Wednesday, June 11, 2008

UC- appeal - preservation/waiver of issues

Pearson v. UCBR - ordered to be reported August 18, 2008 - Commonwealth Court -

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2238CD07_8-18-08.pdf

original unreported decision - June 11, 2008
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2238CD07_6-11-08.pdf

The court rejected the Board's argument that the "Claimant failed to preserve any issues for review," in which it alleged that he "failed to specifically challenge any of the Board’s findings in his petition for review or in his statement of questions involved," and that he "waived any challenge to the evidentiary support for the Board’s findings by not addressing the issue in his appellate brief."

The court said the it "may decline to consider issues a claimant fails to raise with sufficient specificity in his petition for review. See Pa. R.A.P. 1513; Deal v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 878 A.2d 131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) " and that it "may decline to consider issues a claimant raises in the argument section of his appellate brief but fails to include in his statement of questions involved. See Pa. R.A.P. 2119(a); Leone v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 885 A.2d 76 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005)."

However, the court "decline[d] to apply waiver in this instance. In Claimant’s petition for review, we discern two issues preserved for argument. First, Claimant contends the Board failed to 'review all the facts. ' ....We interpret Claimant’s assertion as a challenge to the evidentiary support for the Board’s findings regarding the circumstances of Claimant’s discharge. Second, we interpret Claimant’s assertion that 'this case is not strong enough” to withhold unemployment compensation benefits as challenging whether Employer met its burden to prove it discharged Claimant for cause. Id.; see also Pa. R.A.P. 1513(d) (“The statement of objections will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein.”). Because Claimant sufficiently addresses these arguments in his handwritten appellate brief, we will consider them on their merits."

Saturday, June 07, 2008

tax sale - notice - posting

McCartan v. Montgomery Co. Tax Claim Bureau - Commonwealth Court - June 2, 2008 - UNPUBLISHED OPINION

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1162CD07_6-2-08.pdf

Held: Unverified written document about of posting was not sufficient proof of posting, in the face of uncontradicted testimony of the property owner that the property was not posted. The trial court abused its discretion by finding that the property was properly posted based solely on the unnotarized “Affidavit for Posting of Notice of Public Tax Sale” where unrebutted evidence to the contrary was submitted into the record.

Compliance with the other notice requirements of the Law does not necessarily cure a defect in posting because the posting requirement serves three purposes: to inform the taxpayer of the impending sale; to notify others whose interests in the land may be affected by the sale; and, to notify the public at large of the impending sale.

The law is well-settled in Pennsylvania that a valid tax sale requires the tax claim bureau to strictly comply with all three of the notice provisions of sec. 602 of the law, 72 P.S. §5860.602, or the sale is void. The tax claim bureau must notify the owner of the property in the following three ways: (1) publication of the tax sale at least 30 days prior to the sale; (2) notification of the sale to each owner by certified mail at least 30 days in advance of the sale; and (3) posting notice of the sale on the property at least 10 days prior to the sale. 72 P.S. §§5860.602(a), (e). Strict compliance is necessary to guard against any deprivation of property without due process of law.

Thursday, June 05, 2008

UC - willful misconduct - physician's failure to provide medical information

Zurn Industries v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - June 5, 2008 - UNPUBLISHED OPINION

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2093CD07_6-5-08.pdf

The claimant was not insubordinate and did not commit willful misconduct when his doctors failed to provide the employer with information about the claimant's functional capacity. he claimant contacted his doctors and asked them to provide the information.

As in as in Bogan v. UCBR, 447 A.2d 708 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982) and Houff v. UCBR, 397 A.2d 42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979), "Claimant attempted to get the information Employer requested, but neither of his physicians provided acceptable information, at least not within the time demanded by Employer. Also, similar to Bogan, Employer was also unsuccessful in its attempt to have Claimant’s physicians specify any work restrictions. Claimant attempted to fulfill the directives of Employer but had no control over his physicians."

discovery - appeal - collateral order doctrine - privilege

T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc. - Superior Court - June 5, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s66027_07.pdf

In general, discovery orders are not final, and are therefore unappealable. However, discovery orders involving privileged material are nevertheless appealable as collateral to the principal action pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313 (“Collateral Orders”).

A collateral order is an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost. Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). “A discovery order is collateral only when it is separate and distinct from the underlying cause of action.”

An appeal from a discovery order raising a question of the application of a privilege is separable from the underlying issue, so long as the issue of privilege may be addressed by an appellate court without analysis of the underlying issue.

admin. law - appeal - waiver/preservation of issues - Merida v. UCBR distinguished

By an order dated June 5, 2008, this case has now been designated as an opinion, which will be reported and published.

See http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1912CD07_6-5-08.pdf

Thanks to David Hill of Philadelphia Legal Assistance for preparing and filing the motion which got this case reported

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Ductmate Industries v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - March 12, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1912CD07_6-5-08.pdf

previously reported at http://www.courts.state.pa.us/opposting/cwealth/out/1912cd07_3-12-08.pdf

Claimant did not waive any issue when, in appealing from the referee decision, he said only that he "did not agree" with it, and UCBR reversed and granted benefits. The initial determination and referee decision both dealt with a single issue, whether claimant's acts constituted willful misconduct.

The employer argued that claimant's reasons were not specific enough, citing Merida v. UCBR, 543 A.2d 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) and 34 Pa. Code 101.81(c)(4) http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/034/chapter101/s101.81.html both of which require an appellant to state the "reasons for appeal."

The court noted that in Merida there were two hearings. The employer did not attend the intial hearing, and the Board ordered a second one, during which the claimant raised a number of issues. The referee ruled against the claimant, but did not rule on the propriety of the second hearing.

The claimant appealed to the Board, making only the general objection that he did not agree with the referee's decision. The Board affirmed the referee, and the claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, arguing only that the Board erred in ordering the second hearing. The court determined that the claimant had waived the issue of the propriety of the second hearing, since he did not specifically bring it to the attention of the Board, which "could not be charged with scouring the record to determine every possible appeal."

In this case, however, there was only one issue - whether claimant's acts constituted willful misconduct. That was the issue decided in both the initial UCSC determination and the Board decision. Citing Black Lick Trucking Co. v. UCBR, 6677 A.2d 454 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), the court held that an "inartful appeal" claiming only general disagreement with the referee decision does not prevent the UCBR from addressing the issues ruled on by both the job center/UCSC and referee. The referee should review all issues in the initial determination, and the Board should review all issues the referee considered -- the precise case here.

consumer - payday lending - Consumer Discount Company Law - Loan Interest and Protection Law

Dept. of Banking v. NCAS of Delaware - Pa. Supreme Court - May 29, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2008mopdf

Stating that it is "well established that Commonwealth public policy prohibits usurious lending, a prohibition that has been recognized for well over 100 years, " the state supreme court affirmed the decision of the Commonwealth Court, 931 A.2d 771 (2007) http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/CWealth/out/519MD06_7-31-07.pdf in an action brought by the state Department of Banking to prevent the unlicensed defendant lenders from charging consumers fees that exceeded applicable state limits under the Consumer Discount Company Act, 7 P.S. §§6201-6219 (the “CDCA”), and the Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 P.S. §§101-605 (the “LIPL”).

The court determined that Advance America, a payday lender, was subject to the licensing requirements of the CDCA, since the effective interest rate in its transactions -- more than 300% -- was much higher than the statutory limit of 6%.

Although the stated contract interest rate was 5.98% - just below the 6% limit prescribed by the CDCA - AA also charged consumers $149.95 per month as a "participation fee", which the court said was a charge under the statute that had to be include in the aggregate charges and thus was part of the interest rate determination, because the participation fee was a "necessary condition" of any credit advance by AA and was a "charge inextricably related to the amount actually loaned or advanced."

The court rejected the lender's argument that Delaware law should apply to the case by virtue of a choice-of-law provision in the contract with borrowers, stating that:

a) the case was brought by the state Dept. of Banking, not any individual borrower. The Department was not a party to or bound by the terms of any such contract. The "Department instituted this action pursuant to its police power, not only to protect consumers who had already entered into contracts with Appellant, but more broadly on behalf of the general public to enforce the policy protecting them from usurious lending....When viewed in this light,...the choice-of-law provision in Appellant’s contracts cannot bind the Department in this action to enforce Pennsylvania public policy."

b) even if the contractual provision applied, the Court "has recognized that choice-of-law agreements can be avoided when the terms offend Commonwealth public policy even in disputes between contracting parties....Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that the prohibition of exploitative lending is a fundamental public policy that cannot be circumvented."

c) Although some Pennsylvania statutes permit certain lenders to charge more than the statutory 6% rate under the Loan Interest and Protection Law, 41 P.S. sec. 101 et seq., "violation of any of these statutory provisions will itself offend the public policy of the Commonwealth, as established by the General Assembly."

The court held that its "interpretation harmonizes the remedial purposes of the statute by preventing lenders from charging 'extortionate' fees, while at the same time charging a legal interest rate, thus closing a wide loophole for usurious practices" and agreed with the argument of CLS, an amicus in the case, that this lending vehicle was "an example of the industry’s latest scheme to avoid usury laws....This Court has acknowledged that 'usury is generally accompanied by subterfuge and circumvention of one kind or another to present the color of legality.' ... We agree with the Department, and the amici that Appellant’s interpretation of the statute would undermine the usury laws’ purpose: 'to protect the citizenry of this Commonwealth from being exploited at the hands of unscrupulous individuals seeking to circumvent the law at the expense of unsuspecting borrowers who may have no other avenue to secure financial backing.'"

Wednesday, June 04, 2008

custody - jurisdiction - continuing jurisdiction

Billhime v. Billhime - Superior Court - June 4, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A06024_08.pdf

This case involves Mother's petition for Pennsylvania courts to relinquish jurisdiction to Florida courts. The initial custody order was entered in Pennsylvania. In a later order, the court granted custody to the mother, who lives in Florida, where the children had been living for several years.

The UCCJEA, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422(a)(1), provides that the courts of this Commonwealth will exercise exclusive continuing jurisdiction to modify child custody orders originally entered here unless the child, or a child and at least one parent (or a person acting as a parent), no longer have a “significant connection” with Pennsylvania. For the child, the lack of a continuing “significant connection” with the Commonwealth is established if the court finds that substantial evidence concerning the child’s care, protection, training and personal relationships is no longer available here.

The trial court refused Mother's petition, relying almost exclusively on Father’s continuing “significant connection” with Pennsylvania. However, the court did not focus in any detail on whether the children continue to maintain a “significant connection” to Pennsylvania, noting only that they visit Pennsylvania three times per year and spend time with their father, friends and paternal grandfather. There was little evidence regarding the continuing availability in Pennsylvania of “substantial evidence concerning the child’s “care, protection, training and personal relationships,” as is expressly required by sec . 5422(a)(1) of the UCCJEA. In fact, essentially all of the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing demonstrates that information relating to the children’s welfare is now located in the state of Florida.

In the absence of exclusive continuing jurisdiction, a Pennsylvania court may nevertheless modify a child custody order it previously issued if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination under section 5421 of the UCCJEA. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422(b). Because the trial court did not address the applicability of section 5421 in connection with its initial consideration of Mother’s motion to relinquish jurisdiction, we remand for consideration and decision on this issue.

In the event the trial court determines that it lacks jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination pursuant to section 5421, it should grant Mother’s motion and relinquish jurisdiction of custody matters relating to these two children to the courts of the state of Florida. Order reversed. Case remanded.

appeals - MDJ appeals - appeal v. certiorari

Gladstone Partners v. Overland Enterprise - Superior Court - June 2, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A06037_08.pdf

Appeal de novo and writ of certiorari are different, separate, and mutually exclusive.
These remedies do not and cannot exist simultaneously. MDJ Rule 1015 expressly prohibits a litigant from availing themselves of both an appeal de novo and certiorari review. Rule 1015 clearly requires a litigant desiring to challenge a magisterial district court’s judgment to choose either to appeal de novo or to seek certiorari review.

The purpose of an appeal de novo is to give a litigant a new trial without reference to the record established in the minor court, whereas certiorari connotes a review of the record established in the minor court with an eye to cure defects in procedure and legal error....

The Pennsylvania Constitution does not guarantee the remedy of certiorari review, but, rather, the Judicial Code permits the courts of common pleas to issue writs of certiorari as they had done at common law, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 934. As such, the appellate courts of this Commonwealth have described certiorari review as an alternative to an appeal de novo.

The remedy of appeal de novo takes precedence over certiorari review due to the guarantee of the right to appeal found in Art. V § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Thus, the simultaneous filing of an appeal de novo and a praecipe for writ of certiorari will result in the striking of the writ if it is later granted by the court of common pleas.

The time for appeal is not extended while certiorari proceeding are pending
Courts cannot extend appeal deadlines without showing a breakdown in the processes of the court or fraud that would justify an appeal nunc pro tunc. The MDJ Rules state the time limits for seeking appeal de novo and certiorari review with specificity.

A party challenging the subject matter or procedural jurisdiction of an MDJ via writ of certiorari may do so at any time after entry of the court’s judgment; otherwise, the time limit for seeking certiorari review is 30 days following entry of judgment. Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1009B.

On the other hand, a party appealing de novo is constrained by a 30-day time limitation from the entry of judgment or, in the case of judgments of possession of residential real property, a 10-day time limitation from the entry of judgment. Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002A, 1002B.

Therefore, to find that the grant of a writ of certiorari tolls the time for taking appeal de novo would permit the courts of common pleas to extend the time for taking appeal de novo to a potentially-limitless period.

No good cause for late filing - MDJ Rules 1002A and 1002B permit the filing of an appeal beyond the stated time periods with leave of court and upon good cause shown. In the present case, the appellant did not request the leave of court or demonstrate cause as to why their appeal was filed beyond the 30-day time limit. Accordingly, we need not consider this grace proviso in the present case.

Monday, June 02, 2008

attorney fees - EAJA - paralegal time - prevailing market rates

Richlin Security Services v. Chertoff - US. Supreme Court - June 2, 2008

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/06-1717.pdf

The question presented in this case is whether the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 5 U. S. C. §504(a)(l) (2006 ed.) and 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A) (2000 ed.), allows a prevailing party in a case brought by or against the Government to recover fees for paralegal services at the market rate for such services or only at their cost to the party’s attorney.

Held: A prevailing party that satisfies EAJA’s other requirements may recover its paralegal fees from the Government at prevailing market rates.

EAJA, like §1988, must be interpreted as using the term "attorney . . . fees" to reach fees for paralegal services as well as compensation for the attorney’s personal labor, making "self-evident"that Congress intended that term to embrace paralegal fees.

Since §504 generally provides for recovery of attorney’s fees at "prevailingmarket rates," it follows that paralegal fees must also be recoverable at those rates.

Friday, May 30, 2008

contracts - good faith and fair dealing

Spadoni v. Easton Area School District - ED Pa. - May 22, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0587P.pdf

Pennsylvania does not recognize an independent cause of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Group Health, Inc., 2006 WL 146426, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2006) (Pratter, J.) (quoting Lyon Fin. Servs. v. Woodlake Imaging, LLC, 2005 WL 331695, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2005) (Diamond, J.)).

“There may be an express or implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in any contract between the parties, but if so, its breach is a breach of contract rather than an independent breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing.” Temple Univ. Hosp. Inc., 2006 WL 146426, at *5 (quoting Engstrom v. John Nuveen & Co., 668 F. Supp. 953, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).

Because breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a breach of contract action, a complaint must allege the proper elements of a breach of contract action to survive a motion to dismiss. Temple Univ. Hosp., 2006 WL 146426, at *6 (citing McAllister v. Royal Carribean Cruises, Ltd., 2003 WL 23192102, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2003) (Kauffman, J.)).

disability - severity - remand

Bishop v. Astrue

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0583P.pdf

I agree with the ALJ that there is little, if any, medical evidence supporting the level of disability alleged by plaintiff. I also respect that the ALJ’s credibility determination is entitled to deference.

However, I am bound by Third Circuit law which provides that benefits may be denied at step two of the sequential evaluation only if there are less than slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work and that step two is designed to screen out only groundless claims.

In this case, resolving any doubt in favor of the applicant, as I must under the law, I find that based upon the record evidence, Bishop’s claim is not groundless and, thus, the ALJ legally erred when he found that Bishop’s trigeminal neuralgia/primary trochlear headache was not a severe impairment. Id. As a result, this case must be remanded to the ALJ to determine whether Bishop is disabled due to her severe impairment of trigeminal neuralgia/primary trochlear headache and other non-severe impairment.

Although due to the ALJ’s legal error this case must be remanded, I hesitate, for based on the record, I find it highly unlikely that Bishop’s impairments are severe enough to preclude all work. See Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005)... ; Fisher v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1989)....However, it is not my duty to make the ultimate disability determination, as that decision is reserved solely for the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). My role is limited to determining whether the decision of the ALJ is legally sufficient and supported by substantial evidence....Therefore, the case must be remanded in order for the ALJ to supplement his findings in a manner consistent with this opinion.

Thursday, May 29, 2008

custody - relocation

Hogrelius v. Martin - Superior Court - May 29, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s16015_08.pdf

The court affirmed a decision granting mother permission to move with child to Virginia, where they would live with mother's new husband.

A lot of the opinion dealt with economic factors, including the fact that the stepfather alone earned more than both parents combined.

The court also rejected father's claims that the proposed alternate arrangements for his partial custody were not adequate, because they involved a reduction in his custody time and a longer commute (5.5 hours each way). The court rejected this contention as well, stating:

In addressing this prong of the Gruber analysis, a court’s determination is not whether the alternative schedule would maintain the current level of the non-custodial parent’s interaction with the children, but rather whether the substitute arrangements “will foster adequately an ongoing relationship” between the non-custodial parent and the children....This Court addressed a similar contention in Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 861 A.2d 340, 346 (Pa.Super. 2004), and concluded that the distance between the noncustodial parent and his relocated children is not the controlling concern. We stated, 'If it were, no necessity for a Gruber analysis would ever have arisen, as physical proximity would be a sine qua non of most if not all custody determinations.' Id. Thus, although an alternative custody schedule necessarily reduces the frequency of a parent’s interaction with a child because of the distance involved, relocation should not be denied for that reason alone....Gruber, 583 A.2d at 185-86. See also Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa.Super. 2006) (fact that move of considerable distance will increase cost and logistical problems of maintaining contact between non-custodial parent and child will not necessarily preclude relocation when other factors favor it).

The court found that the proposed custody schedule for the father -- alternating weekends, most holidays, and seven weeks during the summer, as well as alternate holidays, and during extended breaks from school - would increases father’s extended, overnight custody and would adequately foster a healthy relationship between father and child.

UC - voluntary quit - "purely personal reasons"

Johnson v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - May 29, 2008 - UNREPORTED DECISION

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/27CD08_5-29-08.pdf

Claimant was denied UC benefits when she quit her part-time, weekend job without good cause under sec. 4021(b) of the UC Law. Her desire to spend more time with elderly family members was not good cause, in the absence of proof that her presence was required for them to get proper care. Her reason for leaving was thus "purely personal." She also failed to establish that she discussed the issue with her employer or made other efforts to preserve her job.

"Under certain circumstances, the family obligations of a claimant may constitute necessitous and compelling cause to quit employment. Du-Co Ceramics Co. v. UCBR, 546 Pa. 504, 686 A.2d 821 (1996).

For instance, in Pittsburgh Pipe and Coupling Company v. UCBR, 401 Pa. 501, 165 A.2d 374 (1960), the Supreme Court affirmed the granting of benefits to a claimant who quit his employment to return home and take care of his wife, who had suffered a disabling spinal injury, and their children.

Similarly, in Beachem v. UCBR, 760 A.2d 68 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000), we concluded that a claimant who quit his employment to move back in with his eleven-year-old son, who was having emotional and behavioral problems, established necessitous and compelling cause for quitting, thereby entitling him to unemployment compensation benefits.

We have also granted benefits to a claimant when he quit his employment to move back home, in part, to take care of his ailing father. Speck v. UCBR, 680 A.2d 27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996).

However, in Green v. UCBR, 529 A.2d 597 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), we explained that while family obligations may constitute a necessitous and compelling reason to leave one's employment, the reasons may not be purely personal."

Wednesday, May 28, 2008

disability - findings and reasons

Levine v. Astrue - ED Pa. - March 27, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0368P.pdf

The court ordered a remand due to several unexplained conflicts and inconsistencies the ALJ’s findings, which are "not for an appellate court to explain....See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41-42 (3d Cir. 2001)."

"Despite finding that the treating physician’s opinion was entitled to controlling weight, ...the ALJ did not discuss these limitations in his assessment of RFC, even though “a clear and satisfactory explanation” must accompany an ALJ’s finding of RFC. Fargnoli, 47 F.3d at 41....The ALJ’s opinion below is deficient in this respect because it does not specifically discuss the mental impairments the treating physician reported."

"The ALJ’s decision did not explain the conflict between the skill level the ALJ found plaintiff to have and the skill requirements of the jobs the VE testified the plaintiff could perform. The VE and the ALJ must explain such inconsistencies on the record, and if they have not, the matter must be remanded. See Burns, 312 F.3d at 127 (requiring that conflicts between an ALJ’s findings and the DOT definitions be explained “on the record and that the ALJ explain in his decision how the conflict was resolved”). This matter is therefore remanded so that the ALJ can explain these inconsistencies."

appeal - time - unreasonably short appeal period

Premier Comp Solutions, LLC v. Dept. of General Services - Commonwealth Court - May 28, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/570MD07_5-28-08.pdf

This case involves petitioner's challenge to respondent's award of a single-source contract, in which there was no public notice or competitive bidding, as required by Article III, sec. 22, of the state constitution. The case was brought in the the Commonwealth Court's original jurisdiction.

DGS filed POs, claiming that Premier did not challenge its decision within the 7-day period set out in the regulations. The court held that Premier did not have a legally enforceable interest and thus couldn't challenge the DGS decision in any event.

However, the court did discuss the 7-day appeal period, stating in dicta tha if Premier did have such an interest, then a statute

"foreclosing its right to challenge a contract within such a short period of time [seven (7) days] would implicate due process rights. See Luke v. Cataldi 593 Pa. 461, 932 A.2d 45 (2007). Moreover, such a remedy is not an available or adequate remedy. See Pentlong Corp. v. GLS Capital, Inc., 780 A.2d 734 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). If we were to hold otherwise, administrative agency decisions could be made virtually unchallengeable – a decision could made in secret making it impossible for any interested party to take an appeal."

Query: Could this issue be raised in the landlord-tenant context of the 10-day period to appeal an MDJ judgment?

time - computation

Rodriguez v. Board of Probation and Parole - Commonwealth Court - May 28, 2008 - UNREPORTED DECISION

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2154CD07_5-28-08.pdf

In a case in which a prisoner challenged the actions of the Board as untimely, the court set out the regulatory and statutory rules for counting time:

1 Pa. Code § 31.1 sets forth how days are to be counted for time periods in regulations. It provides “in computing a period of time prescribed or allowed . . . regulations of the agency . . . ., the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to run may not be included, . . . . The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is Saturday, Sunday or a legal holiday in this Commonwealth, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a holiday.”4

n. 4 - Section 1908 of the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. C.S. §1908, counts days in statutes in the same manner. It provides: “When any period of time is referred to in any statute, such period in all cases, . . . shall be so computed as to exclude the first and include the last day of such period[.]”

Tuesday, May 27, 2008

disability - remand - additional evidence, findings

Bauer-Cromartie v. Astrue - ED Pa. - May 21, 2008

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0565P.pdf

additional evidence
The court remanded the case because of the ALJ's failure to follow the Appeals Council's insructions to gather further evidence about one of claimant on plaintiff’s impairments. "[A]lthough the likelihood that plaintiff’s impairment meets the de minimus standard for severity is high, it is impossible for me to properly evaluate whether this is, in fact, the case. McCrea v. Commr., 370 F.3d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 2004)."

Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(f), the court ordered the ALJ to obtain a "consultative exam and take any other appropriate measures needed to properly evaluate plaintiff’s claim including consultation with a medical expert and questioning of plaintiff at a hearing, if necessary," if "more salient records regarding the impairment are not available..."

statement of evidence to support findings
The court also ordered the to "clearly set forth the evidence supporting her physical RFC determination [concerning claimant's arthritis] and, if necessary, obtain a physical RFC statement from a medical professional." The ALJ had found that the now 62 year-old claimant could do medium work -- lifting 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently -- in spite of her arthritis.

Friday, May 23, 2008

UC - willful misconduct - medical condition - expert testimony

Philadelphia Parking Authority v. UCBR - Commonwealth Cour - May 22, 2008 - UNREPORTED DECISION

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2157CD07_5-22-08.pdf

Reversing the referee and UCBR, the court held that a claimant who admitted to being habitually late did not establish good cause for this violation of the employer rules with her lay testimony about a medical condition - obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), holding that she needed expert testimony to prove the diagnosis and its effects.

"To meet its burden of proof in establishing willful misconduct as to the violation of a work rule, an employer must establish the existence of the rule, that the employee was aware of the rule and that the rule was violated....Once employer has met its burden, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove that the rule was unreasonable or that there was good cause for violating it."

The employer established the rule and claimant's violation. The court held that claimant did not establish good cause.

The court said that, while it was "sympathetic with Claimant, we cannot neglect the fact that Claimant failed to present expert testimony as to the nature of her mental disorder. Claimant merely testified that she had OCD, which caused her to wash her hands after each of her morning activities and, thus, caused her to be late for work. Expert testimony was needed to provide a proper diagnosis of Claimant’s mental disorder and to explain how the mental disorder affects Claimant’s judgment and behavior. Expert testimony was also necessary to explain how a diagnosis of OCD could cause a person to be habitually late for work involuntarily, i.e., why simply waking earlier would not rectify the problem or why the disorder would cause someone to be one hour late for work one day, but only thirty minutes late for work the following day. As Claimant failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that her OCD condition constituted good cause for violating Employer’s work rule regarding excessive tardiness, the Board erred in concluding that Claimant’s actions did not rise to the level of willful misconduct.

admin. law - due process - notice of charges

Goslin v. State Board of Medicine - Commonwealth Court - May 23, 2008

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1830CD07_5-23-08.pdf

A registered nurse was charged by the State Board of Medicine with various offenses involving whether she was properly licensed to practice midwifery.

She was found to have violated a section of the law barring "practicing as a midwife without a license and for holding herself out to the public as a midwife."

She appealed, inter alia, on the ground that "the Board deprived her of due process by failing to provide notice that she was charged with violating" that section of the law. The Court agreed.

The court said that in an administrative proceeding, the essential elements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard.....The purpose of the notice requirement is to afford the person reasonable notice of the charges against her so that she will have sufficient opportunity to answer the charges....For such notice to be adequate, it must at the very least contain a sufficient listing and explanation of charges so that the individual can know against what charges she must defend herself if she can.

The court concluded that "[g]iven the different purposes" of the two statutes, the charges against the nurse the one act, did not give her adequate notice to defend against the offenses charged in the other, which she was found to have violated.

predatory lending - definitions - N.J. case

Nowosleska v. Steele, et al. - N.J. Superior Court, Appellate Division - May 19, 2008

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a5759-06.pdf

Borrowers moved to open a default judgment entered against them in a case in which they "were induced to pay with the title to property valued at $405,000 in order to pay off debts totaling $145,000." The various transactions included a $50,000 fee to one of the lenders.

In its opinion opening the default judgment based on possible "grave injustice" and "equity and justice" under N.J. law, the court mentioned several definitions of "predatory lending," as follows:

While predatory lending is a general concept not subject to precise definition, one authority has described it as: a mismatch between the needs and capacity of the borrower . . . In essence, the loan does not fit the borrower, either because the borrower's underlying needs for the loan are not being met or the terms of the loan are so disadvantageous to that particular borrower that there is little likelihood that the borrower has the capability to repay the loan. Assocs. Home Equity Servs. , Inc. v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super. 254, 267 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Daniel S. Ehrenberg, If the Loan Don't Fit, Don't Take It: Applying the Suitability Doctrine to the Mortgage Industry to Eliminate Predatory Lending, 10 J. Affordable Housing & Community Dev. L. 117, 119-20 (Winter 2001)).

HUD Treasury Task Force on Predatory Lending, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending 17-24 (2000) http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf discusses predatory lending in general and the difficulty in providing a definition of predatory lending. Predatory lending includes "the practice of making loans containing interest rates, fees or closing costs that are higher than they should be in light of the borrower's credit and net income, or containing other exploitative terms that the borrower does not comprehend." Henry v. Lehman Commercial Paper, Inc. 471 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep's Clothing: A Legislative Proposal, 21 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 129, 134 (2005) (stating that "predatory lending is the situation where a mortgage broker or mortgage lender engages in fraudulent, deceptive or sharp practices to induce borrowers (often the elderly or minorities) to enter into 'bad' loans," which would include loans that are overpriced, loans where there is no net economic benefit to the borrower, loans where the borrower cannot afford the payment so the lender is relying on the borrower's equity for payment, and loans with other exploitative terms not understood by the borrower).