Nguyen v. Astrue - ED Pa. - January 23, 2008
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0094P.pdf
Case remanded for proper consideration of the opinion of the treating psychiatrist.
The ALJ errors included
- improperly relying on claimant's failure to allege any symptoms in his Social Security paperwork failing to tell the treating psychiatrist about experiencing emotional problems as of a certain date. The court held that these “facts” are entitled to “no weight . . . because neither are based on ‘contrary medical evidence.’
- improperly considering claimant's failure to discuss his emotional problems with his family physician. That cannot negate the opinion of his treating psychiatrist, the specialist claimant consulted for his specific problem.”
- the fact that Mr. Nguyen told his doctor that he was "doing okay on the medication and was less depressed” does does not expressly contradict treating physician's opinion and substitutes the ALJ’s clinical judgment for that of the treating psychiatrist. The notes do not expressly contradict the physician's opinion. In so finding, the ALJ’s substituted his clinical judgment for that of the treating psychiatrist. The ALJ did not identify a contradiction between the doctor's notes and her opinion, but instead “set [the ALJ’s] own expertise against that of a physician who presents competent evidence.” Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (1985).
- The ALJ's statement that the treating physician's report was completely unsubstantiated by any contemporaneous clinical notes or testing. . . .is belied by the record"
- duty to develop the record - The ALJ, in considering the submissions of a claimant’s treating psychiatrist, has a limited duty to develop the record if he finds those submissions, in certain respects, inadequate to support the conclusions the psychiatrist makes. See Ferguson, 765 F.2d at 36 (“[I]f the ALJ believed [a claimant’s medical] evidence was inconclusive or unclear, it was incumbent upon him to secure whatever evidence he needed to make a sound determination.”). Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(e)(1), the ALJ must “seek additional evidence or clarification from [a claimant’s] medical source when the report from [the] medical source contains a conflict or ambiguity that must be resolved, the report does not contain all the necessary information, or does not appear to be based on medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” This specific regulation is an instance of the ALJ’s broader “duty to develop a full and fair record in social security cases.” Ventura v. Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 902 (3d Cir. 1995).
This duty is “heightened” when plaintiff is without counsel, Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1979), but still exists when plaintiff is represented. See Ventura, 55 F.3d at 902 (concluding, in a case where the claimant was represented by counsel but the ALJ was biased, that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record stems from the non-adversarial nature of social security hearings and the “beneficent purposes” of the Social Security Act).
Thus, while claimant bears the burden of providing evidence that the Commissioner “can use to reach conclusions about [the claimant’s] medical impairment(s),” 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a), circumstances may arise where the ALJ, when presented with such evidence, may be compelled to develop the record in order to corroborate or discredit the claimant’s submissions. An “essential inquiry” for determining when this duty arises “is whether the incomplete record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in prejudice to the claimant.” Gauthney v. Shalala, 890 F. Supp. 401, 410 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Schwartz v. Halter, 134 F. Supp. 2d 640, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record “exists even when the claimant is represented by counsel because an administrative hearing is not an adversarial proceeding . . . ”); Battles v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 43, 44 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that “the duty to develop the record fully and fairly” exists “‘even if . . . the claimant is represented by counsel’” (quoting Boyd v. Sullivan, 960 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir.1992) (internal quotation omitted)).
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
Monday, January 28, 2008
PA Bar Association Issues Ethics Opinion on Mining Metadata
The Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility has recently issued Formal Opinion, 2007-500, on the subject or mining metadata received in materials furnished by opposing counsel.
Metadata is information embeded within electronic documents that may not be viewed in a printed version of the document. It may include information about the creation of the document including information about the author, date, time or location where it was created. Metadata may also contain information deleted from earlier versions of the document, or information contained in comments made by reviewers during the document's creation.
The Committee concluded that, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, each attorney must determine for himself or herself whether to utilize the metadata contained in documents and other electronic files based upon the lawyer’s judgment and the particular factual situation.
This determination should be based upon the nature of the information received, how and from whom the information was received, attorney-client privilege and work product rules, and common sense, reciprocity and professional courtesy.
Although the waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to privileged and confidential materials is a matter for judicial determination, the Committee believed that the inadvertent transmissions of such materials should not constitute a waiver of the privilege, except in the case of extreme carelessness or indifference.
The Committee noted that there is no specific Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct determining the ethical obligations of a lawyer receiving inadvertently transmitted metadata from another lawyer, his client or other third person; and, there is no specific Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct requiring the receiving lawyer to assess whether the opposing lawyer has violated any ethical obligation to the lawyer's client.
In reaching its conclusion, the Committee reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions in light of the existing rules in Pennsylvania.
The Opinion is available to Pennsylvania Bar Association members on the PA Bar Association website at the link below.
PA Bar Association Ethics Opinions
Metadata is information embeded within electronic documents that may not be viewed in a printed version of the document. It may include information about the creation of the document including information about the author, date, time or location where it was created. Metadata may also contain information deleted from earlier versions of the document, or information contained in comments made by reviewers during the document's creation.
The Committee concluded that, under the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, each attorney must determine for himself or herself whether to utilize the metadata contained in documents and other electronic files based upon the lawyer’s judgment and the particular factual situation.
This determination should be based upon the nature of the information received, how and from whom the information was received, attorney-client privilege and work product rules, and common sense, reciprocity and professional courtesy.
Although the waiver of the attorney-client privilege with respect to privileged and confidential materials is a matter for judicial determination, the Committee believed that the inadvertent transmissions of such materials should not constitute a waiver of the privilege, except in the case of extreme carelessness or indifference.
The Committee noted that there is no specific Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct determining the ethical obligations of a lawyer receiving inadvertently transmitted metadata from another lawyer, his client or other third person; and, there is no specific Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct requiring the receiving lawyer to assess whether the opposing lawyer has violated any ethical obligation to the lawyer's client.
In reaching its conclusion, the Committee reviewed decisions from other jurisdictions in light of the existing rules in Pennsylvania.
The Opinion is available to Pennsylvania Bar Association members on the PA Bar Association website at the link below.
PA Bar Association Ethics Opinions
Labels:
ethics
Wednesday, January 23, 2008
consumer - warranty - UCC- UTPCPL - Magnuson-Moss
Woolums v. National RV - MD Pa. - January 17, 2008
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/Conner/06v0787.pdf
Plaintiff sued under the UCC,13 Pa. C.S 2313-2316; the Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-1 et seq.; and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act, 15 USC 2301-2312. The case was originally brought in state court, but removed to federal court on defendant's motion.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion only as to breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, holding that they had been properly disclaimed -- it was in writing, was conspicuous, and used appropriate and understandable language. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied as to all other claims, based on applicable law and because there were genuine issues as to material facts.
Defendant issued a one-year limited warranty covering the costs of repairing or replacing parts and labor to correct Covered Defects, which are limited to the any manufacture or assembly process performed by National. Problems with other parts were outside of this warranty. There was no representation that the covered parts or workmanship conformed to any standard of quality or performance. Plaintiff had numerous problems with the RV and took it in for repairs on many occasions.
seller's promise to repair or replace is an express warranty under UCC 2313(a)(1)
Noting a split of authority on the issue, which it said Pennsylvania courts have not squarely addressed, the court held that the "repair-or-replace covenant constitutes an express warranty actionable under the UCC, 13 Pa. C.S 2313(a)(1). The court noted the "breadth of statutory language [that] provides that "any affirmation of fact or promises...creates an express warranty that the good shall conform to the affirmation or promise...[T]he word 'any' suggests that all express promises that pertain to the goods become warranties, even if they do not specifically address the goods' quality or nature...The UCC official comments confirm that sec. 2313 is to be given a wide berth." National itself used the term "express warranty." Under those circumstances, the court said the "it would be fundamentally unfair to permit National to invoke an illusory construction of its contractual language, leaving merely a remedial promise to repair" instead of the express promise to repair or replace.
The court noted that the "express warranty at issue, like many contracts between commercial sellers and consumer, is one of adhesion....Adhesion contracts are not per se invalid, but courts strictly construe them against the drafting party, who holds a position of superior bargaining power and can dictate the agreement's terms."
failure of limited remedy to accomplish its essential purpose
The court held that the parties' positions differed significantly on the issue of whether defendant's attempt to limit plaintiff's remedies caused them to "fail of its essential purpose" under UCC sec. 2719(b), thus raising a jury question and precluding summary judgment, given the buyer's proffered evidence that he was unable to use the motor home for about eight months because of repairs that were covered by the warranty. An exclusive repair--as opposed to repair-replace-- remedy is acceptable, "so long as the buyer has the use of substantially defect-free goods. But when the seller is either unwilling or unable to conform the good to the contract, the remedy does not suffice" and fails of its essential purpose.
Magnuson-Moss warranty claim - 15 USC 2301 et seq.
This act "provides relief for consumers 'damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under [the Act] or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.' 15 USC 2301(d)(1)..."Written warranties under the act include those which guarantee that the seller will 'repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to a defective product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking...A violation of the act allows the consumer to seek recovery of the purchase price of the product plus attorney's fees and costs. The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim, finding that "a reasonable jury could find that defendant failed to abide by the term of the warranty," in violation of the statute.
state consumer protection claim 73 P.S. 201-1 et seq.
A failure to comply with the terms of any written guarantee or warranty is actionable under the CPL, sec. 201-2(4)(xiv). Summary judgment for defendant denied because of genuine issue of material fact.
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/Conner/06v0787.pdf
Plaintiff sued under the UCC,13 Pa. C.S 2313-2316; the Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-1 et seq.; and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-FTC Improvement Act, 15 USC 2301-2312. The case was originally brought in state court, but removed to federal court on defendant's motion.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on all claims. The court granted the motion only as to breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, holding that they had been properly disclaimed -- it was in writing, was conspicuous, and used appropriate and understandable language. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied as to all other claims, based on applicable law and because there were genuine issues as to material facts.
Defendant issued a one-year limited warranty covering the costs of repairing or replacing parts and labor to correct Covered Defects, which are limited to the any manufacture or assembly process performed by National. Problems with other parts were outside of this warranty. There was no representation that the covered parts or workmanship conformed to any standard of quality or performance. Plaintiff had numerous problems with the RV and took it in for repairs on many occasions.
seller's promise to repair or replace is an express warranty under UCC 2313(a)(1)
Noting a split of authority on the issue, which it said Pennsylvania courts have not squarely addressed, the court held that the "repair-or-replace covenant constitutes an express warranty actionable under the UCC, 13 Pa. C.S 2313(a)(1). The court noted the "breadth of statutory language [that] provides that "any affirmation of fact or promises...creates an express warranty that the good shall conform to the affirmation or promise...[T]he word 'any' suggests that all express promises that pertain to the goods become warranties, even if they do not specifically address the goods' quality or nature...The UCC official comments confirm that sec. 2313 is to be given a wide berth." National itself used the term "express warranty." Under those circumstances, the court said the "it would be fundamentally unfair to permit National to invoke an illusory construction of its contractual language, leaving merely a remedial promise to repair" instead of the express promise to repair or replace.
The court noted that the "express warranty at issue, like many contracts between commercial sellers and consumer, is one of adhesion....Adhesion contracts are not per se invalid, but courts strictly construe them against the drafting party, who holds a position of superior bargaining power and can dictate the agreement's terms."
failure of limited remedy to accomplish its essential purpose
The court held that the parties' positions differed significantly on the issue of whether defendant's attempt to limit plaintiff's remedies caused them to "fail of its essential purpose" under UCC sec. 2719(b), thus raising a jury question and precluding summary judgment, given the buyer's proffered evidence that he was unable to use the motor home for about eight months because of repairs that were covered by the warranty. An exclusive repair--as opposed to repair-replace-- remedy is acceptable, "so long as the buyer has the use of substantially defect-free goods. But when the seller is either unwilling or unable to conform the good to the contract, the remedy does not suffice" and fails of its essential purpose.
Magnuson-Moss warranty claim - 15 USC 2301 et seq.
This act "provides relief for consumers 'damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation under [the Act] or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract.' 15 USC 2301(d)(1)..."Written warranties under the act include those which guarantee that the seller will 'repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to a defective product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking...A violation of the act allows the consumer to seek recovery of the purchase price of the product plus attorney's fees and costs. The court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim, finding that "a reasonable jury could find that defendant failed to abide by the term of the warranty," in violation of the statute.
state consumer protection claim 73 P.S. 201-1 et seq.
A failure to comply with the terms of any written guarantee or warranty is actionable under the CPL, sec. 201-2(4)(xiv). Summary judgment for defendant denied because of genuine issue of material fact.
Friday, January 18, 2008
bankruptcy - appeals - final order
In re Truong - 3rd Circuit - January 16, 23008
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063980p.pdf
An order which "merely denied [a] request for a hearing concerning an alleged conflict of interest on the part of the trustee" is not final and appealable under 28 USC 158(a). It was a "purely interlocutory order" and did not "end the litigation on the merits" or "dispose of any discrete claim or cause of action." .
The court reached this decision, even though there are finality considerations unique to bankruptcy appeals, in which the courts "traditionally impose a 'relaxed standard of finality.' " A "general antipathy toward appeals still prevails in individual adversary actions...[E]ven in bankruptcy appeals the concept of finality is not open-ended."
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063980p.pdf
An order which "merely denied [a] request for a hearing concerning an alleged conflict of interest on the part of the trustee" is not final and appealable under 28 USC 158(a). It was a "purely interlocutory order" and did not "end the litigation on the merits" or "dispose of any discrete claim or cause of action." .
The court reached this decision, even though there are finality considerations unique to bankruptcy appeals, in which the courts "traditionally impose a 'relaxed standard of finality.' " A "general antipathy toward appeals still prevails in individual adversary actions...[E]ven in bankruptcy appeals the concept of finality is not open-ended."
Thursday, January 17, 2008
employment - wages - FLSA - donning and doffing
Lugo v. Farmer's Pride, Inc. - ED Pa. - January 14, 2008
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0061P.pdf
The court denied defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for wages for time donning and doffing work clothing, holding that it would be premature to rule on such mixed questions of law and fact without further development of the record.
The issue is whether the donning and doffing is "integral and indispensable " to employee's work and thus compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC sec. 201 et seq., the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 USC 254(a), and IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) and its progeny.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0061P.pdf
The court denied defendant's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for wages for time donning and doffing work clothing, holding that it would be premature to rule on such mixed questions of law and fact without further development of the record.
The issue is whether the donning and doffing is "integral and indispensable " to employee's work and thus compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 USC sec. 201 et seq., the Portal-to-Portal Act, 29 USC 254(a), and IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (2005) and its progeny.
Wednesday, January 16, 2008
Commonwealth Court - unreported opinions - indefinite posting
As of January 15, 2008 (and at the request of the Commonwealth Court), the following changes have been made to the webpage where its opinions are posted
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/index/CWealthOpindex.asp
Unreported opinions - indefinite posting
Unreported opinions will be posted indefinitely. Previously, they were removed after 90 days. All unreported opinions less than 90 days old, posted prior to January 15 are available through a link on the unreported opinions webpage titled ‘Unreported Opinions Prior to Jan. 15, 2008.’
Order of posting - most recent to oldest
The default sort order for both reported and unreported postings is now from the most recent to the oldest, as requested by many users. This posting order is also being followed on Superior http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/index/SuperiorOpindex.asp and Supreme Court http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/index/SupremeOpindex.asp opinion sites
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/index/CWealthOpindex.asp
Unreported opinions - indefinite posting
Unreported opinions will be posted indefinitely. Previously, they were removed after 90 days. All unreported opinions less than 90 days old, posted prior to January 15 are available through a link on the unreported opinions webpage titled ‘Unreported Opinions Prior to Jan. 15, 2008.’
Order of posting - most recent to oldest
The default sort order for both reported and unreported postings is now from the most recent to the oldest, as requested by many users. This posting order is also being followed on Superior http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/index/SuperiorOpindex.asp and Supreme Court http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/index/SupremeOpindex.asp opinion sites
Sunday, January 13, 2008
bankruptcy - credit counseling prior to filing
In re Hoshan - ED Pa. - January 7, 2008
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0029P.pdf
This Chapter 13 case was held to have been properly dismissed, because the debtor/appellant did not get or certify that she got credit counseling before filing the bankruptcy, as required by 11 USC sec. 109(h)(1).
The debtor filed her petition on March 30th, lacking a number of documents, including either a certificate that she had already received credit counseling or a request for an extension or exemption from that requirement, due to exigent circumstances. She didn't actually get credit counseling until April 3rd, and filed a certificate to that effect on April 30th.
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) allows the court discretion to excuse late filing due to "exigent circumstances" and the debtor made a "persuasive case" for that. But the court said that the "real issue....is not the late filing [but] that the appellant did not receive credit counseling before she filed her bankruptcy."
Although the court recognized that the counseling requirement is not jurisdictional, it noted that "[m]osts courts have concluded that dismissal is mandated when the debtor has not complied with the credit counseling requirement."
Noting that "[s]ome courts have waived the credit counseling requirements to avoid manifest injustice," the court said that the debtor did not meet that test, even thought it was "sympathetic to the challenges the appellant faces as the mother of seven children and the primary caretaker for her injured husband....Her family situation, while difficult, does not rise to the level of those cases in which courts avoid manifest injustice by waiving the credit counseling requirement."
The court cited In re Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 296 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) (debtor’s counsel mistakenly advised him that his non-consumer debts were not subject to the requirements); In re Vollmer, 2007 WL 541747 Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (debtor was incarcerated at the time he filed his petition and had no access to a credit counselor); In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (debtor spoke only Creole and no Creole-speaking credit counselor was available); In re Bricksin, 346 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (debtors had set up a payment plan with a credit counseling agency and had been making payments but failed to file the certificate with their bankruptcy petition).
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0029P.pdf
This Chapter 13 case was held to have been properly dismissed, because the debtor/appellant did not get or certify that she got credit counseling before filing the bankruptcy, as required by 11 USC sec. 109(h)(1).
The debtor filed her petition on March 30th, lacking a number of documents, including either a certificate that she had already received credit counseling or a request for an extension or exemption from that requirement, due to exigent circumstances. She didn't actually get credit counseling until April 3rd, and filed a certificate to that effect on April 30th.
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) allows the court discretion to excuse late filing due to "exigent circumstances" and the debtor made a "persuasive case" for that. But the court said that the "real issue....is not the late filing [but] that the appellant did not receive credit counseling before she filed her bankruptcy."
Although the court recognized that the counseling requirement is not jurisdictional, it noted that "[m]osts courts have concluded that dismissal is mandated when the debtor has not complied with the credit counseling requirement."
Noting that "[s]ome courts have waived the credit counseling requirements to avoid manifest injustice," the court said that the debtor did not meet that test, even thought it was "sympathetic to the challenges the appellant faces as the mother of seven children and the primary caretaker for her injured husband....Her family situation, while difficult, does not rise to the level of those cases in which courts avoid manifest injustice by waiving the credit counseling requirement."
The court cited In re Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 296 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007) (debtor’s counsel mistakenly advised him that his non-consumer debts were not subject to the requirements); In re Vollmer, 2007 WL 541747 Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (debtor was incarcerated at the time he filed his petition and had no access to a credit counselor); In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006) (debtor spoke only Creole and no Creole-speaking credit counselor was available); In re Bricksin, 346 B.R. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (debtors had set up a payment plan with a credit counseling agency and had been making payments but failed to file the certificate with their bankruptcy petition).
Tuesday, January 08, 2008
Free Public Access to all Pennsylvania Statutes - PS and Pa. C.S.
The complete unannotated version of Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes is now available for free on the Internet. The Unofficial Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes from West are now available directly from the link below or from the website of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
Previously, no official statutes were available online. Then in July 2007 the General Assembly posted the official consolidated statutes for Pennsylvania on the Internet. Now the unofficial Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes from West has replaced the official consolidated version.
Although Purdon’s is not an official publication of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it is still probably the best resource to use when researching the laws of Pennsylvania by subject.West’s Purdon’s Pennsylvania Statutes, hosted by Westlaw, is easy to browse and can be searched using natural language or by typing a statute citation in quotations. This free version is not annotated and does not include court rules.
Court rules and state agency regulations are available on the Pennsylvania Code website http://www.pacode.com/, which is free and searchable.
Proposed regulations and court rules, as well as official notices, etc., are available in the Pennsylvania Bulletin http://www.pabulletin.com/, which is also free and searchable.
Unofficial Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes from West
Previously, no official statutes were available online. Then in July 2007 the General Assembly posted the official consolidated statutes for Pennsylvania on the Internet. Now the unofficial Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes from West has replaced the official consolidated version.
Although Purdon’s is not an official publication of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, it is still probably the best resource to use when researching the laws of Pennsylvania by subject.West’s Purdon’s Pennsylvania Statutes, hosted by Westlaw, is easy to browse and can be searched using natural language or by typing a statute citation in quotations. This free version is not annotated and does not include court rules.
Court rules and state agency regulations are available on the Pennsylvania Code website http://www.pacode.com/, which is free and searchable.
Proposed regulations and court rules, as well as official notices, etc., are available in the Pennsylvania Bulletin http://www.pabulletin.com/, which is also free and searchable.
Unofficial Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes from West
Friday, January 04, 2008
predatory mortgages
Parker v. Long Beach Mortgage Company - ED Pa. - January 3, 2008
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0015P.pdf
Although the court rejected the consumer claims of the plaintiffs, "relatively sophisticated borrowers" one of whom had a real estate license, there is some potentially useful language in the opinion.
The court noted that the dispute involved a "broker and four lending institutions [and] embodies many of the factors identified with predatory, subprime mortgage loans:[ n.1] an aggressive mortgage broker, no document loans, interest climbing to double-digit rates, escalating payments, balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and negative amortization. As distasteful as the practices may be, [n. 2] that odor of opportunism is not enough to save [the plaintiffs] from themselves."
n.1 - HUD-Treasury Joint Report http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf12/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf
n. 2 - The power to curb predatory practices lies either in consumer education or with Congress; as a court of limited jurisdiction, I may only enforce the laws as written, not as I would wish they were written.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/08D0015P.pdf
Although the court rejected the consumer claims of the plaintiffs, "relatively sophisticated borrowers" one of whom had a real estate license, there is some potentially useful language in the opinion.
The court noted that the dispute involved a "broker and four lending institutions [and] embodies many of the factors identified with predatory, subprime mortgage loans:[ n.1] an aggressive mortgage broker, no document loans, interest climbing to double-digit rates, escalating payments, balloon payments, prepayment penalties, and negative amortization. As distasteful as the practices may be, [n. 2] that odor of opportunism is not enough to save [the plaintiffs] from themselves."
n.1 - HUD-Treasury Joint Report http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf12/pressrel/treasrpt.pdf
n. 2 - The power to curb predatory practices lies either in consumer education or with Congress; as a court of limited jurisdiction, I may only enforce the laws as written, not as I would wish they were written.
evidence - immature witnesses
Commonwealth v. Davis - Superior Court - December 17, 2007
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/a29031_07.pdf
The determination of a witness's competency rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. The decision of the trial court will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. The "standard of review of rulings on the competency of witnesses is very limited indeed. "
In Pennsylvania, the general rule is that every witness is presumed to be competent to be a witness. However, young children must be examined for competency pursuant to the following test:
(1) The witness must be capable of expressing intelligent answers to questions;
(2) The witness must have been capable of observing the event to be testified about and have the ability to remember it; and,
(3) An awareness of the duty to tell the truth.
If there is an allegation of taint, the inquiry centers on the second element. The “appropriate venue” for investigation into such a claim is a competency hearing , centered on the inquiry into the minimal capacity of the witness to communicate, to observe an event and accurately recall that observation, and to understand the necessity to speak the truth.
Pennsylvania courts have recognized that an immature witness’s testimony can be tainted by the inquiries of adults. In that instance, the core belief underlying the theory of taint is that a child's memory is peculiarly susceptible to suggestibility so that when called to testify a child may have difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy. Taint is the implantation of false memories or the distortion of real memories caused by interview techniques of law enforcement, social service personnel, and other interested adults, that are so unduly suggestive and coercive as to infect the memory of the child, rendering that child incompetent to testify.
The capacity of young children to testify has always been a concern, since immaturity can impact a child's ability to meet the minimal legal requirements of competency. Common experience informs us that children are, by their very essence, fanciful creatures who have difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality; who when asked a question want to give the “right” answer, the answer that pleases the interrogator; who are subject to repeat ideas placed in their heads by others; and who have limited capacity for accurate memory.
In order to trigger an investigation of competency on the issue of taint, the moving party must show some evidence of taint. Once some evidence of taint is presented, the competency hearing must be expanded to explore this specific question. During the hearing the party alleging taint bears the burden of production of evidence of taint and the burden of persuasion to show taint by clear and convincing evidence. Pennsylvania has always maintained that since competency is the presumption, the moving party must carry the burden of overcoming that presumption .
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/a29031_07.pdf
The determination of a witness's competency rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. The decision of the trial court will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. The "standard of review of rulings on the competency of witnesses is very limited indeed. "
In Pennsylvania, the general rule is that every witness is presumed to be competent to be a witness. However, young children must be examined for competency pursuant to the following test:
(1) The witness must be capable of expressing intelligent answers to questions;
(2) The witness must have been capable of observing the event to be testified about and have the ability to remember it; and,
(3) An awareness of the duty to tell the truth.
If there is an allegation of taint, the inquiry centers on the second element. The “appropriate venue” for investigation into such a claim is a competency hearing , centered on the inquiry into the minimal capacity of the witness to communicate, to observe an event and accurately recall that observation, and to understand the necessity to speak the truth.
Pennsylvania courts have recognized that an immature witness’s testimony can be tainted by the inquiries of adults. In that instance, the core belief underlying the theory of taint is that a child's memory is peculiarly susceptible to suggestibility so that when called to testify a child may have difficulty distinguishing fact from fantasy. Taint is the implantation of false memories or the distortion of real memories caused by interview techniques of law enforcement, social service personnel, and other interested adults, that are so unduly suggestive and coercive as to infect the memory of the child, rendering that child incompetent to testify.
The capacity of young children to testify has always been a concern, since immaturity can impact a child's ability to meet the minimal legal requirements of competency. Common experience informs us that children are, by their very essence, fanciful creatures who have difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality; who when asked a question want to give the “right” answer, the answer that pleases the interrogator; who are subject to repeat ideas placed in their heads by others; and who have limited capacity for accurate memory.
In order to trigger an investigation of competency on the issue of taint, the moving party must show some evidence of taint. Once some evidence of taint is presented, the competency hearing must be expanded to explore this specific question. During the hearing the party alleging taint bears the burden of production of evidence of taint and the burden of persuasion to show taint by clear and convincing evidence. Pennsylvania has always maintained that since competency is the presumption, the moving party must carry the burden of overcoming that presumption .
state pre-emption of local law-making
Nutter v. Dougherty, et al. - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - December 28, 2007
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-89-2007mo.pdf
State law pre-empts local lawmaking where
- a state statute specifically declares that it has "planted the flag of pre-emption in a field" (express pre-emption)
- a state statute "proclaimes a course of regulation and control which brooks no municipal intervention" (field pre-emption)
- local law contradicts or contravenes state law (conflict pre-emption)
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-89-2007mo.pdf
State law pre-empts local lawmaking where
- a state statute specifically declares that it has "planted the flag of pre-emption in a field" (express pre-emption)
- a state statute "proclaimes a course of regulation and control which brooks no municipal intervention" (field pre-emption)
- local law contradicts or contravenes state law (conflict pre-emption)
evidence - value of property - proof - testimony v. document
Nelson v. State Board of Veterinary Medicine - Commonwealth Court - December 17, 2007
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/CWealth/out/75CD07_12-17-07.pdf
The testimony of the owner of an asset is competent to prove its value, so long as it is based on the owner's personal knowledge. Written documents are not preferable to oral statements. The best evidence rule does not apply where the matter to be proved exists independently of a writing that might also be probative.
http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/CWealth/out/75CD07_12-17-07.pdf
The testimony of the owner of an asset is competent to prove its value, so long as it is based on the owner's personal knowledge. Written documents are not preferable to oral statements. The best evidence rule does not apply where the matter to be proved exists independently of a writing that might also be probative.
Sunday, December 30, 2007
consumer - arbitration clause - credit repair
Gay v. Creditinform - 3rd Circuit - December 19, 2007
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/064036p.pdf
Enforcing the contractual arbitration clause pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC sec. 2, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court in granting the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, on an individual basis, of the plaintiff's proposed class action under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 USC 1679 et seq. and the Pennsylvania Credit Services Act (CSA), 73 P.S 2181 et seq.
The court held that plaintiff did not satisfy her "burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration" of a claim under the CROA or that arbitration "irreconcilably conflicts" with the purposes of the CROA, citing its similar decision under the TILA in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F3d 366, 371, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). The court said that the plaintiff, in the arbitration proceeding, would retain her "full range of rights created by the statutes" and that the right to bring a class action was created by the federal rules of civil procedure rather than the CROA. The court also stressed the possibility of administrative enforcement of the CROA by the FTC and state attorneys general, which it said "supply procedures for obtaining remedies reasonably substituting for those available in a class action."
Concerning the anti-waiver provision of the CROA, the court said that it "only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations" imposed by the CROA and not the enforcement procedures, such as seeking relief in a judicial forum or seeking class relief.
Concerning plaintiff's claim that the arbitration clause and the contract as a whole were unconscionable, the court recognized that federal courts may apply "generally applicable contract defenses" available under state law "such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability" without running afoul of the FAA and the supremacy clause. However, the court held that "mere inequality" of bargaining power did not render a contract unconscionable, unless it approached "fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract." The court found that the plaintiff -- who paid defendant about $5/month under the credit repair contract -- "could have walked away" from the contract and could have chosen another company to provide the services that defendant did. Her position was "different, for example, from that of a homeowner facing a mortgage foreclosure who accepts onerous refinancing terms in a desperate attempt to save her home."
The court rejected the Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions in Lytle v. CitiFinancial Services, Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. 2002) and Thibodeau v. ComCast Corp., 912 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. 2006), which struck down waivers of the right to bring a class action as unconscionable. Citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), the court held that Lytle and Thibodeau established state law principles that were unique to arbitration agreements, rather than applicable to contracts generally. "'A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with" the generality requirement of sec. 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court also noted the statement in Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 129 (Pa. 2006), that the Lytle opinion "was well intentioned" but "swept too broadly."
The court ended by stating that it expressed "no view on whether [narrowing of the application of the FAA] might be a desirable result as it is not our function to do so. Rather, our obligation is to honor the intent of Congress and that is what we are doing. If the reach of the FAA is to be confined then Congress and not the courts should be the body to do so."
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/064036p.pdf
Enforcing the contractual arbitration clause pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC sec. 2, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court in granting the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, on an individual basis, of the plaintiff's proposed class action under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 USC 1679 et seq. and the Pennsylvania Credit Services Act (CSA), 73 P.S 2181 et seq.
The court held that plaintiff did not satisfy her "burden of establishing that Congress intended to preclude arbitration" of a claim under the CROA or that arbitration "irreconcilably conflicts" with the purposes of the CROA, citing its similar decision under the TILA in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F3d 366, 371, 373 (3d Cir. 2000). The court said that the plaintiff, in the arbitration proceeding, would retain her "full range of rights created by the statutes" and that the right to bring a class action was created by the federal rules of civil procedure rather than the CROA. The court also stressed the possibility of administrative enforcement of the CROA by the FTC and state attorneys general, which it said "supply procedures for obtaining remedies reasonably substituting for those available in a class action."
Concerning the anti-waiver provision of the CROA, the court said that it "only prohibits waiver of the substantive obligations" imposed by the CROA and not the enforcement procedures, such as seeking relief in a judicial forum or seeking class relief.
Concerning plaintiff's claim that the arbitration clause and the contract as a whole were unconscionable, the court recognized that federal courts may apply "generally applicable contract defenses" available under state law "such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability" without running afoul of the FAA and the supremacy clause. However, the court held that "mere inequality" of bargaining power did not render a contract unconscionable, unless it approached "fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any contract." The court found that the plaintiff -- who paid defendant about $5/month under the credit repair contract -- "could have walked away" from the contract and could have chosen another company to provide the services that defendant did. Her position was "different, for example, from that of a homeowner facing a mortgage foreclosure who accepts onerous refinancing terms in a desperate attempt to save her home."
The court rejected the Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions in Lytle v. CitiFinancial Services, Inc., 810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. 2002) and Thibodeau v. ComCast Corp., 912 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. 2006), which struck down waivers of the right to bring a class action as unconscionable. Citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987), the court held that Lytle and Thibodeau established state law principles that were unique to arbitration agreements, rather than applicable to contracts generally. "'A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with" the generality requirement of sec. 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act. The court also noted the statement in Salley v. Option One Mortgage Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 129 (Pa. 2006), that the Lytle opinion "was well intentioned" but "swept too broadly."
The court ended by stating that it expressed "no view on whether [narrowing of the application of the FAA] might be a desirable result as it is not our function to do so. Rather, our obligation is to honor the intent of Congress and that is what we are doing. If the reach of the FAA is to be confined then Congress and not the courts should be the body to do so."
Tuesday, December 18, 2007
consumer - arbitration clause - unconscionability
O'Shea v. Direct Financial Solutions, Inc. - ED Pa. December 5, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1467P.pdf
The court held that the arbitration clause in a payday loan contract was not unconscionable, either procedurally or substantively, thus preventing the plaintiff from raising UDAP and related consumer claims in a judicial forum. The court found this result mandated by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC sec. 1 et seq. Section 2 makes such a clause "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 USC, sec. 2 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode09/usc_sec_09_00000002----000-.html.
Unconscionability can be a ground for revocation, but a person challenging on this ground has the burden of showing that the provision is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process by which an agreement is reached and the form of an agreement, including the use of fine print or convoluted or unclear language, none of which was at issue here. Substantive unconscionability refers to terms that unreasonably favor one party, terms to which the unfavored party does not truly assent.
The Third Circuit has "repeatedly held that inequality in bargaining power, alone, is not a valid basis upon which to invalidate an arbitration agreement. Harris v. Green Tree Finance Corp., 183 F.3d, 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). The Harris court also held that mutuality of remedies - e.g., the ability of the lender but not the borrower to seek judicial enforcement - is not required of a valid arbitration clause. The instant court rejected the different reasoning in Bragg v. Linden Research Inc., 487 F.Supp. 2d 593 (ED Pa. 2007), which applied California law on unconscionability, not Pennsylvania law.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1467P.pdf
The court held that the arbitration clause in a payday loan contract was not unconscionable, either procedurally or substantively, thus preventing the plaintiff from raising UDAP and related consumer claims in a judicial forum. The court found this result mandated by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 USC sec. 1 et seq. Section 2 makes such a clause "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 USC, sec. 2 http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode09/usc_sec_09_00000002----000-.html.
Unconscionability can be a ground for revocation, but a person challenging on this ground has the burden of showing that the provision is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. Procedural unconscionability pertains to the process by which an agreement is reached and the form of an agreement, including the use of fine print or convoluted or unclear language, none of which was at issue here. Substantive unconscionability refers to terms that unreasonably favor one party, terms to which the unfavored party does not truly assent.
The Third Circuit has "repeatedly held that inequality in bargaining power, alone, is not a valid basis upon which to invalidate an arbitration agreement. Harris v. Green Tree Finance Corp., 183 F.3d, 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). The Harris court also held that mutuality of remedies - e.g., the ability of the lender but not the borrower to seek judicial enforcement - is not required of a valid arbitration clause. The instant court rejected the different reasoning in Bragg v. Linden Research Inc., 487 F.Supp. 2d 593 (ED Pa. 2007), which applied California law on unconscionability, not Pennsylvania law.
Sunday, December 16, 2007
employment - wages - WPCL
Inoff v. Craftex Mills, Inc. - ED Pa. - December 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1457P.pdf
Suit for wages on alleged oral, three-year guaranteed contract later memorialized in a series of writings. Plaintiff was a salesman in fabric/textile industry . Motion for summary judgdment by defendant, plaintiff's purported employer, granted in part and denied in part.
choice of law -
A federal court exercising its diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, Klaxon Co. v. Stenton Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941), so Pennsylvania law was applied to this case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a “flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.” Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964). The approach “gives to the place having the most interest in the problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context and thereby allows the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963)). The Griffith “interest/contacts” approach applies to contract disputes. Restatement 2d, Conflict sec. 188(2).
what was the parties' contract?
The defendant claims that plaintiff is an indpt. contractor whose employment was terminable at will. Plaintiff alleges another contract. “Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff seeking to proceed with a breach of contract action must establish ‘(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract[,] and (3) resultant damages.’” ...The first element is at issue . For a valid contract to exist, there must have been a “meeting of the minds” between the parties. A meeting of the minds is found where “both parties mutually assent to the same thing, as evidenced by an offer and its acceptance.” Since there was a genuine issue of some material facts, no summary judgment granted.
wage payment and collection law -
State statute applies only to employees,not indpt contractors . The defendant claims that plaintiff is not an "employee" under the WPCL. “Employee” is not defined by the WPCL, so Pennsylvania courts look to the state UC Law and the Worker’s Compensation Act’s definitions. ...According to the Pennsylvania courts, the following factors are relevant to the question whether one is an independent contractor: the control of the manner that work is to be done; responsibility for result only; termsof agreement between the parties; the nature of the work or occupation; the skill required for performance; whether one employed is engaged in a distinct occupationor business; which party supplies the tools; whether payment is by the time or by the job; whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer, and the rightto terminate the employment at any time.Surowski v. Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 1373, 1374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). “[P]aramount . . .among these factors is the right of an individual to control the manner that another’s work is tobe accomplished.” Morin, 871 A.2d at 850.
Also at issue in the case and discussed in the opinion are: promissory estoppel and piercing the corporate veil to make individual corporate officer liable for the wages claimed.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1457P.pdf
Suit for wages on alleged oral, three-year guaranteed contract later memorialized in a series of writings. Plaintiff was a salesman in fabric/textile industry . Motion for summary judgdment by defendant, plaintiff's purported employer, granted in part and denied in part.
choice of law -
A federal court exercising its diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state, Klaxon Co. v. Stenton Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941), so Pennsylvania law was applied to this case. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted a “flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests underlying the particular issue before the court.” Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805 (Pa. 1964). The approach “gives to the place having the most interest in the problem paramount control over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context and thereby allows the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction most intimately concerned with the outcome of the particular litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963)). The Griffith “interest/contacts” approach applies to contract disputes. Restatement 2d, Conflict sec. 188(2).
what was the parties' contract?
The defendant claims that plaintiff is an indpt. contractor whose employment was terminable at will. Plaintiff alleges another contract. “Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff seeking to proceed with a breach of contract action must establish ‘(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract[,] and (3) resultant damages.’” ...The first element is at issue . For a valid contract to exist, there must have been a “meeting of the minds” between the parties. A meeting of the minds is found where “both parties mutually assent to the same thing, as evidenced by an offer and its acceptance.” Since there was a genuine issue of some material facts, no summary judgment granted.
wage payment and collection law -
State statute applies only to employees,not indpt contractors . The defendant claims that plaintiff is not an "employee" under the WPCL. “Employee” is not defined by the WPCL, so Pennsylvania courts look to the state UC Law and the Worker’s Compensation Act’s definitions. ...According to the Pennsylvania courts, the following factors are relevant to the question whether one is an independent contractor: the control of the manner that work is to be done; responsibility for result only; termsof agreement between the parties; the nature of the work or occupation; the skill required for performance; whether one employed is engaged in a distinct occupationor business; which party supplies the tools; whether payment is by the time or by the job; whether the work is part of the regular business of the employer, and the rightto terminate the employment at any time.Surowski v. Commonwealth, 467 A.2d 1373, 1374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983). “[P]aramount . . .among these factors is the right of an individual to control the manner that another’s work is tobe accomplished.” Morin, 871 A.2d at 850.
Also at issue in the case and discussed in the opinion are: promissory estoppel and piercing the corporate veil to make individual corporate officer liable for the wages claimed.
Thursday, December 13, 2007
employment- FMLA - notice to employer
Sarnowski v. Airbrooke Limousine, Inc - 3d Circuit - December 12, 2007
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062144p.pdf
This opinion contains a lot of good language about the requirement that an employee must give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B), 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). No formal written request for FMLA leave is necessary. Simple verbal notice is sufficient. The notice provision must be construed liberally. No magic words are required. The employee need not know or give the exact dates of the anticipated leave.
http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/062144p.pdf
This opinion contains a lot of good language about the requirement that an employee must give notice to the employer of the need for FMLA leave, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B), 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c). No formal written request for FMLA leave is necessary. Simple verbal notice is sufficient. The notice provision must be construed liberally. No magic words are required. The employee need not know or give the exact dates of the anticipated leave.
Monday, December 03, 2007
Fair Credit Reporting Act - negligent non-compliance
Perez v. Trans Union, LLC, et al. - ED Pa. - November 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1391P.pdf
Plaintiff sued for an alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 USC 1681e(b), when the defendant credit reporting agency (CRA) mistakenly reported to a car dealership that plaintiff had a good credit history but was deceased and thus had no credit score. After this same thing happened several times, matters finally got sorted out, but plaintiff claimed that he had paid more for credit because of the mistakes, which he said were caused by defendant's failure to "follow reasonable procedure to assure maximum possible accuracy of information...." as required by sec. 1681e(b).
Defendant moved for summary judgment, which in a negligent noncompliance case can only be granted in this circuit when the "evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that the procedures it [defendant] followed were reasonable." Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F3d 957, 965 (3d Cir. 1996). Judging reasonableness "involves weighing the potential harm from inaccuracy against the burden of safeguarding against such inaccuracy." Id at 963. By contrast, "[o]ther courts have concluded flatly that 'the question, of whether a credit reporting agency followed reasonable procedures is reserved for the jury.'" (citing cases)
The defendant here admitted reiterating inaccurate information, which it did not independently verify. The questions is whether it "ought to have appreciated, under the circumstances presented, that there was a material inaccuracy such that a duty arose upon it to do something to correct it or not make a report." (emphasis in original).
The court held that there had no willful noncompliance, which it said "requires more than mere knowledge." There was no evidence to show that the CRA was "consciously aware that Plaintiff contested the accuracy of the report and then proceeded to report the inaccuracy anyway." (emphasis in original)* There was no "deliberate intention to violate Plaintiff's personal rights."
The court also rejected the negligent noncompliance claim, which consists of four elements
- the inclusion of inaccurate information in a credit report
- the inaccuracy was due to a failure to follow reasonable procedures
- the consumer suffered injury
- the injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry.
The court granted summary to defendant based on the plaintiff's "lack of rebuttal evidence" to counter that in the summary judgment record, which showed that the banks involved all got their credit evidence independently of defendant. There was an "absence of evidence that [defendant] provided a credit report about Plaintiff to any potential lender...."
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1391P.pdf
Plaintiff sued for an alleged violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 USC 1681e(b), when the defendant credit reporting agency (CRA) mistakenly reported to a car dealership that plaintiff had a good credit history but was deceased and thus had no credit score. After this same thing happened several times, matters finally got sorted out, but plaintiff claimed that he had paid more for credit because of the mistakes, which he said were caused by defendant's failure to "follow reasonable procedure to assure maximum possible accuracy of information...." as required by sec. 1681e(b).
Defendant moved for summary judgment, which in a negligent noncompliance case can only be granted in this circuit when the "evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that the procedures it [defendant] followed were reasonable." Philbin v. Trans Union Corp., 101 F3d 957, 965 (3d Cir. 1996). Judging reasonableness "involves weighing the potential harm from inaccuracy against the burden of safeguarding against such inaccuracy." Id at 963. By contrast, "[o]ther courts have concluded flatly that 'the question, of whether a credit reporting agency followed reasonable procedures is reserved for the jury.'" (citing cases)
The defendant here admitted reiterating inaccurate information, which it did not independently verify. The questions is whether it "ought to have appreciated, under the circumstances presented, that there was a material inaccuracy such that a duty arose upon it to do something to correct it or not make a report." (emphasis in original).
The court held that there had no willful noncompliance, which it said "requires more than mere knowledge." There was no evidence to show that the CRA was "consciously aware that Plaintiff contested the accuracy of the report and then proceeded to report the inaccuracy anyway." (emphasis in original)* There was no "deliberate intention to violate Plaintiff's personal rights."
The court also rejected the negligent noncompliance claim, which consists of four elements
- the inclusion of inaccurate information in a credit report
- the inaccuracy was due to a failure to follow reasonable procedures
- the consumer suffered injury
- the injury was caused by the inclusion of the inaccurate entry.
The court granted summary to defendant based on the plaintiff's "lack of rebuttal evidence" to counter that in the summary judgment record, which showed that the banks involved all got their credit evidence independently of defendant. There was an "absence of evidence that [defendant] provided a credit report about Plaintiff to any potential lender...."
social security disability - treating physician's opinion - claimant credibility
Wilson v. Astrue - ED Pa. November 28, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1402P.pdf
Benefits were granted in this case, which has good discussions of the standards for
- evaluating the opinion of a treating physician, and
- judging claimant credibility.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1402P.pdf
Benefits were granted in this case, which has good discussions of the standards for
- evaluating the opinion of a treating physician, and
- judging claimant credibility.
Sunday, December 02, 2007
consumer - pleading - UTPCPL - no natl. bank liability under HIFA
Millege v. Chase Bank et al - ED Pa. November 26, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1389P.pdf
Like a number of other courts, this one misstated the pleading requirements under the state consumer protection law, 73 PS 201-2(4)(xxi), holding that the particularity equivalent of fraud pleading is required. The court actually miscited and misquoted the relevant provision, citing it as sec. 201-2(4)(xvii), the pre-1996 citation, instead of sec. 201-4(xxi), and omitting the "or deceptive" language added by the 1996 amendments.
The court also held that a national bank such as Chase cannot be found liable under the state Home Improvement Finance Act (HIFA), 73 P.S. 500-408, for its alleged inclusion of a cash loan in a home improvement contract, because such liability is pre-empted by 12 USC 371 and 12 CFR 34.4, which say that such banks can make real estate loans wihtout regard to state law limitations concerning the terms of credit.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1389P.pdf
Like a number of other courts, this one misstated the pleading requirements under the state consumer protection law, 73 PS 201-2(4)(xxi), holding that the particularity equivalent of fraud pleading is required. The court actually miscited and misquoted the relevant provision, citing it as sec. 201-2(4)(xvii), the pre-1996 citation, instead of sec. 201-4(xxi), and omitting the "or deceptive" language added by the 1996 amendments.
The court also held that a national bank such as Chase cannot be found liable under the state Home Improvement Finance Act (HIFA), 73 P.S. 500-408, for its alleged inclusion of a cash loan in a home improvement contract, because such liability is pre-empted by 12 USC 371 and 12 CFR 34.4, which say that such banks can make real estate loans wihtout regard to state law limitations concerning the terms of credit.
consumer - title insurance - TICA & UTPCPL - exhaustion of admin. remedies
Markocki v. Old Republic Natl. Title Ins. Co. v. Citizens Abstract Co. - ED Pa. - Nov. 19, 2007
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1382P.pdf
Held, plaintiff was entitled to sue under the Consumer Protection Law, 73 PS 201-9.2, for an alleged violation of the state Title Insurance Company Act (TICA), 40 PS 910-37(h), without first exhausting her remedies under TICA.
Plaintiff brought her case when she refinanced her mortgage and was charged a "basic rate" of $978.75 rather than a "refinance rate" of $704.70, to which she was entitled under the Rate Manual of the Title Insurance Rating Bureau, 40 PS 910-37(h). When she found out about the improper charges, she sued under RESPA, 12 USC 2607, as well as for violations of the CPL, because of the improper charges under TICA.
Old Republic joined Citizens as a 3d party defendant, because Citizens, acting as its agent under TICA, had collected the improper charges, in spite of Old Republic having told Citizens about the proper changes under the Rate Manual.
Citizens' 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss was denied. Citizens claimed that Markocki had to exhaust her remedies under TICA, which says that an aggrieved person "may be heard" under TICA concerning its insurance rating, 40 PS 910-44(b).
Relying on the "weight of authority" under
- Cohen v. Ciicago Title Insurance Co., 2006 US Dist. Lexis 36689 (ED Pa. )
- Highmark Inc v. UPMC Health Plan, 276 F3d 160 (, 168 (3d Cir. 2001), and
- Ohio Casualty Group v. Argonaut Insurance, 525 A2d 1195, 1197 (Pa. 1987)
The court held that the remedy under TICA was discretionary, optional and incomplete rather than mandatory and exclusive, and that plaintiff's case under the Consumer Protection Law should not be dismissed.
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1382P.pdf
Held, plaintiff was entitled to sue under the Consumer Protection Law, 73 PS 201-9.2, for an alleged violation of the state Title Insurance Company Act (TICA), 40 PS 910-37(h), without first exhausting her remedies under TICA.
Plaintiff brought her case when she refinanced her mortgage and was charged a "basic rate" of $978.75 rather than a "refinance rate" of $704.70, to which she was entitled under the Rate Manual of the Title Insurance Rating Bureau, 40 PS 910-37(h). When she found out about the improper charges, she sued under RESPA, 12 USC 2607, as well as for violations of the CPL, because of the improper charges under TICA.
Old Republic joined Citizens as a 3d party defendant, because Citizens, acting as its agent under TICA, had collected the improper charges, in spite of Old Republic having told Citizens about the proper changes under the Rate Manual.
Citizens' 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss was denied. Citizens claimed that Markocki had to exhaust her remedies under TICA, which says that an aggrieved person "may be heard" under TICA concerning its insurance rating, 40 PS 910-44(b).
Relying on the "weight of authority" under
- Cohen v. Ciicago Title Insurance Co., 2006 US Dist. Lexis 36689 (ED Pa. )
- Highmark Inc v. UPMC Health Plan, 276 F3d 160 (, 168 (3d Cir. 2001), and
- Ohio Casualty Group v. Argonaut Insurance, 525 A2d 1195, 1197 (Pa. 1987)
The court held that the remedy under TICA was discretionary, optional and incomplete rather than mandatory and exclusive, and that plaintiff's case under the Consumer Protection Law should not be dismissed.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)