Monday, September 19, 2005
SSI - treating M.D. - credibility - subjective complaints - duty of ALJ to develop record
age/disability discrimination - state employer - 11th amendment
Sunday, September 18, 2005
custody - international - Hague Convention
Baxter v. Baxter, Third Circuit Court of Appeals, September 15, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043228p.pdf
District Court's denial of father's petition for return of child to Australia from the the US reversed by 3d Circuit. Father consented to child's initial removal to the U.S. with the mother, but not the child's retention here. Case remanded for the entry of an order granting the petition for return of the child to the country of habitual residence, Australia.
jurisdiction
The Distict Court had jurisdiction under 28 USC 1331, since the action arose under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspect of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 1501, and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 USC 11601 et seq (ICARA). Under the ICARA, state and federal courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over actions arising under the Hague Convention.
Hague Convention (HC)
The HC has two main purposes
1) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any contracting State, and
2) to ensure that rights of cutsody and access under the law of one contracting State are effectively respected.
The Convention's procedures are designed to restore the status quo prior to any wrongful removal or retention of a child, and to deter parents from engaging in international forum shopping in custody cases. The Convention is not designed to settle international custody disputes, but rather to ensure that cases are heard in the proper court.
To get an order for a child's return, the petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the removal or retention was wrongful under the HC. A removal or retention is "wrongful" where a) it is in breach of rights of custody under the law of the state in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal/retention, and b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
If the court finds a wrongful removal or retention, the burden shifts to the respondent, who must then prove an affirmative defense of a) consent or acquiescence to the removal or retention, by a preponderance of the evidence, or b) the defense of a "grave risk of harm" to the child, by clear and convincing evidence. Both of these affirmative defenses are narrowly construed, and even a finding of an exception does not automatically preclude an order of return. If a petitioner prevails, the HC requires courts to " 'order the return of the child forthwith.' "
discussion
The evidence was clear that father's consent for mother and child to come to the US was conditional and that he did not acquiesce in the child remaining in the US. Acquiescense depends of the parent's subjective intent. There was no settled purpose to leave Australia permanently and no acquiescense, as evidenced by the District Court's own conclusions that a) Australia remained the country of habitual residence at the time of removal, b) the parents were undecided about their next residence, and c) father's prompt contest of mother's decision to remain in the US and move in with a new male partner whom she had known for only a short time.
There was no "grave risk of harm" to the child if he was returned to the father in Australia. Such harm must involve a real risk of being hurt, physically or psychologically, as a result of repatriation, and not just inconvenience or hardship, the elimination of education opportunities, or the child's preferences.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Friday, September 16, 2005
Pennsylvania Bulletin of September 17, 2005
Here is the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin of September 17, 2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/index.html
Items of potential interest include
- court records - public access - notice of proposed policy - electronic case records in unified judicial system
N.B. comments due no later than November 17, 2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1709.html
- courts - Pa. Supreme Court - internal procedures - decisional procedures
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1705.html
- courts - costs and fees
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1703.html
- court rules - local rules - Berks County - papers presented by 3d parties
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1706.html
- court rules - local rules - Fayette County - motion for post-trial relief
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1707.html
- court rules - local rules - Monroe County - security police, school police, private detectives
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1708.html
- health - child immunization practices
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1727.html
- welfare - MA - day-of-care definition
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1711.html
- Hurricane Katrina - Governor's proclamation of emergency to receive mutual aid , receive and house evacuees
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1702.html
- Indpt. Regulatory Review Commission - notice of comments issued
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1746.html
- Indpt. Regulatory Review Commission - notice of final rulemaking
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-38/1747.html
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Thursday, September 15, 2005
employment - age discrimination - reduction in force
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1125P.pdf
Claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and Pa. Human Relations Act dismissed on summary judgment.
Plaintiff lost his job when employer initiated a reduction in force (RIF). Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a) he was a member of the protected class, b) he was qualified for the job in question, c) he suffered an adverse employment action, and d) circumstances existed which gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Since this was a reduction in force case, he also had to and did show that the employer retained a sufficiently younger similarly situated employee.
However, the court held that the employer had articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (NDR) for the adverse employment action, thus shifting the burden back to the plaintiff to show that such NDR was only a pretext for discrimination.
The court held that the plaintiff failed to successfully refute the employer's asserted legitimate NDR for his dismissal. Plaintiff's primary argument was that the employer had used to wrong criteria for its decision and that it had made a wrong decision. The court rejected this reasoning based on other cases holding that " 'to discredit the employer's proffered reasons....the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute as issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent,or competent.' " Instead, the plaintiff would have had to show "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence" and that its reasons were pretextual.
The plaintiff did not do that. Nor did the plaintiff show that the in the RIF as a whole, older workers were affected more than younger employees.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Tuesday, September 13, 2005
disability - treating physicians' opinions - GAF - credibility - etc.
Burley v. Barnhart - ED Pa. September 9, 2005 - diability claim based on mental disorders denied
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1124P.pdf
Opinions of treating professionals - The ALJ accepted the opinions of consultative physicians and medical expert over that of a treating physician and a treating therapist with an M.Ed., not medical degree, and "appropriately explained his reasons for" doing so, including "several specific and substantial justifications for his decision." The court set out a decent synopsis of Third Circuit law about effect of findings and opinions of treating physician.
Rejectionf of GAF assessment - The court accepted the medical expert's statement that "GAF scores are unreliable, non scientific assessments of overall mental functioning reflecting [claimant's[ symptoms rather than his functioning capacity," citing Howard v. Commissioner, 276 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2002) (ALJ's failure to reference GAF score in the RFC does not, standing alone, make the RFC inaccurate.)
credibility -- The court said that "adverse credbility findings are afforded substantial deference so long as the findings are supported by specific cogent reasons. The reasons must be substantial and bear a legitimate nexus to the finding."
Overall, the court acklowledged that a different conclusion could have been reached on the record, but that the ALJ's decision was supposted by the required substantial evidence.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Sunday, September 11, 2005
custody - relocation - right to travel
In re Marriage of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135 (Colorado 2005)
http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?OpinionID=5167
This is a Colorado case, but it is interesting for its discussion of the effect of a parent's consitutional right to travel (see e.g. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)) in a relocation case in relation to other important factors -- a parent's right to the care and control of her/his children (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)), and the best interest of the children.
The court discussed the approaches of three other states. Wyoming gives priority to the right to travel, Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608 (Wyo. 1999). Minnesota holds that because the best interest of the child is a compelling state interest, there is no need to balance the competing rights of the parents set out in Shapiro and Troxel. LaChapelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct.App. 2000). New Mexico courts say that the interests of the parents and children are best protected through an equal sharing of burdens, Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 8213 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1991), also adopted by Maryland, Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. App. 2000). The Colorado court chose to apply the New Mexico/Maryland standard, which it found to be most consistent with the detailed Colorado statute governing relocation cases.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services-Gettysburg
Friday, September 09, 2005
civil rights - domestic violence - sec. 1983 suit v. police
Starr v. Price - ED Pa. - Sept. 8, 2005
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/munley/03v636.pdf
Estate of deceased victim of domestic violence sued various law enforcement officials for violations of deceased's constitutional rights involving the return of a firearm to deceased's husband, who subequently killed her and others.
Summary judgment granted to defendants based on analysis in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005). Claims for violations of substantive due process, procedural due process, and Brady Claim all denied.
"Section 1983 is not a 'font of tort law…but it does not mean that State are powerless to provide victims with personally enforceable remedies….Thus Plaintiff has no section 1983 remedy for her claims, although she may have an enforceable state law remedy. Absent a pendent federal claim, however, we have no jurisdiction over the state law claims."
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
foster parents are not state actors under 42 USC sec. 1983 - 3d Cir. case
Leshko v. Servis - 3d Circuit Court of Appeals, September 9, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042610p.pdf
Held, foster parents are not state actors for purposes of liability under 42 USC sec. 1983.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
child abuse - corporal punishment - criminal negligence standard applied
W.S. Dept. of Public Welfare - Commonwealth Court, September 9, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/214CD05_9-9-05.pdf
The Court reversed DPW's finding that father had abused his daughter, as abuse is defined in the Child Protective Services Law, 23 Pa. C.S. 6301 et seq. Under the CPSL, child abuse is "any recent act or failure to act…which causes nonaccidental serious physical injury to a child under 18 years of age," 23 Pa. C.S. 6303(b)(1)(i). "Serious physical injury" is defined as an injury that "causes a child severe pain" or "significantly impairs a child's functioning, either temporarily or permanently.," 23 Pa. C.S. 6303(a)
Father hit his 14 y/o daughter on the ear with an open hand 2-3 times when she lied to him about where she had been and her report card. When she fell to the floor, he hit her again. The findings were undisputed, and DPW found both parent and child to be credible. Father had not hit the daughter before. The daughter testified that she did not complain about her ear hurting, didn’t take aspirin or anything else for pain, went to school the next day and had no problem hearing her teachers, and that she is not afraid of her father. Father was "frustrated because of his daughter's continuous misconduct and, in disciplining her, did not intend to inflict injury." The record showed and the court emphasized continuing disciplinary problems with the daughter.
Citing P.R. v. DPW, 801 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002), the Court said that the case presented "competing objectives" which involved balancing a parent's right to discipline a child, including by corporal punishment, with the duty under the CPLS to protect children. The P.R. case established a criminal negligence standard in parental corporal punishment cases. Under that standard, there is no abuse, under the CPSL, unless there has been as "gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation."
The Court said that the "evidence…reveals that [father] slapped [his daughter] two to three times with an open hand, after numerous attempts to discipline her without resorting to physical contact. Although the slapping resulted in a temporary loss of hearing, [father's] conduct did not rise to the level of criminal negligence and cannot be viewed as a gross deviation from the standard of care a reasonable parent would observe in the same situation….[The father] maintained self-control by walking away from the situation after he made physical contact with her the second or third time. The fact that [the daughter] experienced a temporary hearing loss does not allow us to presuppose an unjustificable risk that would lead to the finding of criminal negligence. The injury [the daughter] received as a result of corporal punishment was an accident, and a 'regrettable result of corporal punishment' rather than abuse."
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Pennsylvania Bulletin for September 10, 2005
Here is the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin for September 10, 2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-37/index.html
Items of potential interest include -
- welfare - energy assistance - LIHEAP plan for 2006
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-37/1682.html
- welfare - MA - fee schedule revisions - 2005 HCPCS updates - prior authorization requirements
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-37/1683.html
- Indpt. Regulatory Review Commission (IRRC) - actions taken by IRRC
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-37/1688.html
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Tuesday, September 06, 2005
civil rights - forcible removal and medical exam of children
Adkins v. Luzerne County Child & Youth Services - MD Pa. September 2, 2005
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/vanaskie/01v470.pdf
Held that, under the circumstances, there were no civil rights violations when county CYS forcibly removed plaintiff's children from the home and subjected them to medical examinations. Summary judgment for defendants.
The circumstances were -- Plaintiff's first wife had died of "presumed natural causes" at age 40. His second wife died at age 30 from undetermined causes. A confidential informant told police that a) Plaintiff 4 y/o daughter had told her that Plaintiff's new girlfriend had said the she (the daughter) was going to heaven very soon to join her mother, and that b) the daughter had been sick several times recently but had not received proper medical attention. The children were taken into custody on March 18, examined and found to be in good health, then released back to Plaintiff on March 22. There was never any search warrant issued, nor any juvenile protective custody hearing.
substantive due process - The court recognized that Plaintiff had a fundamental substantive DP interest in the care, custody and management of his children. However, the court applied a "shock the conscience" test and said that CYS had " 'reasonable and articulable evidence giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a child has been abused or is in imminent danger of abuse.' " The court said that CYS had reasonable grounds to believe that the children were in imminent danger of harm, and that the agency action had not been "' so ill-conceived or malicious that it 'shocks the conscience'….In the context of the removal of a child from the parent's home, the social worker's conduct 'must exceed both negligence and deliberate indifference, and reach a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed shocks the conscience.
unreasonable search and seizure - Defendants conceded that their taking the children had been a seizure, but the court held that that it had been reasonable under the circumstances, given the potential emergency nature of the case. The court also sustained the taking of bodily fluids from the children, under the analysis of Vernonia School District v. Action, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Monday, September 05, 2005
consumer protection - atty. fees - additional damages - etc.
Neal v. Bavarian Motors, et al. - Pa. Superior Court, September 2, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a10022_05.pdf
Plaintiff sued car dealer, finance company, etc, for damages she suffered as a result of defendants' having sold, financed, etc. a stolen car, which Plaintiff lost when it was impounded by the police.
Plaintiff was awarded actual damages, as well as treble damages and attorney fees under the state consumer protection law (CPL), 73 PS sec. 201-9.2, as well as damages under the UCC and the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, and costs. Defendants appealed.
attorney fees - The majority reduced the award of attorney fees under the CPL. It "eliminate[d] from the award of attorney fees the efforts of counsel to recover on non-CPL theories....[A]bsent special circumstances, to permit plaintiff to recover counsel fees for all of the counts upon which she recovered damages would not only be inequitable, but would be contrary to the law.....'[A]n effort should be made to apportion the time spent by counsel on the distinct causes of action.'"
The concurring judge said that "determining the amount of CPL-related attorney fees is very fact-specific and should be assessed on a case-by-case basis." He said that "apportioning CPL-related damages 'may prove difficult given that these claims are based on a common core of facts and related legal theories,'" and noted that in other CPL cases, the court had refused to award attorney fees based on the % of CPL damages as distinguished from the total damage award. He said that it "may be inherently difficult to separate attorney fees based on a strict percentage" because some research "supported multiple legal theories."
treble damages and costs - The court said that "any violation of the CPL empowers the trial judge to consider the additional remedies provided thereunder...." such as treble damages. (emphasis added) In this case, the court found the appellants' conduct "egregious and their liability clear" and upheld the lower court.
joint and several liability - The court noted that Pennsylvania has adopted sec. 879 of the Restatement (2d) of Torts on this issue, holding that "if the tortious conduct of each of two or more persons is a legal cause of harm that cannot be apportioned, each is subject to liability for the entire harm, irrespective of whether their conduct is concurring or consecutive." An arbitrary apportionment should not be made where there is no rational, logical or practical basis to divide the harm caused by multiple defendants.
remittitur - The court upheld the trial court's refusal to grant a larger remittitur, summarizing Pa. law as follows -- A remittitur should fix the highest amount any jury could properly award, giving due weight to all evidence offered. The question is whether the award falls within the uncertain limits of fair and reasonable compensation, or whether the verdict so shocks the sense of justice as to suggest that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejduce, mistake, or corruption.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburgwww.midpenn.org
Friday, September 02, 2005
age discrimination - statute of limitations, tolling - etc.
Holocheck v. Luzerne County Head Start, M.D Pa., August 30, 2005
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/vanaskie/04v2082.pdf
Defendant moved to dismiss Age Discrimination complaint which alleged federal and state causes of action.
tolling statute of limitations - 180-day limit on bringing an age discrimination claim can be tolled where the employer fails to post required notice of employee rights. Failure to post the notice means that the employee was "prevented from asserting her rights…."
- individual liability - federal statute, ADEA, 29 USC 63 et seq -- federal claims against invidivuals supervisors dismissed --
"…courts in this and other circuits continue to reject the notion that individuals may be held liable under the ADEA
- individual liability - state statute - PHRA - 43 Pa. CS 955 "contemplates individual liability…Supervisory employees…may be held liable…on the theory that only supervisors can share the discriminatory purpose and intent of the employer that is required for aiding and abetting." Thus, motion to dismiss this claim denied.
- Sec. 1983 - personnel manual, federal regulations - Section 1983 claims dismissed. Held, personnel manual did not create an enforceable property interest under state law, where there was no state enabling legislation that gave local government the right to employ people on other than an at-will basis. Similarly, a "federal regulation alone may not create a right enforceable through section 1983 not already found in the enforcing statute…'a regulation may invoke a private right of action that Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that Congress has not…[R]egulations give rise to a right of action [under sec. 1983] only insofar as they constue a personal right that a statute creates,'" citing Three Rivers Center for Indpt. Living vf. Housing Authority, 382 F.3d 412, 424 (3d Cir. 2004).
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Pennsylvania Bulletin of September 3, 2005
Here is the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin of September 3, 2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-36/index.html
Items of potential interest include:
- court rules - Pa. RCP 76 - definitions - signature - computer-generated signatures
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-36/1631.html
- court rules - local - Northumberland Co. - family transition program - custody conflict resolution program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-36/1633.html
- health -HIV community prevention planning committee - public meeting
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-36/1646.html
- welfare - NOTICE - diversion program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-36/1647.html
DPW "intents [sic] to amend the...TANF (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 601--619) State Plan. The proposed amendment will permit individuals or families who otherwise qualify for TANF cash assistance to receive a nonassistance diversion payment as an alternative to receiving ongoing cash assistance."
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Tuesday, August 30, 2005
sec. 1983 - police liability for part in private repo. in DV case
Harvey v. Plains Township Police Department - 3d Circuit Court of Appeals, August 30, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041148p.pdf
Summary judgment in favor of individual police officer reversed (2-1) in 42 USC 1983 case. Plaintiff alleged that the officer took part in an improper entry into her apartment and an ex parte private repossession of her property by her former boyfriend. The court held that, in a summary judgment procedural posture, the evidence showed that
a) the officer took part in "state action" by ordering the landlord to open plaintiff's apartment, contrary to the direction of an existing protection from abuse (PFA) order.
b) such action violated plaintiff's clearly established 4th Amendment constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches/seizures
c) the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity -- There was a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, and a reasonable police officer would have believed that his conduct deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights. The court held that a letter from the boyfriend's attorney to the plaintiff's attorney did not give the officer a reasonable belief that plaintiff consented to the boyfriend's seizure of property at her home, especially given knowledge of the PFA order. "A reasonable offivce at least would have refused to assist with opening the door until he was satisfied that consent was given." His actions went well beyond keeping the peace.
The dissent felt that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Steininger v. Barnhart - hypo must include all credibly established limitations - ED Pa.
Steininger v. Barnhart -- ED Pa. August 24, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1065P.pdf
The court remanded the case because the ALJ's hypothetical to the vocation expert was inadequate at step 4 in the disability determination process -- involving determination of ability to do past relevant work.
The court said that "an ALJ hypothetical must include all of claimant's impairments," citing Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2004), and that the claimant's mental impairments were not adequately set out. They didn't even comport with the ALJ's own findings on the issue.
An ALJ need not submit "every impairment alleged by a claimant," but it is "required that 'the hypothetical posed must accurately portray the cliamant's impairments and that the expert must be given an oppportunity to evaluate those impairments as contained in the record'....The ALJ's hypothetical 'must accurately convey to the vocational expert all of a claimant's credibly establish limitations.'" (emphasis in original). The court said that ''great specificity' is required when an ALJ incorporates a claimant's mental or physical limitations into a hypothetical," citing Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 554-5.
The court also said that even though the issue in the case arose at step 4 in the 5-step disability process, the Ramirez analysis was still dispositive, even though that was a step-5 case, since the ALJ's decision relied "exclusively" on the VE's testimony.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Monday, August 29, 2005
recent disability cases - Pa. fed. courts - 07-08. 2005
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Pierce v. Barnhart - August 11,2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1054P.pdf
Nunnery v. Barnhart - August 23, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1047P.pdf
Garcia v. Barnhart - August 22, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1045P.pdf
Jones v. Barnhart - August 23, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1042P.pdf
Laracuente v. Barnhart - August 18, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1026P.pdf
Thompson v. Barnhart - August 17, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1018P.pdf
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Smith v. Barnhart - July 25, 2005
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/munley/04v810.pdf
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals
Allen v. Barnhart - August 8, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042163p.pdf
Friday, August 26, 2005
Pennsylvania Bulletin of August 27, 2005
Here is the link to the August 27, 2005 edition of the Pennsylvania
Bulletin
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/index.html
The following items may be of interest--
-- welfare - revisions to GA and MA benefits packages &
recipient co-payments for adults
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1586.html
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1586a.html
-- welfare - pharmaceutical services - revisisions to max.
allowable cost
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1561.html
- transportation - approval of ignition interlocks
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1605.html
-- Patient Safety Authority - MCARE- public meeting - Sept. 12,
2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1617.html
-- health - syphillis tests - pregnant women in Allegheny,
Bucks, Dauphin, Erie, Lancaster, Lehigh,
Luzerne, Montgomery, Northampton, Northumberland, Philadelphia
and Westmoreland Counties
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1601.html
-- Gaming Control Board - amendments to temporary regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1590.html
Don
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
128 Breckenridge Street
Gettysburg, Pa. 17325
tel. 717/334-7623 x2414
fax 717/334-0863
dmarritz@midpenn.org
www.midpenn.org
Friday, August 19, 2005
Pennsylvania Bulletin for August 20, 2005
Here’s the missing link
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/index.html
Of possible interest--
- attorneys - bar admission rules - amendment
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1554.html
- local rules - Forest/Warren Counties - pro se filings
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1555.html
- welfare - MA - FFS - pharmaceutical services - revisions to max. allowable cost (MAC)
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1561.html
- welfare - MA - fee increases for dental anesthesia services
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1576.html
- health - integrated HIV Planning Council - public meeting
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1574.html
- State Ethics Commission - public meeting
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1584.html
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services- Gettysburg
Wednesday, August 17, 2005
LEP - license suspension - refusal to take breath test - inability to understand O'Connell warnings
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/406CD05_8-17-05.pdf
Driver's license suspension by DOT for licensee's (L) alleged refusal to take breath test upheld by the court, despite his apparent inability to understand the required warnings about the consequences of failure to submit to the test.
L's native language was Serbo-Croatian. All interaction between L and police was in English or by the police acting things out. The police officer said there was "no protocol" for dealing with a non-English speaker in these cases. L was not successful in producing enough breath for a valid breath test, which failure is assumed to be a refusal, absent an inability to provide enough breath.
L testified in court through a translator. He said that he didnt understand anything the police said but tried to figure it out from their gestures. The trial court found L to be credible and, based on a videotape, held that L had met his burden of showing the he didnt speak English well enough to have understood warnings about the consequences of refusing a breath test.
Case law holds that DOT has burden of proving that a) L arrested for DUI by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to do so; b) L was asked to submit to chemical test; c) L refused to do so; d) L specifically warned about the consequences of a refusal. Once that burden is met, the L has the burden to show he was physically unable to do the breath test OR that his refusal was not knowing or conscious
Citing prior cases, the court said the "most cases hold that a failure to understand English provides no foundation for an argument that the licensee was unable to make a knowing and conscious refusal....[W]hether Licensee understand the...warnings or not is inconsequential. An officer's sole duty is to inform motorists of the implied consent warnings; once they have done so, they have satisfied their obligation....[O]fficers ghave no duty to make sure the licensees under the O'Connell warnings of the consequences of refusing a chemical test....It is equally not the officer's duty to enlist the assistance of an interpreter to make sure a motorist understands implied consent warnings." (emphasis in original)
The court also said that "whether Licensee fails to understand English is not automatically outcome determinative....[S]imply because Licensee spoke Serbo-Croatian and did not speak English does not mean that he cannot act knowingly and consciously. The court used the analogy of a drunk person whose voluntary intoxication prevents him/her from conscious and intentional actions. "The same is true for language barriers; when motorists are limited by their understanding of the English language, thereby allegedly preventing them from 'knowingly' refusing the test, we still hold that those motorists 'knowingly' refused the test absent some other verifiable impediment....Otherwise, anyone who speaks little or not English can automatically claim that he or she did not understand the ....warnings and avoid the consequences of refusing a chemical test, just as anyone who is drunk could automatically claim that he or she was too drunk to understand the....warnings and avoid the consequences of refusing a chemical test."
Wow !
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Tuesday, August 16, 2005
UC - vol. quit - reduced pay - efforts to maintain employment; timeliness of appeal; duty of referee
Claimant held ineligible for UC benefits where she quit without taking "all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the employment relationship."
Claimant worked at a retail store for a salary of $30,000/year, plus bonus payments based on store profits. The claimant resigned when the employer (ER) proposed to stop the bonus payments, which claimant allged were about $18,000/year.
voluntary quit - The employer had proposed then backed off on similar proposals several times before. Each time, claimant had been able to get the ER to change its mind and get the bonus payments restored. In this last instance, however, she made no attempt to do so. She did not protest and in fact worked for another two months before submitting her resignation, giving two weeks' notice with no explanation for her action. The court said that under these circumstances, claimant had not taken all necessary and reasonable steps to keep her job.
duty of referee to develop record and aid unrepresented parties
In n. 3, the Court noted that although it was not an issue in the case, it "wish[ed] to highlight to importance of the referee's responsibility udner 34 Pa. Code 101.21" to unrepresented parties by advisiing them of their rights, aiding in the examination of witness and gving "every assistance compatible with the impartial discharge of the referee's official duties. This provisions requires the referee to participate in the hearing in a manner and to the extent necessary for the facts of the case to be adequately developed, ensuring that" benefits will not be paid if the claimant is not eligible and will be paid "if the facts, thoroughly developed, entitle the claimant to benefits."
Where there is an unrepresented party, the referee's role is semi-inquisitorial, as in disability cases. Sims v. Apfel, 503 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (Social Security proceedings are "inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits, and the Council's review is similarly broad.")
timeliness of the appeal -- Due to referee error, the envelope contained claimant's appeal was lost and not part of record. Claimant and her husband testfiied that she mailed the appeal in a timely way, but couldn’t produce any documentary proof. The Court rejected the ER's argument that the UCBR was strictly bound by the requirements of 34 Pa. Code 101.82(b)(1), which allows for documentary proof and says that absent such proof, the filing date will be the one recorded by the Department when it receives the appeal. In this case, the date received was after the appeal limit. The court held that since claimant's inability to prove timeliness was "due soley to the referee's failure to retain Claimant original envelope or date-stamp Claimant's appeal, it was proper for the UCBR to consider the testimony of Claimant and her husband to determine that the appeal was timely filed."
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Monday, August 15, 2005
Title VII - gender discrim. - p/f case
Hugh v. Butler County YMCA - Third Circuit - August 12, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041459p.pdf
Summary judgment for Defendant/employer reversed. Plaintiff made out prima facie case of gender discrimination - member of protected class
- qualified for the job from which she was discharged
- others not in protected class were treated more favorably P was fired for alleged poor performance, although she was never warned or counseled, as employer handbook required.
P was replaced by a man, at a higher salary
ER's claim that P wasn’t qualified for the job rejected.
P didn’t have college degree, as job description set out, but ER hired her knowing that, and she performed well in the job.
P produced evidence that suggested discriminatory motives by the employer.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
insurance - misrepresentation - duty to read policy - unfair trade practices
Friday, August 12, 2005
bankruptcy - criminal restitution order not dischargeable
In re Thompson - 3d Cir. - August 11, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043220p.pdf
Held, state court criminal restitution order is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The court said that sec. 523 (a)(7) "preserves from discharge any condition that a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence." (emphasis in original). The court said that this was a matter of first impression in the courts of appeals. David Scholl was the debtor's attorney.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Pennsylvania Bulletin of August 13, 2005
Here's the link:
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/index.html
Of possible interest:
- court rules - Lebanon County - family division rule amendment
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1511.html
- court rules- Northampton County - child custody conference procedure
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1512.html
- health - meeting- Governor's council on health and fitness
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1532.html
- health - Health Policy Board Meeting
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1533.html
- welfare - nursing facilities - metropolitan statistical area
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1514.html
- welfare - demonstration waiver for medicaid for children w/special needs
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1534.html
Don
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
128 Breckenridge Street
Gettysburg, Pa. 17325
tel. 717/334-7623 x2414
fax 717/334-0863
dmarritz@midpenn.org
www.midpenn.org
FMLA case - interference
Reid-Falcone v. Luzerne Co. CC - USDC - MD Pa., June 28, 2005
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/vanaskie/02v1818.pdf
An employer interferes with FMLA rights where it does not advise employee of FMLA rights and thus employee is rendered unable to exercise FMLA rights in a meaningful way
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Thursday, August 11, 2005
Third Circuit: SSR and Disabilty Determination
Allen v. Barnhart , No. 04-2163 (3d Cir. August 08, 2005)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/042163p.pdf
This case looks at the role that Social Security Rulings play in Agency determinations, and, more specifically, whether reference to the specific Ruling was an appropriate substitute for the testimony of a vocational expert.
In this case, involving only non-exertional impairments, the ALJ relied on the grid regulations as a "framework," and then relied on Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-15 in reaching his ultimate conclusion that Allen could engage in substantial gainful employment.
The Court questioned the ALJ's reliance on the ruling in his decision which focused on the attributes of work, not the limitations experienced by the Claimant, noting that the Claimant was capable of performing "a full range of unskilled work at all exertional levels" but then stating, as the complete mental impairment analysis, the following: "The mental limitations for simple, routine, repetitive work do not significantly erode the base of jobs the claimant is capable of performing. (SSR 85-15.)"
The Court noted that the ALJ made broad statements regarding Claimant's RFC but his conclusion only addresses in general fashion the "mental limitations for simple, routine, repetitive work." It does not reference any aspect of SSR 85-15 that relates Claimant's particular nonexertional limitations to the occupational job base.
This was especially significant in this case where the Appeals Council had previously remanded the case and in its remand order specifically admonished the ALJ to state the claimant's exertional and nonexertional limitations.
Accordingly, the Court held that if the Secretary wishes to rely on an SSR as a replacement for a vocational expert, it must be crystal-clear that the SSR is probative as to the way in which the nonexertional limitations impact the ability to work, and thus, the occupational base.
The court also said that if SSA intends to "rely on rules as a substitute for individualized determination, and thus relieve the agency from the burden of producing evidence, we think advance notice should be given" to the claimant. The court urged and said that it "will always be appropriate.....as a matter of fairness" for SSA to "alert... a claimant to the relevant rule in advance" of a hearing. "While the agency can meet its burden by reference to a Ruling, as the Supreme Court has held, nonetheless, the claimant should have the opportunity to consider whether it wishes to attempt to undercut the Commissioner's proffer by calling claimant's own expert. Obviously, this requires notice in advance of the hearing."
"We think it only appropriate to give close scrutiny to the ALJ's reliance on a Ruling as satisfying the Commissioner's burden at Step 5 where the Commissioner has not previously advised or argued the clear applicability of the Ruling in advance of the hearing. In this way, while the Commissioner has the ability to satisfy its burden in this way, its doing so does not constitute an ambush whereby the claimant, who assumed he would have the opportunity to cross-examine a vocational expert, is left as a practical matter to merely argue against a Ruling in response to the Commissioner's proof."
The case was remanded for further elaboration by the ALJ regarding how the specific limitations experienced by Claimant would impact his ability to perform simple repetitive tasks in a job that constitutes substantial gainful employment. This can be accomplished by noting how SSR 85-15 is relevant and controlling - if indeed that is the case - or by obtaining the individualized assessment that SSR 85-15 seems to prefer by way of a vocational expert.
Henry Leone, Esquire
Training and Information Facilitator
Pennsylvania Legal Services
Wednesday, August 10, 2005
appeals - nunc pro tunc - mistake in Purdon's about appeal time
Appeal of Tenet HealthSystems - Commonwealth Court - Augut 10, 2005 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1443CD04_8-10-05.pdf
Held, nunc pro tunc appeal not allowed where appeal time incorrectly printed in Purdon's Statutes, because:
-- Purdon's is not an official publication, it a private publication of West Publishing Company. Therefore, there was no breakdown in government actions that would excuse a late appeal. The late appeal was not attributable to the admin. board that issued the decision
-- The relevant Purdon's statute contained information which should have alerted counsel to check further.
-- West's error was not an "extraordinary event" that would justify a nunc pro tunc appeal under Bass v. Commonwealth, 401 A2d 1133 9Pa. 1979) or Cook v. UCBR, 671 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1996), which deal with non-negligent conduct of a litigant's counsel or the litigant him/herself.
-- Appellant's suggestions to include "legislative breakdown" as a justification for a late appeal is not persuasive. West Publishing Co., a private body, was responsible for the mistake, not the relevant government body, the Legislative Reference Bureau.
-- Appellant's counsel did not read the relevant law in its entirety. Had he done so, he would have found the proper appeal time or, at the very least, would have found information which should have prompted further inquiry.
UC- willful misconduct - bringing gun to work and lying to employer during investigation
Claimant committed willful misconduct where he brought loaded gun to work and, during investigation about the incident, lied about it to the employer.
Schnitzer v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - August 10, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/559CD05_8-10-05.pdf
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Monday, August 08, 2005
evidence - hearsay - excited utterance - 911 call etc.
US v. Brun (08/01/05 - 8th Cir. - No. 04-4208) - Out of court statements made to 911 operator and police held to be admissible under excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, where victim refused to testify and other witness could not be located.
Friday, August 05, 2005
Pennsylvania Bulletin of August 6, 2005
Here's the link
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/index.html
Items of potential interest
-- Rules of Professional Conduct - disclosure to client of lack
of malpractice insurance
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1474.html
-- Rules of Professional Conduct - organization and procedure of
Disciplinary Board
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1475.html
- Minor Court Rules - proposed amendment - availability and
temporary assignment of MDJs
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1476.html
- Welfare - Revisions to Pharmaceutical Services Payment
Methods, General Assistance Pharmacy Benefits, Payment Levels and Rate
Setting Notification --
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1478.html
- Governor's Office- catalogue of non-regulatory documents
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1493.html
- Indpt. Regulatory Review Commission - notice of comments
issued, including Electricity Generation Customer Choice and
Competition Act --
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1494.html
Don
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Thursday, August 04, 2005
admin. law - nunc pro tunc appeal - improper notice of appeal rights
C.S. v. Department of Public Welfare -- Commonwealth Court, August 3, 2005 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/905CD04_8-3-05.pdf
Held, nunc pro tunc appeal filed 6 years late should have been granted where the administrative determination did not accurately set out the notice of statutory appeal rights.
In 1997 DPW sent CS a notice of the entry of an indicated report of abuse. The notice told him that, within 45 days, he could ask the DPW Secretary to amend or destroy the report, and that if the Secretary did not do so, he "may" get a hearing.
CS appealed in 2003, when he was denied a clearance to do an internship connected with his getting a degree in psychology. The internship was denied because of the existence of the 1997 indicated report of abuse. CS said that he didn’t appeal earlier out of "ignorance. I did not understand what my responsibilities were and how I could ask for an appeal."
The 1997 DPW notice said that CS "may have a right to a hearing." (emphasis in original). By contrast, the statute gave him an unequivocal right to a hearing. The court said that the law "mandates that an alleged perpetrator who has made a request for a hearing will receive one, and at this hearing, the agency bears the burden of proving child abuse by the alleged perpetrator. This right is essential. Otherwise, citizens can have their ability to work at a job requiring [a clearance] taken away on the basis of an investigator's report alone and not on the basis of a hearing at which the government agency claiming abuse bears the burden of proof. The equivocal notice given by the Department…did not satisfy the exacting requirements of [the statute] and, thus, this breakdown in the administrative process entitles Petitioner to file a nunc pro tunc request for expungement….."
Concerning the length of the delay in appealing, the court said that "[w]hether a delay is one day or six years late….does not change the analysis….."
The decision also underscored that under another section of the Child Protective Services Law, the DPW Secretary has the discretion to amend or expunge a finding of abuse at any time, upon good cause shown.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Wednesday, August 03, 2005
support - recipient living in "3d world country" - no downward deviation
Nischal v. Nischal - Pa. Superior Court, July 14, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a19029_05.pdf
Held, downward deviation from guidelines not appropriate just because recipient child lived in alleged "third world country" (India) where standard of living was much lower than in US and where guideline amount would make mother and child virtual "millionaires" in their native country. Trier of fact should not try to determine reasonable needs of a particular child. A court can't deviate from the guidelines on the grounds that the child doesn't need the amount prescribed in the
guidelines.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
employment - racial bias - retaliation - prima facie case
Spanish Council of York v. PHRC -- Commonwealth Court, July 20, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1767CD04_7-20-05.pdf
Held, prima facie case of employment discrimination against white employee established when employer officials said that they wanted all employees to be Latino and that plaintff would be fired because he was white. Cause of termination inferred when adverse job action took place
close in time (8 days) to employee's participation in protected activity.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services -Gettysburg
Sunday, July 31, 2005
Pennsylvania Bulletin of July 30, 2005
Here's the link
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-31/index.html
Of possible interest - recent statutes
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-31/1425.html
- court rules - local rules - Phildelphia - petitions, motion, courtrooms
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-31/1428.html
- evidence - rules of evidence - proposed revision of comment to rule 101 - scope and citation of rules
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-31/1426.html
- health - availability of draft application- health and health services block grant
Health People 2010 Healthy Status Objective
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-31/1445.html
- welfare - nursing facilities services - preadmission and civil rights requirements - proposed amendments
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-31/1435.html
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Tuesday, July 26, 2005
custody - jurisdiction - UCCJEA v. UCCJA
About a week ago, I posted information about O'Gwynn v. Herbert - Pa. Superior Court, June 21, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a16005_05.pdf
The case involved a woman who filed for custody in Pa., having just moved from Louisiana to avoid abuse. The father filed for custody in Louisiana, and the court decided that the LA courts, not the PA courts, had jurisdiction. I got too lazy to analyze the case fully. Mea culpa. I mentioned that it was decided under the old UCCJA, 23 Pa. CS 5341 et seq. -- which has been replaced with the UCCJEA, 23 Pa. CS 5401 et seq. -- along with the PPKA, and questioned the current relevance of the decdision.
I've looked at the case more closely and think that the UCCJEA may entirely undermine the decision and might now direct a different result under the same facts.
In O'Gwynn, the court relied heavily on the fact under the UCCJA, harm to the child was a predicate to exercising emergency jurisdiction. The court stressed this factor (decision at 10-12) and mentioned but then ignored the fact that the mother had a PFA order in Louisiana. The abuse of the mother was not a factor in the case.
Under the UCCJEA, 23 Pa. CS 5424(a), Pennsylvania courts can exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction in a custody case if a) the child is present in Pa. and b) the child has been abandoned, or c) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child or a sibling or a parent of the child is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse." (emphasis added)
Under its express terms, the UCCJEA makes abuse of a sibling or parent of the child relevant in determining emergency custody jurisdiction.
I think that this is a significant change from the practice under the UCCJA.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
Gettysburg, Pa.
Friday, July 22, 2005
Pa. Bulletin of July 23, 2005
Here's the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin of July 23, 2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/index.html
Of potential interest
-recent statutes
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1375.html
-more recent statutes, including amendments to Welfare Code and domestic relations statutes
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1376.html
N.B. You can get statutes by act and bill # at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/session.cfm
-court rules - state - civil procedure - title and citation
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1377.html
- court rules - state - juror note-taking - rescission of rule as of 12/31/05
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1378.html
- court rules - local - Perry and Juniata - orphans' court
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1381.html
- court rules - local - Beaver County
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1380.html
- court rules - local - Philadelphia
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1379.html
- health - agreement on community health reinvestment
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-30/1407.html
Don
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
128 Breckenridge Street
Gettysburg, Pa. 17325
tel. 717/334-7623 x2414
fax 717/334-0863
dmarritz@midpenn.org
www.midpenn.org
Thursday, July 21, 2005
custody - jurisdiction - UCCJA
O'Gwynn v. Herbert - Pa. Superior Court, June 21, 2005
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a16005_05.pdf
I haven't had a chance to fully analyze this case, but it involves both abuse and custody. It was decided under the old UCCJA -- which has been replaced with the UCCJEA -- along with the PPKA. So I'm not sure of its current relevance.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
Gettysburg, Pa.
UC- voluntary quit - health - reasonable accommodation
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/83CD05_7-19-05.pdf
Claimant (CL), a dialysis patient, became too ill to do the lifting required in his state job as a liquor store clerk.
The employer (ER) had no jobs available w/in CL's medical restrictions.
ER sent CL a letter dated June 18 that he had only one option - to resign effective June 15. The letter also said that CL could apply for other work with the state by filling out an application. CL terminated his position but did not submit the application.
Held, Genetin v. UCBR, 451 A2d 1353 (Pa. 1982) controls concerning health issues. A claimant can show necessitous and compelling reasons to quit a job for health reasons if a) there are adequate health reasons to justify a quit, b) the claimant tells the ER about the reasons, and c) the claimant is available to work if reasonable accommodations can be made.
Only the third element was at issue in this case. The ER argued that the CL did not make himself available because he didn’t fill out the application. The referee, UCBR, and court all rejected that. The Court distinguished Nolan v. UCBR, 797 A2d 1042 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), because in instant case, the application for employment was not proferred until after CL's employment had been terminated.
Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg
Monday, July 18, 2005
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act - 15 USC 1639- ED Pa. case
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS — Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act — 15 U.S.C. 1639 — high cost mortgage — TITLE INSURANCE — 10 percent premium increase — not unreasonable — requirement of ownership transfer — Chapter 13 — plenary standard of review — refusal to disallow secured claim affirmed
In re Strong, No. 04-CV-4699 (June 20, 2005) — Requirement that debtor pay 10 percent more for title insurance does not render premium so high as to render it includable in title insurance premium for purposes of points and fees calculation per Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act disclosure requirements, 15 U.S.C. 1639.
Donald Marritz,
MidPenn Legal Services