumes, Inc. - ED Pa. - 8-15-06
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1024P.pdf
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-259.pdf
In what one of the plaintiff's lawyers called an "exceptionally important decision," the court held 9-0 that a person pursuing an anti-retaliation claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C . sec.. 2000e-2(a),against an employer need only prove a "materially adverse" employment action that "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker" from complaining about discrimination. The anti-retaliation provision protects an employee who has made a charge, testified, assisted orparticipated in a Title VII proceeding or investigation, sec. 2000e-3(a).
The court rejected the employer's claim that retaliation should only include actions that affect an employee's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment. The court found that the anti-retaliation provision was broader that the anti-discrimination provision and is "not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment," holding that Congress wanted to "deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take" in the workplace and beyond.
The court said the context and common sense matter and that it was not imposing a "general civility code" on the workplace. Rather, the court's decision and standard would "screen out trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees from complaining."
This new standard was applied in Walsh v. Irvin Stern's Costumes, Inc. - ED Pa. - 8-15-06
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/06D1024P.pdf
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