Access to (federal) courts - Arthur Miller article

SIMPLIFIED PLEADING, MEANINGFUL DAYS IN COURT,

AND TRIALS ON THE MERITS: REFLECTIONS ON THE

DEFORMATION OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE

http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawReview-88-1-Miller.pdf

from the intro

When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938, theyreflected a policy of citizen access for civil disputes and sought to promote their resolution on the merits rather than on the basis of the technicalities that characterized earlier procedural systems.The federal courts applied that philosophy of procedure for many years.

However, the last quarter century has seen a dramatic contrary shift in the way the federal courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, have interpreted and applied the Federal Rules and other procedural matters. This shift has produced the increasingly early procedural disposition of cases prior to trial. Indeed, civil trials, especially jury trials, are very few and far between today.

The author examines the significant manifestations of this dramatic change, andtraces the shift in judicial attitude back to the three pro-summary judgment decisions by the Supreme Court in 1986. Furthermore, he goes on to discuss the judicial gatekeeping that has emerged regarding (1) expert testimony, (2) the constriction of class action certification, (3) the enforcement of arbitration clauses in an extraordinaryarray of contracts (many adhesive in character), (4) the Court’s abandonment of notice pleading in favor of plausibility pleading (which, in effect, is a return to fact pleading), (5) the intimations of a potential narrowing of the reach of in personam  jurisdiction, and (6) a number of limitations on pretrial discovery that haveresulted from Rule amendments during the last twenty-five years.

All of these changes restrict the ability of plaintiffs to reach a determination of theirclaims’ merits, which has resulted in a narrowing effect on citizen access to a meaningful day in court. Beyond that, these restrictive procedural developments work against the effectiveness of private litigation to enforce various public policies involving such matters as civil rights, antitrust, employment discrimination, andsecurities regulation.

Concerns about abusive and frivolous litigation, threats of extortionate settlements,and the high cost of today’s large-scale lawsuits motivate these deviations from the original philosophy of the Federal Rules, but these concerns fail to take properaccount of other systemic values. The author argues that these assertions are speculative and not empirically justified, are overstated, and simply reflect the self-interestof various groups that seek to terminate claims asserted against them as early as possible to avoid both discovery and a trial. Indeed, they simply may reflect a strong pro-business and pro-government orientation of today’s federal judiciary.

The author cautions that some restoration of the earlier underlying philosophy of the Federal Rules is necessary if we are to preserve the procedural principles that should underlie our civil justice system and maintain the viability of private litigationas an adjunct to government regulation for the enforcement of important societal policies and values.