Tuesday, April 11, 2017

UC - late appeal - misleading information

Greene v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – March 10, 2017


Claimant denied nunc pro tunc late appeal in spite of the fact that he was incorrectly advised that he could not collect UC benefits while receiving severance pay, since there were “no statements attributable to compensation authorities that address the availability, timing or need for an appeal.”  The Court held that “not every misstatement by an apparently authoritative person will justify a nunc pro tunc appeal; rather, the misinformation must relate to the availability, timing or need for an appeal. “

Dissent
The question of whether permission to appeal nunc pro tunc should be granted is one which lies in equity. See Bass v. Bureau of Corrections, 401 A.2d 1133 (Pa. 1979); see also, Schofield v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 828 A.2d 510, 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).

This case involved a simple matter of fairness. There is no question that misleading information by a governmental entity was provided to Claimant. This information, at the very least, influenced (if not outright controlled) Claimant's decision-making process about whether and when to appeal, and created an impediment to the timely filing of the appeal. Submitting the equitable question to the standard employed by the Majority places such a noose around it as to choke it of all sense of fairness.



Thursday, March 09, 2017

mortgage insurance - HAMP modification - extension of insurance premiums not proper

Fried v. JP Morgan Chase – 3d Cir. – March 9, 2017


Ginnine Fried bought a home in 2007 for $553,330. It was near high tide in the real estate market, but she had to believe she was getting a bargain, as an appraisal estimated the home’s value to be $570,000.

Fried borrowed $497,950 at a fixed interest rate to make her purchase and mortgaged the home as collateral. Because the loan-to-purchase-price ratio ($497,950 / $553,330) was more than 80%, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), the servicer for Fried’s mortgage (that is, the entity who performs the day-to-day tasks for the loan, including collecting payments), required her to obtain private mortgage insurance. Fried had to pay monthly premiums for that insurance until the ratio reached 78%; in other words, the principal of the mortgage loan needed to reduce to $431,597, which was projected to happen just before March 2016.

We now know that the housing market crashed in 2008, and the value of homes dropped dramatically. Fried, like many homeowners, had trouble making mortgage payments. Help came when Chase modified Fried’s mortgage under a HAMP, a federal aid program, by reducing the principal balance to $463,737. The rub was that Chase extended Fried’s mortgage insurance premiums an extra decade to 2026.


Whether it could do this depends on how we interpret the Homeowners Protection Act (“Protection Act”), 12 U.S.C. § 4901 et seq. Does it permit a servicer to rely on an updated property value, estimated by a broker, to recalculate the length of a homeowner’s mortgage insurance obligation following a modification or must the ending of that obligation remain tied to the initial purchase price of the home? We conclude the Protection Act requires the latter.

due process - impartial tribunal - actual bias v. unacceptable risk of bias - US SCt

Rippo v. Baker – US SCt – March 6, 2017


Criminal conviction reversed where defendant moved to disqualify judge, who was subject of federal investigation in with the state DA’s office had participated.

State supreme court’s use of actual bias standard was improper.  Under U.S. Supreme Court precedents “the Due Process Clause may sometimes demand recusal even when a judge “ ‘ha[s] no actual bias.’ ” Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U. S. 813, 825 (1986). Recusal is required when, objectively speaking, “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U. S. 35, 47 (1975); see Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 6) (“The Court asks not whether a judge harbors an actual, subjective bias, but instead whether, as an objective matter, the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias” (internal quotation marks omitted)).


The decision in Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S. 899 (1997) is not to the contrary:   Although the Court explained that the petitioner there had pointed to facts suggesting actual, subjective bias, it did not hold that a litigant must show as a matter of course that a judge was “actually biased in [the litigant’s] case,” . . . . much less that he must do so when, as here, he does not allege a theory of “camouflaging bias.” The Nevada Supreme Court did not ask the question that the  SCt precedents require: whether, considering all the circumstances alleged, the risk of bias was too high to be constitutionally tolerable.

Wednesday, March 08, 2017

arbitration - appeal - Pa. RCP 1311.1 - voluntary limit on $ damages - WCPL attorney fees not "damages"

Grimm v. Universal Medical Services, Inc. – Pa. Superior – March 1, 2017


On appeal from arbitration in breach of contract and wage case, Plaintiff elected to limit recovery money damages to $25,000, under Pa. R.C.P. 1311.1, in excchange for easing of evidentiary rules concerning introduction of documents.  Plaintiff prevailed on wage claim under Wage Payment and Collection law, 43 P.S. 260.1 et seq., which provides for attorney fees for prevailing plaintiff.   The court also granted plaintiff attorney fees.  The total award of damages plus attorney fees was greater than $25,000.00.

Held, attorney fee award under WCPL was not “damages” under Pa.R.C.P. 1311.1, citing LaRue v. McGuire, 885 A.2d 549 (Pa. Super. 2005); Dolan v. Fissel, 973 A.2d 1009 (Pa. Super. 2009); Allen v. Mellinger, 784 A.2d 762 (Pa. 2001) and language from WCPL that fee award is “in additionl to any judgment” awarded to plaintiff.


Tuesday, February 28, 2017

UC - late appeal - confusion/breakdown in admin. process



Court held that claimant was entitled to late appeal, nunc pro tunc, in overpayment case, because of

- UCSC failure to follow Referee’s remand instructions, issuing new determinations rather than investigating claimant’s allegations that her niece had hacked her UC account and that no UC payments had been deposited into claimant’s bank account

- confusion caused multiple (10) determinations - By making new decisions, on remand, under brand new docket numbers, the Service Center created sufficient confusion to constitute a breakdown in the administrative system. Indeed, the very number of decisions that were flying about created confusion and a consequent breakdown in the administrative system.

The court also found that the failure of Counsel’s secretary to log the appeal deadlines was not dispositive.   “[I]t was the breakdown in the administrative process that brought Claimant back for a second round of proceedings. “[H]ad the unemployment authorities conducted an investigation … on the issue of whether or not any type of identity theft, fraud by a third party, had occurred, [Claimant] probably wouldn’t have these cases filed.” . . . .Counsel took action to get the appeals filed as soon as he learned of  his secretary’s error, and there is no evidence to indicate that the lateness of Claimant’s appeals prejudiced the Department.”

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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)



Monday, February 27, 2017

UC - due process - notice of issues



Held:  Claimant denied due process where notice of determination indicated one critical time period, but another period was subject of the hearing.

Claimant appeared at the hearing with documentary evidence detailing his work injury, medical treatment, and leave of absence during the period of November 20, 2014 through December 1, 2014,  identified in the Notice of Determination as the basis for his ineligibility for unemployment benefits. However, the Referee based the decision on events that allegedly took place on December 2, 2014 through December 8, 2014.

Claimant had no notice that these events could form the basis for denying him unemployment compensation.  Claimant was clearly without notice that he would need to produce witnesses for another time period, given that both Employer and Claimant testified that a coworker was present with Claimant during the events that allegedly took place December 2, 2014 through December 8, 2014 and that he acted as an interpreter for Claimant at work.

Whether or not Claimant would have chosen to call this coworker to offer testimony to dispute Employer’s version of events, due process requires that Claimant must be given the opportunity to do so and to otherwise defend against any allegations that would serve as a basis to deny him unemployment compensation benefits. The lack of proper notice of the grounds for denying him unemployment benefits denied Claimant due process of law. Hanover Concrete Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 402 A.2d 720, 721 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984).

In Sterling v. UCBR, 474 A.2d 389 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984), it was held that a claimant’s right to due process is violated when a referee issues a decision based on facts that were not addressed by the Department’s Notice of Determination and were instead raised for the first time at a hearing before a referee,

It has long been accepted that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law is equally applicable to administrative proceedings as it is to judicial proceedings. Included in this concept of due process is the requirement that such notice must at the very least contain a sufficient listing and explanation of any charges so that the individual can know against what charges he must defend himself if he can. Thus notice is integrally linked to the right to be heard, for without notice, litigants are ill-equipped to assert their rights and defend against claims.

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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)



UC - vol. quit - child care issues - on-call job - short advance notice

Vital Support Home Health Care Agency v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – Feb. 24, 2017 – unreported memorandum decision


Claimant had good cause to quit her job as home health aid where, after her long-time client moved, employer offered her only on-call work with only one-hour advance notice.  Claimant had three young children and needed child care.

The inability to find childcare on short notice, with communication to the employer, may constitute a necessitous and compelling cause for voluntarily terminating employment. Truitt v. UCBR, 589 A.2d 208, 210 (Pa. 1991); Blakely v. UCBR, 464 A.2d 695, 696 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983). However, generally in order to justify quitting based on lack of childcare, a claimant must establish that he or she exhausted all other alternative childcare arrangements before voluntarily terminating employment. Beachem v. UCBR, 760 A.2d 68, 72 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000).  Claimant did so in this case
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)



Sunday, February 26, 2017

civil procedure - limited partnership - representation by non-attorney general partner allowed

Jamestown Condominium, v. Sofayov et al. – Cmwlth. Court – unreported memorandum opinion – February 22, 2017


Non-attorney general partner of a limited partnership had the right to represent the partnership in court under the rationale set out in In re Lawrence County Tax Claim Bureau, 998 A.2d 675 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), and sec. 2501(a) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. 2501(a). (In all civil matters before any tribunal every litigant shall have a right to be heard, by himself and his counsel, or by either of them.)


civil procedure - post-trial motions - supporting brief not required - Pa. R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2)

Williston Township v. Main Line Gardens, Inc., et al. – Supreme Court of Pa. – February 22, 2017

Held:  Pa. R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2) concerning preservation of issues for appeal in a motion for post-trial relief does not require the moving party to file a supporting brief.

Post-trial motions serve an important function in the adjudicatory process because they provide the trial court with an opportunity to correct errors in its ruling and avert the need for appellate review. . . .In 1984, this Court adopted Rules 227.1 through 227.4 to establish uniform procedures for post-trial relief in actions at law and equity, and actions tried with or without a jury. . . .

Rule 227.1 addresses waiver at the trial court level, “as a matter of the trial court’s post-trial power.”  . . .Rule 227.1(b)5 establishes that issues not preserved either before or at trial, see Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1), or in post-trial motions, see Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(2), are waived. As this Court ruled in Lane Enterprises, Inc. v. L.B. Foster Co., 710 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1998), Rule 227.1 “requires parties to file post-trial motions in order to preserve issues for appeal,” and “[i]f an issue has not been raised in a post-trial motion, it is waived for appeal purposes.” Id. at 54.

The Commonwealth Court erred in ruling that Main Line waived the issues set forth in its post-trial motions for failing to file briefs in support thereof. Main Line conformed with the dictates of Rule 227.1 to preserve its issues for appeal by filing post-trial trial motions that complied with Rule 227.1(b)(2). Main Line’s post-trial motions set forth the requested grounds for relief and the theories in support thereof. Importantly, Rule 227.1(b)(2) contains no requirement that parties file briefs or present argument with respect to the issues specified in the motion in order to preserve them for appeal.” [emphasis in original].


Wednesday, February 08, 2017

UC - vol. quit - medical issues - duty to preserve employment

St. Clair Hospital v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – en banc (4-3) – February 2, 2017


Held that claimant “did nokt take all reasonable and necessary steps to preserve her employment,” where
- employer game her list of 132 open positions
- employer specified two job from list that CL could do
- CL did not contact ER about the two job or apply for any open position specified by employer.

The two primary cases discussed were
- Genetin v. UCBR – 451 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1982), and
-  Nolan v. UCBR – 797 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)

The dissents argued that
- the record “lacked sufficient evidence that the employer is able to provide...suitable work”
- the majority opinion ran counter to Genetin – employer did not take steps to provide suitable work once CL told ER of medical issue
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This case is also reported in the PLAN Legal Update  http://planupdate.blogspot.com/ , which is searchable and can be accessed without a password.
If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)


Thursday, January 26, 2017

consumer - FCRA - unauthorized disclosure of personal information - injury - standing

In re Horizon Healthcare Services – 3d Cir. – January 20, 2017


The dispute at the bottom of this putative class action began when two laptops, containing sensitive personal information, were stolen from health insurer Horizon Healthcare Services, Inc.

The four named Plaintiffs filed suit on behalf of themselves and other Horizon customers whose personal information was stored on those laptops. They allege willful and negligent violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., as well as numerous violations of state law.    Essentially, they say that Horizon inadequately protected their personal information.

The District Court dismissed the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of Article III standing. According to the Court, none of the Plaintiffs had claimed a cognizable injury because, although their personal information had been stolen, none of them had adequately alleged that the information was actually used to their detriment.  We will vacate and remand.

In light of the congressional decision to create a remedy for the unauthorized transfer of personal information, a violation of FCRA gives rise to an injury sufficient for Article III standing purposes. Even without evidence that the Plaintiffs’ information was in fact used improperly, the alleged disclosure of their personal information created a de facto injury. Accordingly, all of the Plaintiffs suffered a cognizable injury, and the Complaint should not have been dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1).
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If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)


Wednesday, January 18, 2017

UC - overpayment - fault v. non-fault - "honest mistake"

Fugh v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – January 18, 2017 – en banc


Firmly rejecting the UCBR’s suggestions to change the law, the court held that an overpayment came under the non-fault provisions of 43 P.S. 874(b) and not the fault provisions of 43 P.S. 874(a), where

            - “honest mistake” - the Board made a finding that Claimant made an “honest mistake” in filling out her UC application online.   She said that her unemployment was caused by lack of work after she quit due to a reduction of hours that would not have constituted good cause to quit her job.  Claimant “construed ‘lack of work’ to refer to a reduction in work available to her, which described her situation.”
            - no intentional failure to disclose information, no false statement – the Board also made specific findings to this effect

The en banc court rejected the UCBR’s suggestions that it should overrule the long-standinbg (40 years) precedent of Cruz v. UCBR, 531 A.2d 1178 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) and Daniels v. UCBR , 309 A.2d 738, 741 (Pa. Cmwlth.), holding that “fault” is a “term that ‘connotes an act to which blame, censure, impropriety, shortcoming, or culpability attaches.”  It involves a “blameworthy act” that shows the actor’s wrongful state of mind.   The court said that the “commission of a mere voluntary act does not establish fault. . . .The Board cannot hold a claimant liable for a fault overpayment for a mere mistake or confusion.” 

The court also noted the legislature’s silence and inactivity in the face of the holdings in Daniels and Cruz.

The court said that “our long held construction of ‘fault’ is not in need of ‘correction.’  It is as sound today as it was 40 years ago.  The revision to the Section 804 paradign proposed by the Board is one for the General Assembly to make.

Congratulations and thanks to Kevin Burke of NWLS and Julia Simon-Mishel of PLA for their work on this case.
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Tuesday, January 17, 2017

UC - late registration for employment services is NOT an automatic disqualification

Jakubowicz v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – unreported* memorandum opinion – January 17, 2017


Late registration for employment search services is “not a per se violation of” 43 P.S. 801(b)(1)(i) and 34 Pa. Code 65.11(c), which require registration within 30 days of initial application for benefits.

Footnote 10 –

In Department of Labor & Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 131 A.3d 597 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), this Court explained:
A failure of a claimant to register timely in accordance with Section 401(b)(1)(i) of the Law is not a per se violation that automatically disqualifies a claimant from unemployment compensation. Section 401(b)(6) of the Law provides that ‘[t]he [D]epartment may waive or alter the requirements of this subsection in cases or situations with respect to which the secretary finds that compliance with such requirements would be oppressive or which would be inconsistent with the purposes of this act.’ 43 P.S. § 801(b)(6). In Sharpe v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Pa. Cmwlth.[] No. 431 C.D. 2014, . . . filed October 21, 2014), this Court addressed the Department’s ability to waive the registration requirement. We observed as follows:

During the promulgation of the Department’s regulations implementing Section 401(b) [of the Law], a commenter asked whether a ‘good cause’ standard should be incorporated into the [R]egulations. 43 Pa. B. 4730, 4735 (2013). The Department replied that in most cases where a ‘good cause’ standard is applied, it is because it is directed by statute and that it would not adopt one on its own initiative. Id. However, the Department noted that, ‘if a claimant’s ‘good cause’ for noncompliance with the regulation also constitutes a reason why compliance ‘would be oppressive or . . . inconsistent with the purposes of’ the law, the claimant’s circumstances could be addressed under the waiver provision in [S]ection 401(b)(6) of the [L]aw and [the Regulation Section 65.11(f)(6)].’ Id. [Sharpe, slip op.] at 6-7.

In short, where a claimant can show ‘good cause’ for not registering on time, the Department may waive the time requirement of Section 401(b)(1)(i) of the Law.

The Law does not define ‘good cause,’ and our Supreme Court has established that it ‘must be determined in each case from the facts of  that case.’ Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Comp[.] B[d.] of Review, . . . 50 A.2d 336, 340 ([Pa.] 1947). In each case, ‘good cause’ must be ‘so interpreted that the fundamental purpose of the [Law] shall not be destroyed.’ Id. The central purpose of Section 401(b) of the Law is to require claimants to make ‘an active search for suitable employment’ while collecting benefits. 43 P.S. § 801(b).
. . . .
[T]he [UCBR] has abandoned the nunc pro tunc standard for evaluating a waiver of the on-line registration time requirement. Instead, it argues for a more relaxed standard, noting that not every claimant can be expected to be ‘computer savvy’ and that a single keystroke mistake can fail to effect a registration. Further, registration cannot be done by letter or by phone call. The [UCBR] rejects the argument of the Office of UC Benefits in favor of a strict liability standard. The [UCBR] believes, instead, that a case-by-case examination of ‘good cause’ is appropriate and consistent with the remedial and humanitarian objectives of the Law, which should not be frustrated ‘by slavish adherence to technical and artificial rules.’ Lehr v. Unemployment Comp[.] B[d.] of Review, . . . 625 A.2d 173, 175 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1993) (quoting Unemployment Comp[.] B[d.] of Review v. Jolliffe, . . . 379 A.2d 109, 110 ([Pa.] 1977)).
The [UCBR] explains that in on-line registration waiver cases, ‘good cause’ should be considered in the same way it is used to mitigate willful misconduct. . . .
. . . .
We agree with the [UCBR]’s case-by-case approach to evaluating whether a claimant had good cause for failing to timely register for employment search services under Section 401(b)(1)(i) of the Law, 43 P.S. § 801(b)(1)(i).

Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 131 A.3d at 600-02 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted).  
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)





Tuesday, January 10, 2017

age discrimination - disparate impact - class action - subgroup 50+

Karlo et al. v. Pittsburgh Glass Works – 3d Cir. – January 10, 2017


The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) protects only those individuals who are at least forty years of age. The question in this case is whether a disparate-impact claim is cognizable where a “subgroup” of employees at the upper end of that range—in this case, employees aged fifty and older— were alleged to have been disfavored relative to younger employees. We answer in the affirmative.

Our decision is dictated by the plain text of the statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In particular, the ADEA prohibits disparate impacts based on age, not forty-and-older identity. A rule that disallowed subgroups would ignore genuine statistical disparities that could otherwise be actionable through application of the plain text of the statute.   Although several of our sister circuits have ruled to the contrary, their reasoning relies primarily on policy arguments that we do not find persuasive.


We will therefore reverse the judgment of the District Court based on its interpretation of the ADEA. We will also vacate the District Court’s order excluding the testimony of plaintiffs’ statistics expert and remand for further Daubert proceedings. We will affirm in all other respects.

Thursday, December 08, 2016

tax sale - judicial sale - notice

In re Amended Petition of TCB of Washington County v. Miller – Cmwlth. Court – November 16, 2016


Undisputed facts show that former owner of property sold by repository sale, after judicial sale failed for lack of a bid, did not received notice required by 72 P.S.  5860.610.

The former owner is a party of interest that must be served. See Rivera v. Carbon County Tax Claim Bureau, 857 A.2d 208, 213-16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004); also Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau v. Mermelstein Family Trust, 836 A.2d 1010 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); Bell v. Berks County Tax Claim Bureau, 832 A.2d 587 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).   This is because “owner” is defined by the Law as “the person in whose name the property is last registered, if registered according to law, or, if not registered according to law, the person whose name last appears as an owner of record on any deed or instrument of conveyance recorded in the county office designated for recording. . . .” Section 102 of the Law, 72 P.S. § 5860.102.

Although the owners were provided with proper notice prior to the initial upset sale, which did not go through, 72 P.S. § 5860.607(g), requires,  that they be served with notice regarding the judicial sale of the Property. The record clearly demonstrates they were not. Consequently, because strict compliance with the notice provisions of the Law is required, which the Bureau did not adhere to when selling the Property, the repository sale of the Property must be deemed void ab initio.
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tax sale - MCTLA - redemption - mixed-use property

City of Philadelphia v. Phan – Commonwealth Court – October 24, 2016


Owner of property which was mixed-use (barber shop ground floor; residential apartment on second) was entitled to redeem it from tax sale under 53 P.S. 7293, the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens Act.

The purpose of sheriffs’ sales under the Act is not to strip owners of their property, but to collect delinquent taxes. City of Philadelphia v. F.A. Realty Investors Corporation, 95 A.3d 377, 384 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). Thus, the Act provides property owners with the ability to recover tax-delinquent properties both prior to and after sheriffs’ sales thereof. See Sections 31 and 32 of the Act, 53 P.S. §§7292-7293, which allows redemption of a property which has been “occupied as a residence. . . for at least ninety days prior to the date of the sale and continues to be so occupied on the date of the acknowledgment of the sheriff's deed therefor.”  53 P.S. §7293(a), (c)

There is no requirement in the statute that the entire property have been occupied as a residence, and the Cout refused to imply one.  Nor is there a requirement that the residence be owner-occupied.  Here, the residential part of the unit was a rental property.
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Wednesday, December 07, 2016

UC - employee v. independent contractor

Farinhas Logistics v. UCBR – Commonwealth Court – December 5, 2016 – *unreported memorandum decision


The above case, though unreported, contains the following extended exposition of the issue of employee v. independent contractor

Employment Relationship
To be eligible for unemployment benefits, a claimant must show that his wages were earned from employment. 43 P.S. §§801(a), 753(x).9 Further, section 402(h) of the Law provides that an employee is ineligible for compensation for any week in which he is engaged in self-employment. 43 P.S. §802(h). Although “self-employment” is not defined, we examine the parties’ working relationship under section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Law,10 the purpose of which is to exclude independent contractors from coverage. Beacon Flag Car Company, Inc. (Doris Weyant) v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 910 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

To show that a claimant is a self-employed independent contractor, the employer must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in section 4(l)(2)(B), which states, in pertinent part:

Services performed by an individual for wages shall be deemed to be employment subject to this act, unless and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the department that—(a) such individual has been and will continue to be free from control or direction over the performance of such services both under his contract of service and in fact; and (b) as to such services such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.
43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B).

This section creates a strong presumption that an individual rendering services for wages is an employee. Kurbatov v. Department of Labor and Industry, Office of Unemployment Compensation, Tax Services, 29 A.3d 66, 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011). To overcome this presumption, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant “is not subject to the employer’s control and he is engaged in an independently established trade.” Frimet v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 78 A.3d 21, 25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). Both prongs under section 4(l)(2)(B) must be satisfied for a claimant to be self-employed under the Law; otherwise, the presumption of employment stands. Silver v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 34 A.3d 893, 896 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).

In determining the existence of an employer/employee relationship, the court is required to examine the actual relationship of the parties. Hartman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 39 A.3d 507, 511-12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). We noted that the terminology used by the parties to describe their relationship is not dispositive, id., and even a declaration in a contract stating that the claimant is an independent contractor may not necessarily satisfy the independent contractor test of section 4(l)(2)(B), Clark, 129 A.3d at 1277 n.11. Moreover, although the existence of a non-compete agreement is not determinative of the issue, the terms of the parties’ agreement must be considered. Kurbatov, 29 A.3d at 72.

Two-Prong Test
As noted above, Putative Employer must show that Claimant has been, and will continue to be, free from control or direction over the performance of such services. 43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B)(a). In analyzing this first prong of the test, we consider the following relevant factors: how the claimant was paid; how taxes on the claimant's earnings were paid; whether the claimant or the person for whom [he] worked supplied tools or equipment necessary to perform the services; whether the person for whom claimant worked provided on-the-job training; whether claimant was required to attend meetings or report on [his] work; who set the time and location of the work; whether the claimant's work was subject to supervision or review; the terms of any written contract between the parties; the degree to which the claimant was directed with respect to the work; and whether the claimant was free to refuse work assignments without repercussions.
Stauffer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 74 A.3d 398, 405 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)  

Importantly, no single factor is controlling and the ultimate conclusion pertaining to control must be based on the totality of the circumstances. Quality Care Options v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 57 A.3d 655, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Further, because each case is fact-specific, all of these factors need not be present to determine the type of relationship that exists. Id. However, “‘[w]hile all of these factors are important indicators, the key element is whether the alleged employer has the right to control the work to be done and the manner in which it was performed’ . . . an employer-employee relationship likely exists not only where the employer actually exercises control, but also where it possesses the right to do so.” Kurbatov, 29 A.3d at 70 (quoting York Newspaper Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 635 A.2d 251, 253 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)) (alteration in original).

As to the second prong of the test, Putative Employer must demonstrate that “as to such services[,] such individual is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.” 43 P.S. §753(l)(2)(B)(b). To determine whether a claimant is “customarily engaged in an  independently established trade, occupation, profession or business,” we look at whether the claimant was restricted from performing the services for others and whether anything in the nature of the work limits it to a single employer. Stauffer, 74 A.3d at 407. Evidence that a claimant is engaged in an independent business is an absolute prerequisite to a determination of self-employment. Quality Care Options, 57 A.3d at 666. As noted by our Supreme Court, “[a] worker can be considered an independent contractor only if he or she is in business for himself or herself.” Danielle Viktor, Ltd. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 892 A.2d 781, 798 (Pa. 2006).

Therefore, an employer must show that the claimant took positive steps toward establishing an independent business. Buchanan v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 581 A.2d 1005, 1008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990). Further, the independent trade established must involve the same type of services that the claimant provided to the employer, Electrolux Corporation v. Commonwealth, Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Employer Tax Operations, 705 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998), and the claimant must have performed those services for others, and not just for the employer, Peidong Jia v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 55 A.3d 545, 548 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012).

We have stressed the importance of an employer to submit evidence to show that claimant is engaged in an independent business. See id. at 549 (holding that without evidence that the claimant established an independent business or performed the same services for others, the employer could not establish the second prong of the test to overcome the statutory presumption of employment); see also Clark, 129 A.3d at 1277 (concluding that the employer failed to satisfy the second prong where there was no evidence that the claimant established a private enterprise or independent business through which he provided services to others).
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*An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

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child abuse - expunction - hearing - right to individual notice

J.P. v. Department of Human Services – Cmwlth. Court – November 21, 2016


J.P., paramour of child’s parent, was entitled to appeal and have a hearing to challenge the CYS finding that she had abused the child, because she had not received notice or opportunity to participate in a prior juvenile proceeding, which changed a finding of “indicated” to a finding of “founded.”

Commonwealth Court held that JP had not received adequate notice of the juvenile court hearing, nor had she received that court’s order.  A founded report of child abuse is an adjudication and that, under Section 504 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 504, ‘[n]o adjudication of a Commonwealth agency shall be valid as to any party unless he shall have been afforded reasonable notice of a hearing and an opportunity to be heard.’  K.R. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 950 A.2d 1069, 1077 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) [emphasis in original].  “Due process of law requires notice to be given to the respondent so that [s]he may adequately prepare h[er] defense in such cases.” Straw v. Pa. Human Relations Comm’n, 308 A.2d 619, 621 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) [emphasis in original].

Here, the only notice provided regarding the dependency hearing was the notice to J.P.’s paramour. The fact that J.P. read his notice, does not transform his notice to her notice. This conclusion is especially true here, where J.P. testified that she “was told specifically from [CYS] themselves that any matter pertaining to anything that has to do with the [C]hild, I am not allowed to ask any questions” and she assumed she would not be permitted to participate in the dependency hearing because she was not the Child’s parent.

While “[DHS] may rely on the factual findings of the trial court in a dependency adjudication to dismiss an appeal for a request for expungement[,]” K.R., 950 A.2d at 1078, because J.P. did not receive notice prior to the adjudication, she did not receive the requisite due process for a valid adjudication.
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Tuesday, November 29, 2016

abuse - expungement - appeal - nunc pro tunc - confusing, equivocal notice

D.C. v. DHS – Cmwlth. Court – November 23, 2016 – en banc



Nunc pro tunc appeal permitted because of DHS’s “equivocal and confusing notice of how to get a hearing,” which “establihsed a breakdown in the administrative process,” thus entitling appellant to a nunc pro tunc appeal.

Friday, November 04, 2016

consumer protection - UTPCPL - justifiable reliance - causation

Kirwin v. Sussman Automotive – Pa. Superior Court – October 7, 2016


Held:  No violation of “catchall” provision of Consumer Protection Law, 73 P.S. 201-2)4)(xxi), where
- plaintiff got email solicitation from dealer with one price
- when P went to dealer, he was told that there had been computer error and actual price was $3,000 more
- knowing of this discrepancy, P paid the higher price, then sued under CPL

 UTPCPL’s “catchall” provision in 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi), which J-A17028-16 - 4 - provides liability for “fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.”  

“Deceptive conduct ordinarily can only take one of two forms, either fraudulent or negligent. . . . [T]he pre-1996 catchall provision covered only fraudulently deceptive practices. The broadening of the UTPCPL . . . makes negligent deception, e.g., negligent misrepresentations, actionable under the post-1996 catchall provision.” Dixon v. Northwestern Mutual, 2016 PA Super 186, -- A.3d -- (Aug. 25, 2016). Even with the broadening of the applicability of the catchall provision, in order to prevail on such a cause of action, “the UTPCPL plaintiff must still prove justifiable reliance and causation, because the legislature never intended [the] statutory language directed against consumer fraud to do away with the traditional common law elements of reliance and causation.” 

There was no “justifiable reliance” in this case, since P signed contract of sale with knowledge of the price discrepancy.  P did not make out a prima facie showing of justifiable reliance.,  and the UTPCPL claim alleging a “bait and switch” tactic on the part of car dealer must fail.
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Tuesday, November 01, 2016

UC - vol. quit - sexual harassment, racial slurs - duty to act reasonably

Serrano v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – October 31, 2016


Held:  Incidents of sexual harassment and racial slurs justified claimant’s vol. quit, but she was nonetheless disqualified for failing to act reasonably, “with common sense,” in the face of those things.  Specifically, after reporting the problems to the employer, resigning from her job, and then returning to work w/agreement of the employer, she “always said that [things] were fine” when the employer made regular requests to her about how things were going.

Reporting of harassment, racial slurs
Sexual harassment and racial slurs may present adequate pressure to terminate one’s employment, and a claimant need not be subjected to such language or conduct indefinitely. Porco v. UCBR, 828 A.2d 426, 428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003); see also Peddicord v. UCBR, 647 A.2d 295, 298 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).   A claimant normally will not meet the requirement to make a reasonable effort to preserve employment unless the claimant notifies the employer of the harassment. Martin v. UCBR, 749 A.2d 541, 544 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000). However, failure to report harassment may be excused where the record evidence reveals that doing so would be futile. Id. Moreover, “there is a certain level of conduct that an employee will not be required to tolerate and the Court will not place all responsibility upon an employee to resolve his or her work dilemma. Ultimately the employer bears the responsibility for eliminating harassment against employees in the workplace.” Comitalo v. UCBR, 737 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999).

The decision in Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh v. UnemploymentCompensation Board of Review, 654 A.2d 264 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995), is directly 9 applicable.   There is no requirement to afford an employer a second attempt to rectify the situation, where  there is no evidence to suggest that the second attempt to end the harassment would be any different than the first attempt.   Here, Claimant satisfied the notification requirement by bringing her complaints to her supervisors  when she initially decided to quit. This notice afforded Employer the opportunity to rectify the situation. Claimant was not required to endure the alleged abusive behavior indefinitely, or to afford Employer more than one opportunity to address the alleged harassment. Her initial report to Employer provided the requisite notice to allow Employer to attempt to alleviate the harassment. Lending further credence to her efforts to continue an employment relationship is the fact that Claimant resigned but then agreed to return to work. This demonstrates Claimant’s willingness to allow Employer to remedy the problem and maintain her position. The Referee and the Board erred because the failure to notify Employer of the continuing harassment after Claimant’s return to work was not the fatal flaw in her claim.

Failure to act reasonably, with common sense
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the decision of the Board on other grounds.   The court found that Claimant was unable to demonstrate the third requirement of a necessitous and compelling reason for her voluntary quit, i.e.— that she acted with common sense. The Referee found that the employer “would regularly request the claimant’s assessment of the situation with the coworker, and the claimant always responded that they were fine.”   Whether or not there were, in fact, additional incidents of harassment after Claimant’s return to work, Claimant now maintains that she continued to have a conflict with the dispatch supervisor. Thus, Claimant was untruthful when she reported to employer that “they were fine.” Claimant’s knowing misrepresentation of the conflict is distinct from merely failing to report harassment a second time. We conclude that Claimant did not act with common sense, because she misrepresented the employment situation to Employer. Claimant, therefore, has failed to demonstrate a necessitous and compelling reason for her voluntary quit. Thus, pursuant to Section 402(b) of the Law, Claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
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Monday, October 31, 2016

threat to harm another - interstate communication - 18 USC 875(c)

US v. Elonis – 3d Cir. – October 28, 2016


Conviction upheld for violation on 18 USC 875(c) – use of interstate communications containing threat to injure the person of another
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§818 USC 875 (c). Interstate communications
(c) Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.


Friday, October 28, 2016

privacy - Pa. Constitution - Article I, sec. 1

PSEA et al. v. Office of Open Records, DCED, et al.




Held:  The right to privacy under Article I, sec. 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution precludes the wholesale disclosure of names and addresses of school teachers, absent a strong countervailing interest.



Wednesday, October 26, 2016

Rules of Prof. Responsibility 4.2 - contacting govt. officials - Discip. Board of Pa. newsletter


Attorney News - October 2016


Tip of the Month: Contacting Government Officials

Suppose you are representing a client in a dispute with a government agency. The agency is represented by counsel, perhaps the Attorney General’s Office or the local solicitor or municipal counsel. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a lawyer from communicating directly with a represented party about the subject of the representation without the consent of counsel, or as authorized by law. Does this prohibit you from petitioning the government agency on policy matters the way any other citizen would be allowed to do?
 
In 1997, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility addressed the question in 
Formal Opinion 97-408,  Communication with Government Agency Represented by Counsel (1997). The Committee noted that the “authorized by law” exception arises out of the preservation of the First Amendment’s protection of the right to petition the government in controversies with government officials. The Committee concluded that a lawyer representing a client before an agency may contact the agency when two conditions are satisfied:
1.     The officials to be contacted are in a position to take or recommend action in the matter and the substance of the communication relates to policy issues including settlement; and  
2.     The communicating lawyer gives opposing counsel advance notice of the impending communication so that they can give appropriate advice to their clients as to how to respond to the inquiry. 

The ABA opinion has generally been adopted and followed in state bar ethics opinions. It is important that the right to communicate with government officials recognized by the ABA pertains to matters of policy, not the particulars of cases.

Comment 5 to Rule 4.2 echoes this analysis, stating, “Communications authorized by law may include communications by a lawyer on behalf of a client who is exercising a constitutional or other legal right to communicate with the government.” Also, the fact of representation does not prohibit the lawyer from communicating about other matters unrelated to the representation. Comment 4 states, “the existence of a controversy between a government agency and a private party, or between two organizations, does not prohibit a lawyer for either from communicating with nonlawyer representatives of the other regarding a separate matter.”