Friday, October 29, 2021

UC - telephone hearing - tech. problems - no fault on part of claimant

O’Leary v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – October 27, 2021 – unreported memorandum decision**

 

Held: UCBR decision vacated and case remanded for consideration of merits where there were substantial phone problems, none of which were the fault of the claimant.

 

From the opinion—

 

No evidence of fault on part of claimant

[W]e do not believe that there is evidence that Claimant “failed to appear” in any real sense—because of the pandemic, the hearing was required to be telephonic. The evidence in the record indicates that Claimant was doing exactly what he had been directed to do: waiting by his cell phone at the appointed time for the call from the Referee’s office. Further, there is no evidence that during the first hearing he failed to heed the directive of the hearing notice regarding his cell phone’s ability to receive calls from a source with a Caller ID block7—the record does not reflect the reason for the failure of his cell phone to ring. Claimant’s undisputed testimony was that he did what he could to remedy the situation “in real time,” as the hearing was being conducted in his absence. . . . .There is no indication in the record who was at fault for the dropped call at that point8—merely that there was a dropped call and that no further attempts were made to contact the attorney. At this point, neither Claimant nor his attorney could participate because the telephone hearings were arranged in such a way that parties and their counsel could not call into the hearing but could only be connected when the Referee called them.

 

Responsibility for technological problems

The UCBR does not cite—and our own review of UCBR regulations fails to find—any authority for the proposition that “[p]arties are responsible for their own technology and in charge of their phone and incoming calls,” let alone any regulation suggesting that technological difficulties of unknown causecan preclude a party from having his day in court. Even though an administrative tribunal has discretion over how to conduct a hearing, there are still “certain fundamental rights that must be honored, including the right to a fair hearing in accordance with due process of law.” Collins v. UCBR, 415 A.2d 145, 146 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). While not involving a telephone hearing, this Court in Collins found a violation of due process when a hearing was conducted without the claimant and his attorney despite their presence in the referee’s waiting room, and thus vacated the Board’s order and remanded for a new hearing. Although not directly controlling, we find its analysis applicable here. See also Hoover v. UCBR., 509 A.2d 962, 963 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (reversing for a new hearing where the use of a telephone in an unemployment compensation hearing precluded the claimant from presenting documents into evidence, and the referee “simply ignored the claimant’s proffer”). 

 

Referee actions  -- We recognize that the Referee was put in a difficult situation on the day of the first hearing, given the obligation to connect multiple parties telephonically, apparently without assistance. We do not fault her for her actions. However, that the Referee herself encountered technological difficulties underscores the unreasonableness of depriving Claimant of his right to present his case because he was unable to receive her calls. 

Conclusion – In light of the foregoing, we must conclude that on the facts of this case the UCBR abused its discretion by refusing to consider Claimant’s testimony during the remand hearing.Accordingly, we vacate the order of the UCBR and remand for consideration of the merits of this claim on the evidence already adduced, including the testimony of Claimant at the second hearing. 

 

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**An unreported, non-precedential Commonwealth Court case can be cited for its persuasive value but is not binding precedent.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716.

Thursday, October 21, 2021

LT - security deposits - application of deposit to offset judgment - MDJ rules

Rules                          https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/Attachment%20-%20104930189149616719.pdf?cb=1


Adoption report       https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/Report%20-%20104930189149616914.pdf?cb=1


Order                         https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/Order%20Entered%20-%20104930189149616582.pdf?cb=1

 

Effective date January 1, 2022

 

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Editor’s note: The official note (below) covers many provisions of MDJ Rule 514, including the new ones about security deposits. It is definitely worth reading the entire note.


Official Note


Subdivision A of this rule requires that the landlord appear and give testimony to prove the complaint before the magisterial district judge can enter judgment against the tenant, even when the tenant fails to appear for the hearing. The magisterial district judge shall not enter a default judgment in a possessory action, including a judgment for money only. See Rule 512A and Note. The various issues that the magisterial district judge must determine at the hearing include: whether notice to quit was given to the tenant in accordance with law or that no notice was required under the terms of the lease; the amount or rent due, if any; damages to the leasehold premises, if any; the amount found to constitute the monthly rental; and, the amount of the security deposit held by the landlord, if any. 


As to the notice to quit requirement, see Section 501 of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, 68 P.S. § 250.501. See also Patrycia Bros., Inc. v. McKeefrey, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 149 (Delaware County C.P. 1966). 


The separate entries provided in subdivision A are made necessary as a result of the rental deposit provisions for appeal or certiorari contained in Rules 1008B and 1013B, as well as the wage attachment provisions contained in Section 8127 of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8127. 


If the magisterial district judge permits a security deposit held by the landlord to be used as an offset against a monetary judgment, the amount of the security deposit so applied must be identified as such on the judgment form. There are limited circumstances when application of the security deposit to offset a monetary judgment is appropriate, such as when the tenant has already left the property, the landlord has had the opportunity to inspect the property, both parties have appeared before the magisterial district judge, and the parties agree that the security deposit should be used to offset the judgment. For additional requirements regarding the return of a security deposit, including the provision of a list of damages and remission of the deposit less the cost of damages within 30 days of termination of the lease or upon surrender and acceptance of the leasehold premises, see Section 512 of the Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, 68 P.S. § 250.512. 


Subdivision [B] C of this rule [makes provision] provides for a money judgment for the tenant if the tenant prevails in a greater amount on the tenant's cross-complaint. 


Subdivision [D] E of this rule provides for certain notices the magisterial district court shall include in the written notice of judgment or dismissal. 


Subdivision [D] E(2) reflects that the appeal period for a victim of domestic violence in a case arising out of a residential lease is 30 days. See Rule 1002B(2); see also 68 P.S. § 250.513. A tenant who is a victim of domestic violence may file a domestic violence affidavit with the magisterial district court to stay the execution of an order for possession until 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment, the filing of an appeal with the court of common pleas pursuant to Rule 1002, or by order of the court of common pleas, whichever is earlier. See Rule 514.1. 

As to subdivision [D(2)] E(3)see Rule 402D and Note. As to subdivision [D(3)] E(4)see Rule 341. 

 

 

 

Wednesday, October 20, 2021

courts - coordinate jurisdiction rule - disparate rulings by judges of same court

Rellick-Smith v. Rellick and Vassal – Pa. Supreme Court – October 20, 2021 – reported opinion
majority         https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-25-2021oajc%20-%20104928653149485274.pdf?cb=1


Concurring    https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-25-2021oajc%20-%20104928653149485274.pdf?cb=1


Dissent           https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-25-2021do%20-%20104928653149485169.pdf?cb=1


Dissent           https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-25-2021do1%20-%20104928653149485261.pdf?cb=1

 

Opinion announcing judgment of the court

In this appeal by allowance, we consider whether the Superior Court erred in affirming an order of the trial court that permitted the appellees to file an amended answer to include the affirmative defense of statute of limitations, which a different trial court judge previously ruled was waived. As we conclude that the second trial judge’s order violated the coordinate jurisdiction rule in this regard, we hold that the Superior Court erred in affirming his order, and, accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s decision, vacate in part the trial judge’s order, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Under the coordinate jurisdiction rule, “[j]udges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each others’ decisions.” Ryan, 813 A.2d at 795 (quoting Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331). Beyond promoting the goal of judicial economy, the coordinate jurisdiction rule serves “(1) to protect the settled expectations of the parties; (2) to insure [sic] uniformity of decisions; (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4) to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice; and (5) to bring litigation to an end.” Id. (quoting Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331). 

[D]eparture from the coordinate jurisdiction rule “is allowed only in exceptional circumstances such as where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence giving rise to the dispute in the matter, or where the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed.” Id. (quoting Starr, 664 A.2d at 1332). 

Thursday, October 14, 2021

UC - voluntary quit - reasonable effort to maintain employment

Lundberg v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – October 14, 2021 – unpublished memorandum opinion*

 

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/29CD21_10-14-21.pdf?cb=1

 

HELD: Claimant was not eligible for UC because she quit her job because of COVID concerns, but without either a) trying to maintain her job by discussing her concerns with her employer, and b) without telling  her employer the reason why she was quitting.

 

To show a necessitous and compelling reason under Section 402(b) of the Law, a claimant must show that (1) circumstances existed which produced real and substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her employment. Solar Innovations, Inc. v UCBR, 38 A.3d 1051, 1056 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

Whether the reason for Claimant’s concerns were inadequate safety measures by Employer or fears related to her and/or her father’s health, or both, Claimant’s burden to make a reasonable effort to preserve her employment required her to give notice to Employer as to her concerns and health conditions and allow Employer the opportunity to modify her work conditions. 

This is the case even where there is a real and serious safety concern, see Iaconelli v. UCBR, 423 A.2d 754, 756 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), or where a claimant has a medical condition which endangers her, see St. Clair Hospital v. UCBR, 154 A.3d 401 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). Once communicated, an employer must have a reasonable opportunity to make accommodations with respect to the work conditions and/or medical condition. See Blackwell v. UCBR., 555 A.2d 279, 281-82 & n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). 

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*An unreported, non-precedential Commonwealth Court case can be cited for its persuasive value but is not binding precedent.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716