LT - self-help eviction - injunction - immediate and irreparable harm

A commercial tenant that was evicted by self-help measures is entitled to a preliminary injunction restoring possession because (1) the Landlord-Tenant Act provides the “complete and exclusive system in itself” to obtain the eviction of tenants and (2) the loss of a leasehold interest in real estate constitutes irreparable harm.  Fraport Pittsburgh v. Allegheny County Airport Authority, No. 974 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. May 9, 2023)

From the opinion---

The trial court found that evidence demonstrating all the elements of a preliminary injunction was shown except for the first element requiring “immediate and irreparable harm [defined as] injury for which damages can only be estimated by conjecture and not by an accurate pecuniary standard or cannot be adequately compensated by an award of monetary damages.” City of Allentown v. Lehigh Cnty. Auth., 222 A.3d 1152, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2019) . . . . “In order to meet this burden, a plaintiff must present concrete evidence demonstrating actual proof of irreparable harm.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Where there is a real property interest, the loss of that interest constitutes irreparable harm because each parcel of  real estate is unique. See Peters v. Davis, 231 A.2d 748 (Pa. 1967), stating: 

The aggrieved property owner’s right is absolute. However hard his acts might be regarded; he asks the court for the enforcement of a legal right of a positive character with respect to land which it is conceded was wrongfully taken from him. He is  entitled to a decree. The rule in such a case is founded on sound reason. If damages may be substituted for the land, it will amount  to an open invitation to those so inclined to follow a similar course and thus secure valuable property rights. The amount of land involved does not change the situation. Here is a wrongful invasion of a positive right to real property. If a property owner deliberately and intentionally violates a valid express restriction running with the land or intentionally ‘takes a chance’, the appropriate remedy is a mandatory injunction to eradicate the violation. 

Id. at 752 (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has also held that, “In light of the unique and intrinsic value of land, interference with the plaintiff’s contractual rights to ownership of that land must be deemed irreparable harm.” New Eastwick Corp. v. Philadelphia Builders Eastwick Corp., 241 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 1968). Additionally, regarding possession of a leasehold interest, “[t]here is substantial common-law authority that the leasing of property is identical to  the sale of the premises.” Com., by Creamer v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 822 (Pa. 1974) (citation omitted). 

 

LT - self-help eviction is not allowed

A commercial tenant that was evicted by self-help measures is entitled to a preliminary injunction restoring possession because (1) the Landlord-Tenant Act provides the “complete and exclusive system in itself” to obtain the eviction of tenants and (2) the loss of a leasehold interest in real estate constitutes irreparable harm.  Fraport Pittsburgh v. Allegheny County Airport Authority, No. 974 WDA 2022 (Pa. Super. May 9, 2023).

 

Thank you Brandon Copeland for bringing this case to my attention.

 

“Not only should a preliminary injunction be issued because money

damages cannot compensate Fraport for loss of its leasehold interest, but it

was also an error for the trial court not to issue a preliminary injunction due

to ACAA’s self-help by the improper use of the Allegheny County Police to

advance its commercial interests to evict Fraport.

 

Because a landlord/tenant relationship existed, ACAA was required to

utilize the procedures set forth in the Landlord Tenant Act of 19519

to lawfully evict10 Fraport. The Landlord Tenant Act is a comprehensive regulatory

scheme governing the landlord and tenant relationship. See Stonehedge

Square Ltd. P'ship v. Movie Merchants, Inc., 715 A.2d 1082, 1085 (Pa.

1998). It “sets up the procedure whereby a landlord may repossess [the]

premises if he has a right to evict the tenant.” Warren v. City of

Philadelphia, 115 A.2d 218, 221 (Pa. 1955). The Landlord Tenant Act states

that all other inconsistent acts are repealed and that “[i]t is intended that

this act shall furnish a complete and exclusive system in itself.” 68

P.S. § 250.602 (emphasis added).

 

***

 

Regarding self-help, while the Landlord Tenant Act provides that it is the

“complete and exclusive system in itself” to obtain the eviction of

tenants, surprisingly, no Pennsylvania appellate decision has addressed the

issue of the appropriateness of a landlord’s use of self-help, but the courts of

common pleas which have addressed this issue have consistently held self-

help is not available to evict a tenant. See e.g., O'Brien v. Jacob Engle

Foundation, Inc., 47 Pa. D. & C.3d 557, 558–59 (Cumberland Cty. 1987)

(noting that self-help should not be used where judicial procedures, like the

Landlord Tenant Act, are available); Lenair v. Campbell, 31 Pa. D. & C.3d

237, 241 (Philadelphia Cty. 1984) (“Upon reviewing the [Landlord Tenant Act]

in its entirety, it becomes apparent that self-help eviction is not a remedy

under any circumstances. . . . [T]he legislature clearly expressed its intention

that the Act be the sole source of rights, remedies and procedures governing

the landlord/tenant relationship.”); Wofford v. Vavreck, 22 Pa. D. & C. 3d

444, 453 (Crawford Cty. 1981) (“A landlord desirous of seeking repossession

of his leased premises from his tenant for nonpayment of rent must do so

either by bringing an action under the Landlord and Tenant Act [], and the

related Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure for Justices of the Peace, or by

bringing an action in ejectment.”); Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 52 n.

13 (3d Cir. 1989) (analyzing pertinent Pennsylvania law). Moreover, under

the Master Lease, the ACCA limited itself to seeking only remedies at law and

equity and not to engage in self-help, even if it was permissible. See Master

Lease at 46, § 12.04).

 

UC - voluntary quit - firm offer of other employment

Cortez v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – May 30, 2023 – unreported memorandum opinion**

 

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/776CD22_5-30-23.pdf?cb=1

 

“A claimant who voluntarily terminates his employment has the burden of proving that a necessitous and compelling cause existed.” Solar Innovations, Inc. v. UCBR., 38 A.3d 1051, 1056 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Our Court has held that the receipt and acceptance of a firm offer of employment constitutes cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. Id. A firm offer of employment is one that contains the specific conditions of employment, such as wages, hours, duties, and a starting date. Baron v. UCBR., 384 A.2d 271, 272 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978). “The offer of employment, however, must be definite, and the claimant must act prudently with regard to his employer.” N. Huntingdon, 450 A.2d at 769. While “the receipt and acceptance of a firm offer of employment does constitute termination for cause of a necessitous and compelling nature . . . [t]he mere possibility of obtaining another job is insufficient to establish that employment was terminated for good cause.” Solar Innovations, 38 A.3d at 1056-57 (emphasis added). 

In determining whether the claimant had a firm offer of work justifying his voluntary quit, our case law instructs that the operative date is the date the claimant resigns, not the claimant’s last day of work. See N. Huntingdon, 450 A.2d at 770 (looking to the terms of the claimant’s offer of employment “at the time [the c]laimant tendered his resignation” to determine if the offer was, in fact, definite) (emphasis added); UCBR. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 698, 700 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976) (concluding that, based on the circumstances surrounding his offer of employment at the time the claimant submitted his notice of resignation, the test for necessitous and compelling cause was met); see also Lane v. UCBR. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 576 C.D. 2014, filed Oct. 21, 2014), slip op. at 2-4 (affirming the denial of UC benefits where “[t]he Board found that [the] ‘claimant ha[d] not credibly established that he had a firm offer of other employment at the time he quit’” and where “‘[t]he claimant admit[ted] that he tendered his resignation notice without having a start date for the other employment’”) (quoting the Board’s decision) (emphasis added).

 

** An unreported decision of the Commonwealth Court can be cited “for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent” under 210 Pa. Code 69.414 (citing judicial opinions in filings).