UC - vol. quit - late payment of wages - single instance
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In UGI Utilities, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 851 A.2d 240 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), this Court held that Section 402(e.1) of the Law governs discharges related to drug tests and not the general willful misconduct discharge governed by Section 402(e) of the Law. UGI Utilities, 851 A.2d at 245. See also Architectural Testing, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 940 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (noting both the failure of a drug test, and the refusal to take a drug test, are now analyzed under Section 402(e.1)). Accordingly, Section 402(e.1) requires an employer to (1) demonstrate that it adopted a substance abuse policy; and (2) that the employee violated that policy. UGI Utilities, 851 A.2d at 252. Further, the policy permitting drug and alcohol testing need not be detailed. Architectural Testing, 940 A.2d at 1282. Once the employer establishes the policy, the burden shifts to the employee to show that the policy was either trumped by a statute or collective bargaining agreement. UGI Utilities, 851 A.2d at 252.
Here, Employer’s substance abuse policy states that [r]efusal to submit to a requested alcohol or drug test is grounds for immediate discharge. Refusal includes refusing to report immediately to the testing location upon request …. The Federal regulation, by which Employer is bound, also states that drivers must report immediately for testing. 49 C.F.R. §382.305(l). The Federal regulation provides that an employee is considered to have refused a drug test when he "fail[s] to appear for any test . . . within a reasonable time, as determined by the Employer, . . . after being directed to do so by the employer." 49 C.F.R. §40.191(a)(1)
Claimant did not comply with the requirement to proceed immediatelyto the testing facility, i.e., first thing Monday morning. Telling Employer that he would go for the drug screen after he returned from Massachusetts constitutes a "refusal" as that term is defined in Employer’s substance abuse policy and in FMCSA regulations
In re E.A. - Cmwlth. Court - January 9, 2012
Daughter‟s statements of sexual abuse involve Father, Father's wife, a cow and dogs. Her statements ramble, describing incidents that took place under a bed and in her bed, years ago or several days ago. Daughter's statement is simply not competent to stand as the sole support of a finding of sexual abuse.
Daughter's statement was not corroborated by the testimony of CWS workers, whose only experience with Daughter was attendance at the interview is not corroboration. Their testimony about what Daughter said at her interview is double hearsay that was redundant, not corroborative, of the out-of-state DVD. Hearsay can not constitute independent corroborative evidence of hearsay. A.P. v. Department of Public Welfare, 696 A.2d 912, 916 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). In short, there was no corroboration to support the Bureau‟s finding that Father sexually assaulted Daughter.
As noted, there is no prior case where a court has allowed a child‟s uncorroborated hearsay statement to serve as the sole evidence to support a factual finding of child abuse. Indeed, county agencies routinely offer corroborating evidence. In C.E. v. Department of Public Welfare, 917 A.2d 348, 351 (Pa. Cmwlth 2007), for example, the county agency offered testimony from the emergency room physician who treated the child as corroborating evidence. See also A.O. v. Department of Public Welfare, 838 A.2d 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (testimony of physician with expertise in sexually abused children offered to corroborate hearsay statements of child victim); Mortimore v. Department of Public Welfare, 697 A.2d 1031 (Pa. Cmwlth 1997) (testimony of physician offered to corroborate hearsay statement of child victim of sexual abuse); D.P., 733 A.2d 661 (testimony of child psychiatrist and medical doctor offered to corroborate hearing statement of child victim, although the child‟s statement was held inadmissible). Here, the CYW offered no comparable evidence to corroborate Daughter‟s out-of-court statement that Father, as well as his wife and family dogs, had subjected her to various acts of defilement. The evidence CYS claims to be corroboration was only more hearsay.
Where the hearsay statement is that of a very young child, corroboration is needed to find that a perpetrator engaged in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus and digital penetration of the child, as was reported here by CYS. A medical examination to confirm vaginal penetration and an investigation of Daughter‟s living situation in New York, to consider what other persons had an opportunity to abuse Daughter in the past, should have been undertaken. This is not the exceptional case where uncorroborated hearsay alone may be sufficient to justify a finding of abuse.
The DVD was admitted without prior determination of indicia of reliability - In his second issue, Father contends that the hearing officer erred, procedurally, in ruling that the New York DVD was admissible in lieu of Daughter‟s testimony. We agree. The ruling was made before the hearing officer reviewed the New York DVD. A stenographer did not transcribe the videotaped interview, so the hearing officer did not have a written transcript available at the in camera hearing. Instead, the hearing officer relied upon the telephonic statements of Hall, the interviewer, for a recital of what Daughter said in the interview. CYS opinion that the videotaped interview of Daughter satisfied the requirements of 42 Pa. C.S. §5986(a)(1) was beside the point. It is the job of the factfinder to ensure "that the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability …." 42 Pa. C.S. §5986(a)(1) (emphasis added). This requires a review of the hearsay statement to determine its admissibility.
Here, the factfinder relied upon CYS testimony in admitting the New York DVD in lieu of Daughter‟s testimony. This was error. CYS testimony was appropriate for establishing the time and circumstances of Daughter‟s statement. However, only by viewing the New York DVD could the hearing officer determine whether the content of Daughter‟s statement demonstrated sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission. By admitting the New York DVD on the basis of a CYS statement of what it contained, the hearing officer repeated the mistake identified in A.Y.: [T]he Agency was able to rely on its own employees‟ recitation of what the three-year old child stated had occurred … [This] procedure … prevented the hearing officer from having any opportunity to judge the evidence except through the prism provided by the Agency. A.Y. at 125, 641 A.2d at 1152 (emphasis added). Likewise here, the hearing officer decided the admissibility of the New York DVD "through the prism provided by" Wyoming County.
Alleged abuser not required to provide contradictory evidence - The hearing officer criticized Father for not providing "significant contradictory evidence." This was not Father‟s burden. We do not require litigants to prove a negative because it cannot be done. It was Wyoming County‟s duty to investigate the serious allegations made by Mother, and it did not do so. It relied entirely upon New York personnel, for whose work Wyoming County could not vouch. Wyoming County did not investigate Father‟s background, character, reputation or family or offer any evidence such as a physical exam or evaluation of a physician or psychologist to corroborate the New York DVD hearsay statement.
Accordingly, we conclude that substantial evidence does not support the factual finding that Father committed a sexual assault and, therefore, reverse