Meyers v. Freedom Credit Union - ED Pa. - September 21, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1139P.pdf
There is no longer a private cause of action for the failure of a prospective creditor/lender to give a loan applicant who was denied credit the name, address and toll-free number of the credit reporting agency (CRA) whose report formed the basis, at least in part, of the denial of credit, as required by 15 USC sec. 1681m(a)(2)(A).
It is "beyond dispute" that there had been a private cause of action uner 15 USC secs. 1681n and 1681o for such failure -- until the enactment of a provision of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (FACTA), P.L. 108-159, which amended the FCRA by, inter alia, eliminating a private cause of action for the conduct of which plaintiff complains. Under FACTA, such violations can now be enforced only by the relevant federal agencies and officials.
The court reached this conclusion by recognizing the "primacy of text and structure in statutory interpretation" and the decisions of "almost all" of the courts that have examined the issue, even while noting that the result was contrary to the structure, history and purpose of FACTA.
Somewhat ironically, however, the plaintiff in this case was able to recover, because her cause of action accrued before FACTA took effect.
Friday, September 28, 2007
Fair Housing Act - attorney fees
Snyder v. Bazargani et al. - ED Pa. - September 25, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1146P.pdf
Plaintiffs awarded attorney fees under the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3613(c)(2), against defendant-landlords who "inquired about plaintiffs' religious affiliation and thereafter....refused to rent plaintiffs the property." Given that plaintiffs prevailed at trial, the court had "very little discretion to deny an award of counsel fees." The court's discretion to deny fees is "tightly cabined."
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1146P.pdf
Plaintiffs awarded attorney fees under the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3613(c)(2), against defendant-landlords who "inquired about plaintiffs' religious affiliation and thereafter....refused to rent plaintiffs the property." Given that plaintiffs prevailed at trial, the court had "very little discretion to deny an award of counsel fees." The court's discretion to deny fees is "tightly cabined."
contracts - damages - duty to mitigate - burden of proof
Wilmington Finance Co. v. Matrix Financial Services - ED Pa. - September 26, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1159P.pdf
"In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff in a breach-of-contract action has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate its damages. Delliponti v. DeAngelis, 681 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa. 1996). Defendant bears the burden of proving plaintiff’s alleged failure to mitigate. Id. To meet that burden, defendant must “show how further loss could have been avoided through the reasonable efforts of the injured party.” Pontiere v. James Dinert, Inc., 627 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)." It was thus "essential" that the defendant show that the plaintiff "could have taken reasonable steps...and that taking those steps would have prevented at least some of [plaintiff's] loss."
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1159P.pdf
"In Pennsylvania, a plaintiff in a breach-of-contract action has a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate its damages. Delliponti v. DeAngelis, 681 A.2d 1261, 1264 (Pa. 1996). Defendant bears the burden of proving plaintiff’s alleged failure to mitigate. Id. To meet that burden, defendant must “show how further loss could have been avoided through the reasonable efforts of the injured party.” Pontiere v. James Dinert, Inc., 627 A.2d 1204, 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)." It was thus "essential" that the defendant show that the plaintiff "could have taken reasonable steps...and that taking those steps would have prevented at least some of [plaintiff's] loss."
Protection from Abuse - family/household members - siblings - business partners
Custer v. Cochran - Superior Court - September 25, 2007
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/E01002_07.pdf
Siblings who do not live together and whose only relationship is a business one come within the plain words of the definition of "family or household members," 23 Pa. C.S. 6102, since they are clearly related by consanguinity or affinity, overruling Olivieri v. Olivieri, 678 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. 1996), to the extent that it limited application of the PFA Act to people who live in the same household.
The court also held that there was adequate proof of abuse and noted the ages, height and weight of the parties, and that plaintiff -- whose testimony the court found credible -- experienced fear and pain in her arm for several days as a result of defendant's actions.
Judge Ford Elliot concurred reluctantly, noting that the "clear legislative purpose and objective of the Act is frustrated by applying its protection to a dispute between business partners concerning purely business matters." The judge noted that the legislature's removal of the same-household requirement "simply enlarged the group of victims who have standing to seek relief under the Act so long as the abuse they suffer is the result of an intimate, sexual, or familial relationship they share or have shared with the abuser." The current litigants have no relationship that exists in any "domestic sphere." Nonetheless, the judge concurred, finding the majority view "legally sustainable."
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/E01002_07.pdf
Siblings who do not live together and whose only relationship is a business one come within the plain words of the definition of "family or household members," 23 Pa. C.S. 6102, since they are clearly related by consanguinity or affinity, overruling Olivieri v. Olivieri, 678 A.2d 393 (Pa. Super. 1996), to the extent that it limited application of the PFA Act to people who live in the same household.
The court also held that there was adequate proof of abuse and noted the ages, height and weight of the parties, and that plaintiff -- whose testimony the court found credible -- experienced fear and pain in her arm for several days as a result of defendant's actions.
Judge Ford Elliot concurred reluctantly, noting that the "clear legislative purpose and objective of the Act is frustrated by applying its protection to a dispute between business partners concerning purely business matters." The judge noted that the legislature's removal of the same-household requirement "simply enlarged the group of victims who have standing to seek relief under the Act so long as the abuse they suffer is the result of an intimate, sexual, or familial relationship they share or have shared with the abuser." The current litigants have no relationship that exists in any "domestic sphere." Nonetheless, the judge concurred, finding the majority view "legally sustainable."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)