http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-30056.pdf
SUMMARY: We are amending our rules to clarify that we apply the preponderance of the evidence standard when we make determinations and decisions at all levels of our administrative review process.
These rules do not change our policy that the Appeals Council applies the substantial evidence standard when it reviews a decision by an administrative law judge (ALJ) to determine whether to grant a request for review.
We are also adding definitions of the terms ‘‘substantial evidence’’ and ‘‘preponderance of the evidence’’ for use in applying these rules.
DATES: These final rules are effective on January 20, 2009.
Note:
This rule change highlights the difference between standard of proof and standard of review. It is consistent with state law on the issues. “The degree of proof required to establish a case before an administrative tribunal is the same degree of proof used in most civil proceedings, i.e., a preponderance of the evidence.” Samuel J. Lansberry Inc v. PUC, 578 A.2d 600, 602 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Accord, Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981) (discussing the proper standard of proof and the confusion between standard of proof and standard of review.
The proper standard of proof can be a constitutional matter and involve balancing of competing interests. See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 323 (1979); In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 357 (1970). In a Child Protective Services Law case, J.S. v. DPW, 596 A.2d 1114, 1116 n. 2 (Pa. 1991), the court suggested that the proper standard of proof in administrative hearings under that statute was “clear and convincing,” because the fundamental right to reputation under Article I, sec. 1, of the Pa. Constitution was at stake. See also, A.Y. v. DPW, 641 A.2d 1148, 1152, 1153-4 (discussing the importance of right to reputation). This is also the standard in welfare cases where fraud is being charged, 55 Pa. Code 275.31.
