Jamie One, LLC v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court
– January 4, 2019 – unreported** memorandum opinion
The court rejected the employer’s
appeal and upheld the grant of benefits.
In the course of its opinion, not otherwise of special value, the court
discussed the argument that the Board capriciously disregarded competent,
relevant evidence in reaching its decision.
The court discussed this as follows:
Disturbing
an agency’s adjudication for a capricious disregard of evidence is appropriate
only where the fact finder has refused to resolve conflicts in the evidence,
has not made essential credibility determinations or has completely ignored evidence
without comment. Wise v. UCBR, 111 A.3d 1256, 1263 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). An
appellate court conducting a review for capricious disregard of material,
competent evidence may not reweigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations. Id
Here
is the relevant discussion from
Wise v. UCBR – 111 A. 3d 1256, 1262-3
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015)
A
capricious disregard of evidence occurs where the fact finder willfully and
deliberately disregards competent and relevant evidence that one of ordinary
intelligence could not possibly have avoided in reaching a result. Spencer v. City of Reading Charter Board, 97 A.3d 834, 842 (Pa.Cmwlth.2014). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained that review for capricious disregard
of competent evidence is an "appropriate component of appellate
consideration in every case in which such question is properly before the
court." Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Appeal
Board (Marlowe), 571 Pa. 189, 812
A.2d 478, 487 (2002). In Wintermyer, the Supreme
Court noted that where there is substantial evidence to support the agency's
factual findings and those findings support the legal conclusions, "it
should remain a rare instance in which an appellate court would disturb an
adjudication based upon capricious disregard." Id. at 487
n. 14. The standard 1263*1263 announced in Wintermyer applies
whether one or both parties present evidence and, thus, overruled this Court's
earlier-announced paradigm that appellate review for capricious disregard of
evidence was limited to the circumstance where the burdened party was the only
party to present evidence and did not prevail. See, e.g., Lautek Corporation v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 138 Pa. Cmwlth. 547, 588
A.2d 1007, 1010 (1991).
Disturbing an agency's adjudication
for a capricious disregard of evidence is appropriate only where the
fact-finder has refused to resolve conflicts in the evidence, has not made
essential credibility determinations or has completely ignored overwhelming
evidence without comment. Hinkle v. City of Philadelphia,881 A.2d 22, 27 (Pa.Cmwlth.2005). In Hinkle, this
Court, citing Wintermyer,explained that:
"Capricious
disregard" then is just another name for the agency abusing its discretion
and is an error of law when the agency fails to give an indication that it has
examined countervailing substantive testimony that had to be considered at
arriving at its decision.
The capricious disregard
standard then is nothing more than a shorthand way of referring to an amalgam
of existing overlapping legal and constitutional standards mentioned above that
safeguard against arbitrariness by state and local administrative agencies by
requiring a meaningful explanation of why the losing party's overwhelming
evidence was not accepted.
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