tax sales - notice - due process - jurisdiction to order/confirm sale

In re Judicial Tax Sale – Lackawanna County – Cmwlth. Court – May 10, 2021

Held: Where there is evidence that proper notice of a tax sale was not given, or where there is doubt that it was given, failure to comply with additional reasonable efforts under 72 P.S sec. 5860.607a to give notice of tax sale deprives a court, ab initio, of jurisdiction to consider or order a judicial sale of property on account of non-payment of taxes.  Noncompliance with the law’s notice requirements under sec. 607a “is a jurisdictional defect that can void a judicial sale” – which defect can be raised at any time.

From the opinion:

Fundamental rights at issue – 

“Given the fundamental rights at issue when the government sells private property for nonpayment of taxes and the critical role compliance with the Law’s reasonable notice requirements plays in protecting those fundamental rights, Ms. Brown’s arguments that noncompliance with the Law’s requirements is a jurisdictional defect that can void a judicial sale are persuasive and supported by our caselaw. As we held in Manu, “[f]ailure to strictly comply with the service requirement[s] deprives the court of jurisdiction to authorize a sheriff’s sale.” 76 A.3d at 605-06. This is because “[s]trict compliance with the service requirement protects the procedural due process rights of all interested parties to notice and an opportunity to be heard and guards against deprivation of property without substantive due process of law.” Id. at 606 (emphasis added); see also Fraisar, 892 A.2d at 77 (“The rules governing service . . . [are] to ensure notice . . . .”). In cases where, as here, the sale of property is directed by the court of common pleas it is important for that court to “make ‘an independent inquiry’ regarding . . . strict compliance with the service requirement[s],” Manu, 76 A.3d at 605, in order to confirm that it has jurisdiction. . . .Further, the confirmation of proper service and notice is crucial in judicial sales because the statute of limitations to challenge such sales is a mere six months, as opposed to the six-year limitations period available to challenge upset tax sales. Absent jurisdiction, common pleas lacked the authority to approve the judicial sale of the property in the first instance.

Purpose of tax collection law is not to deprive citizens of their property

We must be cognizant that the purpose of the Law is to ensure the collection of taxes, not to deprive citizens of their property. Rinaldi, 22 A.3d at 315. These provisions “were never meant to punish taxpayers who omitted through oversight or error . . . to pay their taxes.” In re Return of Sale of Tax Claim Bureau, 76 A.2d 749, 753 (Pa. 1950). Our Supreme Court has stated that, over time, “taxing authorities have lost sight of the fact that it is a momentous event under the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitutions when a government subjects a citizen’s property to forfeiture for the non-payment of taxes.” Tracy v. Cnty. of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 489 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Pa. 1985) (emphasis added). “It is a fundamental provision of both our state and federal constitutions that no person shall be deprived of property except by the law of the land or due process of law,” which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Hess v. Westerwick, 76 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. 1950). Such notice must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. 

The General Assembly has established, via the Law, what notice is reasonably required prior to selling a property at tax sale. These notice requirements are mandatory and must be strictly construed. Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co. v. Luzerne Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 56 A.3d 36, 39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). One of these mandatory requirements is a tax claim bureau’s obligation to make reasonable efforts to find an owner pursuant to Section 607.1 when mailed notice is returned or when there is doubt that the owner received such notice. 

UC - voluntary quit - unjust accusations, abusive treatment, use of profanity

Spectrum Community Services, Inc. v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – May 24, 2021 – unreported memorandum decision**

Claimant held to have had necessitous and compelling reason to quit her job, where her employer had unjustly accused her of dishonesty and addressed her in abusive and profane manner over a period of time.

From the opinion –

Under Section 402(b) of the UC Law, “[w]here a claimant has voluntarily quit employment, in order to obtain benefits, [the claimant] must show that [the claimant] left [his or her] employment for necessitous and compelling reasons.” Collier Stone Co. v. UCBR., 876 A.2d 481, 484 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Here, it is undisputed that Claimant voluntarily left her employment. Thus, the burden is on Claimant to show that she had a necessitous and compelling reason to do so. Latzy v. UCBR, 487 A.2d 121, 123 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). 

To satisfy this burden, Claimant must demonstrate that: “(1) circumstances existed which produced real and substantial pressure to terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel a reasonable person to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and (4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve [her] employment.” Brunswick Hotel & Conf. Ctr., LLC v. UCBR, 906 A.2d 657, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). Whether a claimant had necessitous and compelling reasons for terminating his employment is a question of law subject to review by this Court. Wise v. UCBR., 111 A.3d 1256, 1261 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). 

“Mere dissatisfaction with one’s working conditions does not constitute cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for terminating one’s employment.” Brunswick Hotel, 906 A.2d at 660. Likewise, “[p]ersonality conflicts, absent an intolerable work atmosphere, do not amount to a necessitous and compelling cause for leaving one’s employment.” Wert v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 41 A.3d 937, 940 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). However, the Court has recognized that “abusive conduct” may constitute a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily quit. First Fed. Sav. Bank v. UCBR., 957 A.2d 811, 816 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). This includes being called names or being “subject to criticism and ridicule from [a superior] that was uncalled for and incorrect.” Id. at 817. Similarly, an accusation of dishonesty or theft can serve as a necessitous and compelling reason to justify voluntarily quitting. Arufo, 391 A.2d at 45. Even “a single accusation, if the circumstances surrounding the incident warrant, may produce sufficient pressure to terminate employment that would compel a reasonable person to act.” Sol Neft Sports v. UCBR, 610 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (emphasis omitted). 

In addition to the above cases, the Court relied heavily on Arufo v. UCBR, 391 A.2d 43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) and Indiana Univ. of Pa. v. UCBR, 202 A.3d 195 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)

+++++++++++

**An unreported, non-precedential Commonwealth Court case can be cited for its persuasive value but is not binding precedent.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

MDJ appeals - proof of service of notice of appeal - dismissal

Kelley v. Harr – Pa. Super. – May 4, 2021 – non-precedential decision**

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A02032-21m%20-%20104765738134426335.pdf?cb=1

 

Held: Court refused to reinstate Plaintiff’s appeal, which was dismissed when defendant/appellee filed praecipe for dismissal when plaintiff/appellant failed to file proof of service of notice of appeal in this civil, non-LT case.

 

MDJ Rule 1005(B) requires an appellant to file “proof of service of copies of the notice of appeal. . . within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal.” Appellant failed to do so.  MDJ Rule 1006 provides a mechanism for an appellee to have the appeal stricken “upon praecipe, for failure to file a proof of service: ‘Upon failure of the appellant to comply with Rule 1004A or Rule 10056, the prothonotary shall, upon praecipe of the appellee, mark the appeal stricken from the record." Pa.R.C.P.M.J.D. 1006. 

 

However, Rule 1006 also allows the Court of Common Pleas to reinstate the appeal "upon good cause shown." Id. In this usage, "good cause" "require[s] an appealing party to proffer some legally sufficient reason for reinstating the appeal." Slaughter , 636 A.2d at 1123 (citing Anderson v. Centennial Homes, Inc., 594 A.2d 737, 739 (Pa.Super. 1991)). Appellant filed to provide such proof. Pro se status, without more, is not good cause.

 

Moreover, appellant here did not provide any record evidence of actually having served the notice of appeal, regardless of the failure to provide proof of any such service.

 

++++++

 

 

**An unreported, non-precedential Superior Court case decided after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its persuasive value, but it is not binding precedent.  See 210 Pa. Code 65.37(B).

 

 

 

 

federal courts - motion to proceed anonymously

Jane Doe v. College of New Jersey – 3d Cir. – May 18, 2021

https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/202469p.pdf

 

Motion to proceed anonymously denied.

 

From the opinion –

 

We turn to the non-exhaustive, multi-factor test we employed in Doe v. Megless, Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) where we asked whether the plaintiff presented a reasonable fear of severe harm meriting an exception to “the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” 654 F.3d at 408 (citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties[.]”). The factors in favor of anonymity include: 

(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant's identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant's identities; (5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives. 

Megless, 654 F.3d at 409 (citation omitted). The factors advising against anonymity include: 

(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants; (2) whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant's identities, beyond the public's interest which is normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated. 

Id. (citation omitted).