Consumer - mortgage refinancing - existence of contract - estoppel/fraud - statute of frauds

McCloskey v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc. - ED Pa. - August 21, 2007

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D0994P.pdf

Plaintiffs were solicited by defendant to refinance their mortgage. Based on a series of conversation and emails with defendant, plaintiffs withdrew their refinancing arrangement with another mortgage company. Defendant ultimately rejected plaintiff's application, allegedly because their income was somewhat less that stated orally during phone conversations. Plaintiffs sued for breach of contract, promissory estoppel and fraud.

Contract
The contract cause of action was dismissed, because plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of a legal contract. The documents that they produced were evidence of preliminary negotiations but not a contract. The documents did not contain the "essential terms of the contract." Under Pennsylvania law, a contract exists if a) the parties have manifested an intent to be found by the terms of the agreement, b) the terms are sufficiently definite, and c) there was consideration. Preliminary negotiations do not alone constitute a contract. To ripen into a contract, there must be a manifestation of mutual asset to the terms of a bargain -- which was not the case here. An oral contract can be enforeable, but it must be established by clear and precise evidence - again not the case here.

Promissory estoppel
Plaintiffs' alleged detrimental reliance on defendant's promises about refinancing. Defendant said plaintiff had unclean hands because of misstatements about income. Inequitable conduct by plaintiff must be connect to the matters at issue, and the conduct has to be willful, not negligent. The court held that factual matters still had to be resolved about these issues and refused defendant's motion for summary judgment.

Statute of frauds defense
A mortgage is an interest in property and must satisfy the statute of frauds, as must an oral agreement to lend money in consideration for a mortgage. A party cannot avoid the statute by relying on an estoppel theory of recovery. However, the statute only makes an oral contract for an interest in real property unenforceable. It does not void the contract. Where the oral agreement has been obtained by fraud, the buyer can recover as damages the loss of his bargain. A plaintiff is permitted to pursue a promissory estoppel claim even when the underlying promise is subject to the statute of frauds, but his recovery is limited to reliance damages in the absence of fraud. The statute of frauds may prevent the specific performance of the promise, but it does not bar the promissory estoppel claim itself. The court held that the plaintiff had the right to pursue further discovery on this claim.

Fraud claim
Defendant again claimed that plaintiffs' overstatement of income barred this claim. The court rejected this because of defendant's lack of reliance on the statement of income, which was of "minimal importance to the loan approval." The court allowed the claim to proceed and permitted additional discovery by plaintiff.

disability - reversal v. remand - effect of substance abuse

Monagle v. Astrue - ED Pa. Augsut 24, 2007

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D1021P.pdf

The court held that it was appropriate to reverse and award benefits rather than remand for a further hearing, citing Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2000) and Allen v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1989). There were no remaining evidentiary issues, and the opinions of the treating physicians that claimant was disabled, independent of his drug addiction, should have been followed.

The case also involved the problem of separating out the effect of marijuana addiction from claimant's bipolar disorder. There is good language in the case about the weight which should be given to the treating physician on this issue.

ejectment - jurisdiction - sheriff's sale - deed

Wells Fargo Bank v. Long - Superior Court - August 22, 2007

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/a14007_07.pdf

A purchaser of property at sheriff's sale cannot bring an ejectment action until the title to the property passes by acknowledgment, delivery and recordation of the sheriff's deed. Before that time, the purchaser does not have a present right to immediate possession, a jurisdictional prerequisite to an ejectment action. The successful bidder at a sheriff's sale only gets "an inceptive, inchoate, or equitable estate."

The hiatus between the sheriff's sale and the delivery and recording of the deed is a "jurisdictional void" which cannot be traversed. There is an extensive (and repetitious) discussion of these principles, in the opinion.

Fair Credit Reporting Act - complaint to credit reporting agency

Beisel v. ABN Ambro Mortgage Inc. - Ed Pa. - Aguust 10, 2007

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D0951P.pdf

A credit reporting agency [CRA] has a duty concerning disputed information in a credit report only after the complaining party has disputed the credit information with the CRA and the credit reporting agency has notified the furnisher of information.

In this case, the consumer-plaintiffs alleged only that they disputed it with the furnisher, not the CRA, before bring suit under the FCRA, 15 USC 1681 et seq. Jaramillo v. Experian, 155 F.Supp. 2d 356, 363 (E Pa. 2001).

bankruptcy - dismissal - bad faith - sec. 707(a)

In re Perlin - Third Circuit - August 3, 2007

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063199p.pdf

In adjudicating a motion to dismiss assserting bad faith under 11 USC 707(a), it is within the discretion of the bankruptcy court to consider a debtor's monthly income and expenses together with any other factors relevant to a debtor's good faith in filing for bankruptcy, reflecting the "fact-intensive nature of the good-faith inquiry."

Net worth, future prospects and ability to repay are not a valid cause for dismissal. Dismissal should be carefully confined to only truly egregious cases that entail concealed or misrepresented assets and/or sources of income, lavish lifestyles, and intention to avoid a large single debt based on conduct akin to fraud, misconduct or gross negligence.

welfare - MA- resources - disretionary support trust

DeBone v. DPW - Commonwealth Court - Masy 31, 2007

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/CWealth/out/2138CD06_8-9-07.pdf

Held,discretionary support trust should be included as a resource in determining eligibility for MA benefits. Trust consisted of $145,000 and trustees could use the money for petitioner's benefit. Petitioner's resource held to exceed $2400 limit under 55 Pa. Code 178.1(a),178.2 and 178.4. Beneficiary's interest depends on settlor's intent. Rosenberg v. DPW, 679 A2d 767 (Pa. 1996).; Shaak v. DPW, 747 A2d 883, 886 (Pa. 2000). Court applied factors cited in those cases, especially that trustee had discretion to use the trust principal for the welfare etc of the beneficiary.

consumer - warranties - exclusion/modification - conflict between express and implied warranties

N.J. Transit Corp. v. Harsco Corp. - 3rd Circuit - August 2, 2007

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063507p.pdf

The court held that a sophisticated commercial buyer who had drafted the contract could not rely on UCC implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose under the N.J. equivalent of 13 Pa. C.S. sec. 2314 and 2315 when there was a one-year express contractual warranty that had expired at the time of the alleged loss.

The court took special note of the fact that this was "hardly the typical case" involving exclusion or modification of a warranty under sec. 2316. Here, the buyer drafted the contract, both parties were sophisticated business entities, and the parties had equal bargaining power. "It was the buyer who dictated all the contract's terms [and] whose bargaining power was superior." The buyer "specified precisely what it required" and the express warranty was "extremely broad," so "there was no implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose."

Under sec. 2317(c), "express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose." Here the court interpreted the express warranty and implied warranty of merchantability as "consistent and cumulative... for the one year term of the express warranty. Beyond that period, the implied warranty of merchantability conflicts with the contract's specifications, and is therefore displaced by the express" one-year warranty, pursuant to sec. 2317 (c).

The court specifically stated and emphasized that it was not interpreting sec. 2316 (exclusion or modification of warranties) to allow all express warranties of limited duration to impliedly exclude or modify limited warranties. Instead, it based its holding on the fact that here the buyer-drafted global warranty was incorporated into the contract specifications, noting that the commentary to sec. 2316 recognized such a situation as "not the ordinary circumstance that the section is designed to address." The court said that its holding was in line with the general purpose of sec. 2316 "which, according to the commentary, is to ensure that there are no surprises concerning which warranties accompany the goods sold." The element of surprise is not present where the buyer drafts the contract. A different holding would turn "a buyer's shield against surprise into a buyer's sword of surprise."

bankruptcy - ch. 13 - post-foreclosure sale cure

In re Connors - 3rd Circuit - August 3, 2007

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/063321p.pdf

Ending a dispute among N.J. district courts, the 3rd Circuit held that a Chapter 13 debtor does not have the right, under 11 USC 1322 (c) (1), to cure a default on a mortgage secured by the debtor's residence after the residence is sold at a foreclosure sale but before the deed is delivered.

The "unambiguous language of sec. 1322 (c) (1) supports the 'gavel rule.'" It says the a "default with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien on the debtor's residence may be cured under paragraph (3) or (5) of subsection (b) until such residence is sold at a foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable nonbankruptcy law…." The court said that numerous courts have held that a residence is "sold" at the foreclosure auction. The sale is final then, not when the deed is later delivered.

There is a provision, 11 USC 108(b), which allows a bankruptcy to be filed and a) objections to the sale to be filed or b) the property redeemed -- if the bankruptcy is filed before the expiration of a grace period established by a nonbankruptcy state law.

In this case, the debtor had the right to but did not exercise his statutory right to object to the foreclosure sale or redeem the property within 60 days of the filing of his chapter 13 petition, as permitted by N.J. state law and 11 USC 108(b).

consumer/housing - rental housing - discrimination - ECOA and CPL

Portis v. River House Associates - MD Pa. - August 2, 2007

http://www.pamd.uscourts.gov/opinions/jones/06v2123.pdf

African-American plaintiffs were turned down for rental housing by Defendant, allegedly based on lack of credit history. They subsequently got rental housing from another landlord, who used same credit agency as Defendant allegedly used. Eventual landlord got a credit history, which was readily available. Plaintiffs sued under a) the Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq.; b) 42 USC 1981; c) 42 USC 1982; d) the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 USC 1691 et seq.; and e) the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law, 73 PS 201-1 et seq. Defendant moved to dismiss the last two claims -- EDOA and Consumer Protection Law. The court agreed.

Equal Credit Opportunity Act - Citing Laramore v. Ritchie Realty, 397 F3d 544 (7th Cir. 2005), the ECOA claim was dismissed because

- it did not involve the extension of "credit," i.e. the right to defer the payment of a debt
- the ECOA was meant to protect against discrimination by financial institutions, not landlords
- a Federal Reserve regulation stating that the granting of a lease is not an extension of credit
- the ECOA interests could be protected in the FHA claim, which Defendant did not move to dismiss.

Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law
The court dismissed this claim, because the Plainiffs and Defendant never entered into a contract. Defendant rejected Plaintiff as a tenant. Plaintiffs found a new place to live. Plaintiffs did not purchase goods or services from Defendant. Calling this a case of first impression, the court held that the CPL does not permit suit by a person who leased property from one entity to bring suit against another entity from the which person initially attempted to lease property. The court noted that the CPL allows the Attorney General or county DA to bring suit, implicitly recognizing that there may be circumstances in which private actors are not permitted to bring suit but public officials can. The court also noted that while direct privity is not required under the CPL, the statute "does not stand for the proposition that a CPL claim can stand against a wholly unrelated party or one who is foreign to the purchase or lease transaction." In that sense, the CPL has a "causation requirement."

judges - deliberative thought processes - discovery

Leber v. Stretton - Superior Court - June 8, 2007

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/A16018_07.pdf

Deliberative thought processes of a judicial officer (including MDJs and presumably ALJs, referees, etc.) are not discoverable.

bankruptcy - retirement annuity not part of estate under sec. 541(c)(2)

Skiba v. Laher- 3rd Circuit - August 2, 2007

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054168p.pdf

Held, bankrupt's TIAA-CREF retirement annuity is exluded from the bankruptcy estate as a "trust" under 11 USC 541(c)(2).

Consumer Protection Law - pleading - particularity

Rosenberg v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. - ED Pa. - July 31, 2007

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions/07D0888P.pdf

The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss a consumer protection claim under the state CPL, 73 PS 201-1 et seq, for failure to plead the claim with "particularity," as allegedly required by FRCivP 9(b), because fraud is said to be involved. "Federal courts have analogized fraud pleading to the "first paragraph of any newspaper story, requiring the who, what, when, where, and how of the circumstances." This applies not only to fraud actions under federal statutes but also to those based on state law, such as the CPL. The court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint.

Citing a series of ED Pa. cases, the court held that under CPL, plaintiff's must plead the following elements with particularily:

a) a specific false representation of material fact;
b) knowledge by the person who made it of its falsity
c) ignorance of its falsity by the person to whom it was made
d) the intention that it should be acted upon
e) that the plaintiff did act on it to his detriment (damages)
These requirements are "relaxed when the factual information regarding the alleged fraud is within the defendant's control."

As so often happens with this issue, the court did not mention Commonwealth v. Percudani, 825 A.2d 743 (Pa. Cmwlth 2003), noting that amendments (fraudulent or deceptive conduct prohibited) to the CPL statute negated this strict pleading requirement.

consumer - foreign judgment - full faith and credit - due process

Frontier Leasing Corporation v. Shah - Superior Court - July 30, 2007

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/Superior/out/a19038_07.pdf

Pennsylvania court stuck down a default Iowa judgment entered against defendant Shah on due process grounds.

The contractual forum selection clause purported to give Polk County, Iowa, jurisdiction. A judgment was entered against Shah, who had leased an ATM machine fromm a 3rd party lessor who in turn assigned its rights to Frontier Leasing. Shah admittedly defaulted on the lease. Frontier then tried to execute on the judgment in Allegheny County, where defendant was located. Defendant filed a motion to strike the judgment.

Full faith and credit under Article IV, sec. 1 of the US Constitution cannot be granted unless the sister state court that entered the judgment had personal jurisdiction over the defendant, who must have been afforded due process. Personal jurisdiction can be established by consent, in which case the minimum contacts requirement under International Shoe, 326 US 310 (1945), is not applicable. In addition, personal jurisdiction can be waived.

The court looked at Iowa law to determine these issues. Under Iowa law (and Pennsylvania law), forum selection clauses (FSC) are presumptively enforceable. The presumption can be rebutted by showing that the FSC is not reasonable, under the circumstances. To do so, a defendant must make a "strong showing" that the judgment should be set aside.

Some factors in this determination are
- whether there was an arm's length (what length sleeve?) transaction
- relative sophistiction of the parties (experienced and sophisticated businessmen?)
- whether enforcement would be unreasonable or unjust in the circumstances
- whether there was fraud of overreaching
- whether enforcement would make things so gravely difficult for Defendant that he would effectively be deprived of his day in court

In this case Defendant was a Pakistani immigrant with a limited command of English. The FSC did not mention the terms "jurisdiction," or "venue" or "service of process." It only said that a suit would be "proper" if brought in Iowa courts. The FSC language was not in bold type and was contained in the midst of boilerplate language, "inconspicuous even to the trained eye." The court had "no doubt that appellant had no idea what the import of this clause was…." The court decided that "if there is anything substantive to the notion that forum selection clauses should be vitiated if unreasonable, this is the case in which to apply that notion. Accordingly, we conclude the forum selection clause is unenforceable under Iowa law."

This would seem to resolve the case, Nonetheless, the court went on to consider whether Iowa's assumption of jurisdiction was proper, under Iowa law, applying a two-part test. The first part was satisfied by the presumption of jurisdiction based on the contractual FSC. The second part, however, was not. It involved several factors concerning the general notion of minimum contacts, including quantity, nature and quality, source and connection with the cause of action, etc. Here, defendant's only contact with Iowa was a "single tangential contact" -- that he executed a contract that provided that the lessor would render performance in Iowa. This contact was "accidental" and it is "doubtful that appellant had an understanding that this contact could result in his being hailed to Iowa to answer for default. It was a single fortuitous contact, insufficient to give Iowa jurisdiction under its own law."

The court held that the FSC was "not only unforceable but also is insufficient, in and of itself, to confer jurisdiction on the Iowa courts under the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment. In the end analysis, we simply have not been psersuaded that appellant was afforded "fair warning" that he could be forced to travel to Iowa to answer for an alleged default of the lease."

consumer - payday lending - license - Consumer Discount Company Law

Department of Banking v. NCAS of Delaware - Commonwealth Court - July 31, 2007

http://www.aopc.org/OpPosting/CWealth/out/519MD06_7-31-07.pdf

In this original jurisdiction case, the court determined that Advance America, a payday lender, was subject to the licensing requirements of the state Consumer Discount Company Act, 73 PS 6201 et seq., since the effective interest rate in its transactions was much higher than the statutory limit of 6% . The court grant the Department's motion for judgment on the pleadings on this claim.

Although the stated contract interest rate was 5.98% - just below the 6% limit prescribed by the CDCA - AA also charged consumers $149.95 per month as a "participation fee", which the court said was a charge under the statute that had to be include in the aggregate charges and thus was part of the interest rate deterimination, because the participation fee was a "necessary condition" of any credit advance by AA and was a "charge inextricably related to the amount actually loaned or advanced." By including the participation fee, the aggregate interest rate was about 368%, "far in excess of" the 6% interest that an unlicensed lender is permitted to charge.

The court held that the factual record was not sufficient to determine the Act 6 question - whether the monthly participation fee should be considered sham interest which, when combined iwth the stated interest rate of 5.98%, established a violation of 41 PS 201.

The court also held Pennsylvania law applied to the case, since it was brought by the state Department of Banking for violation of state banking laws, and thus was not governed by the terms of contracts between AA and individual consumers, which specified that Delaware law applied.