OCTOBER TERM, 2012
SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
CHAFIN v. CHAFIN
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 11–1347. Argued
December 5, 2012—Decided February 19, 2013
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
requires the judicial or administrative authority of a Contracting State to
order a child returned to her country of habitual residence if the authority
finds that the child has been wrongfullyremoved to or retained in the
Contracting State. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA)
implements the Convention in the United States, granting federal and state
courts concurrent jurisdiction over Convention actions and directing those
courts to decide cases in accordance with the Convention. ICARA also requires
defendants to pay various expenses incurred by plaintiffs associatedwith the
return of children. Petitioner Mr. Chafin, a United States citizen and member
of the military, married respondent Ms. Chafin, a United Kingdom citizen, in
Germany, where they later had a daughter, E. C. When Mr. Chafin was deployed
to Afghanistan, Ms. Chafin took E. C. to Scotland.Mr. Chafin was later
transferred to Huntsville, Alabama, and Ms. Chafin eventually traveled there
with E. C. Soon after Ms. Chafin’s arrival, Mr. Chafin filed for divorce and
child custody in Alabama.Ms. Chafin was subsequently deported, but E. C.
remained in Alabama with Mr. Chafin. Several months later, Ms. Chafin filed a
petition under the Convention and ICARA, seeking E. C.’s return to Scotland.
The District Court concluded that E. C.’s country of habitualresidence was
Scotland and granted the petition for return. Ms. Chafin immediately departed
for Scotland with E. C. Ms. Chafin then initiated custody proceedings in
Scotland and was granted interim custody and a preliminary injunction
prohibiting Mr. Chafin fromremoving E. C. from Scotland. Mr. Chafin appealed
the DistrictCourt’s order, but the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as
moot, on the ground that once a child has been returned to a foreign country,
a U. S. court becomes powerless to grant relief. On remand, the District Court
ordered Mr. Chafin to reimburse Ms. Chafin for court costs, attorney’s fees,
and travel expenses.
(a) Article III restricts the power of federal courts to
“Cases” and“Controversies,” and this “requirement subsists through all stages
of [the] proceedings,” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S.
472, 477. No case or controversy exists, and a suit becomes moot, “whenthe issues
presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legallycognizable interest
in the outcome,” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U. S. ___, ___.
But a case “becomes moot only when it is impossiblefor a court to grant any
effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party,” Knox v. Service
Employees, 567 U. S. ___, ___. As “long as theparties have a concrete
interest, however small, in the outcome of thelitigation, the case is not
moot,” ibid. Pp. 5–6.
(b) Because the Chafins continue to
vigorously contest the questionof where their daughter will be raised, this
dispute is very much alive. This case does not address “a hypothetical state of
facts,” Lewis, supra, at 477, and there continues to exist
between the parties“that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues,” Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 6–11.
(1) Mr. Chafin seeks typical appellate relief: reversal of the District Court
determination that E. C.’s habitual residence was Scotland and, upon reversal,
an order that E. C. be returned to the United States. The question is whether
such relief would be effectual. In arguing that this case is moot because the
District Court has no authority to issue a re-return order either under the
Convention or pursuant to its inherent equitable powers, Ms. Chafin confuses
mootness with the merits. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack,
395 U. S. 486, 500. Mr. Chafin’s claim for re-return cannot be dismissed as so
implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction, and his
prospects ofsuccess are therefore not pertinent to the mootness inquiry. As to
the effectiveness of any relief, even if Scotland were to ignore a re-return
order, this case would not be moot. The U. S. courts continue to have personal
jurisdiction over Ms. Chafin and may command her to takeaction under threat of
sanctions. She could decide to comply with anorder against her and return E. C.
to the United States. Enforcement of the order may be uncertain if Ms. Chafin
chooses to defy it, but such uncertainty does not typically render cases moot.
Pp. 7–10.
(2) Mr. Chafin also seeks, if he prevails, vacatur of the District Court’s
expense orders. That too is common relief on appeal, and the mootness inquiry
comes down to its effectiveness. In contending that this case is moot due to
Mr. Chafin’s failure to pursue an appeal ofthe expense orders, which were
entered as separate judgments, Ms. Chafin again confuses mootness with the
merits. Because there is authority for the proposition that failure to appeal
such judgments separately does not preclude relief, it is for lower courts at
later stages of the litigation to decide whether Mr. Chafin is in fact
entitled tothe relief he seeks. That relief would not be “ ‘fully
satisfactory,’ ” but “even the availability of a ‘partial remedy’ is
‘sufficient to prevent [a] case from being moot,’ ” Calderon v. Moore,
518 U. S. 149, 150. Pp. 10–11.
(c) Manipulating constitutional doctrine and
holding these cases moot is not necessary to achieve the ends of the Convention
and IC-ARA, and may undermine the treaty’s goals and harm the children meant to
be protected. If these cases were to become moot upon return, courts would be
more likely to grant stays as a matter of course, to prevent the loss of any
right to appeal. Such routine stays wouldconflict with the Convention’s mandate
of prompt return. Courts should instead apply traditional factors in
considering whether to stay a return order, see, e.g., Nken v. Holder,
556 U. S. 418, 434, thus ensuring that each case will receive the
individualized treatmentnecessary for appropriate consideration of the child’s
best interests.Finally, at both the district and appellate court level, courts
should take steps to decide these cases as expeditiously as possible. Pp. 11–14. Vacated and remanded.
