Osborne v. Boscov’s Inc. – Pa. Super. – 5.14.24 – unreported***
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S03017-24m%20-%20105935293265951864.pdf?cb=1
Held: Trial court erred in dismissing a complaint, sua sponte, for lack of activity, without holding a hearing to determine if the defendant had suffered prejudice by the delay.
It is well settled that a court may invoke its inherent power to dismiss a case for lack of activity on the docket. See Penn Piping, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 603 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1992), abrogated in part by Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.J.A. 1901(a) (stating that “[w]here a matter has been inactive for an unreasonable period of time, the tribunal, on its own motion, shall enter an appropriate order terminating the matter”).
As this Court has explained, the decision to dismiss a case “rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is proof of a manifest abuse of that discretion.” Mudd v. Nosker Lumber, Inc., 662 A.2d
660, 662 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
A trial court may dismiss a case for inactivity under the following
circumstances:
(1) a party has shown lack of due diligence by failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude,
(2) there is no compelling reason for the delay, and
(3) the delay has caused actual prejudice to the adverse party. See Jacobs, 710 A.2d at 1103.
Our Supreme Court has explained that prejudice is “any substantial diminution of a party’s ability to properly present its case at trial.”
This determination is to be made by the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Id.
Although the trial court had the authority to terminate the case for inactivity, see Penn Piping, 603 A.2d at 1008, the trial court erred in doing so without determining whether “the delay . . . cause[d] actual prejudice to the defendant.” Shope, 710 A.2d at 1108.
In its opinion, the trial court found that Appellees were presumed to have suffered prejudice because the delay exceeded five years. . . .. However, our Supreme Court has expressly rejected the presumption of prejudice as “inconsistent with the well-established notion that the adversary must suffer harm before a case is dismissed for lack of
prosecution.” See Jacobs, 710 A.2d at 1102 (abrogating in part Penn Piping). Further, there is nothing in the record to reflect that Appellees suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in this case
Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the order terminating this action and remand for further proceedings.
On remand, Osborne v. Boscov’s Inc. – Pa. Super. – 5.14.24 – unreported***
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S03017-24m%20-%20105935293265951864.pdf?cb=1
Held: Trial court erred in dismissing a complaint, sua sponte, for lack of activity, without holding a hearing to determine if the defendant had suffered prejudice by the delay.
It is well settled that a court may invoke its inherent power to dismiss a case for lack of activity on the docket. See Penn Piping, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 603 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Pa. 1992), abrogated in part by Jacobs v. Halloran, 710 A.2d 1098, 1102 (Pa. 1998); see also Pa.R.J.A. 1901(a) (stating that “[w]here a matter has been inactive for an unreasonable period of time, the tribunal, on its own motion, shall enter an appropriate order terminating the matter”).
As this Court has explained, the decision to dismiss a case “rests within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is proof of a manifest abuse of that discretion.” Mudd v. Nosker Lumber, Inc., 662 A.2d
660, 662 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
A trial court may dismiss a case for inactivity under the following
circumstances:
(1) a party has shown lack of due diligence by failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude,
(2) there is no compelling reason for the delay, and
(3) the delay has caused actual prejudice to the adverse party. See Jacobs, 710 A.2d at 1103.
Our Supreme Court has explained that prejudice is “any substantial diminution of a party’s ability to properly present its case at trial.”
This determination is to be made by the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Id.
Although the trial court had the authority to terminate the case for inactivity, see Penn Piping, 603 A.2d at 1008, the trial court erred in doing so without determining whether “the delay . . . cause[d] actual prejudice to the defendant.” Shope, 710 A.2d at 1108.
In its opinion, the trial court found that Appellees were presumed to have suffered prejudice because the delay exceeded five years. . . .. However, our Supreme Court has expressly rejected the presumption of prejudice as “inconsistent with the well-established notion that the adversary must suffer harm before a case is dismissed for lack of
prosecution.” See Jacobs, 710 A.2d at 1102 (abrogating in part Penn Piping). Further, there is nothing in the record to reflect that Appellees suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in this case
Accordingly, we are constrained to reverse the order terminating this action and remand for further proceedings.
On remand, the trial court shall conduct a hearing to address the remainder of the three-part test, i.e., whether Appellees suffered actual prejudice due to the delay in activity. See Jacobs, 710 A.2d at 1103; Shope,
710 A.2d at 1108.
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Superior Court – unreported opinions can be cited for persuasive value
B. Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
