unreported drug testing case - Cmwlth Court June 20, 2012
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2223CD11_6-20-12.pdf
Some language from the opinion
We rejected the argument that a medical review officer was necessary to admit drug testing results in Turner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 899 A.2d 381 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). In this case, this Court re-emphasized our earlier determinations that:
[I]t is not essential to produce either the person who made the entries or the custodian of the record at the time the entries were made or that the witness qualifying the business records even has personal knowledge of the facts reported in the business record. As long as the authenticating witness can provide sufficient information relating to the preparation and maintenance of the records to justify a presumption of trustworthiness of the business records of a company, a sufficient basis is provided to offset the hearsay character of the evidence. Id., at 386 (quoting Business Records as Evidence Act, 42 Pa. C.S. §6108(b)).
Thursday, June 21, 2012
Welfare - MA - assets - special needs trust
Lewis v. Alexander - 3d Cir. - June 20, 2012
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/113439p.pdf
The court concluded that Plaintiffs‟ case is justiciable and that they have a private right of action under both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
On the merits of Plaintiff's challenge, it decided that the District Court was correct in its determination that the 50% repayment provision of 62 P.S. 1414, "special needs" provision, expenditure provision, and age restriction are all preempted by federal law.
However, it decided that the enforcement provision of Section 1414 – when used to enforce provisions not otherwise preempted by federal law – is a reasonable exercise of the Commonwealth's retained authority to regulate trusts.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/113439p.pdf
The court concluded that Plaintiffs‟ case is justiciable and that they have a private right of action under both Section 1983 and the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
On the merits of Plaintiff's challenge, it decided that the District Court was correct in its determination that the 50% repayment provision of 62 P.S. 1414, "special needs" provision, expenditure provision, and age restriction are all preempted by federal law.
However, it decided that the enforcement provision of Section 1414 – when used to enforce provisions not otherwise preempted by federal law – is a reasonable exercise of the Commonwealth's retained authority to regulate trusts.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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