drivers license - suspension - extraordinary delay between conviction and suspension

Commonwealth, Dept. of Transportation v. Middaugh – Pa. S.Ct. – January 20,2021

 

Majority         http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-7-2020mo%20-%20104664745125444695.pdf?cb=1

Concur           http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-7-2020cdo%20-%20104664745125444731.pdf?cb=1

Dissent   http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-7-2020do%20-%20104664745125444810.pdf?cb=1

 

 

Held: 

Trial court upholding driver appeal affirmed. In reaching its holding, the court relied on Gingrich v. PennDOT, 134 A.3d 528 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016), which set forth the following rule for situations where the delay is attributable to a court clerk rather than PennDOT: 

[W]here . . . a licensee is able to demonstrate all of the following: [(1)] a conviction that is not reported for an extraordinarily extended period of time; [(2)] the licensee has [no further violations of the Vehicle Code] for an extended period; and [(3)] prejudice, it may be appropriate for common pleas to grant relief. 

Id. at 535. Applying the standard, the trial court found that the 28-month delay was extraordinary, Appellee did not have any further violations during that period, and Appellee had demonstrated he would be prejudiced by the lateness of the suspension, particularly in view of his medical condition and the impact a suspension would have on it. 

 

res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)

In re Coatesville Area School District – Pa. S.Ct. – January 19,2021 

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-72-2020mo%20-%20104664752125446022.pdf?cb=1

 

This is a tax assessment case, not really relevant to legal aid practice, but it contains a nice summary of the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion).

 

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Res judicata – literally, a thing adjudicated – is a judicially-created doctrine. See Estate of Bell, 463 Pa. 109, 113, 343 A.2d 679, 681 (1975). It bars actions on a claim, or any part of a claim, which was the subject of a prior action, or could have been raised in that action. See R/S Financial Corp. v. Kovalchick, 552 Pa. 584, 588, 716 A.2d 1228, 1230 (1998); Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 563, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (1995). This Court has explained that 

[r]es judicata, or claim preclusion, prohibits parties involved in prior, concluded litigation from subsequently asserting claims in a later action that were raised, or could have been raised, in the previous adjudication. The doctrine of res judicata developed to shield parties from the burden of re-litigating a claim with the same parties, or a party in privity with an original litigant, and to protect the judiciary from the corresponding inefficiency and confusion that re-litigation of a claim would breed. 

Wilkes ex rel. Mason v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 587 Pa. 590, 607, 902 A.2d 366, 376 (2006) (citation omitted); see also R/S Financial, 552 Pa. at 588, 716 A.2d at 1230 (“The purposes of the rule are the protection of the litigant from the dual burden of relitigating an issue with the same party or his privy and the promotion of judicial economy through prevention of needless litigation.” (quoting Foster v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 544 Pa. 387, 404, 676 A.2d 652, 661 (1996))).

Four elements common to both actions, sometimes termed the “four identities,” see, e.g., Estate of Tower, 463 Pa. 93, 100, 343 A.2d 671, 674 (1975), must be present for res judicata to apply: “an identity of issues, an identity of causes of action, identity of persons and parties to the action, and identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued.” In re Iulo, 564 Pa. 205, 210, 766 A.2d 335, 337 (2001) (citing Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 463 Pa. 567, 574, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (1975)). 

Collateral estoppel is similar in that it bars re-litigation of an issue that was decided in a prior action, although it does not require that the claim as such be the same. For example, if, in a breach of contract action, the defendant asserts that the contract is invalid because of fraud, but the contract is ruled valid and the defendant is found liable, in a future lawsuit against the same party alleging a separate breach of the same contract the defendant is precluded from asserting the invalidity of the contract based on fraud. SeeRESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §27, cmt. a, illus. 2 (1982). 

Collateral estoppel will only apply where: the issue is the same as in the prior litigation; the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior action; and the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. See Rue v. K-Mart Corp., 552 Pa. 13, 17, 713 A.2d 82, 84 (1998). In some renditions, courts add a fifth element, namely, that resolution of the issue in the prior proceeding was essential to the judgment. See, e.g., Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 484, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). 

Collateral estoppel is premised on practical considerations that overlap substantially with those of res judicata. These include avoiding the “cost and vexation” of repetitive litigation, conserving judicial resources, “and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[ing] reliance on adjudication.” Id. at 484, 889 A.2d at 51. 

civil procedure - I.D. of parties - pseudonyms - federal court

Doe v. Moravian College – ED Pa. – January 8,2021

 

https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/21D0044P.pdf

 

Plaintiff allowed to proceed with pseudonym is case involving sexual assault under F.R. Civ. P. 10 (a)

 

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n. 1-  Plaintiff Jane Doe, a college freshman, alleges that she was sexually assaulted on her college campus by fellow students and their guest. She brings this action against her alleged attackers, for the assault, and against the college, for not protecting her. See ECF No. 4 (Amended Complaint). The plaintiff is seeking the Court’s permission to continue litigating this matter under a pseudonym. ECF No. 17. Only one of the individual defendants opposes the motion but, in the alternative, requests that he be permitted to also use a pseudonym in this matter. ECF Nos. 24, 31. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires parties to identify themselves in their pleadings. Doe v. Meglass, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing to Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)). “Courts have explained that [Rule 10(a)] illustrates ‘the principle that judicial proceedings, civil as well as criminal, are to be conducted in public.’” Id. (quoting Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997)). Part of the public nature of judicial proceedings is the identification of the parties. See id. (“Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness.” (quoting Blue Cross, 112 F.3d at 872)). Therefore, a litigant’s “use of a pseudonym ‘runs afoul of the public's common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Despite Rule 10(a)’s identification requirement, courts have the discretion to permit litigants to proceed anonymously “in exceptional cases.” See id. The litigant must demonstrate that they have “a reasonable fear of severe harm that outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings.” Id. The Third Circuit has endorsed a set of non-exhaustive factors when balancing these competing interests. Id. at 409. The factors that favor a litigant’s request to proceed anonymously are: 

(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant's identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant's identities; (5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives. 

Id. (quoting Doe v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1997). The factors that weigh against a litigant’s request for anonymity include: 

(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants; (2) whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant's identities, beyond the public's interest which is normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated. 

Id. (quoting Provident Life, 176 F.R.D. at 467). Considering the public’s interest in open court proceedings, courts have found that there is “an independent duty to determine whether ‘exceptional circumstances’ warrant a departure from the normal method of proceeding’ in federal litigation.” Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. New Kensington-Arnold School Dist., 2012 WL 6629643, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2012) (quoting Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Doe v. County of Lehigh, 2020 WL 7319544, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 11, 2020) (Leeson, J.). 

After careful review, the Court finds that the factors balance in favor of permitting plaintiff to continue litigating this case under a pseudonym. Weighing in favor of pseudonymity are the plaintiff’s attempts to keep her identity confidential; her fear of increased embarrassment, humiliation, and stigmatization as a rape victim that would compound the “severe emotional damage” caused by the alleged actions of the defendants if her identity was disclosed; the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the identities of sexual assault victims; her assertion that she will refuse to continue to pursue this litigation should she be precluded from using a pseudonym; the plaintiff’s lack of illegitimate motive; and the fact that no public figure is involved in this litigation. The remaining factors, such as the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants, do not outweigh the interests in favor of pseudonymity. For these reasons, the plaintiff’s motion will be granted. 

n. 2 Similarly, the factors weigh in favor of allowing the defendant to also proceed using a pseudonym. 

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This case is also reported in the PLAN Legal Update  http://planupdate.blogspot.com/ , which is searchable and can be accessed without a password.