Hamer v. Neighborhood
Housing Services of Chicago
Syllabus
HAMER v. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF CHICAGO ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT No. 16–658. Argued
October 10, 2017—Decided November 8, 2017
An
appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute is considered “jurisdictional,”
meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the
appeal. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 210– 213. In contrast, a time
limit prescribed only in a court-made rule is not jurisdictional. It is a
mandatory claim-processing rule that may be waived or forfeited.
Ibid. This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this
critical distinction. See Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154, 161.
Petitioner
Charmaine Hamer filed an employment discrimination suit against respondents.
The District Court granted respondents’ motion for summary judgment, entering
final judgment on September 14, 2015. Before October 14, the date Hamer’s
notice of appeal was due, her attorneys filed a motion to withdraw as counsel
and a motion for an extension of the appeal filing deadline to give Hamer time
to secure new counsel. The District Court granted both motions, extending the
deadline to December 14, a two-month extension, even though the governing
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4(a)(5)(C), confines such extensions
to 30 days. Concluding that Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s time prescription is
jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals dismissed Hamer’s appeal.
Held:
The Court of Appeals erred in treating as jurisdictional Rule 4(a)(5)(C)’s
limitation on extensions of time to file a notice of appeal. Pp. 5–10.
(a)
The 1948 version of 28 U. S. C. §2107 allowed extensions of time to file a
notice of appeal, not exceeding 30 days, “upon a showing of excusable neglect
based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment,” but the
statute said nothing about extensions when the judgment loser did receive
notice of the entry of judgment. In 1991, the statute was amended, broadening
the class of prospective appellants who could gain extensions to include all
who showed “excusable neglect or good cause” and reducing the time prescription
for appellants who lacked notice of the entry of judgment from 30 to 14 days. §2107(c).
For other cases, the statute does not say how long an extension may run. Rule
4(a)(5)(C), however, does prescribe a limit: “No extension [of time for filing
a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time [for filing a
notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the
[extension] motion . . . , whichever is later.” Pp. 5–6.
(b)
This Court’s precedent shapes a rule of decision that is both clear and easy to
apply: If a time prescription governing the transfer of adjudicatory authority
from one Article III court to another appears in a statute, the limitation is
jurisdictional; otherwise, the time specification fits within the
claim-processing category.
In
concluding otherwise, the Court of Appeals relied on Bowles. There, Bowles
filed a notice of appeal outside a limitation set by Congress in §2107(c). This
Court held that, as a result, the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over his
tardy appeal. 551 U. S., at 213. In conflating Rule 4(a)(5)(C) with §2107(c)
here, the Seventh Circuit failed to grasp the distinction between
jurisdictional appeal filing deadlines and deadlines stated only in mandatory
claim-processing rules. It therefore misapplied Bowles. Bowles’s statement that
“the taking of an appeal within the prescribed time is ‘mandatory and
jurisdictional,’ ” id., at 209, is a characterization left over from days when
the Court was “less than meticulous” in using the term “jurisdictional,”
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454. The statement was correct in Bowles,
where the time prescription was imposed by Congress, but it would be incorrect
here, where only Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits the length of the extension. Pp. 7–10.
835
F. 3d 761, vacated and remanded.
GINSBURG,
J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
