1700 Market Street Associates v. Common Grounds
Pa.Super. - 4-1-24 - reported
L cannot recover both rent and possession
This Court, almost 100 years ago, declared that a landlord cannot evict a tenant and then recover both the possession of the property and the rent for the balance of the term. See Greco v. Woodlawn Furniture Co., 99 Pa. Super. 290, 292 (1930). However, if the tenant abandons the property, the landlord is entitled to possession and accelerated rent:
The distinction must always be made between possession of vacated premises taken by the landlord merely to protect the property or minimize the damages that would follow the tenant’s abandonment, and a possession which would be adverse to any resumption of occupation by the tenant and thus amount to an eviction Id.
“[A] landlord must elect whether to confess judgment for possession and for all monies then due, or to confess judgment for all monies due for the entire term.” Homart Dev. Co. v. Sgrenci, 662 A.2d 1092, 1101 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc). “The landlord . . . cannot . . . enter judgment for possession and for all mon[ie]s which would otherwise be due as rents through the end of the term.” Id. Thus, [i]f the landlord terminates the lease and evicts the tenant before the acceleration clause is enforced, the landlord cannot recover rent for the post-eviction period. If the landlord collects accelerated rent and receives possession of the property by abandonment, the landlord may keep the accelerated rent, but is required to account to the tenant for rent received from a new tenant. Ferrick v. Bianchini, 69 A.3d 642, 656 (Pa. Super. 2013). The legal crux of this matter is whether Appellants evicted Appellees or whether Appellees abandoned the premises.
Proving abandonment
To establish abandonment of a lease, the landlord must prove: (1) an intention to abandon; and (2) conduct by which the intention is carried through. See Ferrick, 69 A.3d at 656. Conversely, an eviction is possession of a property by a landlord “which would be adverse to any resumption of occupation by the tenant.” Greco, 99 Pa. Super. at 292. Pennsylvania’s
Landlord Tenant Act, 68 P.S. §§ 250.101-250.602, was enacted in 1951 and “is a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the landlord and tenant relationship. It sets up a procedure whereby a landlord may repossess [the]
premises if he has a right to evict the tenant.” Fraport Pittsburgh, Inc. v. Allegheny Cnty. Airport Auth., 296 A.3d 9, 19 (Pa. Super. 2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “It is intended that [the Landlord Tenant Act] shall furnish a complete and exclusive system in itself,” and repealed all inconsistent acts. 68 P.S. § 250.602.
Eviction procedure -- must comply with LT Act by filing complaint
To evict a tenant, landlords must comply with the procedure established in the Landlord Tenant Act. A complaint for possession must be filed in a municipal court or with the magistrate court, and “[i]f it appears that the complaint has been sufficiently proven, the [judge] shall enter judgment against the tenant that the real property be delivered up to the landlord.” 68 P.S. § 250.503(a)(1). Five days after judgment is entered, the landlord may request, and the judge shall issue, a writ of possession for the premises. See 68 P.S. § 250.503(b). “This writ is to be served within no later than forty-
eight hours and executed on the eleventh day following service upon the tenant of the leased premises.” Id.
Regardless of how Appellants want to characterize their actions, Appellees were legally evicted from the premises. Moreover, Appellants followed the procedure set forth in the confession of judgment clause of the Lease. Thus, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in finding that Appellees were evicted, and, therefore, Appellants are only entitled to damages for unpaid rent through July 1, 2022, when Appellants obtained possession of the property. Homart, supra; Ferrick, supra.
