Thursday, December 08, 2016

tax sale - judicial sale - notice

In re Amended Petition of TCB of Washington County v. Miller – Cmwlth. Court – November 16, 2016


Undisputed facts show that former owner of property sold by repository sale, after judicial sale failed for lack of a bid, did not received notice required by 72 P.S.  5860.610.

The former owner is a party of interest that must be served. See Rivera v. Carbon County Tax Claim Bureau, 857 A.2d 208, 213-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); also Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau v. Mermelstein Family Trust, 836 A.2d 1010 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Bell v. Berks County Tax Claim Bureau, 832 A.2d 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).   This is because “owner” is defined by the Law as “the person in whose name the property is last registered, if registered according to law, or, if not registered according to law, the person whose name last appears as an owner of record on any deed or instrument of conveyance recorded in the county office designated for recording. . . .” Section 102 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.102.

Although the owners were provided with proper notice prior to the initial upset sale, which did not go through, 72 P.S. § 5860.607(g), requires,  that they be served with notice regarding the judicial sale of the Property. The record clearly demonstrates they were not. Consequently, because strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Law is required, which the Bureau did not adhere to when selling the Property, the repository sale of the Property must be deemed void ab initio.
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tax sale - MCTLA - redemption - mixed-use property

City of Philadelphia v. Phan – Commonwealth Court – October 24, 2016


Owner of property which was mixed-use (barber shop ground floor; residential apartment on second) was entitled to redeem it from tax sale under 53 P.S. 7293, the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act.

The purpose of sheriffs’ sales under the Act is not to strip owners of their property, but to collect delinquent taxes. City of Philadelphia v. F.A. Realty Investors Corporation, 95 A.3d 377, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Thus, the Act provides property owners with the ability to recover tax-delinquent properties both prior to and after sheriffs’ sales thereof. See Sections 31 and 32 of the Act, 53 P.S. §§7292-7293, which allows redemption of a property which has been “occupied as a residence. . . for at least ninety days prior to the date of the sale and continues to be so occupied on the date of the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed therefor.”  53 P.S. §7293(a), (c)

There is no requirement in the statute that the entire property have been occupied as a residence, and the Cout refused to imply one.  Nor is there a requirement that the residence be owner-occupied.  Here, the residential part of the unit was a rental property.
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Wednesday, December 07, 2016

UC - employee v. independent contractor

Farinhas Logistics v. UCBR – Commonwealth Court – December 5, 2016 – *unreported memorandum decision


The above case, though unreported, contains the following extended exposition of the issue of employee v. independent contractor

Employment Relationship
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, a claimant must show that his wages were earned from employment. 43 P.S. §§801(a), 753(x).9 Further, section 402(h) of the Law provides that an employee is ineligible for compensation for any week in which he is engaged in self-employment. 43 P.S. §802(h). Although “self-employment” is not defined, we examine the parties’ working relationship under section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Law,10 the purpose of which is to exclude independent contractors from coverage. Beacon Flag Car Company, Inc. (Doris Weyant) v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 910 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

To show that a claimant is a self-employed independent contractor, the employer must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in section 4(l)(2)(B), which states, in pertinent part:

Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that—(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services both under his contract of service and in fact; and (b) as to such services such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.
43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B).

This section creates a strong presumption that an individual rendering services for wages is an employee. Kurbatov v. Department of Labor and Industry, Office of Unemployment Compensation, Tax Services, 29 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). To overcome this presumption, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant “is not subject to the employer’s control and he is engaged in an independently established trade.” Frimet v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 78 A.3d 21, 25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Both prongs under section 4(l)(2)(B) must be satisfied for a claimant to be self-employed under the Law; otherwise, the presumption of employment stands. Silver v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 34 A.3d 893, 896 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

In determining the existence of an employer/employee relationship, the court is required to examine the actual relationship of the parties. Hartman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 39 A.3d 507, 511-12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). We noted that the terminology used by the parties to describe their relationship is not dispositive, id., and even a declaration in a contract stating that the claimant is an independent contractor may not necessarily satisfy the independent contractor test of section 4(l)(2)(B), Clark, 129 A.3d at 1277 n.11. Moreover, although the existence of a non-compete agreement is not determinative of the issue, the terms of the parties’ agreement must be considered. Kurbatov, 29 A.3d at 72.

Two-Prong Test
As noted above, Putative Employer must show that Claimant has been, and will continue to be, free from control or direction over the performance of such services. 43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B)(a). In analyzing this first prong of the test, we consider the following relevant factors: how the claimant was paid; how taxes on the claimant's earnings were paid; whether the claimant or the person for whom [he] worked supplied tools or equipment necessary to perform the services; whether the person for whom claimant worked provided on-the-job training; whether claimant was required to attend meetings or report on [his] work; who set the time and location of the work; whether the claimant's work was subject to supervision or review; the terms of any written contract between the parties; the degree to which the claimant was directed with respect to the work; and whether the claimant was free to refuse work assignments without repercussions.
Stauffer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 74 A.3d 398, 405 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)  

Importantly, no single factor is controlling and the ultimate conclusion pertaining to control must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Quality Care Options v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 57 A.3d 655, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Further, because each case is fact-specific, all of these factors need not be present to determine the type of relationship that exists. Id. However, “‘[w]hile all of these factors are important indicators, the key element is whether the alleged employer has the right to control the work to be done and the manner in which it was performed’ . . . an employer-employee relationship likely exists not only where the employer actually exercises control, but also where it possesses the right to do so.” Kurbatov, 29 A.3d at 70 (quoting York Newspaper Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 635 A.2d 251, 253 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)) (alteration in original).

As to the second prong of the test, Putative Employer must demonstrate that “as to such services[,] such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.” 43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B)(b). To determine whether a claimant is “customarily engaged in an  independently established trade, occupation, profession or business,” we look at whether the claimant was restricted from performing the services for others and whether anything in the nature of the work limits it to a single employer. Stauffer, 74 A.3d at 407. Evidence that a claimant is engaged in an independent business is an absolute prerequisite to a determination of self-employment. Quality Care Options, 57 A.3d at 666. As noted by our Supreme Court, “[a] worker can be considered an independent contractor only if he or she is in business for himself or herself.” Danielle Viktor, Ltd. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 892 A.2d 781, 798 (Pa. 2006).

Therefore, an employer must show that the claimant took positive steps toward establishing an independent business. Buchanan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 581 A.2d 1005, 1008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Further, the independent trade established must involve the same type of services that the claimant provided to the employer, Electrolux Corporation v. Commonwealth, Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Employer Tax Operations, 705 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), and the claimant must have performed those services for others, and not just for the employer, Peidong Jia v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 55 A.3d 545, 548 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

We have stressed the importance of an employer to submit evidence to show that claimant is engaged in an independent business. See id. at 549 (holding that without evidence that the claimant established an independent business or performed the same services for others, the employer could not establish the second prong of the test to overcome the statutory presumption of employment); see also Clark, 129 A.3d at 1277 (concluding that the employer failed to satisfy the second prong where there was no evidence that the claimant established a private enterprise or independent business through which he provided services to others).
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

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child abuse - expunction - hearing - right to individual notice

J.P. v. Department of Human Services – Cmwlth. Court – November 21, 2016


J.P., paramour of child’s parent, was entitled to appeal and have a hearing to challenge the CYS finding that she had abused the child, because she had not received notice or opportunity to participate in a prior juvenile proceeding, which changed a finding of “indicated” to a finding of “founded.”

Commonwealth Court held that JP had not received adequate notice of the juvenile court hearing, nor had she received that court’s order.  A founded report of child abuse is an adjudication and that, under Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 504, ‘[n]o adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.’  K.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 950 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) [emphasis in original].  “Due process of law requires notice to be given to the respondent so that [s]he may adequately prepare h[er] defense in such cases.” Straw v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 308 A.2d 619, 621 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) [emphasis in original].

Here, the only notice provided regarding the dependency hearing was the notice to J.P.’s paramour. The fact that J.P. read his notice, does not transform his notice to her notice. This conclusion is especially true here, where J.P. testified that she “was told specifically from [CYS] themselves that any matter pertaining to anything that has to do with the [C]hild, I am not allowed to ask any questions” and she assumed she would not be permitted to participate in the dependency hearing because she was not the Child’s parent.

While “[DHS] may rely on the factual findings of the trial court in a dependency adjudication to dismiss an appeal for a request for expungement[,]” K.R., 950 A.2d at 1078, because J.P. did not receive notice prior to the adjudication, she did not receive the requisite due process for a valid adjudication.
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Tuesday, November 29, 2016

abuse - expungement - appeal - nunc pro tunc - confusing, equivocal notice

D.C. v. DHS – Cmwlth. Court – November 23, 2016 – en banc



Nunc pro tunc appeal permitted because of DHS’s “equivocal and confusing notice of how to get a hearing,” which “establihsed a breakdown in the administrative process,” thus entitling appellant to a nunc pro tunc appeal.

Friday, November 04, 2016

consumer protection - UTPCPL - justifiable reliance - causation

Kirwin v. Sussman Automotive – Pa. Superior Court – October 7, 2016


Held:  No violation of “catchall” provision of Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-2)4)(xxi), where
- plaintiff got email solicitation from dealer with one price
- when P went to dealer, he was told that there had been computer error and actual price was $3,000 more
- knowing of this discrepancy, P paid the higher price, then sued under CPL

 UTPCPL’s “catchall” provision in 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi), which J-A17028-16 - 4 - provides liability for “fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.”  

“Deceptive conduct ordinarily can only take one of two forms, either fraudulent or negligent. . . . [T]he pre-1996 catchall provision covered only fraudulently deceptive practices. The broadening of the UTPCPL . . . makes negligent deception, e.g., negligent misrepresentations, actionable under the post-1996 catchall provision.” Dixon v. Northwestern Mutual, 2016 PA Super 186, -- A.3d -- (Aug. 25, 2016). Even with the broadening of the applicability of the catchall provision, in order to prevail on such a cause of action, “the UTPCPL plaintiff must still prove justifiable reliance and causation, because the legislature never intended [the] statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional common law elements of reliance and causation.” 

There was no “justifiable reliance” in this case, since P signed contract of sale with knowledge of the price discrepancy.  P did not make out a prima facie showing of justifiable reliance.,  and the UTPCPL claim alleging a “bait and switch” tactic on the part of car dealer must fail.
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Tuesday, November 01, 2016

UC - vol. quit - sexual harassment, racial slurs - duty to act reasonably

Serrano v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – October 31, 2016


Held:  Incidents of sexual harassment and racial slurs justified claimant’s vol. quit, but she was nonetheless disqualified for failing to act reasonably, “with common sense,” in the face of those things.  Specifically, after reporting the problems to the employer, resigning from her job, and then returning to work w/agreement of the employer, she “always said that [things] were fine” when the employer made regular requests to her about how things were going.

Reporting of harassment, racial slurs
Sexual harassment and racial slurs may present adequate pressure to terminate one’s employment, and a claimant need not be subjected to such language or conduct indefinitely. Porco v. UCBR, 828 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); see also Peddicord v. UCBR, 647 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).   A claimant normally will not meet the requirement to make a reasonable effort to preserve employment unless the claimant notifies the employer of the harassment. Martin v. UCBR, 749 A.2d 541, 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). However, failure to report harassment may be excused where the record evidence reveals that doing so would be futile. Id. Moreover, “there is a certain level of conduct that an employee will not be required to tolerate and the Court will not place all responsibility upon an employee to resolve his or her work dilemma. Ultimately the employer bears the responsibility for eliminating harassment against employees in the workplace.” Comitalo v. UCBR, 737 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

The decision in Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh v. UnemploymentCompensation Board of Review, 654 A.2d 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), is directly 9 applicable.   There is no requirement to afford an employer a second attempt to rectify the situation, where  there is no evidence to suggest that the second attempt to end the harassment would be any different than the first attempt.   Here, Claimant satisfied the notification requirement by bringing her complaints to her supervisors  when she initially decided to quit. This notice afforded Employer the opportunity to rectify the situation. Claimant was not required to endure the alleged abusive behavior indefinitely, or to afford Employer more than one opportunity to address the alleged harassment. Her initial report to Employer provided the requisite notice to allow Employer to attempt to alleviate the harassment. Lending further credence to her efforts to continue an employment relationship is the fact that Claimant resigned but then agreed to return to work. This demonstrates Claimant’s willingness to allow Employer to remedy the problem and maintain her position. The Referee and the Board erred because the failure to notify Employer of the continuing harassment after Claimant’s return to work was not the fatal flaw in her claim.

Failure to act reasonably, with common sense
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the decision of the Board on other grounds.   The court found that Claimant was unable to demonstrate the third requirement of a necessitous and compelling reason for her voluntary quit, i.e.— that she acted with common sense. The Referee found that the employer “would regularly request the claimant’s assessment of the situation with the coworker, and the claimant always responded that they were fine.”   Whether or not there were, in fact, additional incidents of harassment after Claimant’s return to work, Claimant now maintains that she continued to have a conflict with the dispatch supervisor. Thus, Claimant was untruthful when she reported to employer that “they were fine.” Claimant’s knowing misrepresentation of the conflict is distinct from merely failing to report harassment a second time. We conclude that Claimant did not act with common sense, because she misrepresented the employment situation to Employer. Claimant, therefore, has failed to demonstrate a necessitous and compelling reason for her voluntary quit. Thus, pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law, Claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
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Monday, October 31, 2016

threat to harm another - interstate communication - 18 USC 875(c)

US v. Elonis – 3d Cir. – October 28, 2016


Conviction upheld for violation on 18 USC 875(c) – use of interstate communications containing threat to injure the person of another
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§818 USC 875 (c). Interstate communications
(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.


Friday, October 28, 2016

privacy - Pa. Constitution - Article I, sec. 1

PSEA et al. v. Office of Open Records, DCED, et al.




Held:  The right to privacy under Article I, sec. 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution precludes the wholesale disclosure of names and addresses of school teachers, absent a strong countervailing interest.



Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Rules of Prof. Responsibility 4.2 - contacting govt. officials - Discip. Board of Pa. newsletter


Attorney News - October 2016


Tip of the Month: Contacting Government Officials

Suppose you are representing a client in a dispute with a government agency. The agency is represented by counsel, perhaps the Attorney General’s Office or the local solicitor or municipal counsel. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from communicating directly with a represented party about the subject of the representation without the consent of counsel, or as authorized by law. Does this prohibit you from petitioning the government agency on policy matters the way any other citizen would be allowed to do?
 
In 1997, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility addressed the question in 
Formal Opinion 97-408,  Communication with Government Agency Represented by Counsel (1997). The Committee noted that the “authorized by law” exception arises out of the preservation of the First Amendment’s protection of the right to petition the government in controversies with government officials. The Committee concluded that a lawyer representing a client before an agency may contact the agency when two conditions are satisfied:
1.     The officials to be contacted are in a position to take or recommend action in the matter and the substance of the communication relates to policy issues including settlement; and  
2.     The communicating lawyer gives opposing counsel advance notice of the impending communication so that they can give appropriate advice to their clients as to how to respond to the inquiry. 

The ABA opinion has generally been adopted and followed in state bar ethics opinions. It is important that the right to communicate with government officials recognized by the ABA pertains to matters of policy, not the particulars of cases.

Comment 5 to Rule 4.2 echoes this analysis, stating, “Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government.” Also, the fact of representation does not prohibit the lawyer from communicating about other matters unrelated to the representation. Comment 4 states, “the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter.”
 

Tuesday, October 25, 2016

employment - wages - payment by debit card violates WPCL

Siciliano v. Mueller, dba McDonalds – Pa. Super.


In a class action involving an issue of first impression, the court held that mandatory payment of wages by payroll debit card does not meet the requirement of section 260.3 of the WPCL that “wages shall be paid in lawful money of the United States or check.” 43 P.S. § 260.3.

The WPCL states that wages “shall be paid in lawful money of the United States or check.” 43 P.S. § 260.3. The language is clear. A debit card is not “lawful money” and it is not a “check” as contemplated by the drafters of the WPCL.   The Legislature obviously did not contemplate the concept of a payroll debit card when it adopted the language of section 260.3 in 1961.

The term “check” is defined in the WPCL as follows: “A draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand.” 43 P.S. § 260.2(a). A “draft,” though not defined in the WPCL, is “[a]n unconditional written order signed by one person (the drawer) directing another person (the drawee or payor) to pay a certain sum of money on demand or at a definite time to a third person (the payee) or to bearer. A check is the most common example of a draft.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).

The term “lawful money” is not defined in the statute; however, its common definition or approved usage does not include a debit card. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903 (where terms are not defined in statutes, Statutory Construction Act requires words and phrases to be construed by their common and approved usages). The Statutory Construction Act itself defines “money” as: “Lawful money of the United States.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991. B


The use of a voluntary payroll debit card may be an appropriate method of wage payment. However, until our General Assembly provides otherwise, the plain language of the WPCL makes clear that the mandatory use of payroll debit cards at issue here, which may subject the user to fees, is not. S

Thursday, October 20, 2016

Fair Credit Reporting Act - inaccurate crim. records - housing

Stokes v. RealPage Inc. – ED Pa. – October 18, 2016


MTD denied - Defendant, RealPage, Inc.  motion to dismiss Count Two of the Complaint for lack of standing denied. 



Tuesday, October 18, 2016

disability - mental disability - complete history - pre-application/onset hospitalizations

Patel v. Colvin – ED Pa. – October 13, 2016


Plaintiff stated that her disability began on May 1, 2010, and filed the application on August 5, 2011.33 In assessing Plaintiff’s treatment record, the ALJ stated that records before the application date of August 5, 2011, were “not from the relevant period.” 
With regard to Plaintiff’s hospitalizations, the ALJ noted which hospitalizations preceded the “alleged onset date”and apparently discounted them on this basis. This was error.

The regulations specifically acknowledge the importance of a comprehensive view of a claimant’s condition over a significant period of time i.e. the need for longitudinal evidence.

More specifically, the regulations state that a “complete medical history,” means “the records of your medical source(s) covering at least the 12 months preceding the month in which you file your application.”

This is particularly relevant in this case, where Plaintiff alleged an onset date of May 1, 2010, and the hospitalizations occurred after that date, with most occurring within one year of the application date. Of particular concern is the ALJ’s apparent discounting of Plaintiff’s lengthy hospitalization from July 21, 2011 through August 24, 2011, at the time of Plaintiff’s application.


In addition, it appears that the ALJ applied a mechanical assessment of Plaintiff’s medical records, focusing on whether a hospitalization lasted more than two weeks and seemingly discounting or rejecting as irrelevant any that did not, without regard to whether “the duration and functional effects of the episodes are of equal severity and may be used to substitute for the listed finding” as required by the regulations.

Friday, September 23, 2016

employment - employee v. indpt. contractor - class certified - common evidence - franchise agreement

Williams et al. v. Jani-King of Philadelphia – 3d Cir. – September 21, 2016


Disputes about whether workers are properly classified as employees or independent contractors are a classic and reoccurring issue in American law. This case presents such a dispute. Jani-King, the world’s largest commercial cleaning franchisor, classifies its franchisees as independent contractors.

Two Jani-King franchisees, Darryl Williams and Howard Brooks, assert that they are misclassified and should be treated as employees. On behalf of a class of Jani-King franchisees in the Philadelphia area, Brooks and Williams seek unpaid wages under the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 Pa. Stat. §§ 260.1–260.12.

The District Court granted the Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. In this interlocutory appeal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), we consider whether the misclassification claim can be made on a class-wide basis through common evidence, primarily the franchise agreement and manuals.

We hold that the claims in this case are susceptible to class-wide determination and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by certifying the class.
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Tuesday, September 20, 2016

UC - willful misconduct - fighting

Armstrong World Industries v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – 9-15-16 – unreported* memorandum opinion


“Even in the absence of a written policy, fighting may be considered a disregard of the standards of behavior that an employer can expect from its employees, even when the claimant was not the initial aggressor.” Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 83 A.3d 484, 487 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

In such situations, where a claimant has the opportunity to retreat and seek help but instead willingly continues to escalate the situation, the claimant’s actions are “neither reasonable nor justifiable and [do] not constitute good cause.” Rivera v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 526 A.2d 1253, 1256 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).

However, when a claimant has a reasonable belief of imminent bodily harm and fears he is in danger of an assault, he is justified in using reasonable retaliatory force for purposes of self-defense. Miller, 83 A.3d at 487 (“using reasonable force in self-defense is, in some situations, justifiable”); see also Sun Oil Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 408 A.2d 1169, 1171 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (“A reasonable belief of imminent bodily harm and feared danger of an assault justifies reasonable retaliatory force.”).
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

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Wednesday, September 14, 2016

professional licenses - suspension/revocation - strict construction of statute

McGrath v. Bureau of Professional and Occup. Affairs – Cmwlth. Court – August 24, 2016


BPOA intepretation of statute to requir 10-year suspension of nursing license overturned, because BPOA failed to follow statutory construction law requiring ambiguities in penal statutes must be strictly construed against the government, Section 1928(b)(1) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1928(b)(1); Richards v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 20 A.3d 596, 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (en banc) (discussing the common law rule of lenity).  The Court overruled a contrary decision reached in the case of Packer v. Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs, Department of State, State Board of Nursing, 99 A.3d 965 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 109 A.3d 680 (Pa. 2015).

statutes imposes punishment are penal and must by strictly construed
Where a statute imposes punishment, such as the suspension or revocation of a professional license, for specified acts, such statutes are penal in nature. See Pa. State Real Estate Comm’n v. Keller, 165 A.2d 79, 80 (Pa. 1960). Section 1928(b)(1) of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. § 1928(b)(1), requires that penal provisions “shall be strictly construed.” Consistent with this statutory requirement is the rule of lenity, which originated in common law, and provides that:

[a]mbiguities should and will be construed against the government. This principle has its foundation in the rule of lenity that provides that any ambiguity in a criminal statute will be construed in favor of the defendant. The rule of lenity requires a clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be. Application of the rule of lenity extends beyond the context of criminal statutes.  penalties would be. Application of the rule of lenity extends beyond the context of criminal statutes.

Richards, 20 A.3d at 600 (emphasis added). “Underpinning the rule of lenity is the fundamental principle of fairness that gives validity to our laws” by providing individuals the clear and unequivocal warning discussed above. Sondergaard v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 65 A.3d 994, 997 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “To apply the rule of lenity, it is not enough that a statute is penal it must be ambiguous as well.” Id. at 999.

Statutory provisions that impose punishment, such as the suspension or revocation of a professional license, for specified acts are considered penal in nature. Pa. State Real Estate Comm’n, 165 A.2d at 80. As previously described, the rule of lenity provides that the statute should provide a clear and unequivocal warning in language that people generally would understand, as to what actions would expose them to liability for penalties and what the penalties would be. Additionally, ambiguities should be strictly construed against the government.

Board changed its long-standing statutory interpretation w/o adequate warning
The language of the statute in this cases does not provide “a clear and unequivocal warning . . . that people generally would understand” about the what is to happen for the nurse’s wrongful conduct.  This is particularly troubling where the Board changed its long-standing interpretation of those provisions without providing any formal or informal warning, via regulation or policy guideline, of that change to the licensees over whom the Board exercises authority.   As these provisions are ambiguous and do not provide “a clear and unequivocal warning,” they “should [have been] . . . construed against the government . . . [and] in favor of the [licensee].” Richards, 20 A.3d at 600 (internal quotation omitted). To hold otherwise would violate the “fundamental principle of fairness that gives validity to our laws.” Sondergaard, 65 A.3d at 997.
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Tuesday, September 13, 2016

attorney fees - accurate, complete time records

Rougvie et al. v. Ascena Retail Group – ED Pa. – Sept. 12, 2016


As we found in our July 29, 2016 Opinion, Class Counsel performed extraordinary work for the over 18.4 Million Class Members. Class Counsel is entitled to be paid now for reasonable hours for their efforts on behalf of the Class Members who selected immediate cash or a voucher.

But when, as here, Class Counsel representing over 18.4 Million consumers in a national consumer protection case largely based on state statutes submit time records without adequate descriptions or otherwise do not contemporaneously maintain time records, we must not approve funds allocated for Class Members to pay for ambiguous uncertain services.   We provided Class Counsel three opportunities to clarify their services but still cannot determine the benefit to the Class from several time entries. At this initial hourly fee stage, we will not approve payment of all of the proffered hourly billings without support to be paid from the Class recovery.
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If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)



Wednesday, August 31, 2016

admin. law - credibility - determination on written record

Long Run Timber Co. v. DCNR – Cmwlth. Court – August 30, 2016


Credibility determinations may properly be made by the administrative adjudicators from reading a transcript.  Administrative agencies frequently use a system where a hearing examiner takes the evidence, but the ultimate fact-finder is the board or commission. Cavanaugh v. Fayette Cnty. Zoning Hearing Bd., 700 A.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997); Kramer v. Dep’t of Ins., 654 A.2d 203, 206 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).

Thus, a board or commission has the power to make findings of fact solely on its review of the record. Kramer, 654 A.2d at 206. Such a process does not deny a litigant any due process rights. R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 636 A.2d 142, 145 (Pa. 1994). Here, all of the Board members reviewed the full record from the two-day hearing before making the decision to dismiss the Complaint. They were acting within their authority when they made their credibility determinations, and such determinations 21 are not reviewable by this Court. Moreover, the bases on which the Board rejected appellant’s proferred evidence are supported by substantial evidence.


As with other administrative agencies, all determinations of witness credibility and evidentiary weight are solely within the province of the Board. Pa. Game Comm’n v. K.D. Miller Lumber Co., Inc., 654 A.2d 6, 9-10 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). “[I]t is not the function of this court to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence given before an administrative agency.” Id. at 10.  Administrative agencies frequently make credibility determinations on records made before a hearing officer or administrative law judge. Cavanaugh, 700 A.2d at 1355-56; Kramer, 654 A.2d at 206. 

Wednesday, August 17, 2016

HEMAP - reasonable prospect - income - anticipated spousal support too speculative

Barzilayev v. PHFA – Cmwtlh. Court – August 17, 2016 – unreported* memorandum decision


Held:  PHFA did not err when it decided to not include a speculative, anticipated award of spousal support in the calculation of Homeowner’s monthly income.

We do not review the record to determine if a homeowner’s circumstances “militate toward a grant of emergency assistance”; rather we review only to see if there is substantial evidence to support the necessary findings, or to ensure that an error of law was not committed. Mull v. Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency, 529 A.2d 1185, 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). “Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Cullins v. Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency, 623 A.2d 951, 953 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). To prove abuse of discretion, “the petitioner must persuade us that the fact finder capriciously and arbitrarily disregarded evidence which one of ordinary intelligence could not possibly challenge or entertain the slightest doubt as to its truth.” Koch v. Pa. Hous. Fin. Agency, 505 A.2d 649, 650-51 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (emphasis added).
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)


Sunday, August 14, 2016

UC - vol. quit - substantial change

Uniontown Medical Rehab. v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – July 29, 2016 – unreported* memorandum opinion


Claimant had good cause to quit her clerical job at doctor’s office, where the referee and Board found that there was substantial unilateral change in working conditions, to wit, a “constant threatening to cut the claimant’s hours to part-time” and reduce her pay by $3.00/hour, if she refused to work all of the overtime hours that the doctor considered necessary to get the job done.
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)


Tuesday, August 09, 2016

UC - willful misconduct - delib. violation of ER policy - WM v. rule violation



Employee’s deliberate decision to flout ER email policy on internal mass mailings constituted willful misconduct, despite ER policy for discipline short of discharge, where ER policy gave it discretion to impose greater sanction, and it chose to do so.

When Claimant’s application for religious exemption to ER mandatory flu vaccination was denied, he sent out a series of 13 mini-mass mailings to co-workers, after he was unable to send out single mass mailing because of lack of permission.

The evidence reflects Claimant’s acknowledgement of Employer’s e-mail policies and his deliberate decision to flout Employer’s prohibition against mass e-mails by circumventing the restrictions on the distribution list and sending thirteen e-mails.   Accordingly, we conclude that Claimant’s actions constituted willful misconduct. Furthermore, the fact that Employer’s policies provide for discipline short of discharge does not negate Claimant’s termination for willful misconduct where its policies clearly afford it discretion to impose a different and greater sanction for his actions and it chose to do so. See Johnson v. UCBR, 744 A.2d 817, 821 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); Seton Co. v. UCBR, 663 A.2d 296, 299 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995).
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)


Monday, August 08, 2016

tax sales - RETSL - right to installment plan - stay - "default"

Barker v. Chester Co. Tax Claim Bureau – Cmwlth. Court – July 27, 2016


The court set aside the sale and reversed the lower court, holding that

            - Taxpayers did not default under a 2010 installment agreement under sec. 603 where, although they were late with some intermediate installment payments, they made the final payment within the applicable period – “when due.”  Therefore, there was no “default” of the agreement, and the taxpayers were not disqualified from eligibility for a 2013 installment agreement under sec. 603, which bars eligibility if there was default on agreement within prior three years.

            - Sale also set aside because, even assuming there was a default,  the TCB’s admitted failure to give the taxpayers notice of such violated the notice requirement under sec. 603.

There was a lot of good language in the opinion, including the following:

            - notice of right to installment agreement must be given by TCB upon payment of 25% of the taxes due -  An upset sale must be stayed where a taxpayer pays 25% of the taxes due and agrees to an installment plan for the remainder. Further, where a taxpayer makes a payment of 25% or more, “the tax claim bureau must advise the taxpayer of the Section 603 option because its failure to do so ‘would deprive the owner of his or her property without due process of law.’” In In Re Consolidated Return of the Tax Claim Bureau of the County of Beaver from the August 16, 2011 Upset Sale for Delinquent Taxes, 105 A.3d 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 121 A.3d 497 (Pa. 2015),   Id. at 82 (emphasis added) (quoting Darden, 629 A.2d at 323).

            - purpose of RETSL is collection of taxes, not taking of taxpayer’s property -  The statute was not enacted to deprive citizens of their property or to create investment opportunities for those who attend tax sales but, rather, to assist the collection of taxes. Stanford–Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna County, 816 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). The United States Supreme Court has held that due process is implicated in any taking of property for the collection of taxes, stating that “[p]eople must pay their taxes, and the government may hold citizens accountable for tax delinquency by taking their property. But before forcing a citizen to satisfy his debt by forfeiting his property, due process requires the government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking.  Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006). Because of these due process concerns, this Court has explained that
the focus is not on the alleged neglect of the owner, which is often present in some degree, but on whether the activities of the Bureau comply with the requirements of the statute.  Smith v. Tax Claim Bureau of Pike County, 834 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). A failure by a tax claim bureau to comply with each and every statutory requirement will nullify a sale. Id. at 1252.
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If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)



Wednesday, July 20, 2016

criminal history record - expungement - summary conviction - "five years following"

Commonwealth v. Giulian – July 19, 2016 – Pa. Supreme Court


We consider the statutory requirements for expungement of criminal history record information for summary convictions pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. §9122(b)(3) and conclude the lower courts erred in holding expungement unavailable as a matter of law in this matter. We therefore reverse and remand.

Appellant Victoria C. Giulian, then twenty years old, was arrested on April 20, 1997, and ultimately pleaded guilty to the summary offenses of public drunkenness, 18 Pa.C.S. §5505, and harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. §2709(a)(1). At this same time, appellant was also charged with the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct, 18 Pa.C.S. §5503(a)(2), a charge later withdrawn, and the summary offense of underage drinking, 18 Pa.C.S. §6308(a), to which she pleaded guilty.   Appellant was then arrested on September 27, 1998, and pleaded guilty to the summary offense of criminal mischief, 18 Pa.C.S. §3304.  

Appellant has had no arrests since September 27, 1998. On May 8, 2013, appellant filed a petition seeking expungement of these summary convictions from her criminal history record under Section 9122(b)(3), which provides: (b) Generally.--Criminal history record information may be expunged when: * * * (3)(i) An individual who is the subject of the information petitions the court for the expungement of a summary offense and has been free of arrest or prosecution for five years following the conviction for that offense. (ii) Expungement under this paragraph shall only be permitted for a conviction of a summary offense. 18 Pa.C.S. §9122(b)(3).

The Court agreed with appellant that the Superior Court incorrectly read into the statute a requirement that the five arrest-free years be “immediately” following the conviction sought to be expunged, when the actual text of the statute does not include that qualifier.
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If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)


Tuesday, July 19, 2016

UC - late appeal - non-negligent conduct of claimant

Claimant allowed to appeal nunc pro tunc from decision that she had received fault overpayments where --

            - Claimant received benefits between 11-16-13 and 5-24-14
            - On May 15, 2015, the Dept. issued an overpayment notice, charging fault OP
            - Claimant had moved from her old address, at which she received benefits, about a year before the OP notice was sent
            - CL eventually learned of OP notice and filed appeal, beyond appeal date
            - Claimant had not provided forwarding address to USPS because she was being hounded by creditors

Court held that under applicable late appeal jurisprudence, e.g., Hessou v. UCBR, 942 A.2d 194, 198 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), the “non-negligent conduct of the claimant” exception should be applied.  Nothing that CL did was negligent.  She had moved more than a year after her benefits had ended and had no duty or reason to let UC authorities know of this.   The testimony showed that CL had an unstable housing situation and moved to avoid creditors, but not that she was in any way negligent.

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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)





Friday, July 15, 2016

civil procedure - complaint - right to amend - PaRCP 1033

Blackwood, Inc. v. Reading Blue Mtn. and Norther Railroad Col – Superior Court – July 15, 2016


Under Pa.R.C.P. 1033, a party can amend his pleading either with the consent of the other party or with the court’s permission. “Leave to amend lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and the right to amend should be liberally granted at any stage of the proceedings unless there is an error of law or resulting prejudice to an adverse party.” Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540, 557 (Pa.Super. 2014) (quoting Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331, 1338 (Pa. 1996)).

Under the pertinent rule: A party, either by filed consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, may at any time change the form of action, add a person as a party, correct the name of a party, or otherwise amend the pleading. The amended pleading may aver transactions or occurrences which have happened before or after the filing of the original pleading, even though they give rise to a new cause of action or defense. An amendment may be made to conform the pleading to the evidence offered or admitted. Pa.R.C.P. 1033. However, amendment is not permitted to present a new cause of action where the statute of limitations has expired. See Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906 (Pa.Super. 2014).

Generally, an abuse of discretion occurs if a complaint is dismissed without leave to amend. Hill, supra. “There may, of course, be cases where it is clear that amendment is impossible and where to extend leave to amend would be futile. However, the right to amend should not be withheld where there is some reasonable possibility that amendment can be accomplished successfully.” Id. at 557 (citation and emphasis omitted).
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If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)