RFRA - 1st Amendment - free exercise - for-profit corporation

Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Secy. of HHS – 3d Cir. – July 26, 2013

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/131144p.pdf

Appellants Conestoga Wood Specialties Corporation , Norman Hahn, Elizabeth Hahn, Norman Lemar Hahn, Anthony Hahn, and Kevin Hahn appeal from an order of the District Court denying their motion for a preliminary injunction.

In their Complaint, Appellants allege that regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, which require group health plans and health insurance issuers to provide coverage for contraceptives, violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb,  and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, concluding that Appellants were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.  Appellants then filed an expedited motion for a stay pending appeal with this Court, which was denied.  Now, we consider the fully briefed appeal from the District Court‘s denial of a preliminary injunction.

Before we can even reach the merits of the First Amendment and RFRA claims, we must consider a threshold issue: whether a for-profit, secular corporation is able to 1 The Complaint also alleges that the regulations violate the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Administrative Procedure Act.

While the District Court‘s opinion addressed some of these additional claims, Appellants have limited their appeal to whether the regulations violate the RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause. engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the RFRA.

As we conclude that forprofit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise, we will affirm the order of the District Court.

 

immigration - City of Hazleton case - MD Pa. affirmed by 3d Cir.on remand from US SCt

Lozano et al. v.City of Hazleton – 3d Cir. – July 2013

http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/073531p.pdf

OPINION OF THE COURT

__________
McKEE, Chief Judge.

This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court. The City of Hazleton previously appealed the District Court‟s judgment permanently enjoining enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to  prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude them from renting housing within the City.

 In a precedential Opinion and Judgment filed on September 9, 2010, we upheld the permanent injunction. Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted Hazleton‟s petition for a writ of certiorari and remanded this case so that we could reconsider our analysis in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). See City of Hazleton v. Lozano, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011).

Subsequently, the Court also decided Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). Both Whiting and Arizona address the extent to which federal immigration law pre-empts various state laws pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens. On remand, we asked for supplemental briefing on whether either of those decisions alter our original analysis upholding the District Court‟s injunction.

Having thoroughly considered the additional submissions of the parties and the Court‟s decisions in Whiting and Arizona, we again conclude that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are pre-empted by federal immigration law. Accordingly, we will again conclude that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are pre-empted by federal immigration law. Accordingly, we will again affirm the District Court‟s order enjoining enforcement of these provisions.