Tuesday, August 30, 2005

sec. 1983 - police liability for part in private repo. in DV case


Harvey v. Plains Township Police Department - 3d Circuit Court of Appeals, August 30, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041148p.pdf

Summary judgment in favor of individual police officer reversed (2-1) in 42 USC 1983 case.  Plaintiff alleged that the officer took part in an improper entry into her apartment and an ex parte private repossession of her property by her former boyfriend.  The court held that, in a summary judgment procedural posture, the evidence showed that

        a) the officer took part in "state action" by ordering the landlord to open plaintiff's apartment, contrary to the direction of an existing protection from abuse (PFA) order.

        b) such action violated plaintiff's clearly established 4th Amendment  constitutional right to be free of unreasonable searches/seizures

        c) the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity -- There was a violation of clearly established constitutional rights, and a reasonable police officer would have believed that his conduct deprived plaintiff of her constitutional rights.  The court held that a letter from the boyfriend's attorney to the plaintiff's attorney did not give the officer a reasonable belief that plaintiff consented to the boyfriend's seizure of property at her home, especially given knowledge of the PFA order.  "A reasonable offivce at least would have refused to assist with opening the door until he was satisfied that consent was given."  His actions went well beyond keeping the peace.

The dissent felt that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Steininger v. Barnhart - hypo must include all credibly established limitations - ED Pa.

Steininger v. Barnhart -- ED Pa. August 24, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1065P.pdf

The court remanded the case because the ALJ's hypothetical to the vocation expert was inadequate at step 4 in the disability determination process -- involving determination of ability to do past relevant work.

The court said that "an ALJ hypothetical must include all of claimant's impairments," citing Ramirez v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2004), and that the claimant's mental impairments were not adequately set out. They didn't even comport with the ALJ's own findings on the issue.

An ALJ need not submit "every impairment alleged by a claimant," but it is "required that 'the hypothetical posed must accurately portray the cliamant's impairments and that the expert must be given an oppportunity to evaluate those impairments as contained in the record'....The ALJ's hypothetical 'must accurately convey to the vocational expert all of a claimant's credibly establish limitations.'" (emphasis in original). The court said that ''great specificity' is required when an ALJ incorporates a claimant's mental or physical limitations into a hypothetical," citing Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 554-5.

The court also said that even though the issue in the case arose at step 4 in the 5-step disability process, the Ramirez analysis was still dispositive, even though that was a step-5 case, since the ALJ's decision relied "exclusively" on the VE's testimony.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Monday, August 29, 2005

Friday, August 26, 2005

Pennsylvania Bulletin of August 27, 2005

Here is the link to the August 27, 2005 edition of the Pennsylvania
Bulletin

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/index.html

The following items may be of interest--

-- welfare - revisions to GA and MA benefits packages &
recipient co-payments for adults
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1586.html
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1586a.html

-- welfare - pharmaceutical services - revisisions to max.
allowable cost
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1561.html

- transportation - approval of ignition interlocks
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1605.html

-- Patient Safety Authority - MCARE- public meeting - Sept. 12,
2005
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1617.html

-- health - syphillis tests - pregnant women in Allegheny,
Bucks, Dauphin, Erie, Lancaster, Lehigh,
Luzerne, Montgomery, Northampton, Northumberland, Philadelphia
and Westmoreland Counties
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1601.html

-- Gaming Control Board - amendments to temporary regulations
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-35/1590.html

Don

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
128 Breckenridge Street
Gettysburg, Pa. 17325
tel. 717/334-7623 x2414
fax 717/334-0863
dmarritz@midpenn.org
www.midpenn.org

Friday, August 19, 2005

Pennsylvania Bulletin for August 20, 2005

Here’s the missing link

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/index.html

Of possible interest--

        - attorneys - bar admission rules - amendment
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1554.html

        - local rules - Forest/Warren Counties - pro se filings
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1555.html

        - welfare - MA - FFS - pharmaceutical services - revisions to max. allowable cost (MAC)
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1561.html

        - welfare - MA - fee increases for dental anesthesia services
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1576.html

        - health - integrated HIV Planning Council - public meeting
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1574.html

        - State Ethics Commission - public meeting
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-34/1584.html


Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services- Gettysburg


Wednesday, August 17, 2005

LEP - license suspension - refusal to take breath test - inability to understand O'Connell warnings

Martinovic v. DOT, Bureau Driver Licensing -- Commonwealth Court - August 17, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/406CD05_8-17-05.pdf

Driver's license suspension by DOT for licensee's (L) alleged refusal to take breath test upheld by the court, despite his apparent inability to understand the required warnings about the consequences of failure to submit to the test.

L's native language was Serbo-Croatian. All interaction between L and police was in English or by the police acting things out. The police officer said there was "no protocol" for dealing with a non-English speaker in these cases. L was not successful in producing enough breath for a valid breath test, which failure is assumed to be a refusal, absent an inability to provide enough breath.

L testified in court through a translator. He said that he didnt understand anything the police said but tried to figure it out from their gestures. The trial court found L to be credible and, based on a videotape, held that L had met his burden of showing the he didnt speak English well enough to have understood warnings about the consequences of refusing a breath test.

Case law holds that DOT has burden of proving that a) L arrested for DUI by a police officer who had reasonable grounds to do so; b) L was asked to submit to chemical test; c) L refused to do so; d) L specifically warned about the consequences of a refusal. Once that burden is met, the L has the burden to show he was physically unable to do the breath test OR that his refusal was not knowing or conscious

Citing prior cases, the court said the "most cases hold that a failure to understand English provides no foundation for an argument that the licensee was unable to make a knowing and conscious refusal....[W]hether Licensee understand the...warnings or not is inconsequential. An officer's sole duty is to inform motorists of the implied consent warnings; once they have done so, they have satisfied their obligation....[O]fficers ghave no duty to make sure the licensees under the O'Connell warnings of the consequences of refusing a chemical test....It is equally not the officer's duty to enlist the assistance of an interpreter to make sure a motorist understands implied consent warnings." (emphasis in original)

The court also said that "whether Licensee fails to understand English is not automatically outcome determinative....[S]imply because Licensee spoke Serbo-Croatian and did not speak English does not mean that he cannot act knowingly and consciously. The court used the analogy of a drunk person whose voluntary intoxication prevents him/her from conscious and intentional actions. "The same is true for language barriers; when motorists are limited by their understanding of the English language, thereby allegedly preventing them from 'knowingly' refusing the test, we still hold that those motorists 'knowingly' refused the test absent some other verifiable impediment....Otherwise, anyone who speaks little or not English can automatically claim that he or she did not understand the ....warnings and avoid the consequences of refusing a chemical test, just as anyone who is drunk could automatically claim that he or she was too drunk to understand the....warnings and avoid the consequences of refusing a chemical test."

Wow !

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Tuesday, August 16, 2005

UC - vol. quit - reduced pay - efforts to maintain employment; timeliness of appeal; duty of referee

Cumberland Valley Animal Shelter v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court, August 16, 2005 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/421CD05_8-16-05.pdf

Claimant held ineligible for UC benefits where she quit without taking "all necessary and reasonable steps to preserve the employment relationship."

Claimant worked at a retail store for a salary of $30,000/year, plus bonus payments based on store profits. The claimant resigned when the employer (ER) proposed to stop the bonus payments, which claimant allged were about $18,000/year.

voluntary quit - The employer had proposed then backed off on similar proposals several times before. Each time, claimant had been able to get the ER to change its mind and get the bonus payments restored. In this last instance, however, she made no attempt to do so. She did not protest and in fact worked for another two months before submitting her resignation, giving two weeks' notice with no explanation for her action. The court said that under these circumstances, claimant had not taken all necessary and reasonable steps to keep her job.

duty of referee to develop record and aid unrepresented parties
In n. 3, the Court noted that although it was not an issue in the case, it "wish[ed] to highlight to importance of the referee's responsibility udner 34 Pa. Code 101.21" to unrepresented parties by advisiing them of their rights, aiding in the examination of witness and gving "every assistance compatible with the impartial discharge of the referee's official duties. This provisions requires the referee to participate in the hearing in a manner and to the extent necessary for the facts of the case to be adequately developed, ensuring that" benefits will not be paid if the claimant is not eligible and will be paid "if the facts, thoroughly developed, entitle the claimant to benefits."

Where there is an unrepresented party, the referee's role is semi-inquisitorial, as in disability cases. Sims v. Apfel, 503 U.S. 103, 111 (2000) (Social Security proceedings are "inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits, and the Council's review is similarly broad.")

timeliness of the appeal -- Due to referee error, the envelope contained claimant's appeal was lost and not part of record. Claimant and her husband testfiied that she mailed the appeal in a timely way, but couldn’t produce any documentary proof. The Court rejected the ER's argument that the UCBR was strictly bound by the requirements of 34 Pa. Code 101.82(b)(1), which allows for documentary proof and says that absent such proof, the filing date will be the one recorded by the Department when it receives the appeal. In this case, the date received was after the appeal limit. The court held that since claimant's inability to prove timeliness was "due soley to the referee's failure to retain Claimant original envelope or date-stamp Claimant's appeal, it was proper for the UCBR to consider the testimony of Claimant and her husband to determine that the appeal was timely filed."

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Monday, August 15, 2005

Title VII - gender discrim. - p/f case

Hugh v. Butler County YMCA - Third Circuit - August 12, 2005
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/041459p.pdf

Summary judgment for Defendant/employer reversed. Plaintiff made out prima facie case of gender discrimination - member of protected class

- qualified for the job from which she was discharged
- others not in protected class were treated more favorably P was fired for alleged poor performance, although she was never warned or counseled, as employer handbook required.

P was replaced by a man, at a higher salary

ER's claim that P wasn’t qualified for the job rejected.

P didn’t have college degree, as job description set out, but ER hired her knowing that, and she performed well in the job.

P produced evidence that suggested discriminatory motives by the employer.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

insurance - misrepresentation - duty to read policy - unfair trade practices

Dilworth v. Metropoltian Life Insurance Company  - Third Circuit - August 12, 2005
 
This case deals with misrepresentations by an insurance agent about terms which differ from the terms of the actual policy, and the duty of the insured to look at the policy and discover such misrepresentations.
 
Plaintiff bought an insurance policy with the understanding that after a certain period of payments, the policy would be "self-funding," based on representations by the insurance agent.  As it turns out, that was not the case, and Plaintiff sued under the state Unfair Trade Practice law,  73 P.S. 201-1 et seq., as well as common law fraud. 
 
P did not sue, however, until long past the relevant two-year statute of limitations, but relied on the "discovery rule" that extends the S/L where a person acted with "due diligence" but is still "reasonably unaware that an injury has been sustained." 
 
The insurance company said that P was not "reasonably unaware" of the problems and that if she had made a cursory examination of the policy, she would have realized that it was not self-funding.  The court rejected this idea, saying that Pa. courts have held that the "examination requirement" is "at odds with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's justifiable reliable jurisprudence." 
 
The 3d Cir. didnt try to predict whether the Pa. Supreme Court would require a cursory examination of the policy in order to show due diligence, because it held that even had P done a cursory examination of the policy, she would not have been put on notice that the insurance agent had misrepresented the alleged self-funding nature of the policy.  
 
The court said that a "reasonable person" could be expected to get only "mininal information" from a cursory examination of the policy.
 

Friday, August 12, 2005

bankruptcy - criminal restitution order not dischargeable

In re Thompson - 3d Cir. - August  11, 2005

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/043220p.pdf

Held, state court criminal restitution order is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.  The court said that sec. 523 (a)(7) "preserves from discharge any condition that a state criminal court imposes as part of a criminal sentence." (emphasis in original).  The court said that this was a matter of first impression in the courts of appeals.  David Scholl was the debtor's attorney.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Pennsylvania Bulletin of August 13, 2005


Here's the link:

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/index.html

Of possible interest:

        - court rules - Lebanon County - family division rule amendment
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1511.html

        - court rules- Northampton County - child custody conference procedure
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1512.html

        - health - meeting- Governor's council on health and fitness
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1532.html

        - health - Health Policy Board Meeting
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1533.html

        - welfare - nursing facilities - metropolitan statistical area
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1514.html

        - welfare - demonstration waiver for medicaid for children w/special needs
        http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-33/1534.html

Don

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services
128 Breckenridge Street
Gettysburg, Pa. 17325
tel. 717/334-7623 x2414
fax 717/334-0863
dmarritz@midpenn.org
www.midpenn.org

FMLA case - interference


Reid-Falcone v. Luzerne Co. CC - USDC - MD Pa., June 28, 2005

http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/vanaskie/02v1818.pdf


An employer interferes with FMLA rights where it does not advise employee of FMLA rights and thus employee is rendered unable to exercise FMLA rights in a meaningful way


Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Thursday, August 11, 2005

Third Circuit: SSR and Disabilty Determination

Allen v. Barnhart , No. 04-2163 (3d Cir. August 08, 2005)
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/3rd/042163p.pdf

This case looks at the role that Social Security Rulings play in Agency determinations, and, more specifically, whether reference to the specific Ruling was an appropriate substitute for the testimony of a vocational expert.

In this case, involving only non-exertional impairments, the ALJ relied on the grid regulations as a "framework," and then relied on Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-15 in reaching his ultimate conclusion that Allen could engage in substantial gainful employment.

The Court questioned the ALJ's reliance on the ruling in his decision which focused on the attributes of work, not the limitations experienced by the Claimant, noting that the Claimant was capable of performing "a full range of unskilled work at all exertional levels" but then stating, as the complete mental impairment analysis, the following: "The mental limitations for simple, routine, repetitive work do not significantly erode the base of jobs the claimant is capable of performing. (SSR 85-15.)"

The Court noted that the ALJ made broad statements regarding Claimant's RFC but his conclusion only addresses in general fashion the "mental limitations for simple, routine, repetitive work." It does not reference any aspect of SSR 85-15 that relates Claimant's particular nonexertional limitations to the occupational job base.

This was especially significant in this case where the Appeals Council had previously remanded the case and in its remand order specifically admonished the ALJ to state the claimant's exertional and nonexertional limitations.

Accordingly, the Court held that if the Secretary wishes to rely on an SSR as a replacement for a vocational expert, it must be crystal-clear that the SSR is probative as to the way in which the nonexertional limitations impact the ability to work, and thus, the occupational base.

The court also said that if SSA intends to "rely on rules as a substitute for individualized determination, and thus relieve the agency from the burden of producing evidence, we think advance notice should be given" to the claimant. The court urged and said that it "will always be appropriate.....as a matter of fairness" for SSA to "alert... a claimant to the relevant rule in advance" of a hearing. "While the agency can meet its burden by reference to a Ruling, as the Supreme Court has held, nonetheless, the claimant should have the opportunity to consider whether it wishes to attempt to undercut the Commissioner's proffer by calling claimant's own expert. Obviously, this requires notice in advance of the hearing."

"We think it only appropriate to give close scrutiny to the ALJ's reliance on a Ruling as satisfying the Commissioner's burden at Step 5 where the Commissioner has not previously advised or argued the clear applicability of the Ruling in advance of the hearing. In this way, while the Commissioner has the ability to satisfy its burden in this way, its doing so does not constitute an ambush whereby the claimant, who assumed he would have the opportunity to cross-examine a vocational expert, is left as a practical matter to merely argue against a Ruling in response to the Commissioner's proof."

The case was remanded for further elaboration by the ALJ regarding how the specific limitations experienced by Claimant would impact his ability to perform simple repetitive tasks in a job that constitutes substantial gainful employment. This can be accomplished by noting how SSR 85-15 is relevant and controlling - if indeed that is the case - or by obtaining the individualized assessment that SSR 85-15 seems to prefer by way of a vocational expert.

Henry Leone, Esquire
Training and Information Facilitator
Pennsylvania Legal Services

Wednesday, August 10, 2005

appeals - nunc pro tunc - mistake in Purdon's about appeal time

Appeal of Tenet HealthSystems - Commonwealth Court - Augut 10, 2005 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1443CD04_8-10-05.pdf

Held, nunc pro tunc appeal not allowed where appeal time incorrectly printed in Purdon's Statutes, because:

-- Purdon's is not an official publication, it a private publication of West Publishing Company. Therefore, there was no breakdown in government actions that would excuse a late appeal. The late appeal was not attributable to the admin. board that issued the decision

-- The relevant Purdon's statute contained information which should have alerted counsel to check further.

-- West's error was not an "extraordinary event" that would justify a nunc pro tunc appeal under Bass v. Commonwealth, 401 A2d 1133 9Pa. 1979) or Cook v. UCBR, 671 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1996), which deal with non-negligent conduct of a litigant's counsel or the litigant him/herself.

-- Appellant's suggestions to include "legislative breakdown" as a justification for a late appeal is not persuasive. West Publishing Co., a private body, was responsible for the mistake, not the relevant government body, the Legislative Reference Bureau.

-- Appellant's counsel did not read the relevant law in its entirety. Had he done so, he would have found the proper appeal time or, at the very least, would have found information which should have prompted further inquiry.

UC- willful misconduct - bringing gun to work and lying to employer during investigation

Claimant committed willful misconduct where he brought loaded gun to work and, during investigation about the incident, lied about it to the employer.

Schnitzer v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - August 10, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/559CD05_8-10-05.pdf

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Monday, August 08, 2005

evidence - hearsay - excited utterance - 911 call etc.

US v. Brun (08/01/05 - 8th Cir. - No. 04-4208) - Out of court statements made to 911 operator and police held to be admissible under excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, where victim refused to testify and other witness could not be located.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/8th/044208p.pdf

Friday, August 05, 2005

Pennsylvania Bulletin of August 6, 2005


Here's the link

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/index.html

Items of potential interest

-- Rules of Professional Conduct - disclosure to client of lack
of malpractice insurance
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1474.html

-- Rules of Professional Conduct - organization and procedure of
Disciplinary Board
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1475.html

- Minor Court Rules - proposed amendment - availability and
temporary assignment of MDJs
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1476.html

- Welfare - Revisions to Pharmaceutical Services Payment
Methods, General Assistance Pharmacy Benefits, Payment Levels and Rate
Setting Notification --
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1478.html

- Governor's Office- catalogue of non-regulatory documents
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1493.html

- Indpt. Regulatory Review Commission - notice of comments
issued, including Electricity Generation Customer Choice and
Competition Act --
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-32/1494.html

Don

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Thursday, August 04, 2005

admin. law - nunc pro tunc appeal - improper notice of appeal rights

C.S. v. Department of Public Welfare -- Commonwealth Court, August 3, 2005 http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/905CD04_8-3-05.pdf

Held, nunc pro tunc appeal filed 6 years late should have been granted where the administrative determination did not accurately set out the notice of statutory appeal rights.

In 1997 DPW sent CS a notice of the entry of an indicated report of abuse. The notice told him that, within 45 days, he could ask the DPW Secretary to amend or destroy the report, and that if the Secretary did not do so, he "may" get a hearing.

CS appealed in 2003, when he was denied a clearance to do an internship connected with his getting a degree in psychology. The internship was denied because of the existence of the 1997 indicated report of abuse. CS said that he didn’t appeal earlier out of "ignorance. I did not understand what my responsibilities were and how I could ask for an appeal."

The 1997 DPW notice said that CS "may have a right to a hearing." (emphasis in original). By contrast, the statute gave him an unequivocal right to a hearing. The court said that the law "mandates that an alleged perpetrator who has made a request for a hearing will receive one, and at this hearing, the agency bears the burden of proving child abuse by the alleged perpetrator. This right is essential. Otherwise, citizens can have their ability to work at a job requiring [a clearance] taken away on the basis of an investigator's report alone and not on the basis of a hearing at which the government agency claiming abuse bears the burden of proof. The equivocal notice given by the Department…did not satisfy the exacting requirements of [the statute] and, thus, this breakdown in the administrative process entitles Petitioner to file a nunc pro tunc request for expungement….."

Concerning the length of the delay in appealing, the court said that "[w]hether a delay is one day or six years late….does not change the analysis….."

The decision also underscored that under another section of the Child Protective Services Law, the DPW Secretary has the discretion to amend or expunge a finding of abuse at any time, upon good cause shown.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

Wednesday, August 03, 2005

support - recipient living in "3d world country" - no downward deviation

Nischal v. Nischal - Pa. Superior Court, July 14, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a19029_05.pdf

Held, downward deviation from guidelines not appropriate just because recipient child lived in alleged "third world country" (India) where standard of living was much lower than in US and where guideline amount would make mother and child virtual "millionaires" in their native country. Trier of fact should not try to determine reasonable needs of a particular child. A court can't deviate from the guidelines on the grounds that the child doesn't need the amount prescribed in the
guidelines.


Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services - Gettysburg

employment - racial bias - retaliation - prima facie case

Spanish Council of York v. PHRC -- Commonwealth Court, July 20, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1767CD04_7-20-05.pdf

Held, prima facie case of employment discrimination against white employee established when employer officials said that they wanted all employees to be Latino and that plaintff would be fired because he was white. Cause of termination inferred when adverse job action took place
close in time (8 days) to employee's participation in protected activity.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services -Gettysburg