Anderson et al. v. The Franklin
Institute – E.D. Pa. – May 6, 2016
Held:
FI’s policy of charging separate admission fees for the
government-funded personal care attendants (PCA) of people with disabilities
violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 USC 12181 et seq., and
corresponding regulations, 28 CFR 36.101 et seq. FI’s policy effectively doubled the cost of
admission for the class of disabled persons who need PCAs to help with aspects
of daily living.
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA “to
remedy widespread discrimination against disabled individuals. In studying the
need for such legislation, Congress found that ‘historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite
some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.’ ” PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674–75 (2001). 11 Title III of the ADA and
its implementing regulations prohibit “public accommodations,” including
museums, theaters, stadiums, and other places “of exhibit entertainment,” from
discriminating against people with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §
12181(7)(C)&(H). Specifically, “[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
Discrimination under the ADA includes
failure to afford an individual or class of individuals the equal opportunity
to participate in or benefit from a good, service, or facility as able-bodied
individuals on the basis of disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii); see
generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101. An entity can also be held liable for ADA
discrimination for failing to reasonably modify its policies and practices to
accommodate individuals with disabilities absent proof “that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. §
12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). In addition, a “public accommodation may not impose a
surcharge on [disabled persons] to cover the costs of measures, such as the
provision of auxiliary aids, barrier removal, alternatives to barrier removal,
and reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, that are
required to provide [those individuals] with the nondiscriminatory treatment
required by the Act or this part.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.301(c).
The above statutory requirements and
definitions have been condensed by the case law into a three part test: “[t]o
state a claim of disability discrimination under Title III of the ADA, a
plaintiff must show (1) discrimination on the basis of a disability; (2) in the
full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages
or accommodations of any place of public accommodation; (3) by the public
accommodation's owner, lessor or operator.” See, e.g., Harty v. Burlington Coat
Factory of Pennsylvania, L.L.C., No. 11-01923, 2011 WL 2415169, at *9 (E.D. Pa.
June 16, 2011) (internal citations omitted); Dempsey v. Pistol Pete's Beef N
Beer, LLC, No. 08-5454, 2009 WL 3584597, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2009). The court held that that plaintiffs satisfied
this test, concentrating its analysis on part two: the right to full and equal
enjoyment of goods and services.
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