Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Bogo – Pa. Super. 12-27-23 – unreported**
https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A25023-23m%20-%20105782574250221495.pdf?cb=1
Held: A petition to open a default judgment filed 167 days after that judgment was entered is not timely.
“In general, a default judgment may be opened when the moving party establishes three requirements: (1) a prompt filing of a petition to open the default judgment; (2) a meritorious defense; and (3) a reasonable excuse or explanation for its failure to file a responsive pleading.” Smith, 29 A.3d at 25. Additionally, “the trial court cannot open a default judgment based on the ‘equities’ of the case when the defendant has failed to establish all three of the required criteria.” Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 986 A.2d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2009) (emphasis added). Hence, the court may dismiss a petition to open a default judgment based on one or more of the criteria.
Here, the trial court denied relief based upon the first criteria – i.e., that the Bogos failed to file their petition to open the default judgment promptly. The promptness requirement stems from the fact that the party seeking to open a default judgment appeals to the equitable power of the court. Under the ancient maxim, “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber upon their rights.” Riley v. Boynton Coal Co., 157 A. 794, 795 (Pa. 1931).
Equity’s window for lending aid closes quickly when parties seek to open judgments after defaulting under the Rules of Civil Procedure. “The timeliness of a petition to open a judgment is measured from the date that notice of the entry of the default judgment is received.” Myers, 986 A.2d at 176. While there is no “specific time period within which a petition to open a judgment must be filed to qualify as [timely] . . . the [trial] court must consider the length of time between discovery of the entry of the default judgment and the reason for delay.” Id. “In cases where the appellate courts have found a ‘prompt’ and timely filing of the petition to open a default judgment, the period of delay has normally been less than one month.” Id.
Indeed, as the trial court said, our precedents are “clear regarding what should be deemed a prompt request to open a default judgment . . . .” Trial Court Order and Opinion, 1/13/23, at 2. Relying on US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 982 A.2d 986, 995 (Pa. Super. 2009), the trial court observed that delays 55 days, 63 days, and 82 days were not prompt for equitable purposes. Id. (quoting US Bank N.A. and decisions cited therein).
Here, the Bogos delayed far longer than any case upon which the trial court relied. They waited 167 days after the entry of the default judgments to appear and to petition to open those judgments. “Based on these previous decisions, we find support for the trial court’s conclusion that the delay in this case does not constitute a prompt filing, and therefore, we find no abuse of discretion on this basis.” US Bank N.A., 982 A.2d at 995.
+++++++++++
Superior Court – unreported decisions
B. Non-precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b).
