N. Lee Ligo and Associates v. UCBR - unpublished - October 28, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/96CD10_10-28-10.pdf
Decision must be based on evidence produced at the hearing - Pursuant to 34 Pa. Code § 101.106, the Board’s scope of review of an appeal from the decision of a referee is that it “may review both the facts and the law pertinent to the issues involved on the basis of the evidence previously submitted . . . .” The Board is not permitted to consider post-hearing factual communications in its determination and must consider only the evidence previously submitted at the hearing. Croft v. UCBR, 662 A.2d 24 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995); Tener v. UCBR, 568 A.2d 733 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990).
Violation of work rule - employer b/p - claimant conduct must be intentional and deliberate - When the misconduct involves a work rule violation, the employer bears the burden of proving the existence of the work rule and its violation. Walsh v. UCBR, 943 A.2d 363 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). Moreover, in order for Employer to demonstrate willful misconduct, it must present evidence that Claimant’s conduct was intentional and deliberate. See Grieb v. UCBR, 573 Pa. 594, 827 A.2d 422 (2003). A determination of whether an action constitutes willful misconduct requires a consideration of all of the circumstances, “including the reasons for the employee’s noncompliance with the employer’s directive.” Rebel v. UCBR, 555 Pa. 114, 117, 723 A.2d 156, 158 (1998).
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Monday, October 25, 2010
UC - education employees - reasonable assurance - subpoena -
Juniata Childcare and Devel. Services, Inc. v. UCBR - Cmwlth. Court - July 29, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2358CD09_10-22-10.pdf
The court remanded this case for an additional hearing, at which the employer would be allowed to present evidence through witnesses whom the referee improperly refused to subpoena.
The employer alleged that the claimant were educational (Head Start) employees who had reasonable assurance of continuing work in the next educational year and were thus not eligible under 43 P.S. §802.1. Before the hearings began, Employer requested that the Referee issue a subpoena for certain documents which it claimed would establish that Claimants had a reasonable assurance of continuing their employment once the summer ended and school was back in session. The referee refused to issue the subpoena, claiming that the ER would not be able to lay a proper foundation.
A referee has discretion to refuse to issue a subpoena. Alston v. UCBR, 967 A.2d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). However, this discretion is not absolute. A referee may not refuse to issue a subpoena, then rule against the party that requested the subpoena because it did not offer into evidence the very information that the party could only have obtained through the subpoena that the referee declined to issue. Hamilton v. UCBR, 532 A.2d 535, 537(Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2358CD09_10-22-10.pdf
The court remanded this case for an additional hearing, at which the employer would be allowed to present evidence through witnesses whom the referee improperly refused to subpoena.
The employer alleged that the claimant were educational (Head Start) employees who had reasonable assurance of continuing work in the next educational year and were thus not eligible under 43 P.S. §802.1. Before the hearings began, Employer requested that the Referee issue a subpoena for certain documents which it claimed would establish that Claimants had a reasonable assurance of continuing their employment once the summer ended and school was back in session. The referee refused to issue the subpoena, claiming that the ER would not be able to lay a proper foundation.
A referee has discretion to refuse to issue a subpoena. Alston v. UCBR, 967 A.2d 432 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). However, this discretion is not absolute. A referee may not refuse to issue a subpoena, then rule against the party that requested the subpoena because it did not offer into evidence the very information that the party could only have obtained through the subpoena that the referee declined to issue. Hamilton v. UCBR, 532 A.2d 535, 537(Pa. Cmwlth. 1987).
Friday, October 22, 2010
involuntary termination - incarcerated parent
Adoption of S.P. - Superior Court - October 21, 2010 (2-1 decision, with long dissent)
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/S30010_10.pdf
Father appeals from the trial court decree which granted the petition of county CYS petition for involuntary termination of his parental rights to a child who was born in May, 2005. Father is incarcerated and has been since prior to child's birth. The record is unclear as to how much prison time, if any, Father has yet to face, although he was eligible for parole in August 2009 and had a clean prison record at the time of the termination hearing in March 2009.
The issue presented is whether reasons other than the fact of Father’s incarceration provide the basis for the termination of Father’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). After a careful review of the record, including uncontroverted evidence of Father’s efforts to establish and maintain a relationship with the child since her birth and his unassisted efforts to prepare himself to assume parental responsibilities and to enter the work force, we reverse.
The agency failed to prove its case by the standard of clear and convincing evidence, which means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa. Super. 2002).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held more than thirty years ago that incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights. In re McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 216, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (1975). Nonetheless, application of the McCray rule, particularly in cases involving § 2511(a)(2), has proven difficult, inasmuch as a parent’s incarceration is obviously an “incapacity” that precludes day-to-day interactions and activities normally attendant to a parent-child relationship. The difficulty of this reconciliation is evident from the fact-intensive analysis set forth in our case law dealing with terminating the parental rights of an incarcerated parent. Bartasavich v. Mitchell, 471 A.2d 833, 834 (Pa. Super. 1983) and In re I.G., 939 A.2d 950, 953 (Pa. Super. 2007).
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/S30010_10.pdf
Father appeals from the trial court decree which granted the petition of county CYS petition for involuntary termination of his parental rights to a child who was born in May, 2005. Father is incarcerated and has been since prior to child's birth. The record is unclear as to how much prison time, if any, Father has yet to face, although he was eligible for parole in August 2009 and had a clean prison record at the time of the termination hearing in March 2009.
The issue presented is whether reasons other than the fact of Father’s incarceration provide the basis for the termination of Father’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2). After a careful review of the record, including uncontroverted evidence of Father’s efforts to establish and maintain a relationship with the child since her birth and his unassisted efforts to prepare himself to assume parental responsibilities and to enter the work force, we reverse.
The agency failed to prove its case by the standard of clear and convincing evidence, which means testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitation, of the truth of the precise facts in issue. In re J.D.W.M., 810 A.2d 688, 690 (Pa. Super. 2002).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held more than thirty years ago that incarceration alone is not a sufficient basis for termination of parental rights. In re McCray, 460 Pa. 210, 216, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (1975). Nonetheless, application of the McCray rule, particularly in cases involving § 2511(a)(2), has proven difficult, inasmuch as a parent’s incarceration is obviously an “incapacity” that precludes day-to-day interactions and activities normally attendant to a parent-child relationship. The difficulty of this reconciliation is evident from the fact-intensive analysis set forth in our case law dealing with terminating the parental rights of an incarcerated parent. Bartasavich v. Mitchell, 471 A.2d 833, 834 (Pa. Super. 1983) and In re I.G., 939 A.2d 950, 953 (Pa. Super. 2007).
Thursday, October 21, 2010
admin. Law - due process - notice
Erie Sports Bar v. Bureau of Liquor Control Enforcement - Cmwlth. Court - October 221, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1562CD08_10-21-10.pdf
The court upheld an administrative decision concerning an alleged violation of liquor laws by selling liquor to a minor. The BLCE did not give the bar immediate, on-site notice of the alleged violation, as required by a state regulation. In affirming the admin. decision rejecting the BLCE's enforcement because of this failure, the court said
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1562CD08_10-21-10.pdf
The court upheld an administrative decision concerning an alleged violation of liquor laws by selling liquor to a minor. The BLCE did not give the bar immediate, on-site notice of the alleged violation, as required by a state regulation. In affirming the admin. decision rejecting the BLCE's enforcement because of this failure, the court said
To the extent that particular forms of notice have been mandated by the General Assembly via statute, or via regulation properly promulgated thereunder, due process protections are implicated. Given that the notice provision required by [the regulation] is directed solely at the premises at which the Bureau has undertaken an action (and found a violation) . . .due process demands that such an action (when a violation has been found) include the mandated immediate notice to those premises. Where
specifically provided for and expressly mandated without exception, due process protections are not optional.Where the General Assembly, or an administrative body under its own regulations promulgated pursuant to statute, expressly provides for mandated notice, due process protections attach to that notice.
Monday, October 18, 2010
UC - voluntary quit - voluntary layoff option - duty of referee to unrepresented parties
Beddis v. UCBR - October 18, 2010 - Cmwlth. Court - precedential
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2233CD09_10-18-10.pdf
The voluntary layoff (VLO) provision of sec. 402(b) applies only to temporary separations, with the possibility of a recall, and is not accompanied by "some form of consideration from the employer" such as a severance or early retirement package.
Recognizing that its intepretation of the VLO provision goes beyond the plain words of the statute, the court noted that it has interpreted the provision in this manner "since its include in the [UC] Law three decades ago," and that this intepretation was affirmed by a "sharply divided" Supreme Court in, Sievers v. UCBR, 555 A.23 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), affd., 551 A2d 1057 (Pa. 1989).
The Beddis decision also contains a discussion of the duty of a referee to assist unrerpesented parties, both claimant and employer.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2233CD09_10-18-10.pdf
The voluntary layoff (VLO) provision of sec. 402(b) applies only to temporary separations, with the possibility of a recall, and is not accompanied by "some form of consideration from the employer" such as a severance or early retirement package.
Recognizing that its intepretation of the VLO provision goes beyond the plain words of the statute, the court noted that it has interpreted the provision in this manner "since its include in the [UC] Law three decades ago," and that this intepretation was affirmed by a "sharply divided" Supreme Court in, Sievers v. UCBR, 555 A.23 260 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), affd., 551 A2d 1057 (Pa. 1989).
The Beddis decision also contains a discussion of the duty of a referee to assist unrerpesented parties, both claimant and employer.
Saturday, October 16, 2010
tax sale - costs - right to itemization of costs - 72 P.S. sec. 5568q
Appeal of Holler - Cmwlth. Court - September 20, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2318CD08_9-20-10.pdf
A delinquent taxpayer has a right to a statement of taxes owing, incluidng penalty, interest and "any costs or other charges in detail against such property. . . ." 72 P.S. sec. 5568q. (emphasis added).
Where the taxing authority failed to answer the taxpayer's numerous demands for a detailed accounting of costs, providing only a lump sum figure of aggregate, undifferentiated costs, the court held that "Appellant should be provided a hearing limited to the itemization of the Tax Bureau’s costs and whether such costs would be permitted under the Law. . . .We agree with Appellant that she is entitled to an itemization of the costs she owed and not merely a miscellaneous grouping of costs. . . .Accordingly, we must. . . remand for a hearing to order the Tax Bureau to itemize costs that were charged, whether such costs would be permitted under the Law and in the event any costs paid by Appellant are not identified by the Tax Bureau as properly chargeable, to order a refund of same to Appellant.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2318CD08_9-20-10.pdf
A delinquent taxpayer has a right to a statement of taxes owing, incluidng penalty, interest and "any costs or other charges in detail against such property. . . ." 72 P.S. sec. 5568q. (emphasis added).
Where the taxing authority failed to answer the taxpayer's numerous demands for a detailed accounting of costs, providing only a lump sum figure of aggregate, undifferentiated costs, the court held that "Appellant should be provided a hearing limited to the itemization of the Tax Bureau’s costs and whether such costs would be permitted under the Law. . . .We agree with Appellant that she is entitled to an itemization of the costs she owed and not merely a miscellaneous grouping of costs. . . .Accordingly, we must. . . remand for a hearing to order the Tax Bureau to itemize costs that were charged, whether such costs would be permitted under the Law and in the event any costs paid by Appellant are not identified by the Tax Bureau as properly chargeable, to order a refund of same to Appellant.
Thursday, October 07, 2010
UC - voluntary quit - leaving work in anger
Procyson v. UCBR - September 22, 2010 - Commonwealth Court (2-1)
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1771CD09_9-22-10.pdf
The UCBR erred in concluding that Claimant’s sudden departure from work after an upsetting conversation with her supervisor constituted a voluntary quit where
- claimant, a part-time empoyee, walked out before completing her shift on Friday
- claimant never said that she was quitting
- claimant reported to work for her next scheduled shift, the next Tuesday, when ER told her that she was fired, should leave and never come back.
The law requires evidence of a conscious intention to abandon a job, but Claimant never expressed such a conscious intention. The fact that a claimant leaves work before the end of a shift does not, in itself, establish an intent to quit. Iaconelli v. UCBR, 892 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Whether the claimant’s separation from employment is the result of a voluntary resignation is a question of law subject to our review and must be determined from the facts of the individual case. Key v. UCBR, 687 A.2d 409, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). A voluntary quit requires a finding that the claimant had a conscious intention to leave employment. Fekos Enterprises v. UCBR, 776 A.2d 1018, 1021 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In determining the claimant’s intent, this Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident.” Id.
This Court has specifically addressed the question of whether a claimant who abruptly leaves work without permission has manifested an intention to quit. We have explained that an employee who is absent from work without authorization and without taking steps to preserve the relationship by telling the employer if and when he may return may be held to have voluntarily quit. UCBR v. Metzer, 28 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 571, 368 A.2d 1384 (1977). However, the majority of these disputes have resulted from either unreasonable or inordinately long absence periods. Ryan v. UCBR, 448 A.2d 713, 714-715 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (emphasis in original).
An employee who abruptly leaves work has a reasonable period of time in which [the] employee has the opportunity to manifest an intent to quit and the employer has the opportunity to contact the employee or vice-versa. Iaconelli, 892 A.2d at 896 (citing Ryan, 448 A.2d 713). In other words, leaving the workplace in high dudgeon before the end of a shift does not, in itself, manifest an intention to quit.
The totality of the circumstances does not support the Board’s conclusion that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment. Claimant was hoping to return to work full-time when the altercation developed at work. She never said “I quit.” Although she abruptly left work without completing her shift, Ryan established that such conduct does not, in itself, manifest a conscious intention to quit. Claimant was a part-time employee who worked only ten to thirteen hours a week. She left work on Friday and returned on Tuesday, at her next shift. This is not an “inordinately long absence.” Ryan, 448 A.2d at 715. It is not reasonable to infer that by not calling Employer on her days off, Claimant expressed an intention to quit. Indeed, Employer had the “opportunity to contact the employee,” Iaconelli, 892 A.2d at 896, but chose, instead, to drop Claimant from the Tuesday schedule without calling her. By reporting to work at her next shift, Claimant acted to preserve the employment relationship.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1771CD09_9-22-10.pdf
The UCBR erred in concluding that Claimant’s sudden departure from work after an upsetting conversation with her supervisor constituted a voluntary quit where
- claimant, a part-time empoyee, walked out before completing her shift on Friday
- claimant never said that she was quitting
- claimant reported to work for her next scheduled shift, the next Tuesday, when ER told her that she was fired, should leave and never come back.
The law requires evidence of a conscious intention to abandon a job, but Claimant never expressed such a conscious intention. The fact that a claimant leaves work before the end of a shift does not, in itself, establish an intent to quit. Iaconelli v. UCBR, 892 A.2d 894, 896 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).
Whether the claimant’s separation from employment is the result of a voluntary resignation is a question of law subject to our review and must be determined from the facts of the individual case. Key v. UCBR, 687 A.2d 409, 412 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). A voluntary quit requires a finding that the claimant had a conscious intention to leave employment. Fekos Enterprises v. UCBR, 776 A.2d 1018, 1021 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). In determining the claimant’s intent, this Court must consider “the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident.” Id.
This Court has specifically addressed the question of whether a claimant who abruptly leaves work without permission has manifested an intention to quit. We have explained that an employee who is absent from work without authorization and without taking steps to preserve the relationship by telling the employer if and when he may return may be held to have voluntarily quit. UCBR v. Metzer, 28 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 571, 368 A.2d 1384 (1977). However, the majority of these disputes have resulted from either unreasonable or inordinately long absence periods. Ryan v. UCBR, 448 A.2d 713, 714-715 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) (emphasis in original).
An employee who abruptly leaves work has a reasonable period of time in which [the] employee has the opportunity to manifest an intent to quit and the employer has the opportunity to contact the employee or vice-versa. Iaconelli, 892 A.2d at 896 (citing Ryan, 448 A.2d 713). In other words, leaving the workplace in high dudgeon before the end of a shift does not, in itself, manifest an intention to quit.
The totality of the circumstances does not support the Board’s conclusion that Claimant voluntarily terminated her employment. Claimant was hoping to return to work full-time when the altercation developed at work. She never said “I quit.” Although she abruptly left work without completing her shift, Ryan established that such conduct does not, in itself, manifest a conscious intention to quit. Claimant was a part-time employee who worked only ten to thirteen hours a week. She left work on Friday and returned on Tuesday, at her next shift. This is not an “inordinately long absence.” Ryan, 448 A.2d at 715. It is not reasonable to infer that by not calling Employer on her days off, Claimant expressed an intention to quit. Indeed, Employer had the “opportunity to contact the employee,” Iaconelli, 892 A.2d at 896, but chose, instead, to drop Claimant from the Tuesday schedule without calling her. By reporting to work at her next shift, Claimant acted to preserve the employment relationship.
equity - unclean hands
Mazzitti and Sullivan Counseling Services v. DPW - Cmwlth. Court - October 7, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1593CD09_10-7-10.pdf
Claim of payment for a counseling services denied because petitioner had unclean hands, involving fraudlent claims for services.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1593CD09_10-7-10.pdf
Claim of payment for a counseling services denied because petitioner had unclean hands, involving fraudlent claims for services.
It is well settled that “[a] court may deprive a party of equitable relief where, to the detriment of the other party, the party applying for such relief is guilty of bad conduct relating to the matter at issue. The doctrine of unclean hands[7] requires that one seeking equity act fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue….” Terraciano v. Department of Transportation, 562 Pa. 60, 69, 753 A.2d 233, 237-238 (2000) (citations omitted).
As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted:
[T]he doctrine of unclean hands is far more than a mere banality. It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant. That doctrine is rooted in the historical concept of court of equity as a vehicle for affirmatively enforcing the requirements of conscience and good faith…. Thus while ‘equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives’ … as to other matters, it does require that they shall have acted fairly and without fraud or deceit as to the controversy in issue….Shapiro v. Shapiro, 415 Pa. 503, 506-507, 204 A.2d 266, 268 (1964) quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 [(1945)]. Jacobs v. Halloran, 551 Pa. 350, 359-360, 710 A.2d 1098, 1103 (1998).
Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Fair Credit Reporting Act - denial of credit because of incorrect listing as "deceased"
Sheldon v. Experian Information Solutions - ED Pa. - September 28, 2010
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D1006P.pdfThis is a putative class action arising under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Jurisdiction is federal question. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Plaintiffs purport to represent a class of individuals who have been incorrectly classified as "deceased" on credit reports issued by defendant Experian Information Solutions, Inc., resulting in the denial of credit.
The complaint alleges that the inclusion of this information violates 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) because Experian did not implement reasonable procedures to assure the reports’ accuracy. Additionally, it is alleged that the sale of the reports with the incorrect "deceased" notation violates 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(a) because Experian’s purpose for selling credit reports on deceased individuals does not come within a statutorily permitted purpose.
These violations are alleged to have been both negligent and wilful [sic]. Complaint, Count I. Defendant moves for summary judgment. The motion will be denied as to the allegedly negligent violations and granted as to those alleged to be wilful [sic].
Thursday, September 23, 2010
wages - Wage Payment and Collection Law - attorney fees
Ambrose v. Citizens National Bank - Superior Court - September 21, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A09027_10.pdf
Former employees were entitled to attorney fees where they prevailed on fee claim under Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq., including fees for defending against the employer's counterclaims.
The employer's defenses to the WPCL claims and its counterclaim against the former employees were "inextricalby intertwined."
"Moreover, in light of the circumstances of this case, we find the trial court’s award of counsel fees served the express purposes of the WCPL by encouraging Appellees to pursue their wage claims and rebuff CNB’s attempts to intimidate them into dropping the complaints. . . .[T]he trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees prevented Appellees from having to exhaust their entire compensatory award in order to satisfy their legal bills. As the award promotes the purpose of the WPCL’s fee-shifting provision under the circumstances of this case, we reject CNB’s contention that the trial court erred in assessing all of the attorneys’ fees they incurred in this litigation."
The court also held that the trial court correctly decided that the employer's litigation conduct was in bad faith, since the employer was aware at an early stage that its counterclaims were "baseless" and "specious."
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A09027_10.pdf
Former employees were entitled to attorney fees where they prevailed on fee claim under Wage Payment and Collection Law, 43 P.S. § 260.1 et seq., including fees for defending against the employer's counterclaims.
The employer's defenses to the WPCL claims and its counterclaim against the former employees were "inextricalby intertwined."
"Moreover, in light of the circumstances of this case, we find the trial court’s award of counsel fees served the express purposes of the WCPL by encouraging Appellees to pursue their wage claims and rebuff CNB’s attempts to intimidate them into dropping the complaints. . . .[T]he trial court’s award of attorneys’ fees prevented Appellees from having to exhaust their entire compensatory award in order to satisfy their legal bills. As the award promotes the purpose of the WPCL’s fee-shifting provision under the circumstances of this case, we reject CNB’s contention that the trial court erred in assessing all of the attorneys’ fees they incurred in this litigation."
The court also held that the trial court correctly decided that the employer's litigation conduct was in bad faith, since the employer was aware at an early stage that its counterclaims were "baseless" and "specious."
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
federal courts - pre-trial orders - violation - sanctions - FRCivP 16
Rorrer v. Cleveland Steel Container Corp. - ED Pa. - September 20, 2010
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D0986P.pdf
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f), which authorizes sanctions for violations of pretrial orders issued pursuant to Rule 16, provides: (1) In General. On a motion or on its own, the court may issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii), if a party or its attorney: . . .(c) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order. (2) Imposing Fees and Costs. Instead of or in addition to any other sanction, the court must order the party, its attorney, or both to pay the reasonable expenses - - including attorney’s fees - - incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, unless the noncompliance was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(c), 16(f)(2).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “monetary sanctions for noncompliance with Rule 16 pretrial orders are required and appropriate absent a showing that the violationwas ‘substantially justified’ or the award of expenses is ‘unjust’ under the circumstances of the case.” Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 241 (3d Cir. 2007). Substantial justification exists where there is a “genuine dispute concerning compliance.” Id. (quoting Fitz, Inc. v. RalphWilson Plastics Co., 174 F.R.D. 587, 591 (D.N.J. 1997)). To determine whether sanctions are “unjust,” a court considers “the degree of the sanction in light of the severity of the transgression which brought about the failure to comply.” Tracinda Corp., 502 F.3d at 241.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D0986P.pdf
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(f), which authorizes sanctions for violations of pretrial orders issued pursuant to Rule 16, provides: (1) In General. On a motion or on its own, the court may issue any just orders, including those authorized by Rule 37(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii), if a party or its attorney: . . .(c) fails to obey a scheduling or other pretrial order. (2) Imposing Fees and Costs. Instead of or in addition to any other sanction, the court must order the party, its attorney, or both to pay the reasonable expenses - - including attorney’s fees - - incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, unless the noncompliance was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f)(1)(c), 16(f)(2).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “monetary sanctions for noncompliance with Rule 16 pretrial orders are required and appropriate absent a showing that the violationwas ‘substantially justified’ or the award of expenses is ‘unjust’ under the circumstances of the case.” Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 241 (3d Cir. 2007). Substantial justification exists where there is a “genuine dispute concerning compliance.” Id. (quoting Fitz, Inc. v. RalphWilson Plastics Co., 174 F.R.D. 587, 591 (D.N.J. 1997)). To determine whether sanctions are “unjust,” a court considers “the degree of the sanction in light of the severity of the transgression which brought about the failure to comply.” Tracinda Corp., 502 F.3d at 241.
__._,_.___
Thursday, September 16, 2010
UC - willful misconduct - drug testing - memo
In Turner v. UCBR (May 16, 2006) , the Commonwealth Court held (4-3) that the employer could establish written drug test results as business records under 42 Pa. C.S. 6108(b), by the "testimony of the supervisor of those persons who are actually performing the drug testing of a urine specimen. . . ". The court said that the testimony of the employer vice-president and director of toxicology of the lab that did the drug test "provided very detailed and sufficient information relating to the preparation of claimant's drug test result and justified not only a presumption about the trustworthiness of this record but its admission."
This holding is questionable in light of the Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Barton-Martin (September 8, 2010), a criminal case in which the court struck down a DUI conviction based on lab reports, where the lab analyst who did the testing and wrote the report did not appear at trial and was not shown to be unavailable, citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), which was authored by Justice Scalia, with Thomas concurring.
Like Barton-Martin, Melendez-Diaz is a criminal case. Both rely on the confrontation clause of the 6th Amendment. A similar provision in the state constitution, Article I, sec. 9, says that in "all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ."
However, there may be a correlative right to confront witnesses in civil cases as a matter of state due process, the state administrative agency law, 2 Pa. C.S., and other sources. Well-established rules about the use of hearsay in administrative hearings support this position. Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding. Hearsay evidence admitted without objection will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand. Walker v. UCBR, 367 A.2d 377, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth 1976). This long-standing rule is "not a mere technical rule of evidence, but a fundamental rule of law which ought to be followed by agencies when facts crucial to the issue are sought to be placed on the record and an objection is made thereto.” A.Y. v. DPW, 641 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. 1994).
In addition to these basic principles, which Turner undercuts , there is extensive language in Melendez-Diaz (which in turn relied on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) that can be used to argue that Turner was wrongly decided. In Melendez-Diaz, the court struck down a conviction based in part on written "certificates of analysis" that were used to establish that a substance taken from the defendant was cocaine.
This holding is questionable in light of the Superior Court decision in Commonwealth v. Barton-Martin (September 8, 2010), a criminal case in which the court struck down a DUI conviction based on lab reports, where the lab analyst who did the testing and wrote the report did not appear at trial and was not shown to be unavailable, citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), which was authored by Justice Scalia, with Thomas concurring.
Like Barton-Martin, Melendez-Diaz is a criminal case. Both rely on the confrontation clause of the 6th Amendment. A similar provision in the state constitution, Article I, sec. 9, says that in "all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. . . ."
However, there may be a correlative right to confront witnesses in civil cases as a matter of state due process, the state administrative agency law, 2 Pa. C.S., and other sources. Well-established rules about the use of hearsay in administrative hearings support this position. Hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding. Hearsay evidence admitted without objection will be given its natural probative effect and may support a finding if it is corroborated by any competent evidence in the record, but a finding of fact based solely on hearsay will not stand. Walker v. UCBR, 367 A.2d 377, 370 (Pa. Cmwlth 1976). This long-standing rule is "not a mere technical rule of evidence, but a fundamental rule of law which ought to be followed by agencies when facts crucial to the issue are sought to be placed on the record and an objection is made thereto.” A.Y. v. DPW, 641 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa. 1994).
In addition to these basic principles, which Turner undercuts , there is extensive language in Melendez-Diaz (which in turn relied on Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) that can be used to argue that Turner was wrongly decided. In Melendez-Diaz, the court struck down a conviction based in part on written "certificates of analysis" that were used to establish that a substance taken from the defendant was cocaine.
The most useful language in Melendez-Diaz for UC cases involving drug cases involves statements that reject lab reports as "neutral scientific testing" or as business records.
Excerpts from the case about testing --
- Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.- Confrontation is designed to weed out not only the fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well.
-
- There is "little reason to believe that confrontation will be useless in testing analysts' honesty, proficiency, and methodology-the features that are commonly the focus in the cross-examination of experts."
Excerpt about drug tests as business records
- The federal evidence rule about records kept in the regular course of business does not apply "if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at trial. " It doesn't cover records "calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business.
UC - willful misconduct - disparate treatment - burden of proof/persuasion
Geisinger Health Plan v. UCBR - Cmwlth. Court - en banc 4-3 decision - February 5, 2009 - 964 A.2d 970 Pa. Cmwlth. 2009)
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2029CD07_2-5-09.pdf
Claimant was fired for sending pornographic emails at work. He claimed improper disparate treatment, because others who had done the same were not terminated.
The Court (4-3) held that "[d]isparate treatment is an affirmative defense by which a claimant who has engaged in willful misconduct may still receive benefits if he can make an initial showing that: (1) the employer discharged claimant, but did not discharge other employees who engaged in similar conduct; (2 ) the claimant was similarly situated to the other employees who were not discharged; and (3) the employer discharged the claimant based upon an improper criterion. See Department of Transportation v. UCBR, 755 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (“[T]he essence of disparate treatment is not only whether unlawful discrimination has occurred but also whether similarly situated people are treated differently, based upon improper criteria.”). Once the claimant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it had a proper purpose for discharging the claimant.
The court noted, several times, that there are "opinions of this Court that have been less than clear in applying the burden of proving disparate treatment," contrasting cases like Remcon Plastics, Inc. v. UCBR, 651 A.2d 671 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), with others such as Walsh v. UCBR, 943 A.2d 363, 368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The court noted that "it is important to remember that the disparate treatment defense to a finding of willful misconduct is not found in the Law, but has its genesis in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Woodson v. UCBR, 461 Pa. 439, 336 A.2d 867 (1975)."
There were strong dissents from Judges Pelligrini and Friedman (joined by Smith-Ribner).
So far as I know, there was no appeal in the case.
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2029CD07_2-5-09.pdf
Claimant was fired for sending pornographic emails at work. He claimed improper disparate treatment, because others who had done the same were not terminated.
The Court (4-3) held that "[d]isparate treatment is an affirmative defense by which a claimant who has engaged in willful misconduct may still receive benefits if he can make an initial showing that: (1) the employer discharged claimant, but did not discharge other employees who engaged in similar conduct; (2 ) the claimant was similarly situated to the other employees who were not discharged; and (3) the employer discharged the claimant based upon an improper criterion. See Department of Transportation v. UCBR, 755 A.2d 744, 748 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (“[T]he essence of disparate treatment is not only whether unlawful discrimination has occurred but also whether similarly situated people are treated differently, based upon improper criteria.”). Once the claimant has made this showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it had a proper purpose for discharging the claimant.
The court noted, several times, that there are "opinions of this Court that have been less than clear in applying the burden of proving disparate treatment," contrasting cases like Remcon Plastics, Inc. v. UCBR, 651 A.2d 671 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), with others such as Walsh v. UCBR, 943 A.2d 363, 368 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). The court noted that "it is important to remember that the disparate treatment defense to a finding of willful misconduct is not found in the Law, but has its genesis in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Woodson v. UCBR, 461 Pa. 439, 336 A.2d 867 (1975)."
There were strong dissents from Judges Pelligrini and Friedman (joined by Smith-Ribner).
So far as I know, there was no appeal in the case.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
UC - hearing - remand -
Hill v. UCBR - Cmwlth. Court - unreported memorandum decision
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2245CD09_9-14-10.pdf
Claimant’s excuse that she did not attend because she got the hearing date “mixed up,” was not a valid reason for a remand hearing even if the Board believed her. The Board has discretion under its regulation, 34 Pa. Code §101.24(a), to decide whether a remand is necessary. The denial of an application for remand will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. Flores v. UCBR, 686 A.2d 66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
This Court has held that a claimant’s own negligence is not “proper cause” to justify the failure to appear at a referee’s hearing. Savage v. UCBR, 491 A.2d 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Clearly, it was Claimant’s own negligence that prevented her from attending the hearing.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2245CD09_9-14-10.pdf
Claimant’s excuse that she did not attend because she got the hearing date “mixed up,” was not a valid reason for a remand hearing even if the Board believed her. The Board has discretion under its regulation, 34 Pa. Code §101.24(a), to decide whether a remand is necessary. The denial of an application for remand will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. Flores v. UCBR, 686 A.2d 66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).
This Court has held that a claimant’s own negligence is not “proper cause” to justify the failure to appear at a referee’s hearing. Savage v. UCBR, 491 A.2d 947 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Clearly, it was Claimant’s own negligence that prevented her from attending the hearing.
Monday, September 13, 2010
mortgages - racial discrimination in lending - 42 USC 1981
Anderson v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. - 3d Cir. Court of Appeals - September 13, 2010
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/092275p.pdf
This case is brought by three African-American couples who, in 2004, purchased adjacent houses in a Dover, Delaware, community known as “Silver Lake.” Plaintiffs received mortgages from Wachovia Mortgage Corporation, but only after Wachovia imposed several conditions on the approvals of these mortgages. Plaintiffs allege that these conditions were racially motivated, and brought suit against Wachovia under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and various state law causes of action.
This appeal requires us to identify, as a matter of first impression, the elements of a prima facie case of lending discrimination under § 1981. Whether plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of discrimination is a close call, but even if they have, they have not undermined Wachovia’s legitimate reasons for imposing the conditions it did.
Thus, we conclude that they have not shown that the mortgage conditions were imposed for discriminatory reasons. The District Court therefore properly granted summary judgment to Wachovia on the § 1981 claim. We also conclude that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ breach of contract and tortious interference claims, and that it acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel certain discovery. Finally, we find that the District Court acted within its discretion in remanding plaintiffs’ good faith and fair dealing claim to Delaware state court. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s orders and judgment.
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/092275p.pdf
This case is brought by three African-American couples who, in 2004, purchased adjacent houses in a Dover, Delaware, community known as “Silver Lake.” Plaintiffs received mortgages from Wachovia Mortgage Corporation, but only after Wachovia imposed several conditions on the approvals of these mortgages. Plaintiffs allege that these conditions were racially motivated, and brought suit against Wachovia under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and various state law causes of action.
This appeal requires us to identify, as a matter of first impression, the elements of a prima facie case of lending discrimination under § 1981. Whether plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of discrimination is a close call, but even if they have, they have not undermined Wachovia’s legitimate reasons for imposing the conditions it did.
Thus, we conclude that they have not shown that the mortgage conditions were imposed for discriminatory reasons. The District Court therefore properly granted summary judgment to Wachovia on the § 1981 claim. We also conclude that the District Court correctly granted summary judgment on plaintiffs’ breach of contract and tortious interference claims, and that it acted within its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel certain discovery. Finally, we find that the District Court acted within its discretion in remanding plaintiffs’ good faith and fair dealing claim to Delaware state court. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s orders and judgment.
Friday, September 10, 2010
insurance - cancellation - notice to homeowner
Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Insurance Department - Cmwlth. Court - September 10, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/411CD10_9-10-10.pdf
The court held that the insurance company improperly cancelled the homeowner's insurance, because it did not give her the proper statutory notice. Several notices to the homeowner were returned as "undeliverable." The homeowner, an elderly woman, was going back and forth from her home to that of a relative, but the agency found that she " did not officially change her address; therefore, there was no need for her to notify Nationwide of a change of address." Moreover, the insurance company did not follow its own internal policy of contacting the local agent of record for further investigation.
The "Commissioner found that there was no evidence that Nationwide made any attempt to re-send the notice or otherwise notify the homeowner that her policy was being cancelled prior to submission of the claim in December 2008. As such, the insurer's contention that it is truly unfair to Nationwide to void the cancellation since it was the homeowner’s conduct that prevented her from receiving the cancellation notice is without merit."
The Unfair Insurance Practice Act, 40 P.S. §§1171.1-1171.15, prohibits persons engaged in the business of insurance from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Yorktowne Mutual Insurance Company v. Insurance Department, 662 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 543 Pa. 721, 672 A.2d 313 (1996). The insurer has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory requirements for cancellation of a homeowners’ policy of insurance. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 578 A.2d 999 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 527 Pa. 595, 588 A.2d 915 (1991).
Section 5(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows: No cancellation or refusal to renew by any person shall be effective unless a written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew is received by the insured either a t the address shown on the policy or at a forwarding address. 40 P.S. §1171.5(a)(9). Accordingly, “[i]f written notice is not received by the insured, the cancellation is ineffective.” Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 719 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Herein, it is undisputed that Miller did not receive written notice of the cancellation of her homeowner’s policy as it was returned as “undeliverable” to Nationwide.
The language of Section 5(a)(9) of the Act "is clear and unambiguous. The cancellation of a homeowner’s policy is ineffective if written notice is not received by the insured. . . . Accordingly, the Commissioner properly determined, based on credible evidence, that Nationwide failed to comply with Section 5(a)(9) of the Act and the cancellation of Miller’s homeowner’s policy was ineffective.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/411CD10_9-10-10.pdf
The court held that the insurance company improperly cancelled the homeowner's insurance, because it did not give her the proper statutory notice. Several notices to the homeowner were returned as "undeliverable." The homeowner, an elderly woman, was going back and forth from her home to that of a relative, but the agency found that she " did not officially change her address; therefore, there was no need for her to notify Nationwide of a change of address." Moreover, the insurance company did not follow its own internal policy of contacting the local agent of record for further investigation.
The "Commissioner found that there was no evidence that Nationwide made any attempt to re-send the notice or otherwise notify the homeowner that her policy was being cancelled prior to submission of the claim in December 2008. As such, the insurer's contention that it is truly unfair to Nationwide to void the cancellation since it was the homeowner’s conduct that prevented her from receiving the cancellation notice is without merit."
The Unfair Insurance Practice Act, 40 P.S. §§1171.1-1171.15, prohibits persons engaged in the business of insurance from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. Yorktowne Mutual Insurance Company v. Insurance Department, 662 A.2d 1164 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 543 Pa. 721, 672 A.2d 313 (1996). The insurer has the burden of proving compliance with the statutory requirements for cancellation of a homeowners’ policy of insurance. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 578 A.2d 999 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 527 Pa. 595, 588 A.2d 915 (1991).
Section 5(a)(9) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows: No cancellation or refusal to renew by any person shall be effective unless a written notice of the cancellation or refusal to renew is received by the insured either a t the address shown on the policy or at a forwarding address. 40 P.S. §1171.5(a)(9). Accordingly, “[i]f written notice is not received by the insured, the cancellation is ineffective.” Donegal Mutual Insurance Company v. Department of Insurance, 719 A.2d 825, 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998). Herein, it is undisputed that Miller did not receive written notice of the cancellation of her homeowner’s policy as it was returned as “undeliverable” to Nationwide.
The language of Section 5(a)(9) of the Act "is clear and unambiguous. The cancellation of a homeowner’s policy is ineffective if written notice is not received by the insured. . . . Accordingly, the Commissioner properly determined, based on credible evidence, that Nationwide failed to comply with Section 5(a)(9) of the Act and the cancellation of Miller’s homeowner’s policy was ineffective.
Thursday, September 09, 2010
UC - voluntary quit - reduced wages
Krantz v. UCBR - Cmwlth. Court - Stpe. 9, 2010 - unreported memorandum decision
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2300CD09_9-9-10.pdf
Where a claimant asserts that an employer’s unilateral reduction of his wages was the reason for his decision to quit, the claimant must prove that the reduction in wages was unreasonable and substantial in order to establish cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for quitting. Griffith Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. UCBR, 597 A.2d 215, 218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). Mere dissatisfaction with one’s wages is not enough. Id. Each case is determined based on its own circumstances, and there is no talismanic percentage that separates a reduction that is substantial from one that is not. Ship Inn, Inc. v. UCBR, 412 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).
Because it must be a unilateral action of employer that causes the loss in wages, the Court has considered the issue differently based on whether the claimant receives a salary from employer or receives, in whole or in part, a commission reflective of conditions beyond the employer’s control (such as the claimant’s effort). See Griffith Chevrolet; # 1 Cochran, Inc. v. UCBR, 579 A.2d 1386, 1390-91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); Grenier v. UCBR, 505 A.2d 1363, 1365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986); Morysville Body Works, Inc. v. UCBR, 430 A.2d 376, 377 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).
Where the claimant is a salaried employee, it is a relatively simple matter to determine whether there was an unreasonable, unilateral reduction in the claimant’s salary, whether it was due to unilateral action by employer, and whether the reduction was “substantial” under the circumstances of that case. Morysville Body Works, 430 A.2d at 377. In contrast, where the employee’s income consists, in whole or in part, of the receipt of commissions, it can become much more complicated to determine whether any reduction in income constitutes a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Grenier, 505 A.2d at 1365.
Thus, in determining whether the reduction in a claimant’s pay by an employer’s unilateral action is substantial, the claimant’s commission history must be considered when calculating the claimant’s pay. Of course, even if the claimant’s pay is commission-based, where the reduction in the claimant’s pay is the result of the employer’s unilateral actions, the claimant can establish cause of a necessitous and compelling nature to quit his employment. #1 Cochran, 597 A.2d at 1388.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2300CD09_9-9-10.pdf
Where a claimant asserts that an employer’s unilateral reduction of his wages was the reason for his decision to quit, the claimant must prove that the reduction in wages was unreasonable and substantial in order to establish cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for quitting. Griffith Chevrolet-Olds, Inc. v. UCBR, 597 A.2d 215, 218 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). Mere dissatisfaction with one’s wages is not enough. Id. Each case is determined based on its own circumstances, and there is no talismanic percentage that separates a reduction that is substantial from one that is not. Ship Inn, Inc. v. UCBR, 412 A.2d 913, 915 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980).
Because it must be a unilateral action of employer that causes the loss in wages, the Court has considered the issue differently based on whether the claimant receives a salary from employer or receives, in whole or in part, a commission reflective of conditions beyond the employer’s control (such as the claimant’s effort). See Griffith Chevrolet; # 1 Cochran, Inc. v. UCBR, 579 A.2d 1386, 1390-91 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990); Grenier v. UCBR, 505 A.2d 1363, 1365 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986); Morysville Body Works, Inc. v. UCBR, 430 A.2d 376, 377 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981).
Where the claimant is a salaried employee, it is a relatively simple matter to determine whether there was an unreasonable, unilateral reduction in the claimant’s salary, whether it was due to unilateral action by employer, and whether the reduction was “substantial” under the circumstances of that case. Morysville Body Works, 430 A.2d at 377. In contrast, where the employee’s income consists, in whole or in part, of the receipt of commissions, it can become much more complicated to determine whether any reduction in income constitutes a necessitous and compelling reason to quit. Grenier, 505 A.2d at 1365.
Thus, in determining whether the reduction in a claimant’s pay by an employer’s unilateral action is substantial, the claimant’s commission history must be considered when calculating the claimant’s pay. Of course, even if the claimant’s pay is commission-based, where the reduction in the claimant’s pay is the result of the employer’s unilateral actions, the claimant can establish cause of a necessitous and compelling nature to quit his employment. #1 Cochran, 597 A.2d at 1388.
Wednesday, September 08, 2010
UC - vol. quit - medical reasons - non-expert evidence
Visay v. UCBR - March 22, 2010 - unpublished memorandum opinion
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1833CD09_3-22-10.pdf
The court held that, under the circumstances of this case, the claimant did not have to produce expert medical evidence to explain why she (temporarily) left her job, holding that "[t]here is no doubt Claimant here offered evidence which, if believed by the fact-finder, would have satisfied her burden to explain her motivation to leave her employment. Judd v. UCBR, 496 A.2d 1377, 1379 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Steffy v. UCBR, 499 Pa. 367, 453 A.2d 591 (1982).
In Judd, the court said that "anxiety and emotional distress can be necessitous and compelling cause for terminating one’s employment, and … a claimant does not necessarily have to present expert medical evidence in order to establish that he had compelling medical reasons for terminating his employment, but instead may establish that fact by any competent evidence such as claimant’s own testimony and/or documentary evidence." (emphasis in original).
Thus, the Board erred in determining Claimant was required to present expert medical evidence to prove why she left her employment.
Claimant was a combat veteran who worked at transitional housing facility (THF) for homeless women veterans. The job required her to live at the facility. At some point, claimant suffered from her own PTSD problems and got extended off-site treatment at two other facilities. When she returned to work after treatment, the employer did not have any available positions, so she applied for UC.
At the hearing, she did not offer any expert medical evidence but testified and offered other evidence, which showed that she is a veteran; while at the THF, she saw a psychologist and underwent therapy in order to get her “life started over again”; both the program director and her psychologist suggested that she leave the House to partake in the out-of-state PTSD program “to deal with some of [her] traumatic issues.” This testimony explained Claimant’s subsequent actions and was not subject to a hearsay objection. It also shows communication between Claimant and Employer concerning her mental health problems. The record also contains a letter from a staff nurse at the PTSD facility, corroborating Claimant’s testimony that she was participating in the PTSD program. Plaintiff also testified that after the PTSD treatment, she got further treatment at a VA facility.
The court contrasted this case and the holding in Judd with the facts and opinion in Jordan v. UCBR, 684 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), where the court held that the claimant "could not prove his mood disorder caused his unreasonable and unjustifiable conduct without offering expert testimony, and the claimant himself was not qualified to offer an expert opinion. . . .Unlike the claimant in Jordan, however, Claimant here did not assert that her mental health problem compelled an uncontrollable action or irresponsible decision, which was therefore not willful. These types of assertions clearly require expert opinion. Instead, Claimant here asserted advice for remote treatment resulted in her conscious, reasonable decision to seek that treatment. Accordingly, the Board’s reliance on Jordan is misplaced. Rather, in this case the Judd standard is appropriate for determining whether Claimant proved a compelling reason to leave her employment.
Monday, September 06, 2010
abuse - expungement - corporal punishment
F.R. v. DPW - Cmwlth. Court - September 1, 2010
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2062CD09_9-1-10.pdf
This Court concludes, based upon the plain language of the definition of “nonaccidental” and the purpose and intent behind the CPSL, that criminal negligence is the proper standard in corporal punishment cases.
While there is little doubt that the Crimes Code and the CPSL are linked in some ways, it is clear, as acknowledged by our Supreme Court in P.R. v. DPW, 569 Pa. 123, 801 A.2d 478 (2002), that the Crimes Code standard applies in criminal proceedings, while the CPSL standard applies to administrative proceedings. This does not imply that corporal punishment is barred under the CPSL, but rather that the standard of determining when corporal punishment crosses the threshold into child abuse is different in the criminal and administrative contexts. See P.R., 569 Pa. at 132, 801 A.2d at 483 (citing Section 6302(c) of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6302(c), and recognizing that CPSL “offers no restriction on the existing rights of parents to use corporal punishment.”) The appeal now before the Court is from an administrative proceeding under the auspices of the CPSL, and, thus, the Crimes Code does not apply.
The Supreme Court . . .held that to show child abuse in cases of corporal punishment, the agency must show, through substantial evidence, that the child’s serious injury was the result of criminal negligence. Id. at 138, 801 A.2d at 487. . . .[W]e believe the General Assembly’s amendment of the CPSL following P.R. was an effort to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in P.R., not circumvent it. . . .[T]he criminal negligence standard proffered by our Supreme Court in P.R. is now codified in the CPSL under the auspices of the definition of “nonaccidental.” The result is that P.R. remains controlling precedent, and criminal negligence is still the proper standard in corporal punishment cases.
These two statutes [the Crimes Code and the CPSL] act in tandem to create a very limited safe harbor in which parents may use corporal punishment without being found to have engaged in child abuse—one couched in the criminal world; one couched in the administrative world. Thus, an indicated report of child abuse under the CPSL may be proper in a situation in which criminal charges are not. This is what the Supreme Court recognized in P.R., it is what was found to be the purpose and legislative intent behind the statutes, and it is why the Supreme Court used the criminal negligence standard in applying the CPSL to corporal punishment cases. In this way, these considerations work hand-in-hand and create a workable statutory scheme that upholds the General Assembly’s intent to protect children and to provide parents choices in raising and reasonably disciplining their children.
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2062CD09_9-1-10.pdf
This Court concludes, based upon the plain language of the definition of “nonaccidental” and the purpose and intent behind the CPSL, that criminal negligence is the proper standard in corporal punishment cases.
While there is little doubt that the Crimes Code and the CPSL are linked in some ways, it is clear, as acknowledged by our Supreme Court in P.R. v. DPW, 569 Pa. 123, 801 A.2d 478 (2002), that the Crimes Code standard applies in criminal proceedings, while the CPSL standard applies to administrative proceedings. This does not imply that corporal punishment is barred under the CPSL, but rather that the standard of determining when corporal punishment crosses the threshold into child abuse is different in the criminal and administrative contexts. See P.R., 569 Pa. at 132, 801 A.2d at 483 (citing Section 6302(c) of the CPSL, 23 Pa. C.S. § 6302(c), and recognizing that CPSL “offers no restriction on the existing rights of parents to use corporal punishment.”) The appeal now before the Court is from an administrative proceeding under the auspices of the CPSL, and, thus, the Crimes Code does not apply.
The Supreme Court . . .held that to show child abuse in cases of corporal punishment, the agency must show, through substantial evidence, that the child’s serious injury was the result of criminal negligence. Id. at 138, 801 A.2d at 487. . . .[W]e believe the General Assembly’s amendment of the CPSL following P.R. was an effort to codify the Supreme Court’s decision in P.R., not circumvent it. . . .[T]he criminal negligence standard proffered by our Supreme Court in P.R. is now codified in the CPSL under the auspices of the definition of “nonaccidental.” The result is that P.R. remains controlling precedent, and criminal negligence is still the proper standard in corporal punishment cases.
These two statutes [the Crimes Code and the CPSL] act in tandem to create a very limited safe harbor in which parents may use corporal punishment without being found to have engaged in child abuse—one couched in the criminal world; one couched in the administrative world. Thus, an indicated report of child abuse under the CPSL may be proper in a situation in which criminal charges are not. This is what the Supreme Court recognized in P.R., it is what was found to be the purpose and legislative intent behind the statutes, and it is why the Supreme Court used the criminal negligence standard in applying the CPSL to corporal punishment cases. In this way, these considerations work hand-in-hand and create a workable statutory scheme that upholds the General Assembly’s intent to protect children and to provide parents choices in raising and reasonably disciplining their children.
Sunday, September 05, 2010
UC - willful v. unintentional conduct - credibility
Oliver v. UCBR - Cmwlth. Court (en banc) - September 1, 2010 - 5-2 decision
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1798CD09_9-1-10.pdf
Daycare worker held to have committed willful misconduct by violating employer rule about "100% supervision policy" for the children under her care. "Claimant took her group of six children from the playroom to an outdoor play area. Employer had a policy that a teacher must supervise all of the children in her charge at all times. Claimant’s supervisor noticed that one child was still in the playroom. She retrieved the child and delivered him to Claimant. Claimant’s failure to supervise this child resulted in her termination," even though she claimed that this was an inadvertent "honest mistake."
While Claimant concedes that she violated Employer’s rule, she asserts that her conduct was not willful, intentional, or deliberate and does not constitute willful misconduct, but "[c]ritically, Claimant’s version of the events was not credited by the Board," which reversed the referee. The Claimant did not raise the issue of the Board’s alleged failure to support its decision for overriding the referee’s credibility determinations in the Statement of Questions Involved or in the Argument section of her brief. . . [I]t does not appear that Claimant preserved the issue of whether the Board failed to provide sufficient support for arriving at a different credibility determination than the referee in the Statement of Questions Involved. . . .Assuming arguendo, that Claimant did raise this issue in the Statement of Questions Involved, Claimant must also raise the issue in the Argument Section of the brief. . . .At no time in the brief did Claimant argue that the Board erred when it overrode the credibility determination of the referee without adequate explanation. This Court does not raise non-jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Claimant failed to preserve this issue." The court then goes on to discuss, at length, the issue of whether the claimant's testimony was uncontradicted, under Treon v. UCBR, 499 Pa. 455, 460, 453 A.2d 960, 962 (1982).
The court held that "Claimant’s conduct was not a mere mistake. . . Even if her actions constituted an honest mistake, it would not justify the violation of Employer’s rule." Heitczman v. UCBR, 638 A.2d 461 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (fork-lift driver's accident was disqualifying willful misconduct because it violated an employer safety rule concerning about driving a fork-lift).
Dissent (Brobson and Leavitt) - The "Board failed to support its decision for overriding the credibility determination of the referee. . . ."As the ultimate finder of fact, the Board certainly had the right to disbelieve Claimant, even though her testimony was uncontradicted. Treon v. UCBR, 499 Pa. 455, 460, 453 A.2d 960, 962 (1982). The Board, however, is not free to disregard findings of the referee based upon consistent and uncontradicted evidence without providing the reasons for its reversal." The court and Board were wrong to find the claimant's testimony "internally inconsistent. . . The Board has not set forth its reason for reversal, and the Board’s reason for reversal is not “plain enough” from the record. . . .Because I am unable to determine why the Board reversed the referee, there is not an adequate basis for judicial review"
http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1798CD09_9-1-10.pdf
Daycare worker held to have committed willful misconduct by violating employer rule about "100% supervision policy" for the children under her care. "Claimant took her group of six children from the playroom to an outdoor play area. Employer had a policy that a teacher must supervise all of the children in her charge at all times. Claimant’s supervisor noticed that one child was still in the playroom. She retrieved the child and delivered him to Claimant. Claimant’s failure to supervise this child resulted in her termination," even though she claimed that this was an inadvertent "honest mistake."
While Claimant concedes that she violated Employer’s rule, she asserts that her conduct was not willful, intentional, or deliberate and does not constitute willful misconduct, but "[c]ritically, Claimant’s version of the events was not credited by the Board," which reversed the referee. The Claimant did not raise the issue of the Board’s alleged failure to support its decision for overriding the referee’s credibility determinations in the Statement of Questions Involved or in the Argument section of her brief. . . [I]t does not appear that Claimant preserved the issue of whether the Board failed to provide sufficient support for arriving at a different credibility determination than the referee in the Statement of Questions Involved. . . .Assuming arguendo, that Claimant did raise this issue in the Statement of Questions Involved, Claimant must also raise the issue in the Argument Section of the brief. . . .At no time in the brief did Claimant argue that the Board erred when it overrode the credibility determination of the referee without adequate explanation. This Court does not raise non-jurisdictional issues sua sponte. Claimant failed to preserve this issue." The court then goes on to discuss, at length, the issue of whether the claimant's testimony was uncontradicted, under Treon v. UCBR, 499 Pa. 455, 460, 453 A.2d 960, 962 (1982).
The court held that "Claimant’s conduct was not a mere mistake. . . Even if her actions constituted an honest mistake, it would not justify the violation of Employer’s rule." Heitczman v. UCBR, 638 A.2d 461 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (fork-lift driver's accident was disqualifying willful misconduct because it violated an employer safety rule concerning about driving a fork-lift).
Dissent (Brobson and Leavitt) - The "Board failed to support its decision for overriding the credibility determination of the referee. . . ."As the ultimate finder of fact, the Board certainly had the right to disbelieve Claimant, even though her testimony was uncontradicted. Treon v. UCBR, 499 Pa. 455, 460, 453 A.2d 960, 962 (1982). The Board, however, is not free to disregard findings of the referee based upon consistent and uncontradicted evidence without providing the reasons for its reversal." The court and Board were wrong to find the claimant's testimony "internally inconsistent. . . The Board has not set forth its reason for reversal, and the Board’s reason for reversal is not “plain enough” from the record. . . .Because I am unable to determine why the Board reversed the referee, there is not an adequate basis for judicial review"
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