Tuesday, January 27, 2009

disability - attorney fees - subantially justified

Magwood v. Astrue - ED Pa. - January 21, 2009

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/09D0086P.pdf

Government's position was not substantially justified where it was contrary to clearly established law concerning step 2 (severity) of the disability evaluation process. The government's prior "string of successes" before a 3d Cir. reversal was not enough to satisfy its burden.

A fee of $12,275.21 was awarded (68.30 hours at a rate of $176.23, plus $238.70 for expenses)

mortgage foreclosure - defective Act 91 - prejudice

Wells Fargo v. Monroe - Superior Court - January 26, 2009

http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s71014_08.pdf

An allegedly defective* Act 91 notice was held not to be a defense to a foreclosure action when the mortgagors were given and availed themselves of the opportunity to pursue mortgage assistance through the HEMAP program.

They met with a credit counseling agency within the 30, as provided by the Act 91 Notice, and applied for mortgage assistance, which was ultimately denied. Under these circumstances, no prejudice could be presumed because of lack of compliance with the Act 91 requirements, and no prejudice was shown.

The " trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Act 91 Notice sufficiently apprised the Monroes of their options with regard to the aid to which they were entitled. Therefore, the trial court’s grant of the motion for summary judgment filed by Wells Fargo was proper."

*The Act 91 notice was alleged to be defective for lack of notation of a place to cure and the inclusion of improper fees.

attorney fees - lease - prevailing party

Bayne v. Smith - Superior Court - January 26, 2009

http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a28016_08.pdf

The court reversed the trial court and held that the lease was not an adhesion contract and that the attorney fee provision was not unconscionable. The tenant did not show a lack of meaningful choice about whether to accept the provision, or that the provision unreasonably favored the landlord.

The court held that critical language in Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301[, 219 A.2d 463] (1966), was mere dicta. It found that the trial court’s reliance on Galligan and Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 459 Pa. 450, 485-486, 329 A.2d 812, 830 (1974)] was "misplaced" and the the tenant "failed to satisfy her burden as to unconscionability."

The fee provision in question would have allowed the tenant to recover attorney fees from the landlord had she prevailed in her defense. It gave the "prevailing party" the right to recover fees.

discovery - sanctions - Pa. courts

Cove Centre, Inc. v. Westhafer Construction Co. - Superior Court - January 26, 2009

http://origin-www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a32023_08.pdf

Where a discovery sanction either terminates the action directly or would result in its termination by operation of law, the court must consider multiple factors balanced together with the necessity of the sanction.(1) the nature and severity of the discovery violation;(2) the defaulting party's willfulness or bad faith;(3) prejudice to the opposing party;(4) the ability to cure the prejudice; and(5) the importance of the precluded evidence in light of the failure to comply.

With few exceptions, there is no greater sanction in a civil case than a deemed admission of a Request for Admission, as well as preclusion of expert testimony and entry of judgment, so a balancing of the equities emphasizing the nature and motive of the non-compliant party’s conduct is mandatory.

The mere failure of an unrepresented party to comply with discovery rules does not amount to “willfulness or bad faith” as contemplated by case law.

As concerns potential prejudice occasioned by the failure to comply with discovery, the record discloses no hardship to the party seeking sanctions which is not readily remedied upon remand.

The party never filed a Motion to Compel Discovery so as to invoke the trial court’s authority in the interest of advancing the litigation and minimizing delay, which has now been extended by the necessity of this appeal. Moreover, the violations in question did not result in a loss of evidence favorable to the movant. Compliance with the discovery requests in question, even at this late date, would allow the matter to proceed to a full and fair resolution.Compared to the extraordinary prejudice of a sanction order that the trial court has since repudiated, the prejudice to the movant imposed by the failure to comply with discovery is minimal.

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