wages - "employer" - "employee"

Hirsch v. EPL Technologies, et al. - Superior Court - October 16, 2006

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a12012_06.pdf

Corporate officer found personally liable, along with the corporation itself, for unpaid wages to another corporate officer, because the individual defendant was "actively involved in corporate policy-making" while the plaintiff --although he had the title of a corporate officer -- was not.

The court held that a person's "title alone does not bar him from suing" under the Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL), 43 P.S. sec. 260.1 et seq. Noting the the WPCL does not define "employee," the court looked to the UC Law and Worker's Comp. Law rather than agency law to determine the right of a corporate officer to seek wages from his corporate employer and other individuals in the corporation who exercised policy-making functions, even if they do not have knowledge of the improper non-payment. "[S]cienter...is not required for civil liability [but] evidence of an active role in decision making is....."

Persons who are considered to be an "employer" in some context are still permitted to use the WPCL to hold their similarly situated fellow employers liable for unpaid wages," so long at the plaintiff does not exercise policy-making functions. "While evidence of status as a corporate officer...may be relevant, it is not necessarily dispositive of a party's status as an 'employer' under the WPCL."

The court reached this decision, noting that the purpose of the WPCL is to "removed some of the obstacles employees face in litigation by providing them with a statutory remedy when an employer breaches its contractual obligation to pay wages. The WPCL does not create an employee's substantive right to compensation; rather, it only establishes an employee's right to enforce payment of wages and compensation to which an employee is otherwise entitled by the terms of an agreement."

admin. law - equitable class action - exhaustion of admin. remedies

Beattie v. Allegheny County - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - October 11, 2006

majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-87B-2005mo.pdf
concurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-87B-2005mo.pdf

Taxpayers permitted to bypass administrative procedures -- i.e., not required to exhaust administrative remedies - and bring an "equitable class action" challenged the county real estate assessment system which they alleged had "systemic flaws" and violated the uniformity clause of the state constitution, Article VIII, sec. 1.

This was held to be one of those "rare cases, as exception to the exhaustion rule" because "the balance between an administrative agency's exercise of its expertise and its ability to offer complete redress for an alleged wrong of egregious constitutional dimension falls in favor of proceeding in equity in the trial court."

In order to invoke equity jurisdiction, a plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test: "the taxpayers must (1) raise a substantial constitutional issue, and (2) lack an adequate remedy through the [statutory] administrative appeal process."

The court discussed the legislature's "power to channel all issues, including constitutional ones, into a specified route of appeal, such as an administrative appeal" but recognized "an exception for certain types of constitutional questions that the administrative process was ill-suited to resolve...[B]ypassing the agency process within the framework of a direct attack on the enabling statute is inherently less likely to do violence to the agency's role as fact-finder and applier of specialized expertise that in the context of an 'as applied' challenge." The court discussed the "admonition that, 'where relying solely on the statutory appeal mechanism would result in a 'multiplicity of duplicative lawsuits and, in contrast, an action in equity would provide a tidy global resolution,' the legal remedy should be deemed inadequate." In such a case, a "complaint can be facially tested against constitutional norms unaided by agency expertise...."

In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Cappy said that the majority's test was "incomplete" and missed an "important factor" in the court's exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine - whether administrative input would be helpful. The justice felt that the majority failed to give the agency's role sufficient deference, because of agency expertise or because an agency interpretation would be desirable.

pleadings - amendment

Chaney v. Meadville Medical Center - Superior Court - October 19, 2006

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a22017_06.pdf

The administratrix of a decedent's estate sought to amend the complaint in a wrongful death action. During the course of its appellate review, the Superior Court said that:

- Amendments to pleadings are permitted at any time, including before, during and after trial.
- Leave to amend pleadings is to be liberally granted
- Leave to amend should be granted when it will not "unduly prejudice or surprise the adverse party"
- "Undue prejudice" is something more than a detriment to the other party, since any amendment would likely have the effect of harming the adverse party's interest.
- The policy underlying the rule of liberal leave is to insure that parties get to have their cases decided on the substantive case present, and not on legal formalities
- However, an amendment introducing a new cause of action will not be permitted after the statute of limitations has run. Only if the proposed amendment merely amplifies, as opposed to altering, the cause of action already averred, will it be allowed if the statute of limitations has run

debt collection - false/misleading threats to take action

Brown, et al. v. Card Service Center - 3d Circuit - September 29, 2006

http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/054160p.pdf

Plaintiff stated a claim for relief when she alleged that the Defendant collection agency violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USC 1692 et seq., by sending her a letter stating that her failure to make payments arrangements within 5 days "could result in our forwarding this account to our attorney with directions to continue collection efforts," where Plaintiff alleged that such attorney referrals were rarely if ever made.

The court applied the "least sophisticated debtor" (LSD) standard in determining whether the debt collector's statement was a "threat to take any action that...is not intended to be taken" under 15 USC 1692e(5) (false or misleading representations). The LSD standard protects "all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd, the trusting as well as the suspicious," and "prevents liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collections notices by preserving a quotient of reasonableness and presuming a basis level of understanding and willingness to read with care.""

The 3d Circuit reversed the district court, which had held that a debtor should have understood the conditional word "could" as simply advising the debtor of options available to the debt collector. The appellate court disagreed, stating that it was deceptive for the collector to "assert that it could take an action that it had no intention of taking and has never or very rarely taken before." (emphasis in original) The "least sophisticated debtor might get the impression that litigation or referral to a...lawyer would be imminent if he or she did not respond within five days. We do not believe that such a reading would be 'bizarre or idiosyncratic'....."

Pennsylvania Bulletin of October 7, 2006

http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/index.html

court rules - proposed - custody - modification - comments due January 12, 2007
proposal to require allegation of substantial change of circumstances and overrule Karris - 544 A.2d 1328 (Pa. 1988) - http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1960.html

court rules - appellate rules - briefs on reargument/remand/reconsideration
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1958.html

Commonwealth Court - proceedings - guidelines for broadcasting, photographing, recording
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1959.html

welfare - WIC - maximum prices, competitive prices
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1977.html

welfare - WIC - store peer group system
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1978.html

welfare - WIC - minimum inventory requirements
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1979.html

horses - breeding fund program
http://www.pabulletin.com/secure/data/vol36/36-40/1967.html

Workers' Comp. - failure to maintain insurance

Commonwealth v. Corban Corporation - Superior Court - October 4, 2006

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Superior/out/a12030_06.pdf

Failure to maintain worker's compensation insurance is a crime under 77 P.S. 501, for which the statute of limitations is five (5) years,under 77 P.S. 1039.12.

driver's license - suspension - multiple convictions - merger

Drabic v. Penn DOT - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - September 27, 2006

majority http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006mo.pdf
dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006do1.pdf
dissent http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-53-2006do2.pdf

In a 4-3 decision, the court held that civil driver's license suspensions merge in accordance with the merger of the underlying criminal convictions on which the suspensions are based. The court held that its decision was based on long-standing precedent and on the plain language of the statute 75 Pa. C.S.1532, which "directs that only a single suspension can be imposed upon a single-criminal episode." The result in this case was the merger of the suspension based on the driver's DUI conviction into the suspension based on his conviction of homicide by vehicle-DUI and a consequent reduction in his suspension by 2 1/2 years.

custody - religion - free exercise - advocating polygamy

Shepp v. Shepp - Pennsylvania Supreme Court - September 27, 2006 majority

http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004mo.pdfconcurring http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004co.pdfdissenting http://www.courts.state.pa.us/OpPosting/Supreme/out/J-97-2004do.pdf

Analyzing the case under the U.S. rather than Pennsylvania Constitution (whose religion clauses, Article I, sections 3 and 4, are set out at the end of this summary), the state supreme court held that a father's teaching the parties' 13 year-old daughter about plural marriage and polygamy under Mormon Fundamentalism was protected by the free exercise clause of the U.S. Constitution, since there was no interest of "the highest order" that overrode father's First Amendment rights. The court said that it was "clear that the Commonwealth's interest in promoting compliance with the [state] statute criminalizing bigamy is not an interest of the 'highest order' that would supersede the interest of a parent in speaking to a child about a deeply held aspect of his faith" so long as that speech is not "causing or will cause harm to a child's welfare."

The trial court had prohibited the father from teaching the minor child about polygamy and plural marriages, even while finding "no evidence of a grave threat to the child" from such speech by the father. The Superior Court, 821 A.2d 635 (Pa. Super. 2003), found that conclusion "both erroneous and unreasonable" in light of the evidence, including the testimony of one of mother's children from another marriage that father had told her she'd go to hell if she failed to practice polygamy and that father and child (age 14) should marry because they were living under the same roof -- testimony which the trial court found credible.

The Supreme Court found that the Superior Court had engaged in "speculation that Father's statements to his stepdaughter might lead to insistence that his own child engage in polygamy" and in doing so had "improperly substituted its judgment for that of the trial court."

The Supreme Court "emphasize[d] that the illegality of the proposed conduct on its own is not sufficient to warrant the restriction " about teaching the virtues of plural marriage where there was "no finding that discussing such matters constitutes a grave threat of harm to the child...." In these circumstances, the court held that "there is insufficient basis for the court to infringe on a parent's constitutionally protected right to speak to a child about religion as he or she sees fit.....Because such harm was not established in this case, there was no constitutional basis for the state's intrusion in the form of the trials court's order placing a prohibition on Father's speech."

The concurring opinion (Eakin, J.) expressed "misgivings about the application of the strict scrutiny test," claiming the case didn't involve government infringement of any fundamental right. Justice Eakin also was concerned about the majority in effect making the the father's religious rights superior to the mother's "fundamental right to raise [her child] without learning about plural marriage," which the majority opinion rendered "substantially less valuable" than the father's. The justice felt that the parent's opposing rights had a "cross-out" effect on one another.

The dissent (Baer, J.) felt that there was adequate support in the record to uphold the restrictions on father's teaching the child about plural marriage, in that he had "crossed the line between expression and conduct," since he "had every intention" of following through on his beliefs "and, unchecked, would do whatever he could, in his position of considerable authority as Child's parent, to lead Child into a life of polygamy while still of tender years" -- a "factual finding....entirely supported by the evidence of record...." The dissent said that "parental decisions are entitled to no peculiar respect if they 'will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens.' "

Pennsylvania Constitution

Article I, sec. 3 - Religious Freedom - All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of their own consciences; no man can of right be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship or to maintain any ministry against his consent; no human authority can, in any case whatever, control or interfere with the rights of conscience, and no preference shall ever be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship.

Article I, sec. 4 - Religion - No person who acknowledges the being of a God and a future state of rewards and punishments shall, on account of his religious sentiments, be disqualified to hold any office or place of trust or profit under this Commonwealth.