consumer - FDCPA - Rooker-Feldman doctrine - prior state court judgment

Rivera v. Ragan and Ragan - ED Pa. - June 25, 2010

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/10D0624P.pdf

Defendant, a debt collection law firm, got a state court judgment for its client against federal plaintiff. Plaintiff-consumer then sued the law firm in federal court, based on alleged improper collection efforts. Defendant moved to dismiss the federal case, alleging lack of jurisdiction based on Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two Supreme Court decisions, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Comany, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine bars federal jurisdiction under two circumstances: if the claim was ‘actually litigated’ in state court or if the claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court adjudication.” ITT Corp. v. Intelnet Int’l Corp., 366 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2004). In determining whether an issue was “actually litigated” by the state court, “a plaintiff must present its federal claims to the state court, and the state court must decide those claims.” Id. at 210 n.8 (citing Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir. 2003)). Determining that a claim was “actually litigated” “requires that the state court has considered and decided precisely the same claim that the plaintiff has presented to the federal court.” Id.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been narrowed by the Exxon Mobil decision, which held that it does not prevent a district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction where a state court judgment exists, and a plaintiff brings an independent claim(s) from the state court action in federal court.

In Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Saudi Basic Industries Corporation, 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Court observed that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine had “sometimes been construed to extend far beyond the contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases.” 544 U.S. at 283. The Court clarified that the scope of the doctrine is “confined” to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id. at 284; accord Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (observing that the Court in Exxon Mobil explained that Rooker-Feldman is a “narrow doctrine”). The Court added: “[i]f a federal plaintiff ‘present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party[,] . . . then there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the defendant prevails under principles of preclusion.’” Exxon Mobil,544 U.S. at 293.

Here, Rivera does not challenge the judgment against him in state court, but rather, only claims that Ragan’s collection practices violated sections of the FDCPA. Thus, Rivera’s claims in the instant Complaint are independent of the state judgment that was rendered against him, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude subject matter jurisdiction. In support of this conclusion we have found at least seven post-Exxon Mobile cases that have considered the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to circumstances similar to those in this case, ie., where creditors or debt collectors obtain a judgment in state court but have their collection practices challenged in federal court under the FDCPA.

UC - self-employment - attorney

Schneider v. UCBR - Cmwlth Court- June 18, 2010


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/2238CD09_6-18-10.pdf

arbitration - one-sidedness; belated resort to arbitration

Nino v. The Jewelry Exchange - 3d Cir. - June 15, 2010

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/091268p.pdf

Rajae Nino brought this action against his former employer, alleging that he was discriminated against on account of his gender and national origin. After litigating the matter before the District Court for fifteen months, the employer invoked an arbitration provision in Nino’s employment contract and moved the District Court to compel the parties to arbitrate their dispute.

Nino opposed the motion, arguing (1) that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable, and (2) that by engaging in extensive litigation of this dispute, the employer had waived its right to compel arbitration.

The District Court concluded that although the arbitration agreement contained unconscionable terms, those provisions could be severed from the contract and the remainder of its terms could be enforced. The Court then concluded that the employer did not, through its litigation conduct, waive its right to compel arbitration. We disagree.

In our view, the pervasively one-sided nature of the arbitration agreement’s terms demonstrates that the employer did not seek to use arbitration as a legitimate means for dispute resolution. Instead, the employer created a system that was designed to give it an unfair advantage through rules that impermissibly restricted employees’ access to arbitration and that gave the employer an undue influence over the selection of the arbitrator.

We hold that it is not appropriate, in the face of such pervasive one-sidedness, to sever the unconscionable provisions from the remainder of the arbitration agreement. We further conclude that the employer, by engaging in protracted litigation of this matter before belatedly seeking to arbitrate its dispute, waived its right to compel arbitration. We will thus reverse the District Court’s order compelling the parties to arbitrate.

attorney fees - EAJA - offset - indiv. debt owed to government

Astrue v. Ratliff - US Supreme Court - June 14, 2010 - http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1322.pdf

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

ASTRUE, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. RATLIFF

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 08–1322. Argued February 22, 2010—Decided June 14, 2010

Respondent Ratliff was Ruby Kills Ree’s attorney in Ree’s successful suit against the United States Social Security Administration for Social Security benefits. The District Court granted Ree’s unopposed motion for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act(EAJA), which provides, inter alia, that "a court shall award to a prevailing party . . . fees and other expenses . . . in any civil action . . . brought by or against the United States." 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)(1)(A).Before paying the fees award, the Government discovered that Ree owed the United States a debt that predated the award. Accordingly,it sought an administrative offset against the award under 31 U. S. C. §3716, which subjects to offset all "funds payable by the United States," §3701(a)(1), to an individual who owes certain delinquent federal debts, see §3701(b), unless, e.g., payment is exempted by statute or regulation. See, e.g., §3716(e)(2). The parties to this case have not established that any such exemption applies to §2412(d) fees awards, which, as of 2005, are covered by the TreasuryDepartment’s Offset Program (TOP). After the Government notified Ree that it would apply TOP to offset her fees award against a portion of her debt, Ratliff intervened, challenging the offset on thegrounds that §2412(d) fees belong to a litigant’s attorney and thusmay not be used to satisfy the litigant’s federal debts. The District Court held that because §2412(d) directs that fees be awarded to the "prevailing party," not to her attorney, Ratliff lacked standing to challenge the offset. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that under its precedent, EAJA attorney’s fees are awarded to prevailing parties’ attorneys.

Held:

A §2412(d)(1)(A) attorney’s fees award is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to an offset to satisfy the litigant’s preexisting debt to the Government. Pp. 3–11.

(a) Nothing in EAJA contradicts this Court’s longstanding view that the term "prevailing party" in attorney’s fees statutes is a "term of art" that refers to the prevailing litigant. See, e.g., Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources, 532 U. S. 598, 603. That the term has its usual meaning in subsection (d)(1)(A) is underscored by the fact that subsection (d)(1)(B) and other provisions clearly distinguish the party who receives the fees award (the litigant) from the attorney who performed the work that generated the fees. The Court disagrees with Ratliff’s assertion that subsection (d)(1)(A)’s use of the verb "award" nonetheless renders §2412(d) fees payable directly to a prevailingparty’s attorney. The dictionaries show that, in the litigation context, the transitive verb "award" has the settled meaning of giving or assigning by judicial decree. Its plain meaning in subsection (d)(1)(A) is thus that the court shall "give or assign by . . . judicial determination" to the "prevailing party" (here, Ree) attorney’s fees in theamount sought and substantiated under, inter alia, subsection (d)(1)(B). That the prevailing party’s attorney may have a beneficial interest or a contractual right in the fees does not alter this conclusion. Pp. 3–6.

(b) The Court rejects Ratliff’s argument that other EAJA provisions, combined with the Social Security Act (SSA) and the Government’s practice of paying some EAJA fees awards directly to attorneys in Social Security cases, render §2412(d) at least ambiguous onthe question presented here, and that these other provisions resolvethe ambiguity in her favor. Even accepting that §2412(d) is ambiguous¸ the provisions and practices Ratliff identifies do not alter theCourt’s conclusion. Subsection (d)(1)(B) and other provisions differentiate between attorneys and prevailing parties, and treat attorneys on par with other service providers, in a manner that forecloses the conclusion that attorneys have a right to direct payment of subsection (d)(1)(A) awards. Nor is the necessity of such payments established by the SSA provisions on which Ratliff relies. That SSA fees awards are payable directly to a prevailing claimant’s attorney, see 42 U. S. C. §406(b)(1)(A), undermines Ratliff’s case by showing that Congress knows how to create a direct fee requirement where it desires to do so. Given the stark contrast between the language of the SSA and EAJA provisions, the Court is reluctant to interpret subsection (d)(1)(A) to contain a direct fee requirement absent clear textual evidence that such a requirement applies. Such evidence is not supplied by a 1985 EAJA amendment requiring that, "where the claimant’s attorney receives fees for the same work under both [42 U. S. C. §406(b) and 28 U. S. C. §2412(d)], the . . . attorney [must] refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee." See note following§2412. Ratliff’s argument that this recognition that an attorney willsometimes "receiv[e]" §2412(d) fees suggests that subsection (d)(1)(A) should be construed to incorporate the same direct payments to attorneys that the SSA expressly authorizes gives more weight to "recei[pt]" than the term can bear: The ensuing reference to the attorney’s obligation to "refund" the smaller fee to the claimant demonstrates that the award belongs to the claimant in the firstplace. Moreover, Ratliff’s reading is irreconcilable with the textual differences between the two Acts. The fact that the Government, until 2006, frequently paid EAJA fees awards directly to attorneys inSSA cases in which the prevailing party had assigned the attorney her rights in the award does not alter the Court’s interpretation of the Act’s fees provision. That some such cases involved a prevailing party with outstanding federal debts is unsurprising, given that it was not until 2005 that the TOP was modified to require offsets against attorney’s fees awards. And as Ratliff admits, the Government has since discontinued the direct payment practice except in cases where the plaintiff does not owe a federal debt and has assigned her right to fees to the attorney. Finally, the Court’s conclusion is buttressed by cases interpreting and applying 42 U. S. C. §1988, which contains language virtually identical to §2412(d)(1)(A)’s.See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U. S. 717, 730−732, and n. 19. Pp. 6–

11. 540 F. 3d 800, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SO-

TOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

__._,_.___

contracts - parol evidence - fraud in the inducement - no contract

Kropa v. Cabot Oil and Gas Corporation - MD Pa. - June 9, 2010

http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/munley/08v551a.pdf

Defendant's motion to dismiss denied on Plaintiffs’ fraudulent inducement claim concerning and oil/gas lease. Plaintiffs contend that defendant’s agents assured them that the company would never pay more than $25.00 per acre. They relied on this statement and signed the lease, only to discover later that these statements were false and that others had signed far more lucrative deals with defendant. Defendant also represented to plaintiffs that if they failed to sign a lease defendant would negotiate leases with neighbors and capture the gas under plaintiffs’ land through the rule of capture, leaving plaintiffs without a lease or gas on their land. According to the complaint, these statements all were false and all induced plaintiff to sign the lease.

The parol evidence rule is a doctrine of contract interpretation. The rule works “‘to preserve the integrity of written agreements by refusing to permit the contracting parties to attempt to alter the import of their contract through the use of contemporaneous [or prior] oral declarations.’” Hamilton Bank v. Rulnick, 136 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting LaDonne v. Kessler, 389 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)).

As defined in Pennsylvania, the parol evidence rule provides that: Where parties, without fraud or mistake, have deliberately put their engagements in writing, the law declares the writing to be not only the best, but the only evidence of their agreement. All preliminary negotiations, conversations and verbal agreements are merged in and superseded by the subsequent written contract, . . . and unless fraud, accident or mistake be averred, the writing constitutes the agreement between the parties, and its terms cannot be added to nor subtracted from by parol evidence. Mellon Bank Corp. v. First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Inv., 951 F.2d 1399, 1405 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting Gianni v. Russel & Co., 126 A. 791 (Pa. 1924)).

Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a court must answer three questions: “(1) Have the parties made a contract? (2) Is that contract void or voidable because of illegality, fraud, mistake, or any other reason? (3) Did the parties assent to a particular writing as the complete and accurate ‘integration’ of that contract.” CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 573. If the answer to any of these questions is “no,” then the rule does not apply. Id.

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out, “‘no contract, no parol evidence rule.’” Mellon, 951 F.2d at 1408. The court will deny the motion for reconsideration on these grounds.

The defendant’s argument that the court found the written agreement between the parties to be fully integrated is only a part of the inquiry into whether the parol evidence rule should apply, and it is not material to the issue of whether a contract actually exists between the parties.

The purpose of the parol evidence rule is to give meaning to the writings of parties who sign valid contracts. Here, the plaintiff alleges that no valid contract exits, because the defendant induced plaintiff to sign the contract through fraud. Plaintiff does not ask the court to interpret the terms of the contract between the parties by using oral or written evidence outside that document, but instead asks the court to find that no contract existed between the parties because of fraud in the inducement. “[E]vidence of fraud in the inducement will suspend the parol evidence rule because fraud prevents formation of a valid contract.” Mellon, 951 F.2d at 1408; see also, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 580 (noting that “fraud in the inducement of assent, or an antecedent mistake by one known to the other, may make the contract voidable without preventing its existence, and without showing that the writing was not agreed on as a complete integration of its terms.”). The parol evidence rule does not prevent an inquiry into the existence of a contract itself.

welfare - GA - disability - proof

Marshall v. DPW - June 7, 2010 - Cmwlth. Court - unreported memorandum opinion


http://www.pacourts.us/OpPosting/Cwealth/out/1835CD09_6-7-10.pdf


Applicant did not provide proof of his alleged physical disability. An applicant seeking GA benefits based on a physical disability must provide documentation verifying a disability precluding gainful employment. 55 Pa. Code §141.61(c)(1)(iii)(A). This documentation must be on a form provided by DPW and completed by a physician or a psychologist. 55 Pa. Code §141.61(c)(1)(iii)(B); see 62 P.S. §432(3)(i)(C) (“The verification of the [applicant’s] physical … disability must be established by written documentation in a form prescribed by [DPW] and must be based on acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques, rather than a statement of symptoms by the applicant….”).

Here, Marshall’s physician completed and signed two Form PA 1663s, each of which indicated that Marshall was not disabled at the time of his application for benefits. In fact, the most recent form, dated January 13, 2009, indicated that Marshall was presently employable.

The applicant got a fair hearing. His inability to present witnesses on his behalf resulted from his own failure to subpoena them. An applicant for GA benefits has the right to appeal DPW’s determination and to receive a fair hearing. See 55 Pa. Code §275.1(a). During the hearing, the applicant shall have the opportunity “[t]o present evidence on his own behalf, to bring witnesses or documents he deems necessary, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses the county office, administering agency or social service provider will produce to support its decision or action.” 55 Pa. Code §275.3(a)(1). The applicant also has the right “[t]o request a subpoena from the hearing officer for the production of evidence or witnesses that [the applicant] feels will be essential in obtaining necessary facts.” 55 Pa. Code § 275.3(a)(2).

Here, Marshall failed to request subpoenas for any witnesses he wished to call on his behalf and failed to make arrangements for any such individuals to testify. (N.T., 2/17/09, at 9.) DPW is not obligated to secure witnesses or evidence for an applicant to present at the hearing. See Integrated Behavioral Health Services v. Department of Public Welfare, 871 A.2d 296, 300 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005).

__._,_.___