admin. law - body that did not hear case CAN decide facts w/o violating due process

Graff v. DPW - Cmwlth. Court - November 21, 2011 - unreported memorandum decision

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/176CD11_11-21-11.pdf

Claimant contends that the Secretary lacked authority to alter the ALJ‟s factual finding that she was permanently disabled by her work injury. The Department counters that the Secretary is vested with final fact-finding authority, and, thus, error did not occur.

In Siemon’s Lakeview Manor Estate v. DPW, 703 A.2d 551, 553-554 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), the Secretary reversed the factual findings of the Bureau in holding that a nursing facility was not entitled to reimbursement of certain costs associated with nursing care services. The nursing facility appealed to this Court, claiming that the Secretary did not have authority to reverse the Bureau's factual findings.

In deciding this legal issue, we reviewed the applicable statutes and regulations. Section 206 of the Administrative Code of 1929, provides that the Secretary of Public Welfare shall "personally" or through a "duly authorized agent" carry out his duties as agency head. 71 P.S. § 66. The General Rules of Administrative Practice and Procedure, which govern hearings before state agencies, such as the Department, authorize the "agency head" to personally conduct hearings or to appoint a presiding officer to conduct hearings. 1 Pa. Code §§35.123, 35.185. Here, the legislature has expressly made "the Secretary" the "head" of the Department. 71 P.S. §66. Consistent with these principles, we held that even though the Secretary did not view the demeanor of witnesses, this did not preclude the Secretary from exercising final fact-finding authority.

Again, in A.O. v. Department of Public Welfare, 838 A.2d 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), we reiterated that the Secretary, as the agency head, is vested with fact-finding authority. We further explained as follows:

While a fact finder‟s observation of the demeanor of a witness has traditionally been viewed as an important factor in determining credibility, administrative adjudicators are permitted to determine the credibility of testimony from the reading of a transcript. Administrative agencies often use a system of adjudication where a hearing examiner or presiding officer takes evidence and the ultimate fact finder is a board or commission, which has the power to make findings of fact based solely on a review of the record. See, e.g., Kramer v. Department of Insurance, 654 A.2d 203 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (presiding officer conducted an evidentiary hearing, but the adjudication was issued by the Insurance Commissioner); … An adjudicative method where the ultimate decision in a case is made by an administrative fact finder who did not hear the testimony does not deny a litigant due process of law. Id.
at 38, n.5 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  

More recently in Duvall v Department of Corrections, 926 A.2d 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), we considered whether the Secretary of Corrections could reject a hearing examiner‟s factual findings made in a hearing to determine eligibility for Heart and Lung benefits. The Secretary found that the claimant had fully recovered and was able to return to work. The claimant appealed to this Court, arguing that the Secretary could not make credibility determinations contrary to those of the hearing examiner. We disagreed, explaining that the hearing examiner was merely the designee of the Secretary, who was "the ultimate finder of fact in the instant matter" and able to make different credibility determinations. Id. at 1225.

We reject Claimant's contention that it was impermissible for the Secretary to make new factual findings, including credibility determinations, that differed from those of the administrative law judge appointed to take evidence and make the record for the Secretary. The contrary principle has been well established in legislation, regulations and case law precedent.

The opinion, though not reported, may be cited "for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent."

210 Pa. Code § 67.55. Citing Judicial Opinions.

Legislation - unlawful delegation of legis. power - due process right to a hearing

MCT Transp. v. Phila. Parking Authority – Cmwlth – 2-14-13 – en banc (39 pp.)

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/481MD12_2-14-13.pdf

 

Statute establishing process by which licensing fees are established, 53 P.S. 5707(b), held unconstututional, because

      - unconstitutional delegation of legislative power – no legis. standards to guide or restrain setting of licensing fees by administrative body
      - lack of due process, stemming from lack of the opportunity to challenge the licensing fee decision at a hearing.

 Unconstitutional delegation

Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution vests legislative power in a General Assembly.8 Legislative power is the power to make a law and, thus, the General Assembly “cannot constitutionally delegate the power to make law to any … other body or authority.” . . . . However, it can “make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend.” . . . The legislature must make the basic policy choices, but it can “impose upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy in accordance with the general provisions” of the statute.  In that situation, “it is the legislature which has legislated and not the administrative body.”  When conferring power on an agency to decide the facts and apply the law to a particular situation, the legislature must establish the standards for exercising that power.

We hold that Section 5707(b) is unconstitutional. The General Assembly has failed to establish standards directing the Parking Authority’s exercise of discretion in deciding how much to spend each year to regulate common carriers providing taxicab and limousine service in Philadelphia.  Additionally, the General Assembly has given the Parking Authority “no standards to guide or restrain [it] in setting fees” in any fashion whatsoever. . . . .Because Section 5707(b) lacks standards to guide the establishment of an annual budget and fee schedule, it delegates legislative power to the Parking Authority, in violation of separation of powers.

Due Process – right to a hearing
The Taxicab Companies contend that Section 5707(b) unconstitutionally deprives them of due process because it does not provide any procedure for challenging the Parking Authority’s fee schedule, either before or after its adoption. We agree. . . . The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee due process of law before the state can deprive an individual of a protected life, liberty or property interest. . . . The right to pursue a livelihood or profession is a protected property interest that triggers procedural due process. . . . As our Supreme Court has explained, the “Constitution guarantees to those who invest their property in business enterprises that it will not be taken without due process of law.” . . . . The “essential elements [of due process] are notice and opportunity to be heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding adapted to the nature of the case before a tribunal having jurisdiction of the cause.”

The Court began with the observation that it is a “fixed principle in our law that no man shall be adjudged in person or property without notice and an opportunity to appear and be heard. To condemn without a hearing is repugnant to due process.” . Because due process applies to administrative officials, “there must be a hearing somewhere, at some stage in the proceeding, even if it be after the property itself is parted with,” in order for the agency’s action to comport with due process. Section 5707(b) requires the Taxicab Companies to pay a fee to the Parking Authority if they wish to stay in business. The fee can be excessive and confiscatory, but there is no relief to the utilities subject to such a fee. The Taxicab Companies cannot challenge the fee schedule in a hearing “at any stage in the process,” either before or after the fee schedule becomes effective. . . .  To “condemn without a hearing is repugnant to the due process clause.” . Accordingly, we hold that Section 5707(b) is unconstitutional.

UC - religious institution - "employment"

Livny v. UCBR – January 29, 2013

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/1498CD12_1-29-13.pdf

Judy Livny (Claimant) petitions for review, pro se, of the June 12, 2012, order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (UCBR) affirming the decision of a referee to deny Claimant unemployment compensation benefits. The UCBR found that Claimant was ineligible for benefits because Claimant’s work for Jewish Day School of the Lehigh Valley (Employer) did not constitute “employment” under section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law).1 We affirm.

The referee concluded that Employer is a religious educational institution and, therefore, Claimant’s work for Employer was not “employment” under section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Law.

We begin by noting that the second prong of section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(ii), requiring the organization to be operated or controlled by a church, was declared unconstitutional in Christian School Association of Greater Harrisburg v. Department of Labor and Industry, 423 A.2d 1340, 1347 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980) (en banc). As a result, we must limit our inquiry under section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(ii) to the first prong, i.e., whether Employer is operated primarily for religious purposes. See Imani Christian Academy v. UCBR, 42 A.3d 1171, 1174-75 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). We conclude that it is.

We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support the UCBR’s conclusion that Employer operates primarily for religious purposes under section 4(l)(4)(8)(a)(ii) of the Law. See, e.g., Christian School Association, 423 A.2d at 1345 (concluding that certain religion-affiliated schools were operated primarily for religious purposes where, “in addition to offering actual religious instruction and prayer, each school attempts to emphasize its respective religious principles on a daily basis in its presentation of even secular subjects”).

US Constitution - equal protection - right to travel

Connelly v. Steel Valley School District – 3d Circuit – January 25, 2013

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/114206p.pdf

No violation of equal protection or privileges and immunities clause (right to travel) for limiting credit for prior teaching experience, when setting salary, to teaching experience within Pennsylvania.  Rational basis standard applied.

 

__._,_.___

UC - willful misconduct - truckdriver - accident v. violation of ER rule

Dixon v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – January 24, 2013 – unreported memorandum decision

 http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1296CD12_1-24-13.pdf

 Truckdriver denied UC not for having an accident but for violating a work rule to walk around the truck before backing it up.  See  Heitczman v. UCBR, 638 A.2d 461 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).

 _____________________

 

The opinion, though not reported, may be cited "for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent." 210 Pa. Code § 67.55. Citing Judicial Opinions.

 

child abuse - spousal privilege does not apply

Commonwealth v. Hunter – Superior Court – January 15, 2013

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A30019_12O.pdf

Pennsylvania’s Child Protective Services Law (CPSL) recognizes that, in order to further important public policy, privileged communications may need to give way to the prosecution of child abuse. Under the CPSL, confidential communications between spouses are admissible in any proceedings regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6381(c).  See also, B.K. v. Department of Public Welfare, 36 A.3d 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). 

public housing - applicant - no right to appeal denial - no "adjudication"

R.                            McKinley v. Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh - 211 C.D. 2012
Po	Commonwealth Court
Op	Colins, Senior Judge
Da	12/21/2012
Op	Reported
Op:	Majority Opinion	211CD12_12-21-12.pdf

 Following its opinion in Cope v. Bethlehem Housing Authority, 514 A.2d 295 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986), the court held that that an applicant for public housing does not have a property interest, and that the denial of an application is not an "adjudication" from which an appeal can be taken.

PUC - manuf. home communities - foreign load - accounts not individually metered

1-A Realty v. PA PUC - 885 C.D. 2012
Posted by:	Commonwealth Court
Opinion by:	Covey, J.
Date:	01/04/2013
Opinion status:	Reported
Opinion type:	Majority Opinion	885CD12_1-4-13.pdf

PUC Code, 66 Pa. C.S. 1529.1(b) did not permit manuf. home community owner to have street lights on the accounts of various residents, even if the owner compensated them for the extra costs.  Sec. 1529.1(b) sayd that "if the mobile home park. . .contains one or more dwelling units not individually mtered, an affected public utility shall. . . .list the account for the premises in questin in the name of the owner [of the park]." 

UC - voluntary layoff proviso

Diehl v. UCBR – Pa. Supreme Court – December 28, 2012

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-61-2012mo.pdf - majority

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-61-2012co.pdf - concurring

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-61-2012do.pdf - dissenting

We granted review to consider whether the “voluntary layoff option” proviso (“VLO Proviso”) contained in Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (“UC Law”), 43 P.S. § 802(b),1 permits employees to receive unemployment compensation benefits when they accept an early retirement plan offered pursuant to an employer-initiated workforce reduction.

Upon application of our rules of statutory construction, we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and conclude that the UC Law does not preclude application of the VLO Proviso to early retirement plans offered pursuant to employer-initiated workforce reductions.

Pennsylvania Constitution - substantive due process - lifetime employment ban - old criminal conviction

This new en banc Cmwlth Court decision finds the new lifetime bans on employees/contractors/etc… who have certain enumerated criminal records unconstitutional (as applied) because they violate substantive due process under art 1, sec 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution

 The court said this in the conclusion:

Because 24 P.S. §1-111(e)(1)  creates  a lifetime ban  for  a  homicide offense that has no temporal proximity  to Johnson’s present ability to perform the duties of his position, and it does not bear a real and substantial relationship to the Commonwealth’s interest in protecting children, it is unreasonable, unduly oppressive and patently beyond the necessities of the offense.  As a result, 24 P.S. §1-111(e)(1) imposes unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon Johnson’s lawful employment as a  “Fatherhood Facilitator” with AIU  and it is unconstitutional as violative of his substantive due process rights. . .

 

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/789CD12_12-13-12.pdf

 

statutes - passage - single-subject - Art. III, sec. 3 - Pa. Constitution

Sernovitz v.  Dershaw-   Pa. Super. November 14, 2012

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A22023_12.pdf

Statute barring claim for "wrongful life" held to be unconstitutional because of violation of the single-subject rule of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, sec. 3, which states that

“No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.” PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.7 The purpose of the creation of Article III was “to place restraints on the legislative process and encourage an open, deliberative and accountable government.” City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 573, 838 A.2d 566, 585 (2003) (citation omitted).

This Article was included in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which was drafted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust of the legislative body and of fear of the growing power of corporations, especially the great railroad corporations. It was the product of a convention

whose prevailing mood was one of reform[.] […] [A]s these mandates survived the more recent constitutional revisions, they continue to reflect important policies relating to the nature of the deliberative process. Id. at 573-74, 838 A.2d at 585-86 (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

The single-subject requirement of Article III, Section 3 serves a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the attachment of unpopular riders that would not become laws on their own to popular bills that are sure to pass;8 (2) providing for a more considered review of bills brought before the General Assembly, as a bill addressing a variety of subjects is less likely to get such attention; and (3) protecting the integrity of the Governor’s veto power.9 Id. at 574, 575 n.18, 838 A.2d at 586, 586 n.18.

UC - wages - full-time student employed by school s/he is attending

Miller v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – November 13, 2012

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/751CD12_11-13-12.pdf

Wages earned by a full-time student who worked part time as a lecturer are not includable as UC wages under 43 P.S. §753(l)(4)(10)(B), which says that employment shall not include:  Service performed in the employ of a school, college or university if such service is performed (i) by a student who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes at such school, college or university . . . .

In Knee v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 415 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), Knee was registered as a full-time dissertation student, having completed her formal classroom studies, and was preparing for her comprehensive examinations. The UCBR excluded the wages she earned while she was preparing for her comprehensive examinations and working as a teaching fellow because she was enrolled as a full-time dissertation student at that time. Id. at 1009. This court affirmed, finding that Knee was a full-time dissertation student and was not finished with her studies. Id.

Here, the UCBR found that Claimant was employed as a part-time lecturer while he was enrolled as a full-time student working on his dissertation, from August 23, 2010, through May 5, 2011. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 1-3.) Claimant was registered as a full-time student while completing the dissertation portion of the doctoral program at PSU. Therefore, according to Knee, Claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. The UCBR did not err in excluding Claimant’s earnings.

UC - sexual harassment - vol. quit

Consolidated Scrap v. UCBR –  November 8, 2012 – unpublished memorandum opinion

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/567CD12_11-8-12.pdf

Employer argues that Claimant calculatedly walked away from her job because she disliked Employer’s chosen course of investigation and quit after Employer took prompt and effective steps to end the conduct about which she complained .

However, the HRA admitted, at the hearing and in her memorandum to Claimant, that Employer’s proposed remedy would have forced Claimant to have daily contact with the individual who had been her harasser, and was continuing to harass her. Obviously, Employer utterly failed to provide Claimant a workplace where she could work without fear of further harassment and/or retaliation.

We find that Claimant’s unwillingness to continue to work in contact with her harasser was reasonable and does not show any lack of good faith effort to preserve employment. Gavlick Personnel Services, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 706 A.2d 406, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (promise of future transfer away from harasser to office which did not yet exist was not a sufficient accommodation where claimant would have to work with harasser in the interim); Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 654 A.2d 37, 41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (claimant had shown necessitous and compelling reason to quit her job where employer failed to transfer her to shift where she would not have contact with harasser). “[T]here is a certain level of conduct that an employee will not be required to tolerate and … the Court will not place all responsibility upon an employee to resolve his or her work dilemma.

________________

 

The opinion, though not reported, may be cited "for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent." 210 Pa. Code § 67.55. Citing Judicial Opinions.

employment - ex-military - USERRA

Murphy v. Radnor Twp – ED Pa.  – November 2012

 

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/12D1044P.pdf

 

 

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”)

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

 

A person who is a member of ... or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed

service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment,

promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that

membership…or obligation.  38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).

 

It elaborates further: “An employer shall be considered to have engaged in

actions prohibited ... under subsection (a), if the person's membership ... is a motivating factor in

the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in

the absence of such membership.” Id. at § 4311(c) (emphasis). Thus the statute, by its terms,

prohibits discriminatory actions where a person’s military status is simply a motivating factor,

not the sole motivating factor.

public housing - eviction - criminal conduct that preceded lease

In addition to the Wellston Housing Authority case, below, see 66 FR 28776, at 28781 (5/24/01), which states the following, on the timing of the illegal activity:

" ...

 For public housing, the 1937 Act (section 6(l)(6)), 42 U.S.C.
1437d(l)(6)) requires that a PHA use leases that ``provide that any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a [covered
person] shall be cause for termination of tenancy.'' Thus, the illegal
drug use criterion of section 577 of the 1998 Act adds little regarding
eviction of illegal drug users for the public housing program, but adds
a provision on alcohol abuse. None of the statutes explicitly addresses
the timing of the offending activity. The final rule does not include
the phrase ``during the term of the lease'' that would have been added
by the proposed rule, since that phrase is unnecessary. Activity
occurring only prior to the time the leaseholder signed the lease, or
the household member or guest joined the household or became a guest,
would not be a basis for termination of tenancy. The provision on
consideration of rehabilitation is not included in the eviction
provision itself but is included in the regulatory provisions that
address generally the authority of a responsible entity in making
admission and termination decisions (see Secs. 5.852, 960.203, 966.4,
982.310, and 982.552).   "  [emphasis added]
   

 

                        

---

 

131 S.W.3d 378 (2004)

WELLSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Marilyn MURPHY, Defendant/Respondent.

No. ED 83156.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

March 23, 2004.

 

 

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13299758204172287375&q=131+sw+3d+378&hl=en&as_sdt=2,39

attorney fees - sec. 1988 - prevailing party - no money damages

Lefemine v. Wideman – US SCt – November 5, 2012

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-168_9o6b.pdf

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEVEN LEFEMINE, DBA COLUMBIA CHRISTIANS FOR LIFE v. DAN WIDEMAN ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–168. Decided November 5, 2012

PER CURIAM.

This case concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a suitalleging unconstitutional conduct by government officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuitheld that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction but no monetary damages was not a “prevailing party” under 42 U. S. C. §1988, and so could not receive fees.That was error. Because the injunction ordered the de­fendant officials to change their behavior in a way thatdirectly benefited the plaintiff, we vacate the Fourth Circuit's decision and remand for further proceedings.

child abuse - expungement - privilege - 23 Pa. C.S. 6381(c)

T.D. v. DPW – October 11, 2012 – Commonwealth Court

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/581CD12_10-11-12.pdf

Secion 6381(c) of the Child Protective Services Law, setting out rules for privileged communications in child abuse cases, pre-empts all other privilege statutes.

Sec. 6381(c) says that

(c) Privileged communications. – Except for privileged communications between a lawyer and a client and between a minister and penitent, a privilege of confidential communication between husband and wife or between any professional person, including but not limited to, physicians, psychologists, counselors, employees of hospitals, clinics, day-care centers and schools and their patients or clients, shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse. [emphasis added]

Accrord, B.K. v. Department of Public Welfare, 36 A.3d 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

tax sale - notice - incomplete mailing address

Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. v. Luzerne Co. Tax Claim Bureau – Cmwlth. Court – Oct. 2, 2012

 http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2186CD11_10-1-12.pdf

 Tax sale vacated where the address of the notice send to bank was not complete and bank alleged non-receipt.

The address used omitted the term "Attn: General Counsel's Office," which was part of the address listed on the bank's recorded lien document.

 

_________________________________

paternity by estoppel

Pa. Superior Court

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a15024_12.pdf

 

UC - separation agreement - immediacy of threat of discharge - VQ v. invol. termination

Halldin v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – Septemver 19, 2012 – unpublished memorandum opinion

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2482CD11_9-19-12.pdf

Board denial of benefits reversed where its own findings of fact did not support its legal conclusion that the claimant quit her job when continuing work was available and chance of termination was only speculative.

The Board's own findings of fact showed that claimant met with management to discuss an involuntary separation of employment.” (FOF ¶ 2 (emphasis added).) On the day after this meeting discussing Claimant’s involuntary separation, Employer presented Claimant with the Separation Agreement, in which Employer agreed to pay Claimant severance pay for a period of time in exchange for Claimant signing the Separation Agreement and leaving her employment. Finally, finding of fact 5 states that “[C]laimant signed the Separation Agreement . . . because of her belief that her employment would have been involuntarily terminated in one (1) month if she decided not to accept and sign the Separation Agreement.” (FOF ¶ 5 (emphasis added).)

Notwithstanding these findings of fact, the Board concluded that there was no indication that there would not be continuing work for Claimant had she not signed the Separation Agreement or that Employer would discharge Claimant. Based on these conclusions, the Board found Claimant ineligible for UC benefits.

However, the findings of fact do not support the Board’s conclusions of law but, rather, support the contrary conclusion that Claimant’s signing of the Separation Agreement and voluntarily leaving her employment was done in anticipation of her imminent involuntary discharge. See Wright-Swygert v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 16 A.3d 1204, 1208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)
_________________________

The opinion, though not reported, may be cited "for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent." 210 Pa. Code § 67.55. Citing Judicial Opinions.