employment - discrimination - PHRA - "employment agency"

Nethken v. Pa. Civil Service Commission - Commonwealth Court - November 1, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/1064CD05_11-1-05.pdf

The Pa. Civil Services Commission is an "employment agency" under the Pa. Human Relations Act, 43 PS sec. 951 et seq., and can be liable for age discrimination.

Plaintiff stated prima facie case of age discrimination when she was not put on a list of eligibles solely because she graduated from college in 1974, when job posting called for recent grad (1999). Lower court judgment on liability upheld.

D. Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

HIPAA - HHS privacy rules valid - 3d Cir.

Citizens for Health, et al. v. Leavitt, Secy. of HHS - 3d Cir. - October 3, 2005

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/042550p.pdf

HHS privacy rules under HIPAA upheld against challenges under Administrative Procedure Act and 1st & 5th Amendments.

admin. law - collateral estoppel/issue preclusion - capricious disregard of competent evidence

The Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Pa. Human Relations Commn. - Cmwlth. Court - Oct. 27, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/125CD05_10-27-05.pdf

This is an employment law case, but it has implications in all administrative law cases, hence the cross posting. The Petitioner/Employer appealed from a ruling of the PHRC that it had unlawfully retaliated against a former employee because of his union activities. The employee had also gone through arbitration, resulting in a contrary decision, i.e., that the employer had just cause for disciplining him (but that termination was an excessive punishment).

collateral estoppel/issue preclusion -- In the administrative proceeding before the PHRC, the employer contended that the facts found by the arbitrator were conclusive and binding on the Commission. After an extended (and unnecessary?) discussion about whether collateral estoppel (aka, issue preclusion) was applicable, the court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Bortz v.WCAB, 683 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1996), was controlling. There the court held that a decision of the UCBR did not have preclusive effect in a worker's comp. case, "because every administrative agency...is charged with enforcing its own acts which have different purposes; therefore, one agency's hands would be tied by the findings and conclusions of another without being allowed to make independent findings and conclusions and applying its own expertise to the facts."

The court said that "[because labor arbitrations are akin to 'private administrative agencies' and the Commission is charged...with adjudicating claims under the PHRA...., the General Assembly did not intend any arbitration award to have preclusive effect on claims of discrimination brought pursuant to the PHRA."

capricious disregard -- The court remanded the case back to the Commission, because it had "capriciously disregarded overwhelming critical evidence that could have compelled a different conclusion.," citing Wintermeyer v. WCAB, 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002), and its 8-17-05 decision in Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia,
http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2071CD04_8-17-05.pdf
In the latter case, the court said that the capricious disregard standard is a "shorthand way of addressing various statutory and constitutional requirements that require...an agency to give reasons for its decision, and when an agency ignored critical overwhelming evidence that constituted an abuse of discretion requiring the decision to be vacated" so that the agency can "explain its action and arrive at a new decision if it so desired. Because an agency has so much discretion when enforcing its statute, capricious disregard, like abuse of discretion, will only be applied in rare instances when the agency palpably has failed to give a proper explanation of overwhelming critical evidence. This is one of the extremely rare cases where the threshold has been reached, because in each and every key finding of causation, it ignored evidence that would have compelled a different conclusion."

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

admin. law - standard of proof - preponderance v. clear-and-convincing

Suber v. Pennsylvania Commn. on Crime & Delinquency -- Cmwlth. Court - October 28, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/265CD05_10-28-05.pdf

Held, the proper standard of proof was "preponderance of the evidence" and not "clear and convincing" in a case involving the removal of a deputy sheriff from an educ./training program, based on allegations that he had cheated on an exam.

The standard of proof in a particular type of case is "based on the level of concern regarding the degree of accuracy in the factual findings made by the trier of fact...The traditional 'preponderance of the evidence' standard allows parties...to share equally in the risk in proving their claims and affirmative defenses. Any other standard expresses a preference for one side's interests."

In most civil and administrative actions, the proper standard of proof is "preponderance of the evidence." (citing cases). "Clear and convincing" is the highest standard of proof in civil law and is "reserved for cases 'where particularly important individual interests or rights are at stake....'" such as termination of parental rights, civil fraud, involuntary commitment, and public figure defamation.

Meeting the "clear and convincing" standard requires that the witnesses be found to be credible, the facts to which they have testified be remembered distinctly, and their testimony be so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

The court found that this case was like Ruane v. Shippensburg Univ., 871 A.2d 859 (2005), in which it applied the preponderance standard in a matter involving the suspension of a student for sexual assault. It rejected the analogy to an attorney disbarment case in which the clear-and-convincing standard was applied, ODC v. Duffield, 644 A.2d 1186 (Pa. 1994).

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 29, 2005

Here is the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 29, 2005

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-44/index.html

Items of potential interest include --

-DPW - personal care homes - delayed implementation of some regs
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-44/1981.html

- local court rules - Crawford County -
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-44/1977.html

- local court rules - Lehigh County
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-44/1978.html

- local court rules - Somerset County
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-44/1979.html
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-44/1980.html

lean pickings

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

disability - med. equivalency - evidence

Oakes v. Barnhart - ED Pa. - October 18, 2005

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1276P.pdf

The court rejected the magistrate's recommendation that summary judgment be granted to plaintiff (P) and, rather, granted s/j to defendant (D).

The magistrate believed that the ALJ's equivalency decision was not supported by substantial evidence, because the ALJ failed to secure the testimony of a medical expert before determining that plaintiff's impairment did not equal a listing. The magistrate recommended that the case be remanded for the taking of medical evidence about whether the combination of P's impairments equaled a listed impairment.

The court rejected this reasoning and agreed with SSA that under its "testing modifications" policy set out at 20 CFR 404.906(b)(2), it had "fundamentally altered" its former long-standing policy by allowing an ALJ to use medical expert testimony when "appropriate," rather than requiring the opinion of a medical consultant to determine if a claimant met or equaled a listed impairment. This testing modification policy applies to cases decided in Pennsylvania and nine other states.

The court held that 20 CFR 404.906(b)(1) and (2) established a "single decisionmaker model" and that the ALJ is not required to seek a medical opinion of the issue of equivalence, although s/he may do so where "appropriate," thus going from a "mandatory to discretionary use of medical experts on the issue of equivalency."

The Court upheld the ALJ decision on (non)equivalency and granted s/j to defendant.

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

ADA - employment - regarded as having a disability

Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc. - ED Pa. - October 19, 2005

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1278P.pdf

The court rejected the defendant's post-trial motion to overturn a jury verdict for plaintiff, whom it found that defendant had "regarded as disabled" under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff established that she is an "qualified individual with a disability," 42 USC 12112(a), i.e., a person who with or w/o a reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the job that she holds or wants.

A "disability" is defined as either a) physical/mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or b) a record of such impairment, or c) being regarded as having such an impairment.

A person is "regarded as having a disability if a) she has an impairment that doesn't limit any major life function, but is treated by the employer as if it does; b) she has an impairment that does limit her, but only as a result of the attitude of others; or c) has no impairment but is treated as having a substantially limiting impairment., 29 CFR 1630.2(1).

Plaintiff prevailed because she showed that she was discriminated against by her employer, who believed that she was unable to work in a particular class or broad range of jobs, as required in the definition of disability.

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

UC - willful misconduct - decision of another agency is not WM per se

Woods Services v. UCBR - Commonwealth Court - October 2, 4 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/784CD05_10-24-05.pdf

Held, determination of county child/youth services (CYS) agency that an employee of a residential treatment facility "abused" one of his clients "does not constitute willful misconduct per se." The finding is enough to terminate a claimant's employment, which the employer had to do to retain its DPW license to run the facility. Without more, however, the CYS determination does not support a finding of willful misconduct. The employer "failed to present any admissible testimony or evidence, independent of the…. determination, to support a finding of willful misconduct."

The employer did only a cursory investigation. Its proffered testimony was hearsay and rejected. Claimant and an eyewitness testified. The Board resolved all credibility issues in favor of the claimant and his witness. "Our review of the record supports the Board's finding the Employer failed to directly link the CYS finding of child abuse to Claimant for purposes of establishing willful misconduct….."

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

disability - fibromyalgia - credibility - treating physician

Kurilla v. Barnhart - ED Pa. - October 18, 20

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1280P.pdf

Case remanded (sentence four, 42 USC 405(g)) because of ALJ errors on credibility and use of reports of treating physicians.

The ALJ's credibility finding was not supported by substantial evidence or made in accordance with SSR 96-7p, which requires careful consideration of statements about symptoms such as pain, which may suggest a greater impairment than shown by the objective medical evidence alone. This is especially true in the case of fibromyalgia, an impairment which is "mysterious and elusive....because it lacks both a clear etiology and objective diagnostic testing capable of verifying the legitimacy of accompanying symptoms."

The finding and statements of claimant's treatment providers was not given sufficient weight. If they are supported by medical date, they should be accepted absent contradictory medical evidence (citing 3d Cir. precedent). The record about fibromyalgia consisted solely of claimant's complaints and his treating physician's diagnosis that he was disabled. Without any evidence to the contrary than the ALJ's erroneous determination that claimant lacked credibility, the court concluded that the ALJ's rejection of the treating physician's opinion was impermissible, because it was not based on substantial evidence.

The court remanded the case for a new consultative exam about the effects of claimant's fibromyalgia on his RFC and a new RFC assessment by a physician, preferably a rheumatologist who has experience and an expertise in fibromyalgia and its related symptoms.

The court did not simply reverse and grant benefits, because "granting...benefits at Step 4 improperly truncates the sequential evaluation process. Step 5 of the process is necessary to determine whether the claimant could perform a less demanding level of work, such as sedentary work."

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

employment - FMLA - advance notice provision

Solovey v. Wyoming Valley Health Care System-Hospital, MD Pa. - October 13, 2005
http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/conaboy/04v2683.pdf

Held, that the employer's (ER) policy of requiring two-week advance notice before being able to take an accrued paid vacation day violates the FMLA. Summary judgment granted to plaintiff-employee.

Plaintiff's father was placed in hospice care in June 2003. On June 23, plaintiff left work in mid-shift after learning that her father's condition had worsened. She spent June 23 and 25 with her father and returned to work on June 26th, but left early when she learned that his condition had become critical. She remained out on June 27 and her father died on June 28.

Plaintiff was paid for June 23 and 24 through a policy of "family ill days." The ER deemed the other time missed as FMLA leave but denied her request to use accrued vacation time to cover her other absences, because she had not complied with the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) requirement that she give a two-week notice before taking a vacation in order that the absence qualify for use of paid vacation time. Plaintiff couldn't give such notice, because she didn't know of her need to use it until June 22nd.

The court agreed with plaintiff that sec. 2612 of the FMLA, 29 USC 2612(d)(2)(A), is an express grant allowing her to use accrued vacation w/o the restriction of a two-week notice policy. The statute also holds that a CBA may grant more rights than the FMLA but may not diminish FMLA rights. To adopt the ER's argument would mean that an employee who had ample accrued pain vacation time to substitute for FMLA leave might have to go w/o pay for up to two weeks in the common situation where a serious health situation requiring leave was not foreseeable. This is the kind of economic hardship the FMLA seeks to avoid. It is appropriate to treat a procedural impediment (two-week notice) to using paid leave differently from a substantive right to use the leave (e.g. has the leave time vested? how much has accrued?). The court also found that the ER had no business reason other than its desire to enforce strict adherence to the procedural aspects of the CBA vacation policy to prohibit an employee from taking paid time off during the two-week notice period, when the need for the FMLA leave was not foreseeable.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services

employment - wrongful discharge - sexual harassment

Weaver v. Harpster -- Pa. Superior Court, October 21, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/s44032_05.pdf

Plaintiff, an at-will employee, held to have stated a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge based on allegations of sexual harassment, even though the employer (ER) did not meet definition of "employer" under the Pa. Human Relations Act (PHRA) because it had fewer than four employees.

The court rejected the notion that there is never an alternative to the PHRA as an avenue for relief for sexual discrimination. It also held that, under the circumstances, there was a public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, because state law -- a statute and the state constitution -- established a "clear public policy against sexual discrimination."

Plaintiff had quit her job because of intolerable work conditions. Her request that the PHRC investigate and take action was rejected because the ER did not meet the statutory definition of "employer." Plaintiff then filed a case in the common pleas court claiming, inter alia, wrongful discharge. The ER's preliminary objections were sustained. The lower court held that the state PHRA provided the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination based on sex, and that since the PHRA provided plaintiff no remedy, she had none.

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services

UC - VQ - demotion - justification v. substantial change analysis

Diversified Management Care v. UCBR -- Commonwealth Court - October 21, 2005 (2-1 decision)

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/796CD05_10-21-05.pdf

Claimant (CL) quit her job when she was demoted. There was a reduction in her responsibilities but no reduction in pay or benefits. The employer (ER) demoted CL over an incident in which her son was arrested and faced criminal charges. During this period, she used ER phones to discuss what the UCBR found were "pressing legal and financial matters." There was no ER policy about using phones for personal reasons. The Board found no misconduct or even poor judgment on CL's part.

The ER claimed that the UCBR should have used the "substantial change analysis" to decide the case, and that the CL had failed to show that her job duties had substantially changed as a result of her demotion.

The court cited Allegheny Valley School District v. UCBR, 697 A.2d 243 (Pa. 1997) as setting forth the "appropriate standard" for determining whether a claimant has good cause to quit a job after a demotion. In that case, the court said that the focus in such a case should be "the justification for the demotion." If the demotion was justified, the claimant should get no benefits. If it wasn’t, benefits should be granted. The Commonwealth Court thus upheld the UCBR's application of the justification analysis and its refusal to use the change-of-circumstances analysis.

The Court also upheld the UCBR's reliance on the fact that the ER had no policy prohibiting the way that CL used the phones. The "Board did not err when it based its decision in part on the fact that Employer had no telephone policy, or, more important, that the demotion was unjustified."

Dissenting opinion -- Judge Leavitt filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Allegheny Valley case was factually different from instant case. The former involved both a reduction in responsibilities and in salary. The instant case involved only a reduction in responsibilities. The dissent felt that, for that reason, the correct analysis should have been substantial change. She felt that the justification analysis is appropriate if there is a reduction in duties and salary -- whether both of those factors are present so as to constitute a demotion. If so, then the justification analysis is applicable.

Because the instant case only involved a reduction in responsibilities and not in salary, the dissent felt that Allegheny Valley was "distinguishable...and…inapposite. In other words, inquiry into the justification for Claimant's so-called demotion is unnecessary." The Board didn't make findings about substantial change. Without those, and the impact that such changes had on her, "it is impossible to determine whether those changes were substantial and whether 'like circumstances would compel a reasonable person' to voluntarily quit." Judge Leavitt also disagreed with putting the burden on the employer to prove that the demotion was justified, given that in VQ cases, the burden is on the claimant. Overall, the dissent felt that the majority had undermined the goal of the Allegheny Valley court "to avoid intruding upon the ability of employers to make 'valid demotion'….The test should not be whether the Board agrees with the Employer's decision to relieve Claimant of her supervisory responsibilities but whether Employer can show that its stated reasons for a demotion can be factually supported."

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 22, 2005

Here is the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 22, 2005

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/index.html

Items of potential interest include ----

- recent statutes
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1937.html

- appellate rules - criminal - stays in capital cases
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1938.html

- local rules - Lehigh County - juvenile cases
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1941.html
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1942.html

- welfare- payments to nursing facilities - final rates for fiscal 2004-5
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1942.html

- welfare - peer groups, peer group medians, peer group prices for various facilities
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1954.html

- revenue - Jolly Holiday Lottery game
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1915.html

- Dept. of Labor & Industry - reorganization chart
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1947.html

- education - IRRC approval of educ. regs. - student rights and responsibilities
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-43/1957.html

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

bankruptcy - mobile home - ch. 13 - cram down - realty v. personalty - valuation

Nowlin v. Tammac Corporation - ED Pa. - October 17, 2005

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1267P.pdf

Nowlin filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy case and brought an adversary action against the secured holder of her installment loan contract, seeking a cram down its claim to the actual value of her mobile home. The bankruptcy court held that

a) the mobile home was personalty, not realty;
b) the value was $38,000, compared to principal balance at time of trial of $41, 368.28;
c) interest of 8% should apply to the creditor's claim, as opposed to the contract rate of 12.5%.

Nowlin appealed the valuation, which she thought should be lower, as well as the 8% interest rate. The creditor appealed the ruling that the home was personality and not realty.

The district court held that

a) the home was personalty, in the bankruptcy context (detailed discussion of this issue) - This determination allowed the court to bifurcate the creditor's claim into secured and unsecured elements, based on fair market value.
b) the valuation of $38,000 was not clearly erroneous -- somewhere between the $ figures provided by the parties' experts.
c) 8% was the appropriate interest rate to be applied to the crammed down claim, under a
"formula approach" - national prime rate, adjusted according to risk factors.

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

debt collection - FDCPA - attorney fees

Moyer v. Turnbrook Associates, Inc. -- ED Pa. - October 17, 2005

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1270P.pdf

The court rejected all of defendant's arguments and awarded attorney fees to plaintiff's counsel under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692 et seq.

size of award - Plaintiff's judgment was for $1,000, the statutory maximum. The judgment was based on defendant's failure to comply with the statutory requirements, "suggesting a significant level of non-compliance. Attorney fees are then mandatory under" Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1991).

timing of request for fees -- Defendant said that plaintiff should have made her claim for fees during arbitration. Federal civil rules require plaintiff to request fees no later than 14 days after the entry of judgment. Plaintiff filed w/in that time.

proper party defendant - post-judgment amendment of pleading - Defendant said that the judgment against the corporate entity was unenforceable against the unincorporated Turnbrook Associates. The court allowed a post-judgment amendment of the pleading, under equitable estoppel principles, because defendant "actively misled" plaintiff when it admitted that it was a N.J. corporation.

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

ADA - standing - injury in fact

Kratzer v. Gamma Management - ED Pa. -- October 12, 2005
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1259P.pdf
Defendant's motion for summary judgment denied on plaintiffs' ADA claims.

Plaintiffs alleged that they are qualified individuals with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC sec. 12101 et seq. Defendant corporation is the operator of a Ramada Inn and Conference Center. Plaintiffs said that they visited the Ramada and were denied full, safe and equal access due to barriers and Defendant's lack of compliance with the ADA.

Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleged that plaintiffs do not have standing, because they have never tried to stay at the hotel and have no current plans to hold a conference there. Standing requires an "injury in fact." Plaintiffs did allege that each has personally visited the center, continues to desire to visit, and has attended a conference there. They made very specific allegations about the particular shortcomings of the facility.

The ADA gives remedies to "any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability...or who has reasonable grounds for believing that such person is about to be subjected to discrimination" in violation of the ADA, 42 USC sec. 12188(a)(1). The provision also states that "[n]othing in this section shall require a person with a disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization" covered by the law does not intend to comply with the ADA.

No circuit court appears to have addressed the precise issue here -- whether a plaintiff who has visited a facility and identified alleged compliance problems may, after a new operator has taken over, assert a claim alleging ADA violations that are grounded in a plaintiff's intended future use of the newly operated facility." However, precedent from other circuits has held that the "futility provision" allows a suit so long as the plaintiff establishes knowledge of the barriers and that they would visit the facility but for the barriers. Other circuits have held that a plaintiff who is deterred from patronizing a public accommodation because of defendant's failure to comply with the ADA may be considered to have suffered an injury in fact. Many district courts have held likewise.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment denied.

disability - MS - Listing 11.09(C) - treating physician - credibility

Fisher v. Barnhart - ED Pa. - October 12, 2005

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/05D1250P.pdf

Summary judgment granted to Plaintiff/claimant, a 44 y/o woman with multiple sclerosis (MS). She had a h.s. education, some college, and prior work as accounts payable clerk. She alleged disability as of August 1990 and had date last insured (DLI) of December 1991.

remission/consistency of severe symptoms/ fatigue/listed impairment - The ALJ found that claimant had a period of remission before her DLI, and that she did not have a severe impairment as of that date. The court rejected this, nothing that the 3d Circuit has not addressed MS specifically, but citing precedent from the 6th and 9th Circuits holding that MS "can be disabling notwithstanding normal activity in a period of remission....Although a patient may be in remission, she is not necessary symptom free." (citing an ED Mich case). For instance, Plaintiff's physicians testified that she suffered from fatigue, that her MS was "long standing in nature" and "involved extreme fatiguability which is an intrinsic part of the disease" which made her unable to do basic work activities on a "regular and continuing basis" as defined in SSR 96-8p. The "persistent fatigue" and other factors reported by her doctor supporting a finding that she met listing 11.09(c) from a date prior to her DLI to the present.

treating physician report - The ALJ did not give sufficient weight to the report of claimant's treating physicians. The 3d Circuit has said that such reports should be accorded great weight, especially when they reflect expert judgment which is the product of continuing observation over a long period of time. "In fact, 'absent persuasive contradictory evidence, the validity of the claimant's symptoms can be conclusively established by the opinion of the treating physician." (citing ED Pa. case)

ALJ's lay observation/opinion -- The court found that the "ALJ substituted her own lay understanding of Plaintiff's MS, an entirely improper substitution. The Third Circuit has made clear that 'an ALJ is not free to set his own expertise against that of physicians who present competent medical evidence.'" (citing 3d Cir. cases).

credibility/pain/homemaker & childcare activities -- The ALJ found claimant's complaints of pain to be not credible, because she voluntarily left the labor force in 1986, was a homemaker, and cared for her children. The court found this focus on her homemaker status "misplaced" because when she left the workforce, she had not yet suffered the onset of MS. Moreover, her credible testimony, backed by her physicians, was that "her MS-related fatigue was severe while she raised her children" and that she needed her from both her mother and a part-time nursery school for the children.

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

child abuse - appeal - timeliness

A.P. v. DPW - Commonwealth Court - October 14, 2005

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/424CD05_10-14-05.pdf

AP petitioned court for review of DPW order dismissing her request to expunge a report of indicated child abuse on the ground that the request was not timely.

The Court did not affirm the admin. adjudication but rather dismissed the appeal, holding that DPW Secretary was without jurisdiction to consider AP's request that she reconsider an earlier decision. "The Department's…order was not a valid order from which Petitioner could appeal," 1 Pa. Code 34.241(a), because the recon. request was not timely.

A local CYS agency filed the original indicated report in September 1999. Petitioner was given notice at that time and told that she had 45 days in which to file a request to amend or destroy the report. AP took no action until 16 months later, when she sent DPW a letter stating that she had been clearing of related criminal charges.

DPW told AP that she could request a hearing if she believed her case should be considered in spite of the late appeal. She did so and a hearing was held a short time later, resulting in a decision in December 2002 denying the request for a nunc pro tunc appeal and an evidentiary hearing on the merits.

That decision gave AP 15 days to ask for reconsideration, but AP did not act until 21 months later, September 2004. The DPW Secretary granted reconsideration and issued a final order on the merits upholding the December 2002 order dismissing APs appeal as untimely.
As stated above, the Court held that the Secretary didn’t have jurisdiction to grant recon. and so dismissed the appeal with prejudice.

The court refers to its recent opinion in C.S. v. DPW, 879 A.2d 1274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) where it held that a nunc pro tunc appeal filed 6 years late should have been granted, because the appeal information in the administrative determination did not accurately set out the notice of statutory appeal rights. However, the court in A.P. does not mention this aspect of the C.S. case, only that part of C.S. that says that the DPW Secretary has the discretion to amend or expunge a finding of abuse at any time, upon good cause shown.

The notice in A.P. was presumably the same as the one in C.S., where it said that the alleged abuser "may have a right to a hearing." (emphasis in original). By contrast, the statute gives an unequivocal right to a hearing. The court said that the law "mandates that an alleged perpetrator who has made a request for a hearing will receive one, and at this hearing, the agency bears the burden of proving child abuse by the alleged perpetrator. This right is essential. Otherwise, citizens can have their ability to work at a job requiring [a clearance] taken away on the basis of an investigator's report alone and not on the basis of a hearing at which the government agency claiming abuse bears the burden of proof. The equivocal notice given by the Department…did not satisfy the exacting requirements of [the statute] and, thus, this breakdown in the administrative process entitles Petitioner to file a nunc pro tunc request for expungement….." Concerning the length of the delay in appealing, the court said that "[w]hether a delay is one day or six years late….does not change the analysis….."

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services

Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 15, 2005

Here is the link to the Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 15, 2005

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/index.html

Items of potential interest include --

- education - exec. order - Training America's Teachers Commission
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1890.html

- IOLTA - proposed regs - pro haec vice admissions
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1891.html

- minor court rules - proposed rules - subpoenas - issuance of blank subpoenas
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1896.html

- court rules - DR cases - modification/change in circumstances
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1892.html

- court rules - DR cases - more support rules
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1893.html

- community and econ. development - emergency shelter grant program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1903.html

- health - integrated HIV planning council - public meeting
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1909.html

- human relations commission - public hearing opinions
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol35/35-42/1922.html

Donald Marritz, staff attorney
MidPenn Legal Services

ADA - state employer - 11th Amendment immunity

Benn v. First Judicial District of Philadelphia - 3d Circuit Court of Appeals - October 12, 2005

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/013769p.pdf

Plaintiff was a probation/parole officer for the 1st Judicial District of Pa. (Philadelphia). He sued his former employer alleging a violation of the Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq.

Held, the judicial district is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth and entitled to immunity under the 11th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The court said that it was "too late in the jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment for this court (and perhaps even for the Supreme Court) to interpret that Amendment in light of its explicit language as applicable only to suits against a state brought by citizens of another state. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Eleventh Amendment immunizes an unconsenting state from suits brought in federal court by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another state." So much for "strict construction" and eschewing "judicial activism."

The court said that Congress can abrogate such immunity pursuant to its authority under sec. 5 of the 14th Amendment provided that it "has unequivocally expressed its intent to do so." Even then, however, the Supreme Court can hold that Congress did not act pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority," as it did in another ADA case, Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 US 356 (2001).

A suit can also be barred by the 11th amendment where the state is not named as a party, so long as the state is deemed the real party in interest. Held here that under the state supreme court's interpretation of the state constitution, a state judicial district is a state entity, therefore it has 11th Amendment immunity.

Donald Marritz
MidPenn Legal Services