open records - right to know law - request must be addressed to agency open-records officer

Gaming Control Board v. Office of Open Records – Pa. Supreme Court – November 10, 2014

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-43-2014mo%20-%201020067152800974.pdf?cb=1

In this open-records matter, we are called upon to construe Section 703 of the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL), 65 P.S. § 67.703 (“Section 703”), setting forth the  requirements for written RTKL requests for access to public records, to determine proper application of the provision which directs that all such requests “must be addressed to the open-records officer.”

 

For reasons stated below, we hold that in order to establish a valid RTKL request sufficient to trigger appellate rights from a nonresponse under the RTKL, the requestor must address his request to the respective open-records officer as mandated in Section 703.  In the case at bar, the requester addressed his request to a press aide, not the open records officer.

 

Commonwealth Court 4-3 decision reversed.

 

custody - jurisdiction - UCCJEA sec. 5423

TAM v. SLM and DMS – Superior Court – November 7, 2014

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A29043-14o.pdf?cb=2

Non-custodial father's complaint to modify was properly addressed to Pennsylvania court, where

            - original order was entered in Tennessee in 2004

            - Mother was missing – disappearance being investigaged as homicice

            - pursuant to Tennessee order in 2011, maternal grandmother had physical custody of the  child in Pennsylvania , which is home state under secs. 5421 and 5423

            - grandmother's assertion that father was judge-shopping irrelevant to jurisdictional issue.*

* Tennessee judge "has found the father to be a despicable individual"

terroristic threats - out-of-state threats - jurisdiction

Commonwealth v. Vergilio – Superior Court – November 6, 2014

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A24033-14o%20-%201020022242789246.pdf?cb=1

Pennsylvania court has juridiction over crime of terroristic threats, 18 Pa. C.S. 2706(a)(1), where the plaintiff was in Pennsylvania and heard the threats of defendant, who was in New Jersey, on the telephone.

Current technology that creates a “seemingly unlimited ability to connect people near and far.”  A contrary holding would render an offender who utters a threatening message in one state immune from suit in any and all other states to which he intentionally sends his illegal communication.

Long-standing principles in this Commonwealth hold that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects[7] within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm. . . .”

Although our extensive research of this issue did not reveal any Pennsylvania caselaw that has addressed the specific issue presented here,8 we find the pertinent caselaw of other jurisdictions to be (citing caselaw from Kansas, Minnesota, Hawaii).

employment - wrongful discharge - worker's comp.

Owens v. Lehigh Valley Hospital – Cmwlth. Court – November 7, 2014

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/472CD14_11-7-14.pdf?cb=1

A former at-will employee who alleged wrongful termination for having reported a work-related injury and having received benefits states a claim for relief for wrongful discharge, even if she has not filed a claim petition.

Section 315 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 602. This provision recognizes that payment to an employee for a work-related injury by an employer may be made without a claim petition being filed, and that such agreements do not deprive an employee of the statutory right to file a claim petition should the agreement fail to sufficiently compensate the employee.

The Workers’ Compensation Act reflects both the historical quid pro quo between employers and employees, and the public policy of the Commonwealth. If an employer could discharge an employee for a work-related injury because the employee received payment in lieu of compensation, rather than compensation administered by the Bureau, the public policy embodied by the Workers’ Compensation Act would be undermined. . . .

Such a holding would create an incentive for employers to steer employees away from filing workers’ compensation petitions in order to retain the right to discharge the employee due to the injury, the exact harm the General Assembly intended to prohibit by enacting the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Appellant may ultimately be unable to carry her burden to establish that her injury was work-related and that the payments she received were for this injury. Employer may be able to demonstrate that there was a separate, plausible, and legitimate reason for Appellant’s discharge. However, these are considerations beyond the reach of preliminary objections; on demurrer, Appellant’s claim is sufficient.

 

federal diaability benfits - attachment - alimony/support

Uveges v. Uveges – Superior Court – November 5, 2014

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Superior/out/J-A29021-14o%20-%201020001842783015.pdf?cb=1

Husband's disability benefits under federal statute, Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 USC 901 et seq., may be attached to pay his alimony obligation, despite anti-attachment clause of LHWCA, because

- alimony is not a debt under42 USC 659 (SSA  garnishment provision), which allows attachment for support/alimony

- wife is not a creditor

- LWHCA disability payments are "remuneration for employment" under sec. 659

UC - financial eligibility

Logan v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – November 10, 2014

http://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/586CD14_11-10-14.pdf?cb=1

Claimant not financially eligible for UC benefits, because

            - her only income during her base year was worker's comp. benefits, which are not "wages" – Swackhammer v. UCBR, 484 A2d 851 (`984)

            - under alternate base year analysis under 77 PS 71(b), wages she had earned in otheere quarters had already been used for payment of benefits under a prior application and could not be used again in subsequent application. Lewis v. UCBR, 454 A2d 1191