Murray v. American Lafrance, LLC – Pa.
Super. – reported, published – September 25, 2018
Held:
A corporation consents to jurisdiction of Pennsylvania courts when it
registers as a foreign corporation under 42 Pa. C.S. 5301 (a) (2) (i-iii).
From the opinion
We
observe that whether a foreign corporation consents to general personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania by registering to do business in the Commonwealth
is a matter of first impression in this Court. Our review of the caselaw has
revealed that neither this Court nor our Supreme Court has had the occasion to
determine whether, post-Daimler, registering to do business as a foreign
corporation in the Commonwealth constitutes consent for the purposes of
exercising general personal jurisdiction. However, Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648
(E.D. Pa. 2016), provides a persuasive, well-reasoned analysis and we cite it
with approval.
In
Bors, supra, the district court considered whether Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925
F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1991),7 remained good law or whether Daimler eliminated
consent by registration under section 5301 as a basis for jurisdiction. See
Bors, supra at 653-54. The Bors court reasoned that “Pennsylvania’s statute
specifically advises the registrant of the jurisdictional effect of registering
to do business[,]” and concluded that “[c]onsent remains a valid form of
establishing personal jurisdiction under the Pennsylvania registration statute
after Daimler.” Id. at 655; see also Hegna v. Smitty’s Supply, Inc., 2017 WL
2563231, at *4 (E.D. Pa. filed June 13, 2017) (“conclud[ing] that, by registering
to do business under § 5301, Smitty’s consented to general personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and that its consent is still valid under Goodyear
[Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011),] and Daimler.”).
In
this case, Appellee registered as a foreign corporation to do business in
Pennsylvania. (See Preliminary Objections, Exhibit B, at 1). In doing so, we
hold that it consented to general personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania. See
Sulkava, supra at 889; Bors, supra at 655; see also Bane, supra at 640.
Therefore, based on the relevant caselaw, and the language of section 5301(a),
we conclude that the trial court erred when it dismissed these actions for lack
of personal jurisdiction.8 Accordingly, we vacate the orders sustaining the preliminary
objections, and remand these cases to the trial court.
