legislative power -improper delegation - lack of standards

West Philadelphia Achievement Charter School v. School District of Philadelphia – Feb. 16, 2016 - Pa. Supreme Court

majority (3)    http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-1-2016mo%20-%201025472856152411.pdf?cb=1

dissent (2)      http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-1-2016do%20-%201025472856152420.pdf?cb=1

Held: Sec. 696 of School Distress Law, 24 P.S. 6-691(c), violated Article II, sec. 1 (legislative power vested in General Assembly), because it gave power to a non-legislative body, without establishing adequate standards of restraint on the use of that power.

Article II, sec. 1 – legislative power – non-delegation

Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that “[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” PA. CONST. art. II, §1.  The nondelegation

rule has been described as a “natural corollary” to this text. . . . . The precept, which has its origins in the separation-of-powers doctrine . . . is of early lineage, see Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.), and was expressed by political theorists who influenced the framers of the Constitution. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §141 (1690) (observing that legislative power “consists of the power to make laws, not to make legislators,” and indicating, moreover, that the legislature is not free to transfer its lawmaking powers to any other body because such power was delegated to the legislature by the people); cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *168 (1753) (remarking that a member of the House of Commons could not delegate his vote to a proxy “as he himself is but a proxy for a multitude of other people”). See generally BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS XI:6 (1748) (suggesting that political liberty requires a separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers), quoted in THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).

Lack of standards – adequately defined standards

Legislative power may be delegated, so long as there has been a legislative establishment of primary objectives or standards and the entrustment to another entity to “fill up the details under the general [legislative] provisions[.]” . . . . So long as adequately-defined standards andmethodologies are provided by the Legislature, the administrative action involved may be as narrow as the grant or denial of a license, see, e.g., Casino Free Phila. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 594 Pa. 202, 934 A.2d 1249 (2007), or as broad as the setting and adjustment of minimum and maximum wholesale and retail prices of a commodity to ensure fairness to producers and consumers and to regulate the supply of that commodity. See, e.g., Rohrer v. Milk Control Bd., 322 Pa. 257, 186 A. 336 (1936)

In the instant case,  the legislature had a salutary goal, but the means it chose to effectuate it were overly broad, basically carte blanche powers to suspend virtually any combination of provisions of the School Code – a statute covering a broad range of topics.  The Court’s decisions addressing the non-delegation rule have never deemed such an unconstrained grant of authority to be constitutionally valid.    The Distress Law also lacks any mechanism to limit the SRC’s actions so as to “protect[] against administrative arbitrariness and caprice.” Tosto v. Pa. Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 12, 331 A.2d 198, 203 (1975); William Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 346 A.2d 269 (1975) (plurality);  Holgate Bros., 331 Pa. at 260, 200 A. at 675; Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund v. Commonwealth, 583 Pa. 275, 331, 877 A.2d 383, 417 (2005) (“PAGE”); Blackwell v. State Ethics Comm’n, 523 Pa. 347, 359, 567 A.2d 630, 636 (1989));  Bell Tel.v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 116, 21 A.2d 912, 915-16 (1941)).

----------------------

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)

UC - voluntary quit - temporary refusal to return to full-time work after childbirth

Havrilchak v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – December 14, 2015 – reported by order of February 14, 2016

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/1054cd15_2-18-16.pdf#search=%22havrilchak%22

Woman returning to work after pregnancy held to have quit her job without good cause when her request for a limited period of part-time work was refused and she rejected employer’s offer of full-time work.  The employer was Physician’s Health Alliance.

The court saw claimant’s request as one to “unilaterially change the terms of her employment from full-time to part-time,” Senkinc v. UCBR, 601 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).   Because Employer offered Claimant full-time employment, which she refused, the totality of the circumstances reflect a voluntary quit, not a termination. Id.; see Andrevich v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 658 C.D. 2010, filed March 7, 2011) (unreported), 2011 WL 10843696 (claimant’s refusal to return to work full-time after maternity leave constitutes a voluntary quit). As a consequence, Claimant is ineligible for benefits unless she can establish a necessitous and compelling reason for leaving her employment.

No good cause to have refused employer offer - Claimant asserted that a medical condition precluded her from returning to work full-time but didn't present evidence of that.  In her questionnaire, Claimant stated she left Employer for health reasons -- “post-partum depression anxiety.   A claimant has the burden to establish a medical condition as a compelling reason to leave work. Genetin v. UCBR, 451 A.2d 1353 (Pa. 1982).   Part of that burden involves submitting documentation substantiating a claimant’s medical condition to her employer. Bonanni v. UCBR, 519 A.2d 532 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986).   Here, the record contains no indication that Claimant was unable to return to work full-time based on medical necessity.  Claimant admitted her doctor released her to return to work.

Claimant gave birth on October 18, was released to return to FT work on January 3, and was given an extra three weeks to recuperate.   Based on a “totality of circumstances,” the court rejected her argument that she had been fired, or that she had good cause to refuse the employer offer of full-time work.

----------------

N.B.  This opinion was not initially reported.   It was later reported on motion of the UCBR.  Claimant was pro se.

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)

UC - appeal - elec. transmission - timeliness - Board recorded receipt w/in appeal period

Chartiers Community Mental Health & Retardation Center v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – March 10, 2016

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/1677CD15_3-10-16.pdf?cb=1

Court affirmed UCBR decision that claimant’s appeal was timely under 34 Pa. Code 101.82(b) where the UCBR recorded receipt of the email appeal within required period, even though the Board was unable to open the secure message box in the email.    On the date it received the appeal, the Board emailed claimant’s counsel that:  a) it couldn’t open the secure message box; b) claimant should provide the information as an attachment or in the body of an email.  “The Board did not provide a deadline” foe doing any of this.

Citing  Mountain Home Beagle Media v. UCBR, 955 A.2d 484 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), Roman-Hutchinson v. UCBR, 972 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009), and McClean v. UCBR, 908 A.2d 956 (Pa. Cwmlth. 2006), the Board and Court held that the appeal was timely under 34 Pa. Code 101.82(b), because the Board recorded receipt of the appeal within the required time. 

Even though an appellant who uses electronic transmission accepts the risk of non-receipt, “a risk...is not a certainty.  As long as the electronic transmission is received prior to the expiration of the appeal period, the regulation affords the Board discretion to instruct the employer or claimant on how to proceed if there is an issue with readability. This is not unlike this Court’s own internal operating procedures, which direct the Chief Clerk to time-stamp written communication that evidences an intention to appeal with the date of receipt and to advise the party by letter of  the procedures necessary to perfect an appeal, as well as the time within which the party must file a fully conforming petition for review in order to preserve the date of receipt of the original non-conforming request to appeal. See Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure No. 211, 210 Pa. Code. § 69.211 (Petition for Review; Clarification). The Board acted fully within its discretion in directing Claimant to resend the unreadable segments of her email once it had received her appeal.

--------------------------

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)

UC - willful misconduct - reporting absence - reasonable steps

Health Care Stat, Inc. v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – March 2, 2016 – unreported memorandum opinion*

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/906CD15_3-2-16.pdf?cb=1

No willful misconduct where claimant reported her absence in a reasonable way, even though not strictly in accordance with the employer rule.

An employer has not established willful misconduct if an employee has reported an absence in a reasonable manner, even if the manner is not in accord with the employer’s rule. Buscemi v. UCBR, 485 A.2d 1238 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985). Here, substantial evidence exists to support the Board’s conclusion that Claimant made a reasonable effort to notify Employer that she would not be present on a particular day. . . .Further, Employer failed to present evidence that an established policy regarding call off procedures dictated that only notification to a supervisor or the Director would suffice.

-----------------------

* An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)

tax sale - MCTLA - posting not proper - sale set aside

City of Philadelphia v. Morris Park Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses – Cmwlth. Court -3-7-16 – ** unreported memorandum opinion

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/264CD15_3-7-16.pdf?cb=1

Held:  Notice of tax sale inadequate and sale set aside where

 - city knew that service by mail had not been accomplished

 - affidavit of posting did not include information about date, time, place of posting nor any photo of posted notice and thus did not satisfy the MCTLA statute or due process requirements

* The purpose of a sheriff’s sale under the MCTLA “is not to strip an owner of his or her property but to collect municipal claims.” City of Philadelphia v. Manu, 76 A.3d 601, 606 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013); see also Fernandez v. Tax Claim Bureau of Northampton County, 925 A.2d 207, 215 n.18 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).  The primary purpose of a taxing authority is to “insure payment of taxes. Although selling of the property may end up being the ultimate means used toward achieving that end, it is not the end itself.”).

* Strict complaince required - Section 39.2 of the MCTLA mandates strict service requirements that the City must follow for a court to gain the jurisdiction necessary to authorize a sheriff’s sale, including service of the petition and rule to show cause why the property should not be sold by “posting a true and correct copy of the petition and rule on the most public part of the property.” 53 P.S. § 7193.2(a)(1); City of Philadelphia v. Schaffer, 974 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). Strict compliance with the service mandates of the MCTLA protects the procedural due process rights of all parties involved by guaranteeing that they receive notice and an opportunity to be heard and protects an owner against deprivation of his or her property without substantive due process of law. Manu, 76 A.3d at 606; First Union National Bank v. F.A. Realty Investors Corp., 812 A.2d 719, 726 (Pa. Super. 2000); see also Tracy v. Chester County, Tax Claim Bureau, 489 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Pa. 1985).

* Duty of court to conduct independent inquiry -- A sheriff’s sale pursuant to the MCTLA is conducted under the auspices of the court and it is the court’s duty to conduct an independent inquiry to ensure that the MCTLA has been complied with, and that the due process rights guaranteed by the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions are adequately safeguarded.  U.S. National Bank Association v. United Hands Community Land Trust, __ A.3d __, __ (Pa. Cmwlth No. 2237 C.D. 2014, filed December 15, 2015), 2015 WL 8718035, slip op. at 5; Manu, 76 A.3d at 606.

* Presumption of regularity of posting – does not apply where neither affidavit nor testimony shows date, time, place or posting.   The presumption of of regularity afforded a public official cannot overcome a statutory mandate. Unlike the RETSL, the statutory language in the MCTLA requires posting of “the petition and rule on the most public part of the property.” 53 P.S. § 7193.2(a)(1) (emphasis added). There is no evidence in the record that the petition and rule were posted on the most public part of the Property.  U.S. National Bank Association held that the presumption of regularity cannot be applied to private individuals; the facts in this case demonstrate the limits of the application of the presumption of regularity to public officials.

* Posting – policy – Posting is of critical importance where notice by mail was not successful - In a first class city in this Commonwealth, proper posting is not only an additional reasonable step that should be taken to adequately safeguard constitutional due process once a municipal authority has knowledge that service through the mail was ineffective, but a basic and longstanding statutory obligation.  There is no overestimating the great challenges facing the City in its efforts to collect municipal taxes. In recognition of that challenge, the City was granted the power to take private property, a power so extraordinary under our system of governance that it is constitutionally restrained. In accordance with this constitutional restraint, the General Assembly established strict procedural requirements that a municipality must follow to exercise its power to take private property from one and sell it to another. The momentous nature of the act of taking property from one and selling it to another to collect municipal taxes likewise requires the courts to examine the record in a sheriff’s sale with a close, independent and vigorous eye to ensure that the procedural requirements for notice of the sale have been adhered to and due process of law has been adequately safeguarded. The Trial Court had a duty to conduct an independent inquiry to ascertain if the City had fulfilled its statutory and constitutional obligations; by failing to do so here, the Trial Court abused its discretion, and by relying on facts not in evidence, the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that it gained jurisdiction to authorize the sale of the Property for the collection of municipal taxes.  Accordingly, the order of the Trial Court is reversed and the tax sale is set aside.

-----------------------

** An unreported Commonwealth Court case may not be cited binding precedent but can be cited for its persuasive value.  See 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(b) and Pa. R.A.P.  3716

If the case is old, the link may have become stale and may not work, but you can use the case name, court, and date to find the opinion in another source (e.g., Westlaw, Lexis, Google Scholar)

custody - full-faith and credit - foreign judgment

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/15-648_d18e.pdf

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

V. L. v. E. L., ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

No. 15–648 Decided March 7, 2016

PER CURIAM.

A Georgia court entered a final judgment of adoption making petitioner V. L. a legal parent of the children that she and respondent E. L. had raised together from birth. V. L. and E. L. later separated while living in Alabama. V. L. asked the Alabama courts to enforce the Georgia judgment and grant her custody or visitation rights. The Alabama Supreme Court ruled against her, holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution does not require the Alabama courts to respect the Georgia judgment. That judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is now reversed by this summary disposition, [citing well-established full-faith-and-credit jurisprudence.

V. L. and E. L. are two women who were in a relation-ship from approximately 1995 until 2011. Through as- sisted reproductive technology, E. L. gave birth to a child named S. L. in 2002 and to twins named N. L. and H. L. in 2004. After the children were born, V. L. and E. L. raised them together as joint parents.  V. L. and E. L. eventually decided to give legal status to the relationship between V. L. and the children by having V. L. formally adopt them.   The Georgia court determined that V. L. had complied with the applicable requirements of Georgia law, and entered a final decree of adoption allowing V. L. to adopt the children and recognizing both V. L. and E. L. as their legal parents.