Ericcson Properties v. Bulle Construction
Pa. Superior Court 1-10-25
A breach of contract entitles the non-breaching party to damages. “The central principle of the law regarding contractual damages is that the non-breaching party should be placed in the position he or she would have been in absent breach.” See Oelschlegel v. Mut. Real Estate Inv. Tr., 633 A.2d 181, 184 (Pa. Super. 1993).
This Court has cited and applied the following measure of damages set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 347:
[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured by
[T]he injured party has a right to damages based on his expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in the value to him of the other party’s performance caused by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
(b) any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he has avoided by not having to perform.
Douglass v. Licciardi Const. Co., Inc., 562 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Super. 1989); accord Oelschlegel, 633 A.2d at 184 (discussing Illustration 2 of Restatement 2d of Contracts § 348). Our courts “have generally allowed damages for incomplete or defective performance of a building contract to be measured by the cost of completing the work or correcting the defects by another contractor.” Douglass, 562 A.2d at 915-16.
“When performance of a duty under a contract is due, any nonperformance is a breach.” Seneca Res. Corp. v. S & T Bank, 122 A.3d 374, 379 (Pa. Super. 2015) . . . ..
Acts of a third party that cause a delay do not excuse failure to perform if such acts were foreseeable. See Luria Eng’g Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 213 A.2d 151, 153 (Pa. Super. 1965). Rather, mere inconvenience, though it works a hardship on a party, does not excuse him from the performance of an absolute and unqualified undertaking to do a thing which is both lawful and possible; and, where performance becomes difficult or impossible by reason of something occurring subsequent to the contract, the promisor is not thereby discharged if it appears that the thing to be done is lawful and possible in itself, inasmuch as it is his duty, if he wishes to be excused from performance in the event of such contingency arising, to provide for that situation in his contract. Id. at 154
