Sunday, March 24, 2024

admin. law - mailbox rule - proof of mailing required

Mixell v. Board of Assessment Appeals – Cmwlth. Court – 3-20-24 – reported, precedential

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/1243CD22_3-20-24.pdf?cb=1

 

HELD:  Trial court erred in dismissing appeal of landowner/taxpayer seeking special tax status under Clear and Green Act, when owner failed to attend scheduled hearing, about which owner claimed she had never received noticed. 

 

Specifically, the appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying the “mailbox rule,” which raises a rebuttable presumption that a mailed notice was received, because there was no evidence that the notice of hearing was, in fact, mailed.  

 

From the opinion:

 

“Under the mailbox rule, proof of mailing raises a rebuttable presumption that the mailed item was received.” Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Grasse, 606 A.2d 544, 545 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). For the mailbox rule to apply, “there must be some evidence . . . that the notice was mailed . . . .” Douglas v. Unemployment Compensation Review Board, 151 A.3d 1188, 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). “[U]ntil there is proof that a letter was mailed, there can be no presumption that it was received.” Id

The presumption under the mailbox rule, once established, may be rebutted. Grasse, 606 A.2d at 545. However, “the presumption . . . is not nullified solely by testimony denying receipt of the item mailed.” Id

. . . .In Douglas, this Court determined substantial evidence produced at the hearing did not support application of the mailbox rule. 151 A.3d at 1193. The claimant contended that the notice was not mailed and that she did not receive the notice. The only evidence offered was the notice itself, which bore a “mailed date.” Id. We noted that “[t]he ‘mailed date’ was part of the information included in the notice itself at the time the notice was prepared. There [was] no subsequent notation in the file indicating that the notice was, in fact, mailed.” Id. Thus, we concluded that, “[w]ithout proof of mailing or the presumption of regularity to establish that the notice was mailed, the presumption of receipt—i.e., the mailbox rule—cannot be applied.” Id. Thus, we vacated the order and remanded for further proceedings. Id

Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 814 A.2d 754, 760 (Pa. Super. 2002),the Superior Court rejected application of the mailbox rule based on the evidence presented. The Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth failed to meet the evidentiary threshold necessary for application of the mailbox rule’s presumption of receipt. Id. at 759. 

The Superior Court explained that the  “Commonwealth, as the party which sought to invoke the mailbox rule presumption . . . had the burden of proof to show that the notice was in fact mailed or that it had been prepared and placed in the regular place of mailing.” Id. at 760. The Court noted that the Commonwealth presented only “circumstantial evidence” suggesting that the notice had been mailed, but it did not establish proof of the same. Id. The Commonwealth’s evidence consisted of an employee’s testimony regarding the general practice for the preparation and mailing of summary appeal hearing notices but did not offer any testimony regarding mailing the specific hearing notice at issue. Id. at 759. The employee acknowledged “that there was no official record kept of any of the notices . . . prepared and given to the tipstaff for delivery to the mailroom on” the day the notice was allegedly prepared. Id. There was no evidence, such as postal records or logs, that “showed that this notice was in fact mailed . . . or that this notice had been prepared and taken to the regular place of mailing.” Id. at 760. Although the notice itself was dated, there were no markings indicating that the original had been mailed. Id. at 756. The Superior Court held that “[m]erely producing an un-timestamped copy of a hearing notice . . . and offering generic testimony as to the standard mailing procedures for summary appeal hearing notices . . . was insufficient.” Id. at 760. Upon determining that the mailbox rule’s presumption of receipt was not triggered, the Superior Court reversed and remanded the matter for a de novo trial. Id. at 761-62. 

...... Here, the trial court did not conduct any form of evidentiary hearing or factfinding proceeding. Rather, the trial court dismissed Taxpayer’s appeal on a PO upon determining that the mailbox rule applied even though Taxpayer disputed that the notices were mailed and that she received them. The only evidence offered in support of mailing was a copy of the scheduling notices attached to the PO. Although the notices are dated June 8, 2022, they bear no indication that they were mailed. . . .The Board did not offer docket entries or testimony supporting that the notices were placed in the regular place of mailing. See Douglas, 151 A.3d at 1193 (holding that the “mailed date” on the notice, in and of itself, without more was insufficient to establish proof of mailing in the face of a challenge). 

Even assuming that the hearing notices themselves could constitute proof of mailing under local rule, see Breza, the trial court did not afford Taxpayer an opportunity to rebut the presumption of receipt. Although Taxpayer initially stated she was unable to attend the hearing, she pled in her New Matter and asserted in her brief that she never received the hearing notice. The trial court simply rejected Taxpayer’s argument and granted the PO without affording Taxpayer the opportunity to adduce evidence to corroborate her allegation of non-receipt. In so doing, the trial court erred and abused its discretion. 

 

 

 

 

Monday, March 11, 2024

admin. law - continuance - due process

Hite v. City of McKeesport – Pa. Cmwlth. – 3-8-24 – reported opinion

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/180CD23_3-11-24.pdf?cb=1

 

Held: Claimant for disability pension was denied due process when his request for a continuance to subpoena an examining physician was denied.

 

From the opinion:  

 

The basic elements of procedural due process are “adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case.” . . . . Additionally, the opportunity to be heard must occur “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” . . . . This Court has noted that in addition, due process requires “an opportunity to offer evidence in furtherance of such issues.” . . . .We have further observed that “[t]he key factor in determining whether procedural due process is denied is whether the party asserting the denial of due process suffered demonstrable prejudice.” 

Additionally, the power to grant or refuse a continuance is an inherent power of a court or administrative agency, which is normally discretionary and subject to review only on a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion.  . . . .In such cases, our chief considerations in determining the existence of an abuse of discretion are “whether or not the grant or refusal of the continuance would be in furtherance of justice and whether or not a refusal would prejudice the rights of one of the parties.”

For example, in [one case] this Court concluded that the State Civil Service Commission abused its discretion in denying a continuance for the petitioner to obtain counsel, when the petitioner had attempted but was unable to obtain counsel prior to the hearing. See Replogle, 430 A.2d at 1222. By contrast, in a workers’ compensation matter, this Court upheld the denial of a continuance where each party had had ample opportunity to present its case, and the damaging testimony “sought to be refuted was extracted by appellant’s own counsel who called the claimant as his own witness as if on cross-examination, after a continuance at appellant’s request.” . . .. . This Court concluded that there was no abuse of discretion in denying a second request for a continuance in such circumstances.

In the instant matter, Hite requested a single continuance in order to secure the presence of a necessary witness.13 The hearing officer denied that request. However, the refusal of the continuance was not in the furtherance of justice: the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Tucker was integral to Hite’s arguments on appeal.. . . . Further, the denial did prejudice Hite, as Dr. Tucker’s opinion was the basis for denying him his disability pension. . . . .Finally, if the hearing officer had granted the continuance, Hite would continue to receive what he had been receiving from the Plan: no money and no benefits. Accordingly, the denial prejudiced Hite, but not the Board.