LT - L's damages - abandonment v. eviction

1700 Market Street Associates v. Common Grounds

 

Pa.Super. - 4-1-24 - reported

 

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A28029-23o%20-%20105884863260982536.pdf?cb=1

 

L cannot recover both rent and possession

This Court, almost 100 years ago, declared that a landlord cannot evict a tenant and then recover both the possession of the property and the rent for the balance of the term. See Greco v. Woodlawn Furniture Co., 99 Pa. Super. 290, 292 (1930). However, if the tenant abandons the property, the landlord is entitled to possession and accelerated rent:

The distinction must always be made between possession of vacated premises taken by the landlord merely to protect the property or minimize the damages that would follow the tenant’s abandonment, and a possession which would be adverse to any resumption of occupation by the tenant and thus amount to an eviction  Id.  

 

“[A] landlord must elect whether to confess judgment for possession and for all monies then due, or to confess judgment for all monies due for the entire term.” Homart Dev. Co. v. Sgrenci, 662 A.2d 1092, 1101 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc). “The landlord . . . cannot . . . enter judgment for possession and for all mon[ie]s which would otherwise be due as rents through the end of the term.” Id. Thus, [i]f the landlord terminates the lease and evicts the tenant before the acceleration clause is enforced, the landlord cannot recover rent for the post-eviction period. If the landlord collects accelerated rent and receives possession of the property by abandonment, the landlord may keep the accelerated rent, but is required to account to the tenant for rent received from a new tenant. Ferrick v. Bianchini, 69 A.3d 642, 656 (Pa. Super. 2013). The legal crux of this matter is whether Appellants evicted Appellees or whether Appellees abandoned the premises.

 

Proving abandonment

To establish abandonment of a lease, the landlord must prove: (1) an intention to abandon; and (2) conduct by which the intention is carried through. See Ferrick, 69 A.3d at 656. Conversely, an eviction is possession of a property by a landlord “which would be adverse to any resumption of occupation by the tenant.” Greco, 99 Pa. Super. at 292. Pennsylvania’s
Landlord Tenant Act, 68 P.S. §§ 250.101-250.602, was enacted in 1951 and “is a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the landlord and tenant relationship. It sets up a procedure whereby a landlord may repossess [the]
premises if he has a right to evict the tenant.” Fraport Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Allegheny Cnty. Airport Auth., 296 A.3d 9, 19 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “It is intended that [the Landlord Tenant Act] shall furnish a complete and exclusive system in itself,” and repealed all inconsistent acts. 68 P.S. § 250.602.

Eviction procedure --  must comply with LT Act by filing complaint

To evict a tenant, landlords must comply with the procedure established in the Landlord Tenant Act. A complaint for possession must be filed in a municipal court or with the magistrate court, and “[i]f it appears that the complaint has been sufficiently proven, the [judge] shall enter judgment against the tenant that the real property be delivered up to the landlord.” 68 P.S. § 250.503(a)(1). Five days after judgment is entered, the landlord may request, and the judge shall issue, a writ of possession for the premises. See 68 P.S. § 250.503(b). “This writ is to be served within no later than forty-
eight hours and executed on the eleventh day following service upon the tenant of the leased premises.” Id.

 

Regardless of how Appellants want to characterize their actions, Appellees were legally evicted from the premises. Moreover, Appellants followed the procedure set forth in the confession of judgment clause of the Lease. Thus, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees were evicted, and, therefore, Appellants are only entitled to damages for unpaid rent through July 1, 2022, when Appellants obtained possession of the property. Homart, supra; Ferrick, supra.

Judgments - opening v. striking

Woods at Namanns Homeowners Assn. v. Cavuto - Cmwlth Court  4-1-24 – unreported ***

 

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/947CD22_4-1-24.pdf?cb=1

There are several categories of judgments, including consent, default, and confession. Such judgments, in turn, may be challenged by filing a single petition to open or strike the judgment. See, e.g., Pa.R.Civ.P. 206.1(b), 2959. Opening a judgment is distinct from striking a judgment. Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs. Inc., 700 A.2d 915, 918 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted).

In considering whether to strike the judgment, the court must accept as true “all well-pleaded facts.” Id. (citation omitted). But not all facts: “a court may only look at the facts of record at the time the judgment was entered to decide if the record supports the judgment.” Id. at 919 (citation omitted); Linett v. Linett, 254 A.2d 7, 10 (Pa. 1969) (holding that the court, whether trial or appellate, “will only look at what was in the record when the judgment was entered in its search for defects”). “A petition to strike can only be granted if a fatal defect appears on the face of the record,” at the time judgment was entered. Cintas, 700 A.2d at 919 (citation omitted).10

“In contrast, a petition to open a judgment is an appeal to the equitable powers of the court,” and we review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. The petitioner must (1) promptly file the petition to open; (2) excuse the failure to appear, timely answer, or otherwise dispute the judgment; and (3) “show a meritorious defense.” Id. (citations omitted). A petition to open “challenge[s] the truth of factual averments in the record at the time judgment was entered . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).

An order denying a petition to open or strike judgment is an appealable order as of right. Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(1). An order granting a petition to open or strike judgment is not appealable as of right under Rule 311(a)(1). See Joseph Palermo Dev. Corp. v. Bowers, 564 A.2d 996, 997 (Pa. Super. 1989) (explaining that Rule 311 had formerly permitted such appeals before it was amended, effective July 1, 1989). The Bowers Court explained that an “order opening judgment . . . does not end the litigation, nor preclude participation by certain parties in the litigation, nor result in the irreparable loss of the claim. On the contrary, this order opens up the possibility of further litigation between the parties, while causing neither irreparable loss nor prejudice to” the aggrieved party. Id. at 998. “Review of the correctness of the trial court’s action in opening the judgment is merely postponed to a later date.” Id. Thus, in Bowers, the Superior Court quashed an appeal from an order granting a petition to open a confessed judgment. Id. at 997.

 

*** Commonwealth Court – citing unreported decisions

https://www.pacodeandbulletin.gov/Display/pacode?file=/secure/pacode/data/210/chapter69/s69.414.html&d=reduce

§ 69.414. Citing Judicial Opinions in Filings.

 (a)  An unreported opinion of this Court may be cited and relied upon when it is relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata or collateral estoppel. Parties may also cite an unreported panel decision of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.