UC - voluntary quit - claimant had good cause to quit her job

Crane v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – 8-15-23 – unreported memorandum opinion**

N.B. Claimant was represented by North Penn Legal Services.  Well done !

 

 

Held: Claimant had good cause to quit her job, after 16 years as an aide to special needs children, where the school district denied her request for a leave of absence w/o pay.  Claimant decided to stay at home to care for her suicidal daughter, who attended school every other day but who, when at home, needed to have an adult present to keep her safe.

 

A claimant who voluntarily quits bears the burden of proving necessitous and compelling cause for leaving her job. Brunswick Hotel & Conf. Ctr., LLC v. UCBR., 906 A.2d 657 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Specifically, a claimant must establish that “(1) circumstances existed which produced real and substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her employment.” Id. at 660. A determination as to whether necessitous and compelling cause for leaving employment exists is a question of law, subject to plenary review by the court., 

 

No substantial evidence for two of UCBR findings – 

The court held that there was no substantial evidence to support the Board’s findings on two critical issues

- Claimant informing the school that her daughter had suicidal tendences and could not stay at home alone

- Claimant informing school that she was willing to work every other day, in accordance with her daughter’s school schedule

Claimant’s evidence on these points was clean and undisputed, even looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the school. 

 

FMLA – Claimant’s leave request was tantamount to a request under FMLA – Family and Medical Leave Act

In Eshbach v. UCBR, 855 A.2d 943, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), the court held that a claimant must notify the employer that leave is necessary to care for a serious medical condition but he or she need not expressly request FMLA leave in order to trigger an employer’s obligation. Id. at 948. In other words, an employer’s obligation is triggered when it acquires knowledge that an employee’s leave may be for an FMLA-qualifying reason.  Here, Employer did not contradict Claimant’s testimony that she informed the Superintendent of the daughter’s needs thereby providing Employer with sufficient information to trigger its obligation, at a minimum, to make further inquiries of her regarding purported grounds for eligibility under the FMLA. Consequently, Claimant made reasonable efforts to preserve her employment by way of a request for unpaid leave and/or via her query as to whether there was anything she could do in order to remain employed. Employer is not an unsophisticated employer, it had unfettered access to the daughter’s confidential records, and Claimant had worked there for sixteen years. 

Accordingly, the court held that Claimant met her burden of proving that she had necessitous and compelling cause for her voluntary quit and, therefore, reversed the decision of the UCBR.

** An unreported decision of the Commonwealth Court can be cited “for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent” under 210 Pa. Code 69.414 (citing judicial opinions in filings).

 

 

 

consumer protection - no misrepresentation by omission - no affirmative duty to disclose

Halpern v. Ricoh USA – Pa. Super. 87-28-23

https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-S20016-23o%20-%20105619038233953299.pdf?cb=1

 

Held: Deception by omission only actionable if there is an affirmative duty to disclose a defect in a good or service, following Romeo v. Pittsburgh Associates, 787 A.2d 1027 (Pa. Super. 2001), even though the court criticized Romeo. 

 

The court stated in n. 5:

At best, this Court’s CPL analysis in Romeo v. Pittsburgh Assocs., 787 A.2d 1027, 1033 (Pa. Super. 2001), is sparse. The panel did not review the statute’s language, its legislative history, or similarly worded statutes from our Sister States or the Federal Government. See, e.g., Oswego Laborers' Local 214 Pension Fund v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 647 N.E.2d 741, 745 (N.Y. 1995) (allowing plaintiff’s nondisclosure theory to proceed to trial under New York’s statutory equivalent of the CPL, “where the business alone possesses material information that is relevant to the consumer and fails to provide this information” without relying upon common-law duty to disclose); see also, Kyszenia v. Ricoh USA, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 3d 350, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2022) (holding that a complaint nearly identical to Buyer’s amended complaint stated a claim against Ricoh for selling similarly defective Pentax cameras under the New York statute but dismissing action as time barred). Moreover, the Romeo court offered no explanation as to how a common-law duty to disclose (or lack thereof) could override the statutory mandates of the CPL. Presumably, the General Assembly adopted the remedial CPL to remove the old strictures of common-law pleading and proof from the law of consumer transactions. Romeo’s holding may have undermined that legislative goal. 

Still, “it is beyond the power of a Superior Court panel to overrule a prior decision of the Superior Court, except in circumstances where intervening authority by our Supreme Court calls into question a previous decision of this Court.” Commonwealth v. Pepe, 897 A.2d 463, 465 (Pa. Super. 2006). We know of no such intervening pronouncement. Nor do we think, as Buyer contends in his brief and reply brief, that Gregg v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 245 A.3d 637, 646 (Pa. 2021), did so. There, the question was what level of intent a vendor must have to violate the CPL-catch-all provision, not whether a common-law duty to disclose is a prerequisite to rendering a vendor’s nondisclosure actionable. The High Court held that no proof of mental state is required; thus, the catch-all provision imposes strict liablity. Buyer seems to conflate strict liablity (i.e., liablity without fault) with passive nondisclosure. An affirmative false statement and a deceptive nondisclosure may both be made intentionally (fraud), negligently (misrepresentation), or with the utmost care (strict liability). Thus, Gregg’s holding regarding strict liability under the catch-all provision did not overrule Romeo sub silentio. 

Because there were no allegations in the complaint that established a common-law duty by Ricoh to disclose the defect in the Pentax camera to Buyer, under Romeo, Buyer failed to state a claim that Ricoh violated the catch-all provision of the CPL by its silence regarding the defective camera. The trial court correctly held that he did not satisfy the third prong of a CPL action, as the test is articulated in Gregg, supra, albeit for an incorrect reason.