Tuesday, July 15, 2008

consumer - arbitration clause - duress, unconscionability - discovery

Hopkins v. Newday Financial, LLC - ED Pa. - June 30, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0759P.pdf

This memorandum order is meant to clarify a previous "limited discovery" order concerning "whether the arbitration agreements at issue are valid."

stay of legal actions if arbitration agreement is valid and binding
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3, federal courts are instructed to stay any suit in which an issue in dispute is properly referable to an arbitrator under a valid written arbitration agreement.

Before doing so, however, the court is obliged to satisfy itself that the arbitration agreement is valid and binding. Great W. Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Under the FAA the district court must be satisfied that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement.”). In making that determination, “generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).

challenge to validity based on allegations of duress and unconscionability
In this case, plaintiffs seek to invalidate the arbitrations agreements on the grounds of duress and unconscionability. To consider these defenses, the court looks primarily to the law of Pennsylvania, because it is the forum state and appears to have a strong relationship with the agreements at issue. Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 388 n.13 (3d Cir. 2007)

a) duress - Under Pennsylvania law, “[d]uress is defined as ‘that degree of restraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness’”....

When the nature of the threat is economic, rather than physical, the doctrine of economic duress applies. “The important elements in the applicability of the doctrine of economic duress or business compulsion are that (1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which compels the injured party to involuntarily or against his will execute an agreement which results in economic loss, and (2) the injured party does not have an immediate legal remedy”....Duress will not lie where the aggrieved party had the opportunity to consult with counsel before entering into the allegedly coercive contract.

According to the named plaintiffs, they were forced to sign arbitration agreements in a compressed span of time under threat that their employment would terminate if they did not agree....[T]hey attest that, because the time for signing was so short, they were accorded no opportunity to seek the review of counsel. Id. Plaintiffs’ affidavits appear to present a set of circumstances that are at least arguably coercive enough to constitute duress under Pennsylvania law.

b) unconscionability - In Pennsylvania, “a contract or term is unconscionable, and therefore avoidable, where there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of the challenged provision and the provision unreasonably favors the party asserting it.” Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. 2007). Unconscion- ability, then, has procedural and substantive aspects.

As to procedural unconscionability, the touchstone is whether the party challenging the agreement had any meaningful choice regarding acceptance of its provisions. Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). Here, the plaintiffs have averred that they were presented with a contract of adhesion, and were given no opportunity to negotiate. An agreement is substantively unconscionable if it is “unreasonably favorable to the drafter”....

Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement is unreasonably favorable to [defendant] NewDay, inter alia, because the arbitral forum’s rule prohibiting plaintiffs from proceeding as a class action, and forcing them instead to proceed individually. A series of Pennsylvania cases have held that limiting the use of the class-action vehicle, if it raises costs to the point of effectively preventing individual redress, is substantively unconscionable. See, e.g., Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 883-84. The open question here is whether the forum’s rules raise costs to that level.

In addition, plaintiffs allege systemic bias on the part of the arbitral forum. If proved, such bias could potentially render the arbitration agreement fundamentally unfair to plaintiffs. But, as plaintiffs admit, they cannot prove that claim without discovery.

c) discovery - It is the court’s view that plaintiffs’ submissions, at the very least, highlight several questions of fact relevant to the validity of the arbitration agreements. When faced with a fact-intensive question regarding the arbitrability of a dispute, it is within the court’s discretion to allow for limited discovery into whether the arbitration agreements at issue are valid....That was the intent of this court’s order....It was not the court’s intent to limit discovery only to the question of the arbitral forum’s alleged bias, but to allow discovery more broadly into all of the defenses to arbitration raised by plaintiffs, as all appear to call for the resolution of factual questions.

Monday, July 14, 2008

custody - in camera interview of child - presence of counsel - expert evaluation - admission into record

Ottolini v. Barrett - Superior Court - July 14, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s39012_08.pdf

Pa. RCP 1915.11(b) mandates that counsel be present during in camera interview of child in custody case in which trial court relied at least in part on such interview. Sandra L.H. v. Joseph L.H., 444 A.2d 12241 (Pa. Super. 1982) is overruled to the extent that it may be inconsistent with the rule.

Remand is also required since a) the court relied on a psychological evaluation that was never entered into evidence, and b) the psychologist was not called as a witness or subject to cross-examination. Pa. CRP 1915.8(a).

consumer - artibration - standard to vacate award

Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Services v. Field - ED Pa. - July 10, 20008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0790P.pdf

There was no basis in this case to overcome the "exceedingly deferential standard necessary to vacate, modify or amended an arbitration award which was sought to be confirmed under 9 USC sec. 9."

Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) states that the court must grant an order confirming an arbitration award unless the award is vacated, modified, or corrected as prescribed in Sections 10 and 11 of this title. 9 U.S.C.A. § 9.

The review of an arbitration award is “extremely deferential” and vacatur is appropriate only in “exceedingly narrow” circumstances....An arbitration award may be set aside where there is an adequate showing of fraud, partiality, misconduct, violation of a specific command of law, or showing that enforcement would be contrary to public policy....The court’s ability to vacate an arbitration award is almost exclusively limited to these grounds, although an award found to be in manifest disregard of the law can also be vacated by the court.

In addition, procedural irregularities may result in such fundamental unfairness as to warrant the vacation of an arbitral award. For example, a court can vacate an arbitration award where an arbitrator received ex parte informati on to the prejudice of one of the parties; or where the arbitrator refused to admit certain evidence in rebuttal without giving parties warning about the application of evidentiary rules); or because the neutral arbitrator rendered decision without obtaining the signatures of the partisan arbitrators, so that there was a lack of evidence of any significant decision-making process by the majority of the board.

The net result of a court’s application of this standard is generally to affirm easily the arbitration award under this extremely deferential standard - a result that is squarely in line with the purpose behind the FAA where courts are tasked with reviewing an arbitration decision. When an arbitrator resolves disputes regarding the application of a contract, and no dishonesty is alleged, the arbitrator's “improvident, even silly, fact-finding” does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.

In discussing the courts' limited role in reviewing the merits of arbitration awards, we have stated that “‘courts ... have no business weighing the merits of the grievance [or] considering whether there is equity in a particular claim.’ ”.../When the judiciary does so, “it usurps a function which ... is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal.”

consumer - FTC Do-Not-Call registry - indefinite registration

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-15994.pdf

SUMMARY: In this document, the FTC amends its rules under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) to require telemarketers to honor registrations with the National Do-Not-Call Registry indefinitely.

This action is consistent with Congress’s mandate in the Do-Not-Call Improvement Act of 2007, which prohibits the removal of numbers from the Registry unless the consumer cancels the registration or the number has been disconnected and reassigned or is otherwise invalid. The Commission also will continue to coordinate with the FTC on additional ways to improve the Registry’s accuracy.

+++++++++++++++++++

47 CFR § 64.1200 Delivery restrictions.

(c) (2) A residential telephone subscriber who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the Federal Government. Such do-not-call registrations must be honored indefinitely, or until the registration is cancelled by the consumer or the telephone number is removed by the database administrator.

Thursday, July 10, 2008

child abuse - expungement - founded report - PFA case

Philadelphia DHS v. DPW - Commonwealth Court - July 10, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1813CD07_7-10-08.pdf

A PFA order in collateral case finding father sexually abused his child provided a sufficient basis for a "founded report" of abuse, 23 P.S. 6303(a), under the Child Protective Services Law.

"Where only one defendant is charged with abuse in a PFA action, only one person defends those charges, an adjudication finds that such abuse occurred and prohibits further contact between the victim child and that defendant, the PFA order is an adjudication containing a sufficient definitive finding upon which DHS based the Founded Report."

These facts were held to distinguish this case from J.G. v. DPW, 795 A.2d 1089 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), where the court held that a generalized finding in a dependency case - with no definitive finding that a particular individiual was responsible for the abuse - did not preclude an appeal in a related expungement case.

"A Founded Report may be based upon any judicial adjudication finding that the child who is the subject of the report has been abused, including, but not limited to, criminal charges. The ALJ erred as a matter of law in relying upon J.G. to conclude that the PFA hearing in this case was not, on its own, able to support a Founded Report of abuse. Thus, the DPW did also err in adopting the recommendation of the ALJ and directing that the Founded Report of child abuse against R.G.S. be expunged."

False Claims Act - charging excess rent in HCV program - OIG alert

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-15663.pdf

SUMMARY: This notice provides important information recently issued by HUD’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) on a recurring problem in the Housing Choice Voucher program. The problem which this notice addresses is landlords submitting false claims for periodic payments under housing assistance payment (HAP) contracts.

Fraud Information Bulletin: Excess Rent

Purpose
This Bulletin highlights a recurring problem in the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program. Specifically, this Bulletin discusses the submission by landlords of false claims for periodic payments under Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contracts, where such landlords have violated their continuing obligations to not charge tenants rents in excess of what is authorized by the HAP contracts.

The Problem
Improperly requiring tenants to pay rent in excess of what is authorized by the applicable HAP contract represents both an actionable offense under the False Claims Act and deplorable behavior directed towards the very persons whom the HCV program was designed to serve. (Additionally, depending on the intent, such an action may qualify as a criminal offense under 18 U.S.C. 287, 1343, etc.) OIG will not tolerate such conduct, and rather will cooperate with efforts to bring offending landlords to justice and to remedy their wrongs.

Background
HUD administers Federal aid to local housing agencies (HAs) that is intended to implement housing assistance programs for low-income residents. With respect to the HCV program, HUD funds HAs via annual contributions contracts. The HAs, in turn, enter into HAP contracts with individual landlords. These HAP contracts provide for periodic housing assistance payments on behalf of eligible lowincome tenants. The HAP contracts also may require eligible tenants to make supplemental rent payments; however, the contracts expressly prohibit landlords from requiring tenants to pay rent in excess of what is authorized by the HAP contracts.

Pursuant to qui tam complaints and citizen complaints filed throughout the nation and subsequent activities, OIG has become aware of a number of landlords who have improperly required tenants to pay rent in excess of what is authorized by the HAP contracts, and thereby submitted or caused to be submitted false claims for HAP contract periodic rent payments.

Example
On July 29, 2005, a Connecticut tenant filed a qui tam complaint, under 31 U.S.C. 3730, against her former landlord. See Coleman v. Hernandez, 490 F. Supp.2d 278 (D. Conn. 2007). The tenant complained that pursuant to a HAP contract the landlord had agreed to accept $1,550 per month for the rental of an apartment in Stamford. Of this $1,550, the tenant was personally responsible for $20, and HUD via the HA paid the complementary $1,530. In spite of the explicit prohibition in the HAP contract, however, the landlord required the tenant to pay an ‘‘additional rent payment’’ of $60 on six separate occasions. In other words, the landlord inappropriately extracted an additional $360 from the helpless tenant. OIG is aware of numerous similar examples of this sort of egregious conduct nationwide.

Penalty
Pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729 et seq., persons who submit to HUD or a HUD intermediary claims that are false, fictitious or fraudulent are liable for an assessment equal to three times the amount of the claim, plus a penalty of between $5,500 and $11,000 per claim. The United States may take the position that the entire amount of its HAP payment, not merely the amount of the excess payment by the tenant, is the claim that should be trebled where landlords make false certifications concerning excess rent charged.
Additionally, each periodic rent payment constitutes a separate claim; thus, in the Coleman case the court levied a $33,000 (6 × $5,500) penalty against the landlord for her $360 victimization of the tenant.

Pertinent Information
If you have pertinent information regarding this bulletin, please contact: Office of Legal Counsel, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Housing and Urban Development, 451 Seventh St., SW., Room 8260, Washington, DC 20410. Dated: July 1, 2008.

Kenneth M. Donohue, Inspector General.



Thursday, June 26, 2008

UC - willful misconduct - absenteeism - imprisonment

Weems v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - publication ordered June 26, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1783CD07_6-26-08.pdf

A nine-month absence from work because of incarceration is willful misconduct, despite claimant's alleged eligibility for work release and employer's refusal to participate in the program.

While absenteeism alone does not constitute willful misconduct, "excessive absences and lack of good or adequate cause for the absence" can be. See Medina v. UCBR, 423 A.2d 469 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Although the claimant told the employer that she would be serving a nine-month prison sentence for an assault conviction, her absence due to that incarceration "clearly constitutes excessive absence."

Imprisonment is not good or adequate cause for absence because “an employee who engages in criminal activity punishable by incarceration should realize that his ability to attend work may be jeopardized....It is the inability to attend work, not the criminal conduct, which supports the finding of willful misconduct....Thus, Claimant’s conduct did rise to the level of willful misconduct."

Claimant's alleged eligibility for work release not proven by her testimony
Claimant's testimony that she was eligible for work release was held to be insufficient to prove that she was, in fact, eligible, citing Cruz v. UCBR, 464 A.2d 656 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983), where the court affirmed a denial of benefits "in part on the lack of any evidence of an order placing the claimant in such a program....Here, aside from Claimant’s testimony that she was eligible for work release, there is no evidence on the record of any court order related to a work release program. Even if such an order does exist, we are not aware of the limitations it might place on Claimant or the responsibilities it might impose on any potential employer."

Employer had a right to refuse to participate in the work release program
The court also rejected claimant's argument that the employer was "obligated to participate in a work release program. Employer cannot be expected to change the conditions of employment in order to accommodate Claimant. In finding the prohibition of unemployment benefits for incarcerated individuals constitutional, we suggested that the General Assembly 'could have felt that while on work release, because of restrictions necessarily imposed under those programs, prisoners were not sufficiently available for work so as to permit them to have a full range of employment options that other claimants have in pursuing new employment'....Employers need not adapt work release restrictions that change the terms of employment. The decision by Employer not to participate in a work release program does not excuse Claimant’s absence from work. Claimant had an obligation to report to work regardless of whether Employer agreed to participate in the work release program."

mortgage foreclosure - equitable subrogation - Pennsylvania v. Restatement

1312466 Ontario Inc v. Carr - Superior Court - June 25, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a14025_08.pdf

U.S. Bank, mortgagee in 4th lien position loaned property owner (p/o) money, which p/o used to pay off first and second mortgage lienors. US Bank was unaware of the 3rd lienor (Ontario), due to a negligent error in its title search.

When p/o defaulted on 3d mortgage, Ontario sued and got judgment in mortgage foreclosure.

US Bank then filed petition to intervene, claiming that it was entitled to "equitable subrogation" under Restatement 3d, Property 7.6, which says that "one who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage, becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment." Such equitable subrogation is an exception to the "first in time" rule that generally determines the priority of a lien.

The trial and appellate courts rejected US Bank's petition, holding that it was not entitled to equitable subrogation under Pennsylvania law, as that doctrine is defined by Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Crouse, 30 A.2d 330 (Pa. Super. 1943) and First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. 2004) -- which are different from the Restatement definition in important respects.

"Like many other jurisdictions," Pennsylvania requires "four criteria to be met for equitable subrogation to apply....These four requirements are:
(1) the claimant paid the creditor to protect his own interests;
(2) the claimant did not act as a volunteer;
(3) the claimant was not primarily liable for the debt; and
(4) allowing subrogation will not cause injustice to the rights of others."

The appellate court found that there were two "important" differences between Pennsylvania's interpretation of equitable subrogation and that in the Restatement.

a) voluntary agent - Under Pennsylvania cases, a creditor such as U.S. Bank is considered an “entirely voluntary agent with no interest in the property” The Restatement does not adopt the 'volunteer' rule but instead only requires that the subrogee paid the creditor to protect some interest. "Thus, under the Restatement, a mortgagee pays off existing loans in order to protect its own interest in gaining the first priority lien position, and therefore would be entitled to the remedy of equitable subrogation."

b) mistake - Another important difference between Pennsylvania law on equitable subrogation and the Restatement’s approach is also illustrated in the Home Owners’ decision, where the court said that “courts of equity will not relieve a party from the consequences of an error due to his own ignorance or carelessness when there were available means which would have enabled him to avoid the mistake if reasonable care had been exercised.... [A] creditor’s mistake 'can be attributed only to its own negligence in failing to search or discover what clearly appeared on the public records'....The Restatement, on the other hand, says that 'subrogation can be granted even if the payor had actual knowledge of the intervening interest; the payor’s notice, actual or constructive, is not necessarily relevant'....Instead, what is relevant under the Restatement is 'whether the payor reasonably expected to get security with a priority equal to the mortgage being paid.'....In fact, the Restatement declares that a refinancing mortgagee should be presumed to have this expectation, even if they are aware of a remaining lien, unless there is affirmative proof that the mortgagee intended to subordinate its mortgage to the remaining interest."

Although the court pointed out that existing state doctrine might sometimes lead to undesirable results*** and "may be ripe for legislative review," it determined that it was bound by its own prior decisions "and principles of stare decisis." The court was also influenced by "the fact that it was US Bank's carelessness that brought about the pecuniary loss that it is now facing."

*** The court posited that, given Pennsylvania doctrine, US Bank would not made the loan "leaving [borrower] in all likelihood unable to refinance his existing loan" -- a scenario that it thought "may be a frequent dilemma for homeowners amidst the current mortgage crisis....."

UC- vol. quit - salary cap

Pearson v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - June 26, 2008 - UNPUBLISHED

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2277CD07_6-26-08.pdf

Claimant was not eligible for benefits where she quit her job after the employer told her that "there would be no possibility of either promotion or increase in pay." Such a statement might "dampen her enthusiasm for continued employment; however, dampened enthusiasm is not a necessitous and compelling reason to quit."

"Claimant’s displeasure with being 'salary capped' was mere dissatisfaction with her working conditions....[M]ere dissatisfaction with one's working conditions does not constitute cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for terminating one's employment. Brunswick Hotel & Conference Center, LLC v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 906 A.2d 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006); McKeown v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 442 A.2d 1257 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982)."

Wednesday, June 25, 2008

standing - assignees for collection of debt

Sprint Communications v. APCC Services - June 23, 2008

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-552.pdf

Here is the first paragraph of the majority decision in the Court's 5-4 decision.

The question before us is whether an assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Because history and precedent make clear that such an assignee has long been permitted to bring suit, we conclude that the assignee does have standing.

Excepts from the Court's own summary of the case appear below.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

A payphone customer making a long-distance call with an access code or 1–800 number issued by a long-distance carrier pays the carrier (which completes the call).

The carrier then compensates the pay-phone operator (which connects the call to the carrier in the firstplace).

The payphone operator can sue the long-distance carrier for any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these "dial-around"calls.

Many payphone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and collection firms (aggregators) so that, in effect, these aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. A group of aggregators (respondents here) were assigned legal title to the claims of approximately 1,400 payphone operators. The aggregators separately agreed to remit all proceeds to those operators, who would then pay the aggregators for their services.

After entering into these agreements, the aggregators filed federal-court lawsuits seeking compensation from petitioner long-distance carriers. The District Court refused to dismiss the claims, finding that the aggregators had standing, and the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held: An assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor.

(a) History and precedent show that, for centuries, courts have found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; where assignment is at issue, courts—both before and after the founding—have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. Supreme Court precedent offers "powerful support for the proposition that suits by assignees for collection have long been seen as "amenable" to resolution by the judicial process.

(b) No convincing reason is offered to depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, the aggregators satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in the Court’s more modern decisions.

Petitioners argue that the aggregators have not themselves suffered an injury and that assignments for collection do not transfer the pay-phone operators’ injuries. But the operators assigned their claims lock, stock, and barrel, and precedent makes clear that an assignee can sue based on his assignor’s injuries.

Petitioners’ claim that the assignments constitute nothing more than acontract for legal services is overstated. There is an important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to alawyer. The latter confers a property right (which creditors might attach); the former does not.

Dissent - Robert, CJ
"The majority concludes that a private litigant may sue in federal court despite having to "pass back . . . all proceeds of the litigation"...thus depriving that party of any stake in the outcome of the litigation. The majority reaches this conclusion, in flat contravention of our cases interpreting the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III, by reference to a historical tradition that is, at best, equivocal. That history does not contradict what common sense should tell us: There is a legal difference between something and nothing. Respondents have nothing to gain from their lawsuit.Under settled principles of standing, that fact requires dismissal of their complaint.assignees

zoning - appeal - standing

SCRUB - Philadelphia Zoning Hearing Board - Commonwealth Court - June 25, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1609CD07_6-25-08.pdf

Citizen group held not to have standing to challenge decision of zoning board granting variance to erect commercial sign.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008

bankruptcy - ch. 13 - lien avoidance - adversary proceeding required

In re Mansaray-Ruffin - 3d Circuit - June 24, 2008

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054790p.pdf

"This appeal requires us to determine whether the debtor in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case successfully invalidated a lien on her property by providing for it as an unsecured claim in her confirmed plan, without initiating an adversary proceeding as required by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. We agree with the lienholder, as well as with the Bankruptcy Court and the District Court, that the answer to this question is no. Accordingly, we will AFFIRM."

This was a 2-1 decision. David Scholl represented the debtor.

contracts - fraud - parol evidence - integration clause

Shutter v. Herskowitz and Banks - ED Pa. - June 23, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0696P.pdf

This commercial case involved the sale of a youth hostel. There was a dispute about alleged mispresentations concerning the number of beds permitted by city ordinances. The contract, which contained an integration clause, did not address this disputed issue.

Material misrepresentation
Where a sales contract contains an integration clause which expressly confirms that all agreed terms between the parties are set out in the contract and that any modifications or changes have to be contained in a writing signed by both parties, a plaintiff claiming fraudulent inducement is precluded from offering any extrinsic evidence as to any further representations. Youndt v. First Nat’l Bank, 868 A.2d 539, 548-9 (Pa. Super. 2005)

As the Youndt court stated [and as we are sick of hearing again and again]:

“Where the parties to an agreement adopt a writing as the final and complete expression of their agreement, alleged prior or contemporaneous oral representations or agreements concerning subjects that are specifically covered by the written contract are merged in or superseded by that contract.”....Where the parties,without any fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only, evidence of their agreement. All preliminary negotiations, conversations and verbal agreements are merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract…and unless fraud, accident or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties, and its terms and agreements cannot be added to nor subtracted from by parol evidence.

Once a writing is determined to be the parties’ entire contract, the parol evidence rule applies and evidence of any previous oral or written negotiations or agreements involving the same subject matter as the contract is almost always inadmissible to explain or vary the terms of the contract. Yocca v. Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc., 854 A.2d 425, 436 (Pa. 2004).

Material non-disclosure
"Fraud in the inducement” exists as a narrow exception to the rule barring parol evidence when an integration clause exists. This exception may be invoked where the party proffering the extrinsic evidence contends that he executed the agreement because he was led to believe that the document contained terms that actually were omitted.

To prevail on a claim for non-disclosure of fact, a plaintiff must satisfy the following elements:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if, he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question.
(2) One party to a business transaction [emphasis added] is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other before the transaction is consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them; and
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading; and
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true or believed to be so; and
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation that it would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those facts.

"Basic to the transaction"
A fact “basic to the transaction” under element (e) is a fact that is assumed by the parties as a basis for the transaction itself. It is a fact that goes to the basis, or essence, of the transaction, and is an important part of the substance of what is bargained for or dealt with. Other facts may serve as important and persuasive inducements to enter into the transaction, but [do] not go to its essence. These facts may be material, but they are not basic. If the parties expressly or impliedly place the risk as to the existence of a fact on one party or if the law places it there by customor otherwise the other party has no duty of disclosure.

appeal - final order - POs

Pennsylvania Bankers Assn. v. Department of Banking -Pa. Supreme Court - June 16, 2008

majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-31A&B-2008mo.pdf
concurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-31A&B-2008co.pdf

An order granting some and denying other of defendant's preliminary objections in plaintiff's declaratory judgment action held to be interlocutory and not a final order subject to appeal.

- As a general rule, where a plaintiff files a multi-count complaint setting forth alternative theories of recovery, an order dismissing less than all of the claim is considered to be interlocutory, because the plaintiff may still pursue the merits of the case based on another theory.
- A final order under PaRAP 341(b)(1) is one that disposes of all claims and all parties
- The plaintiff filed a multi-count complaint which raised alternative constitutional theories of relief
- The lower court's granting of POs resulted in dismissal of some but not all of plaintiff's claims
- The lower court's order did not result in the the dismissal of any parties
- The lower court order did not end the litigation against any party but merely narrowed the scope of the plaintiff's case
- Under its remaining claims, plaintiff might still obtain the relief it is seeking

Friday, June 20, 2008

manuf. home installation program - final HUD rule

http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/pdf/E8-13289.pdf

SUMMARY: This final rule establishes a federal manufactured home installation program, as required by section 605(c)(2)(A) of the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974.

States that have their own installation programs that include the elements required by statute are permitted to administer, under their state installation programs, the new requirements established through this final rulemaking.

The new elements required by statute to be integrated into an acceptable state manufactured home installation program are: The establishment of qualified installation standards; the licensing and training of installers; and the inspection of the installation of manufactured homes.

DATES: Effective Date: October 20, 2008.

Thursday, June 19, 2008

federal courts - preclusion - doctrine of "virtual representation" disapproved

Taylor v. Sturgell - US Supreme Court - June 12, 2008

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-371.pdf

Facts: Herrick, an antique plane enthusiast, brought an FOIA suit against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), seeking information about a classic plane in which he was interested; he lost the case. His friend Taylor later brought an FOIA suit seeking the same information.

The courts below held that Taylor's later suit was precluded under the doctrine of "virtual representation," based on their finding of a) an identity of interests, b) adequate representation, c) a close relationship between the parties, and d) other factors.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, stating that the theory of preclusion by "virtual representation" is disapproved and holding that the preclusive effects of a judgment in a federal-question case decided by a federal court should instead be determined according to the established grounds for nonparty preclusion.

The preclusive effect of a federal-court judgment is determined by federal common law, subject to due process limitations. Extending the preclusive effect of a judgment to a nonparty runs up against the "deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court."

The Court has often repeated the general rule that "one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not designated a party or to which he has not beenmade a party by service of process."

The rule against nonparty preclusion is subject to exceptions, grouped for present purposes into six categories.
- a person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in anaction between others is bound in accordance with the agreement’s terms.
- nonparty preclusion may be based on a pre-existing substantive legal relationship between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment, e.g., assignee and assignor.
- in certain limited circumstances, a nonparty may be bound by a judgment because she was " ‘adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was a party’ " to the suit.
- a nonparty is bound by a judgment if she "assumed control" over the litigation inwhich that judgment was rendered.
- a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive force by relitigating through a proxy. Preclusion is thus in order when a person who did not participate in litigation later brings suit as the designated representative or agent of a person who was a party to the prior adjudication.
- a special statutory scheme otherwise consistent with due process—e.g., bankruptcy proceed-ings—may expressly foreclose successive litigation by nonlitigants.

Reaching beyond these six categories, the D. C. Circuit recognized a broad "virtual representation" exception to the rule against nonparty preclusion. None of the arguments advanced by that court or the FAA justify such an expansive doctrine. The D. C. Circuit’s definition of "adequate representation" strayed from the meaning the Court has attributed to that term.

The FAA wanted the Court "to abandon altogether the attempt to delineate discrete grounds and clear rules for nonparty preclusion, contending that only an equitable and heavily fact-driven inquiry can account for all of the situations in whichnonparty preclusion is appropriate. This argument is rejected. A balancing test is at odds with the constrained approach advanced by this Court’s decisions, which have endeavored to delineate discrete, limited exceptions to the fundamental rule that a litigant is not bound by a judgment to which she was not a party."

Second, a party’s representation of a nonparty is "adequate" for preclusion purposes only if, at a minimum: (1) the interests of the nonparty and her representative are aligned, and (2) either the party understood herself to be acting in a representative capacity or theoriginal court took care to protect the nonparty’s interests. Adequate representation may also require (3) notice of the original suit to the persons alleged to have beenrepresented. In the class-action context, these limitations are implemented by FRCivP 23’s procedural safeguards. But an expansive virtual representation doctrine would recognize a common-law kind of class action shorn of these protections.

Third, a diffuse balancing approach to nonparty preclusion would likely complicate the task of district courts faced in the first instance with preclusion questions.

The Court also rejected the FAA's argument that nonparty preclusion should apply more broadly in "public-law" litigation than in "private-law"controversies, citing Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U. S. 793 (1996). Richards said only that, for the type of public-law claims envisioned there, states were free to adopt procedures limiting repetitive litigation. The Court said that while Congress can adopt such procedures, it doesn't follow that the Court should proscribe or confine successive FOIA suits by different requesters.

In addition, the potential risk that several persons would coordinate a series of vexatious repetitive lawsuits does not justify departing from the usual nonparty preclusion rules. Stare decisis allows courts to dispose of repetitive suits in the same circuit, and even when stare decisis is not dispositive, the human inclination not towaste money should discourage suits based on claims or issues already decided.

Concerning preclusion on the basis of agency, the Court said that a mere whiff of tactical maneuvering will not suffice. Instead, principles of agency law indicate that preclusion is appropriate only if the putative agent’s conduct of the suit is subject to the control of the party who is bound by the prior adjudication.

The Court also rejected the suggestion that Taylor must bear the burden of proving he was not acting as Herrick’s agent.

Monday, June 16, 2008

disability - onset date - medical advisor

Mamrol v. Astrue - ED Pa. - June 9, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0646P.pdf

Where there was little contemporaneous evidence about the date of onset of the claimant's disability - multiple sclerosis - the ALJ should have consulted a medical advisor, under the factors set out in SSR 83-20 and the decisions in Walton v. Halter, 243 F3d 703 (3d Cir. 2001) and Newell v. Commissioner, 347 F3d 541 (3d Cir. 2003).

Citing Newell, the court refused to draw negative inferences from claimant's infrequent or irregular doctor visits without first considering her explanations, which in this case satisfied the court.

child abuse - founded/indicated reports - right to expungement hearing

K.R. v. DPW - Commonwealth Court - June 4, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2060CD07_6-4-08.pdf

It was proper for DPW to deny a hearing on a request for expungement of an "indicated report of abuse and enter an determination based on findings in a related dependency case, which was the basis for a "founded" report of abuse. DPW may rely on the factual findings of the trial court in a dependency adjudication to dismiss an appeal for a request for expungement.

An administrative hearing in a later expungement case would be an improper collateral attack on the factual findings in the dependency adjudication, in which proceeding the alleged abuser has a full and fair opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses. "Due process does not require an administrative [expungement] hearing, as the material facts found in the dependency proceeding cannot be disputed."

Friday, June 13, 2008

disability - treating physician opinion - hypothetical to VE

Johnson v. Commissioner - 3rd Cir. - June 13, 2008

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/072132p.pdf

The Third Circuit affirmed the denial of benefits, rejecting claimant's arguments that (a) the ALJ improperly overlooked treating physician’s opinions and (b) that the ALJ’s disability conclusion was based on the VE's response to "an incomplete hypothetical question."

The court held that the treating physician's opinion was not entitled to controlling weight because it was not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and was not consistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case record. The court said that there was "overwhelming" evidence to support to ALJ's findings.

The court said that the ALJ was "entitled" to reject much of the treating physicians' evidence "without explanation" where it was "neither pertinent, relevant nor probative." In failing to cite the doctor's evidence, the court said that the ALJ implicitly rejected it. That rejection did not trigger the ALJ’s duty to give the doctor an opportunity to explain testimony that the record "overwhelming[ly] disputed."

Citing Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 2005), the court held that hypothetical posed to the vocational expert accurately protrayed the claimant’s impairments that were reflected in the record.

pro se litigants - liberal construction of pleadings

Hall-Ditchfield v. US - ED Pa. - June 10, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0643P.pdf

During the course of this pro se case concerning an allegation that the IRS wrongfully withheld plaintiff's tax refunds, the court discussed pro se litigants and said that "[b]ecause the plaintiff is pro se, the Court will construe her pleadings liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))."

Wouldn't it be wonderful if the UCBR and Commonwealth Court had this same attitude?