statutes - regulations - delegation of legislative authority

Pennsylvania Builders Assn. v. Dept. of Labor and Industry - Cmwlth. Court - August 25, 2010


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/27MD10_8-25-10.pdf


Plaintiff challenged administrative regulations implementing the state construction code, claiming that the regs were promulated by an improper delegation of legislative authority, contrary to Article II, sec. 1, of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which place the power to make laws exclusively within the province of the state legislature.


The court rejected the challenge, stating the following general principles:

Article II, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that “[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.” Pa. Const. art. II, § 1. “Legislative power has been described as the power to incur public debts, levy or collect taxes or make laws.” Scuoteguazza v. DOT, 399 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979). The legislative power implicated here is the General Assembly’s authority to “make laws.” In Association of Settlement Companies, this Court stated that “Article II, section 1 embodies the fundamental concept that only the General Assembly may make laws, and cannot constitutionally delegate the power to make law to any other branch of government or to any other body or authority.” Assn. of Settlement Companies, 977 A.2d at 1265 (quotation marks omitted). Thus, neither L&I nor ICC may be delegated the General Assembly’s power to make law.

The General Assembly may, however, delegate rule-making authority. This Court has declared that “[t]he Legislature may . . . authorize an agency to carry out the legislative intent described in general terms through rules, regulations and standards established by the agency.” Bortz Coal Co. v. Air Pollution Comm’n, 279 A.2d 388, 392 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971). The General Assembly may delegate: “rulemaking in the sense of creating generalized rules of continuing application on the subject of the legislature’s concern.” Charter Hosp. of Bucks County v. Dep’t of Health, 534 A.2d 1125, 1130 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987). Properly delegated rulemaking authority exists: “where the legislature states a general policy but gives the administrative agent, within limits set by express standards, the power to fill in details of the policy with regulations.” Id.

‘Where the standard fixed by the Legislature is not arbitrary or unlimited, but is definite and reasonable, the delegation of power or discretion will be sustained as constitutional. In considering the standard, regard must be had to the purpose and scope of the Act, the subject matters covered therein, the duties prescribed, and the broad or narrow powers granted, because those factors will often determine whether or not a sufficiently clear, definite and reasonable standard has been established.’ Bortz Coal Co., 279 A.2d at 393 (quoting Dauphin Deposit Trust Co. v. Myers, 388 Pa. 444, 449, 130 A.2d 686, 688 (1957)).

There is not a bright line test for determining exactly how or when rules, regulations or standards developed by administrative agencies or non-governmental parties become improper enactments of substantive law. In Gilligan v. Pennsylvania Horse Racing Commission, 492 Pa. 92, 422 A.2d 487 (1980), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held “[t]he latitude of the standards controlling exercise of the rulemaking powers expressly conferred on [a non-legislative party] must be viewed in light of the broad supervisory task necessary to accomplish the express legislative purpose.” Id., 492 Pa. at 98, 422 A.2d at 490. Ultimately, “[t]he rules, regulations and standards of the regulatory agency must be reasonable, understandable, available, and must not violate the constitutional rights of any citizen.” Bortz Coal Co., 279 A.2d at 392. “[T]he delegation of authority to an agency is construed liberally when the agency [namely, L&I,] is concerned with protecting the public’s health and welfare.” DRB, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor & Industry, 853 A.2d 8, 19 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 585 Pa. 8, 887 A.2d 1216 (2005).

federal courts - abstention - state court general order restricting residential evictions

SKS & Associates v. Dart - 7th Cir. - August 27, 2010


http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/tmp/0N1FFAS9.pdf


Corporate landlord brought sec. 1983 challenge to state court general order restricting residential evictions: (a) during two and a half weeks in the winter holiday season, (b) whenever the outside temperature dropped below 15 degrees Fahrenheit, or (c) whenever the sheriff determined that “extreme weather conditions endanger[ed] the health and welfare of those to be evicted.” The Circuit Court had issued similar orders in previous years. Plaintiff claimed that these orders denied it equal protection and due process and cost it money by delaying evictions.


The district and circuit courts held that the landlord's action was barred by Younger abstention, stating that "[t]o the extent that delays in state court processes adversely affect the plaintiff, it can and must seek remedies through the state courts themselves. . . .Under established abstention doctrines, however, a federal court may, and often must, decline to exercise its jurisdiction where doing so would intrude upon the independence of the state courts and their ability to resolve the cases before them."


Even though not quite a perfect fit, this case implicates the principles of Younger abstention, which requires federal courts to abstain from taking jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that seek to interfere with or interrupt ongoing state proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).


SKS is not a defendant in the pending state eviction actions, but it seeks to have a federal court tell state courts how to manage and when to decide a category of cases pending in the state courts. Federal adjudication of SKS’s claims on their merits would reflect a lack of respect for the state’s ability to resolve the cases properly before its courts. Adjudication here would thus run contrary to the “vital” considerations of comity and federalism, . . . and would be inconsistent with “the traditional reluctance of a federal court to meddle in state court proceedings. . . .We see no “unambiguous authority” that would prevent SKS from presenting its federal claims in the state courts.”

consumer - repossesssion - voluntary v. involuntary

Cosgrove v. CItizens Automobile Finance, Inc. - ED Pa. - August 26, 2010

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D0886P.pdf

Plaintiff brought claims against Defendant for defective notice of repossession of cars, under the UCC and the Pa. Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act (MVSFA) Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the court denied.

The key issue involved the fact that plaintiff voluntarily surrended the vehicles, rather than suffer involuntary repossessions. Defendant claimed that this voluntariness of plaintiff's action took him out of the coverage and protection of the MVSFA. The court rejected this argument:

The Court is not persuaded that the Legislature in section 623(D) [of the MVSFA] intended to distinguish between debtors who surrender their cars and those who lose their cars to involuntary repossession. Voluntary surrender of vehicles with defaulted loans is to be encouraged, as it reduces potential conflicts between debtors and creditors. . . . The Pennsylvania Legislature surely did not mean to punish debtors who choose to cooperate with lenders by depriving them of their right to receive notice of their contractual reinstatement rights, nor insist that debtors fight their lenders tooth and nail in order to receive protection under section 623(D). Many reasonable debtors, when informed by a secured creditor that they are past due on their repayment obligation and that the creditor is planning to seize their car, will not wait for the embarrassment of a “repo man” showing up at their door but will instead return the vehicle. This does not mean that these debtors are ceding all rights to the collateral or that they could not benefit from notice of their contractual right to reinstatement. A person who relinquishes his car in the face of pressure from creditors and a person whose car was seized from him both have the same “forlorn hope that if he is notified, [he] will either acquire enough money to redeem the collateral or send his friends to bid for it.” . . . .Because voluntary surrender is preferred under the law, the Court cannot conclude that the Pennsylvania Legislature intended to deny debtors who surrender their collateral the same rights conferred upon debtors whose property is repossessed. Addressing an analogous issue, courts have concluded that a creditor is not relieved of the obligation of notice of disposition of collateral simply because a debtor voluntarily surrenders his or her property.

housing - sec. 8 - non-payment of rent not a per se "serious violation" of lease

Gray v. Allegheny Co. Housing Authority - Cmwlth. Court - August 25, 2010 - unpublished memorandum opinion


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/19CD10_8-25-10.pdf



There was an administrative grievance hearing, at which it was found that the sec. 8 tenant had committed a "serious violation" of the lease under 24 CFR 982.552(b)(2) by failing to pay rent and suffering an MDJ judgment of eviction. At that hearing, tenant testified that he had paid judgment rent to the landlord and thus satisfied the judgment, which was a "pay and stay" judgment under
MDJ Rule 518.


The tenant then appealed to the court of common pleas, which reversed, holding that the HA hearing officer had erred by concluding that non-payment of rent was a per se "serious violation" of the lease. The court agreed, rejecting the HA's argument that non-payment is rent is always a "serious violation." "The trial court was correct that the hearing officer wrongly applied Section 982.552(b)(2) in holding that an eviction, ipso facto, established a serious lease violation." It found that the HA should have examined the reason for non-payment, stating that "[w]hat is absent from the record in this case, however, is why [the tenant], who had apparently paid his rent in a timely fashion for one year, failed to make one payment and continued not to pay until after he was evicted."


The court also noted that the MDJ entered a pay-and-stay judgment, which tenant could have paid right away but did not, because the landlord wouldn't accept payment and insisted that tenant vacate the property. If true, [tenant's] nonpayment of rent was a harm of the landlord’s making and should not be relevant to [tenant's] eligibility for assistance. Such undue influence, if true, was particularly improper with respect to a tenant who suffered a mental impairment. The record is also absent of evidence about [tenant's] monthly rental history, such as which month he missed his rent payment or by how much. All these facts are relevant to whether [tenant] failed to pay rent."

Ultimately, the court held that "[i]n short, the record is incomplete on the dispositive issue of whether [the tenant] committed a serious violation of the lease. See Cain v. Allegheny County Housing Authority, 986 A.2d 947, 952 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (incomplete record is one that lacks sufficient evidence for an appellate court to rule on the question presented).


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There is a lot of good stuff in this opinion. I think that we should consider asking the court to order its publication, so that it can be cited in the future. Please let me know if you agree or not. The opinion cannot be cited, http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/210/chapter67/chap67toc.html#67.55 Reporting of Opinions; Certain Decisions not to be Cited. Unreported opinions of this court shall not be cited in any opinion of this court or in any brief or argument addressed to it. . . . "

Prevailing Wage Act - public projects

Borough of Schuylkill Haven v. Prevailing Wage Appeals Board


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/921CD09_8-20-10.pdf


The court upheld the Board's determination that the borough's sewer manhome maintenance project came under the Prevaling Wage Act, 43 P.S. §§165-1 - 165-17. whose "purpose is to protect workers on public projects from substandard wages by ensuring that they receive the prevailing minimum wages. Ferguson Electric v. Foley, 115 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 1997). By guaranteeing such protection, the legislation helps to insure the employment of skilled craftsmen on the job. Keystone Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industry, 414 A.2d 1129 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). The Act has been recognized as a remedial statute that is to be liberally construed to affect its purposes. Kulzer Roofing, Inc. v. Department of Labor & Industry, 450 A.2d 259 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1982). Any exceptions to its remedial provisions are to be narrowly construed. DiLucente Corp. v. Pennsylvania Prevailing Wage Appeals Board, 692 A.2d 295 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997). The burden of proof in a grievance proceeding is on the grievant. 34 Pa. Code §213.8(j).

consumer - no govt/sovereign immunity under state consumer protection law

Myer, D., et al., etc. v. Community College of Beaver County, Nos. 20-21 WAP 2009
Opinion By: Saylor, Thomas G.
Posted By: W.D. Prothonotary
	Date Rendered: 8/17/2010
	Date Posted: 8/17/2010
	Opinion Type: Majority Opinion	J-22A&B-2010mo.pdf
	Date Rendered: 8/17/2010
	Date Posted: 8/17/2010
	Opinion Type: Concurring Opinion	J22AB-2010co.pdf

Reversing the Commonwealth Court, 965 A.2d 406, 968 A.2d. 235 (Cmwlth. 1009), the Supreme Court held that claims against a government entity under the state consumer protection law, 73 P.S. sec, 201-1 et seq., were not barried by sovergeign/governmental immunity.


The court agreed with the plaintiff/appellants "that the approach taken by the Commonwealth Court is not sustainable. As Appellants ably explain, the language of the statute conferring governmental immunity, and of that implementing the exceptions, pertains to conduct causing 'injury to a person or property.' 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541, 8542. The Commonwealth Court previously has recognized that these terms reflect the main policy consideration historically underlying tort law, whereas, the central focus of contract law is the protection of bargained-for expectations. See Hazelton Area Sch. Dist. v. Bosak, 671 A.2d 277, 282-83 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). . . .In line with the extant understanding of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, we believe the Legislature centered the immunity there conferred on “injury to a person or property” as a reflection of traditional tort jurisprudence. . . .

civil services - removal - just cause

State Board of Probation and Parole v. State Civil Service Commission (Manson)

Commonwealth Court - August 18, 2010


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1958CD09_8-18-10.pdf


The court affirmed the Commission's decision that the employer Board did not meet its burden of proving just cause for the employee's removal pursuant to section 807 of the Civil Service Act, 71 P.S. §741.807, but did establish just cause for Manson’s suspension under section 803 of the Act, 71 P.S. §741.803. The case involved a missing firearm and an alleged improper relationship with a parolee under Board supervision.

In an appeal challenging the removal of a regular status employee, the appointing authority has the burden of establishing just cause for the personnel action. Mihok v. DPW, 607 A.2d 846 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992).

To show just cause for the removal of a regular status civil service employee, the appointing authority must demonstrate that the actions resulting in the removal are related to an employee’s job performance and touch in some rational and logical manner upon the employee’s competence and ability. Ellerbee-Pryer v. State Civil Service Commission, 803 A.2d 249 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

What constitutes ample just cause for removal is largely a matter of discretion on the part of the head of the department. However, to be sufficient, the cause should be personal to the employee and such as to render the employee unfit for his or her position, thus making dismissal justifiable and for the good of the service. Woods v. State Civil Service Commission, 590 Pa. 337, 912 A.2d 803 (2006). Whether actions of a civil service employee constitute just cause for removal is a question of law fully reviewable by the court. Ellerbee-Pryer.

The Commission is the sole fact finder in civil service cases and has exclusive authority to assess witness credibility and resolve evidentiary conflicts. Here, the Commission appeared to credit the parolee’s denial of a relationship with the employee, and it it correctly concluded that the evidence presented by the Board was insufficient to establish the employee's knowledge of the person’s status as a parolee.

The Commission properly invoked its authority to modify the Board’s disciplinary action from removal to a thirty-day suspension without back pay or benefits. Section 952(c) of the Civil Service Act, 71 P.S. §741.952(c) (granting the Commission discretion to modify or set aside the disciplinary action of the appointing authority and, where appropriate, order reinstatement with or without payment of salary or wages lost).

disability - onset date - progressive impairment - medical advisor expert opinion required

Kirkwood v. Astrue - ED Pa. - Augut 11, 2010


http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D0838P.pdf


SSR 83-20 requires that an ALJ use a medical advisor to determine the onset date of impairments when the onset date must be inferred due to the progressive nature of the impairment.1 See Walton v. Halter, 243 F.3d 703, 710 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]his is a situation in which an opinion based on personal, contemporaneous observation was not available. In such a situation, SSR 83-20 calls for an ALJ to have the benefit of expert medical advice based on the best available data without regard to its source.”). The Third Circuit reiterated this requirement in Newell v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 541 (3d Cir. 2003).

SSR 83-20 states in relevant part:

In some cases, it may be possible, based on the medical evidence to reasonably infer that the onset of a disabling impairment(s) occurred some time prior to the date of the first recorded medical examination, e.g., the date the claimant stopped working. How long the disease may be determined to have existed at a disabling level of severity depends on an informed judgment of the facts in the particular case. This judgment, however, must have a legitimate medical basis. At the hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) should call on the services of a medical advisor when onset must be inferred. If there is information in the file indicating that additional medical evidence concerning onset is available, such evidence should be secured before inferences are made. If reasonable inferences about the progression of the impairment cannot be made on the basis of the evidence in file and additional relevant medical evidence is not available, it may be necessary to explore other sources of documentation. Information may be obtained from family members, friends, and former employers to ascertain why medical evidence is not available for the pertinent period and to furnish additional evidence regarding the course of the individual's condition.

__._,_.___

UC - cosmetologist - employee v. indpt. contractor

Osborne Associates v. UCBR - Cmwlth. Court - August 13, 2010


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2084CD09_8-13-10.pdf


The court remanded this case back to the UCBR and directed it to apply the court's indpt. contractor body of law to the facts. The Board had granted benefits to the claimant, a cosmetologist, without applying the independent contractor test factors, concluded that Claimant was not disqualified from receiving benefits under Section 402(h) and Section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Law, because it believed that the cosmetology statute, 63 P.S. § 514.1 and related regulations, 49 Pa. Code § 7.81et seq., prohibited a cosmetologist from being an independent contractor, analogizing the matter to the case of a dental hygienist.


The court held that Board had created a body of law out of whole cloth and should, rather, have followed the court's analysys set out in Glatfelter Barber Shop v. UCBR, 957 A.2d 786 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008), concerning the effect of a supervision requirement on the issue of employee v. indpt. contractor.


The "Board freely acknowledges that it decided this case on the basis of a different legal theory and that it did not make all of the findings necessary to determine Claimant’s eligibility for benefits based on the independent contractor test factors. The Board, thus, requests that this Court remand this matter back to the Board to make the necessary findings. We believe that the remand requested by the Board would be consistent with our precedent. See Resource Staffing, 961 A.2d at 265... D.K. Abbey Marketing, Inc. v. UCBR, 645 A.2d 339, 341-42 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994)

federal courts - right to proceed anonymously

Doe v. Megless et al. - ED Pa. - August 5, 2010


http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D0780P.pdf


The court rejected the sec. 1983 plaintiff's request to proceed anonymously in an action against school officials, who had circulated flyers calling plaintiff a "suspicious person," giving his name, address, pictures, vehicle information, etc. and stating “Extra Patrols Around Schools, Suspicious Person [John Doe] has been known to hang around schools in Upper Merion and other townships. He has not approached any kids to this point. [John Doe’s] mental status is unknown. If seen, stop and investigate.”

Lawsuits are inherently public events. SeeDoe v.Morrisville, 130 F.R.D. 612, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“[L]awsuits are public events and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the pertinent facts, including the true names of the parties.”). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require litigants provide the names of all parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a);Morrisville, 130 F.R.D. at 614.

The public has a presumptive right to open judicial proceedings, and this right is not taken lightly. Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Doe v. Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“This Court recognizes the strong public interest militating against pseudonymity— the public right of access to civil judicial records, and proceedings.”).

A plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym “runs afoul of the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings.” Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000). A court may allow a party to proceed anonymously in exceptional cases. Morrisville, 130 F.R.D at 614 (“Under special circumstances . . . courts have allowed parties to use fictitious names, particularly where necessary to protect privacy.”). Anonymity may be warranted if a case involves highly sensitive or personal matters, or if there is a concrete risk of injury to the plaintiff by disclosure. M. M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998). To proceed anonymously, a plaintiff must show “both a fear of severe harm, and that the fear of severe harm is reasonable.” Kamehameha Sch., 596 F.3d at 1043. The risk a plaintiff may suffer some embarrassment is not enough. Morrisville, 130 F.R.D. at 614; see also Rose v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.R.D. 264, 266 (E. D. Tex. 2007)

A district court has broad discretion to decide whether to permit a plaintiff to proceed anonymously. Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plan, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008). In making this determination, “the public’s right of access [to the court] should prevail unless the party requesting pseudonymity demonstrates that [his] interests in privacy or security justify pseudonymity.” Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 175 (E.D. Pa. 2001).

The Third Circuit has not addressed the standard for granting anonymity, but other circuits conduct a balancing test weighing the public interest in open proceedings against a litigant’s personal privacy and security. See Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 685 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The ultimate test for permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.”) (citation, punctuation, and internal quotation marks omitted); Does I Thru XXIII, 214 F.3d at 1068 (“[We] hold that a party may preserve his or her anonymity in judicial proceedings in special circumstances when the party’s need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity.”).

A district court considers a number of non-exclusive factors when decidingwhether to grant a party anonymity. Evans, 202 F.R.D. at 175. Factors in favor of anonymity include: (1) the extent litigant has kept his identity confidential; (2) the reason for anonymity; (3) if there is public interest in favor of anonymity; (4) if the case is fact sensitive or purely of a legal nature; (5) whether the litigant will pursue his claim if he cannot proceed anonymously; and (6) if the party opposing anonymity has illegitimate ulterior motives. Id. at 175-76. Factors against anonymity include: (1) the general level of public interest in the case; (2) if there is a higher level of public interest in the trial because of the subject matter involved or the public status of a litigant; and (3) if the party seeking anonymity has an ulterior motive. Id. . . .

After weighing the factors [at length], this Court holds Plaintiff has not proven his private interest in anonymity outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to proceed anonymously is denied.

sheriff's sale - setting aside

Irwin Union National Bank and Trust v. Famous - Superior Court - August 9, 2010

http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/S42044_10.pdf

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 3132 provides: Setting Aside Sale - Upon petition of any party in interest before delivery of . . the sheriff's deed to real property, the court may, upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale or enter any other order which may be just and proper under the circumstances. [Pa.R.C.P. 3181(a)(1)(8) makes Pa.R.C.P. 3132 applicable to mortgage foreclosure actions.]

The relevant inquiry is whether proper cause has been shown to set aside the sheriff's sale. The decision to set aside a sheriff's sale is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Merrill Lynch Mortgage Capital v. Steele, 859 A.2d 788, 791 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 A.2d 1199 (Pa. 2005) (table).

A petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale is based on equitable principles. National Penn Bank v. Shaffer, 672 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa. Super. 1996).

“The burden of proving circumstances warranting the exercise of the court's equitable powers is on the petitioner, and the request to set aside a sheriff's sale may be refused due to insufficient proof to support the allegations in the petition.” Kaib v. Smith, 684 A.2d 630, 631 (Pa. Super. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

Sheriff’s sales have been set aside where the validity of the sale proceedings is challenged, a deficiency pertaining to the notice of the sale exists, or where misconduct occurs in the bidding process. Blue Ball National Bank v. Balmer, 810 A.2d 164, 167 (Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 820 A.2d 702 (Pa. 2003) (table).

The appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Kaib, supra.

nurses - license - crime - moral turpitude

Dwumaah v. State Board of Nursing - Cmwlth. Court - August 6, 2010 - unreported memorandum opinion



http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2234CD09_8-6-10.pdf



Nursing license suspended because of conviction of crimes involving moral turpitude and immoral conduct, 63 P.S. § 224(a)(5) and (9), to wit, theft of public monies.

child abuse - expungement - hearsay - A.Y. case

Crawford Co. CYS v. DPW - Cmwlth Court. - August 6, 2010 - unreported memorandum opinion


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2372CD09_8-6-10.pdf

ALJ did not commit an error of law by refusing to give any evidentiary weight to a typewritten transcript of an interview with the child victim that was not supported by an audio or video recording, under guidelines concerning hearsay set out in A.Y. v. Department of Public Welfare, 537 Pa. 116, 641 A.2d 1148 (1994). See 42 Pa. C.S. §5986.