statutes - passage - single-subject - Art. III, sec. 3 - Pa. Constitution

Sernovitz v.  Dershaw-   Pa. Super. November 14, 2012

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/A22023_12.pdf

Statute barring claim for "wrongful life" held to be unconstitutional because of violation of the single-subject rule of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Article III, sec. 3, which states that

“No bill shall be passed containing more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title, except a general appropriation bill or a bill codifying or compiling the law or a part thereof.” PA. CONST. art. III, § 3.7 The purpose of the creation of Article III was “to place restraints on the legislative process and encourage an open, deliberative and accountable government.” City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth, 575 Pa. 542, 573, 838 A.2d 566, 585 (2003) (citation omitted).

This Article was included in the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874, which was drafted in an atmosphere of extreme distrust of the legislative body and of fear of the growing power of corporations, especially the great railroad corporations. It was the product of a convention

whose prevailing mood was one of reform[.] […] [A]s these mandates survived the more recent constitutional revisions, they continue to reflect important policies relating to the nature of the deliberative process. Id. at 573-74, 838 A.2d at 585-86 (internal citations and quotations

omitted).

The single-subject requirement of Article III, Section 3 serves a variety of purposes, including: (1) preventing the attachment of unpopular riders that would not become laws on their own to popular bills that are sure to pass;8 (2) providing for a more considered review of bills brought before the General Assembly, as a bill addressing a variety of subjects is less likely to get such attention; and (3) protecting the integrity of the Governor’s veto power.9 Id. at 574, 575 n.18, 838 A.2d at 586, 586 n.18.

UC - wages - full-time student employed by school s/he is attending

Miller v. UCBR – Cmwlth. Court – November 13, 2012

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/751CD12_11-13-12.pdf

Wages earned by a full-time student who worked part time as a lecturer are not includable as UC wages under 43 P.S. §753(l)(4)(10)(B), which says that employment shall not include:  Service performed in the employ of a school, college or university if such service is performed (i) by a student who is enrolled and is regularly attending classes at such school, college or university . . . .

In Knee v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 415 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980), Knee was registered as a full-time dissertation student, having completed her formal classroom studies, and was preparing for her comprehensive examinations. The UCBR excluded the wages she earned while she was preparing for her comprehensive examinations and working as a teaching fellow because she was enrolled as a full-time dissertation student at that time. Id. at 1009. This court affirmed, finding that Knee was a full-time dissertation student and was not finished with her studies. Id.

Here, the UCBR found that Claimant was employed as a part-time lecturer while he was enrolled as a full-time student working on his dissertation, from August 23, 2010, through May 5, 2011. (UCBR’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 1-3.) Claimant was registered as a full-time student while completing the dissertation portion of the doctoral program at PSU. Therefore, according to Knee, Claimant was not eligible for unemployment benefits. The UCBR did not err in excluding Claimant’s earnings.

UC - sexual harassment - vol. quit

Consolidated Scrap v. UCBR –  November 8, 2012 – unpublished memorandum opinion

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/567CD12_11-8-12.pdf

Employer argues that Claimant calculatedly walked away from her job because she disliked Employer’s chosen course of investigation and quit after Employer took prompt and effective steps to end the conduct about which she complained .

However, the HRA admitted, at the hearing and in her memorandum to Claimant, that Employer’s proposed remedy would have forced Claimant to have daily contact with the individual who had been her harasser, and was continuing to harass her. Obviously, Employer utterly failed to provide Claimant a workplace where she could work without fear of further harassment and/or retaliation.

We find that Claimant’s unwillingness to continue to work in contact with her harasser was reasonable and does not show any lack of good faith effort to preserve employment. Gavlick Personnel Services, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 706 A.2d 406, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (promise of future transfer away from harasser to office which did not yet exist was not a sufficient accommodation where claimant would have to work with harasser in the interim); Mutual Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 654 A.2d 37, 41 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (claimant had shown necessitous and compelling reason to quit her job where employer failed to transfer her to shift where she would not have contact with harasser). “[T]here is a certain level of conduct that an employee will not be required to tolerate and … the Court will not place all responsibility upon an employee to resolve his or her work dilemma.

________________

 

The opinion, though not reported, may be cited "for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent." 210 Pa. Code § 67.55. Citing Judicial Opinions.

employment - ex-military - USERRA

Murphy v. Radnor Twp – ED Pa.  – November 2012

 

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/12D1044P.pdf

 

 

The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”)

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

 

A person who is a member of ... or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed

service shall not be denied initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment,

promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that

membership…or obligation.  38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).

 

It elaborates further: “An employer shall be considered to have engaged in

actions prohibited ... under subsection (a), if the person's membership ... is a motivating factor in

the employer's action, unless the employer can prove that the action would have been taken in

the absence of such membership.” Id. at § 4311(c) (emphasis). Thus the statute, by its terms,

prohibits discriminatory actions where a person’s military status is simply a motivating factor,

not the sole motivating factor.

public housing - eviction - criminal conduct that preceded lease

In addition to the Wellston Housing Authority case, below, see 66 FR 28776, at 28781 (5/24/01), which states the following, on the timing of the illegal activity:

" ...

 For public housing, the 1937 Act (section 6(l)(6)), 42 U.S.C.
1437d(l)(6)) requires that a PHA use leases that ``provide that any
criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to
peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related
criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a [covered
person] shall be cause for termination of tenancy.'' Thus, the illegal
drug use criterion of section 577 of the 1998 Act adds little regarding
eviction of illegal drug users for the public housing program, but adds
a provision on alcohol abuse. None of the statutes explicitly addresses
the timing of the offending activity. The final rule does not include
the phrase ``during the term of the lease'' that would have been added
by the proposed rule, since that phrase is unnecessary. Activity
occurring only prior to the time the leaseholder signed the lease, or
the household member or guest joined the household or became a guest,
would not be a basis for termination of tenancy. The provision on
consideration of rehabilitation is not included in the eviction
provision itself but is included in the regulatory provisions that
address generally the authority of a responsible entity in making
admission and termination decisions (see Secs. 5.852, 960.203, 966.4,
982.310, and 982.552).   "  [emphasis added]
   

 

                        

---

 

131 S.W.3d 378 (2004)

WELLSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
Marilyn MURPHY, Defendant/Respondent.

No. ED 83156.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, Division Three.

March 23, 2004.

 

 

http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13299758204172287375&q=131+sw+3d+378&hl=en&as_sdt=2,39

attorney fees - sec. 1988 - prevailing party - no money damages

Lefemine v. Wideman – US SCt – November 5, 2012

http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-168_9o6b.pdf

Per Curiam

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

STEVEN LEFEMINE, DBA COLUMBIA CHRISTIANS FOR LIFE v. DAN WIDEMAN ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12–168. Decided November 5, 2012

PER CURIAM.

This case concerns the award of attorney’s fees in a suitalleging unconstitutional conduct by government officials. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuitheld that a plaintiff who secured a permanent injunction but no monetary damages was not a “prevailing party” under 42 U. S. C. §1988, and so could not receive fees.That was error. Because the injunction ordered the de­fendant officials to change their behavior in a way thatdirectly benefited the plaintiff, we vacate the Fourth Circuit's decision and remand for further proceedings.